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I have lived in important places, tim es 
W hen great events were decided, who owned  
That half a rood o f rock, a no-m an’s land 
Surrounded by our pitchfork-armed claim s.
I heard the Duffys shouting 'Damn your sou l’ 
And old McCabe stripped to the waist, seen  
Step the plot defying blue cast-steel - 
‘Here is the march along these iron stones’.
That was the year o f  the M unich bother. W hich 
W as more important? I inclined  
To lose my faith in Ballyrush and Gortin 
T ill H om er’s ghost cam e w hispering to my 
mind.
H e said: I made the Iliad from such  
A  local row. Gods make their ow n importance.
Patrick Kavanagh
INTRODUCTION
The raison d 'ê tre  of this work is to provide an historical analysis 
of  the rise and subsequent  co-ordination and consolidation of  the Irish 
welfare  state by focus ing  on income m ain tenance  legis lat ion in 
independent Ireland up to 1952. Originally undertaken as a project in 
social history, the completed work is a synthesis of  social, economic,  
political and administrative history, discussion of  all these areas being 
necessary to unders tand fully the timing, pace and extent of social 
welfare legislation.
This introductory chapter will outline the structure of  the work, 
and will analyse  the historiography of the theme in Ireland. Before 
moving to these issues, however, it is necessary to define the terms 
‘welfare sta te’, ‘social welfare’ and ‘social securi ty’. In the broadest 
sense, ‘welfare’ implies ‘well-being’, the welfare state being concerned 
with the social and therefore the economic well-being of  its citizens. 
F rom  this ‘basic requ is i te ’1 comes a vast array of  definitions and 
categories  o f  welfare  state. This diversity has its origins in the 
impetuses behind and influences on the rise of  a set of policies which 
al lowed the term ‘welfare sta te’ to be applied to any given political 
system. Its development was ‘essentially a process of  compromise and 
ad jus tm en t’,2 a point clearly illustrated by the development of the Irish 
welfare state.
Nordic social scientists and historians, who more than any other 
group of  academics have examined the philosophical,  theoretical and 
practical aspects o f  the welfare state, agree that there can be no one 
t rans-national  or trans-cultural  definition: it is ‘a mult i-dimensional
1 N icholas Reseller. Welfare.: the social issues in philosophical perspective  (Pittsburgh. 1972). p. 4.
2 Joan Higgins. The poverty  business: Britain and Am erica  (London. 1978), p. 19.
phenomenon composed of several dimensions of values’.3 Its content 
‘varies with time and space’.4 The term is also culture-bound: the 
concept of what constitutes welfare in Catholic west European countries 
varies from that of the Lutheran north European countries, welfare 
being ‘dependent on the values of a particular society’.5 There are 
‘fa sh io n s’6 in welfare legislation both trans-nationally and within 
individual states: the concept is an organic one which, historically, is 
more often than not in a state of flux. It ‘does not designate a definite 
system’.7
Despite this complexity associated with defining the term ‘welfare 
state’, there are a number of basic ingredients and a generally accepted 
historical genesis. The Bismarckian reforms of the 1880s and the 
societal transformation which necessitated them are considered as the 
beginning of the ‘present state in the development of the welfare state’.8 
The German reform s heralded a period of direct, national, state 
intervention in the economic lives of citizens through the introduction 
of insurance schemes for all employees. By 1889 this included 
insurance against sickness, accident, old age and invalidity. As is 
discussed in the comparative analysis of the present work, these reforms 
were predated by committees of investigation in other countries, 
established for the purpose of investigating the possibility of introducing 
similar reforms. In Britain the German legislation was mirrored by
3 Erik Allardt, About dimensions o f welfare: an explanatory analysis of a comparative Scandinavian 
survey (Helsinki, n.d. [1970s]), p. 1.
4 Erik Allardt, et al„ Nordic democracy: ideas, issues and institutions in politics, economy, 
education, social and cultural affairs o f Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden (Copenhagen, 
1981), p. 399.
5 Peter Flora (ed.), Growth to limits: the western European welfare states since World War II (Berlin, 
1986), p. xii, vol. 2
6 Joan Higgins, The poverty business: Britain and America, p. 3.
7 William A. Robson, Welfare state and welfare society: illusion and reality (England, 1976), p. 13.
8 Stein Kuhnle, ‘The beginning of the Nordic welfare states: similarities and differences’, Acta 
Sociologica: Congress Issues: The Nordic Welfare States, vol. 21 (1978) Supplement, p. 12.
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reforms in 1908 and 1911, as the following chapter of the present work 
outlines.
Discussed in Germany and the Nordic countries under the title 
‘die a r b e i t e r f r a g e ‘the worker quest ion’,l) it was a half  century after 
the Bismarckian reforms before the term ‘welfare sta te’ was coined, it 
being used firstly in Norway in 1939, ‘partly as a description of  the 
society at the time and partly as a description o f  a future goal’.10 Indeed 
the word ‘welfare’ comes from the Old Norse word ‘v e l fe r d ’. It is 
interesting to note, however,  that the term ‘welfare s ta te’ was rarely 
used in Scandinavia:
In Denmark, there was hardly any comprehensive slogan and in 
Sweden, Per Albin Hannson spoke of  ldet goda fo lk h e m m e f , the 
good home for the people .11
In English, its first usage is generally attributed to the Archbishop 
o f  York, Sir Wil l iam Temple ,  who used the term in a publication of 
1941. Temple viewed the ‘welfare sta te’ as the strongest opposition to 
what  he termed the ‘power s ta te ’ of Nazi Germany and the Stalinist 
Sovie t  U n io n .12 The term was subsequently listed in the N ew  York  
Tim es In d ex  in 1949. In 1955 it appeared for the first time in the 
O xford  E nglish  D ic tionary  which defined it as ‘a polity so organised 
that every worker of the community  is assured of his due maintenance, 
with the most  advantageous  condit ions for a l l ’. This definition,  
although idealistic, may be taken as expressing the basic requisites of the 
welfa re  state. The basic means of ensuring ‘the most  advantageous 
cond i t ions  for  a l l ’ inc luded  the provis ion of  old age pensions.
l) Erik Alimeli, cl ill.. N ordic dem ocracy, p. 400.
10 Byron .1. Nordstrom (eel.). D ictionary o f  Scandinavian history (London. 1 OKA), p. 625.
11 Gunnar Heckscher. 'I'hc w elfare  s ta te  and  beyond: success a n d  p ro b lem s in Scand inavia  
(M inneapolis, 1084), p. ix.
12 S ee Stein Kulinle. ‘National equality and local decision making: values in conflict in the 
developm ent o f the Norwegian welfare stale’, Acta Sociologica, vol. 23 ( 1980), no. 2-3, p. 98.
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u ne m p lo y m en t  insurance,  unem ploym ent  assistance,  w id o w s ’ and 
orphans’ pensions, and children’s allowances.
It is clear therefore that the welfare state is a twentieth century 
phenomenon with its genesis lying in the final decades of the nineteenth 
century. As the twentieth century  progressed  the authori ta t ive  
definitions of  the welfare state became more all-embracing. Maurice 
Bruce, perhaps one of  the most important commentators on the welfare 
state, defined the concept in 1961 as:
the sum of efforts over many years to remedy the practical social 
d i f f icu l t ie s  and evils  o f  a m odern  sy s tem  of  eco no m ic  
organisat ion.13
Implying a structural functionalist approach to the rise of  the welfare 
state, Gunnar Heckscher seems to be in agreement with Bruce when she 
talks about the welfare state as being ‘a compromise between capitalism 
and socialism’.14
Retrospective definitions do agree on the basic elements which 
constitute the welfare state, namely equality of opportunity, income 
maintenance and income distribution. The centrality of these two latter 
elements is agreed upon by most writers:
As d ifferent  aspects  of  life chances  may gain or lose in 
significance, the boundaries of the welfare state can also shift, but 
its historical core - the system of income maintenance.. . is very 
unlikely to change substantially.13
It is this ‘historical co re ’ of income maintenance, described by another
writer as one of ' the principal characteristics when defining the concept
of “welfare state'” , 16 which is examined in detail in the present work.
13 Maurice Bruce. The com ing o f  the welfare state (London. 1 OfS 1 ). p. 30.
14 Guiiiuu- I leckseher. The welfare state and beyond: success and problem s in Scandinavia, p. ix.
13 Peter Flora (ed.). Growth to lim its: the western European welfare state since W orld W ar II  (Berlin, 
1986), vol. 2 p. xvi.




The terms used to describe income maintenance are ‘social 
security’, ‘social assistance’, ‘social insurance’ and ‘social welfare’. The 
first of these terms appears in the title of the present work and is an 
amalgam of ‘economic security’ and ‘social insurance’, first used in the 
title of a United States Federal Bill of 1935.17 Described as the 
'institutional backbone of present social policies',18 ‘social security’ was 
defined by Sir William Beveridge, the main architect of the British 
welfare state, as ‘income security’,19 the term covering both social 
insurance and social assistance. Social insurance, described as the ‘new 
institution which broke with the principles of the century-old European 
poor law ’,20 provided a scheme whereby employees contributed to a 
fund on which they could draw on as a right in the event of 
unemployment, sickness, invalidity or old age. Social assistance schemes 
on the other hand cover a similar range of eventualities but are means- 
tested and are paid for solely by the exchequer, the level of benefits 
being below that of compulsory insurance schemes. In Ireland the only 
scheme that falls into neither category is children's allowances.* Based 
neither on the principles of insurance nor assistance, and available to 
fam ilies irrespective of financial status, children's allowance is 
described as a 'universal scheme'.
Universal schemes, social assistance and social insurance are all 
encompassed by the term ‘social welfare’ which has been defined as:
the various services provided by the public authority in an 
endeavour to help citizens cope with ordinary everyday social
17 ‘In the service o f  social security: the history o f the International Social Security Association, 1927- 
8 7 ’, International Social Security R eview , 2 (1987), p. 138.
18 Jens Alber, 'Some causes o f social security expenditure developm ent in western Europe, 1949-77'
in Martin Loney, et al., Social po licy and social welfare (Philadelphia, 1988), p. 156.
19 Sir W illiam Beveridge, The p illa rs o f  security (London, 1943), p. 112.
20 Peter Flora, Growth to lim its: the western European welfare sta te since W orld War II, vol. 2, p.
X I V .
In 1986 children’s allowances became known as child benefit.
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problem s or with social problem s caused by special 
circumstances.21
In the Irish context the term 'social security' has become a synonym for 
'social w elfare', the ‘various services’ including unem ploym ent 
insurance, unemployment assistance, old age pensions, widows’ and 
orphans’ pensions, and children’s allowances, the main object of which 
has been ‘to help the individual when, through no fault of his own, he is 
in danger of being overwhelmed by poverty’.22 More philosophically, 
the first report of the Department of Social Welfare stated that:
It is well to bear in mind that social welfare schemes, no matter 
how scientifically grounded, can never be reduced to mere 
problems in mathematics or abstract theory; they must always 
remain hopeful experiments in complex human relationships.23
In the following chapters the terms ‘social security’ and ‘social welfare’
are used interchangeably, while the terms ‘social insurance’ and ‘social
assistance’ are used to denote the type of income supplement scheme.
We can conclude our discussion of definitions by briefly alluding
to the different categories of welfare state, notwithstanding the fact that
no two welfare states are similar in all respects. Pekka Kosonen, a
lecturer in the Sociology of Law at the University of Helsinki, Finland,
identifies three categories of welfare state which he describes as follows:
1. Liberal welfare states, where means-tested assistance, modest 
universal transfers and modest social insurance plans predominate, as in 
the United States, Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom.
2. C orporatist w elfare states, where the preservation of status 
differential predominates: rights are attached to class and status, as in 
Austria, France, Germany and Italy.
21 Annikki Suviranta, ‘Social welfare and municipalities’, Finnish local government studies: selected 
writings, vol. 9 (1981), no. 5, p. 74.
22 Department of Social Welfare, First report,1947-49, p. 1.
23 Ibid., p. 3.
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3. Universal welfare states, where the principles o f  universal ism and 
m arke t- independen t  social rights are extended to all classes, as in 
Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland.24
This latter universal model is close to the ‘Nordic M o d e l ’ while the 
Corporatist  Model equates with what  other writers have termed the 
‘Catholic Conservative Model’.25
From the following analysis it will be seen that Ireland perhaps 
best fits in to the Liberal welfare state model. What is important here 
to realise is both the complexity  and diversity o f  the welfare state 
phenomenon in the broad European context, and the extent to which it 
forms a unique historical period of  its own.
In order to gain insights into the philosophy and theory behind 
the rise and development  o f  the welfare state, we must  turn to the 
research of  social scientists in other countries. Partially attributable to 
the fact that Ireland was never to the forefront of welfare legislation, 
the primary reason for looking abroad is the dearth of  analysis of  the 
Irish welfare state by historians in particular, despite the availability of 
numerous sources which have been used in researching the present 
work.
In a recent interview with History Ireland  James Lydon, ‘a real 
Irish historian’,26 commissioned by Routledge to write the new version 
of A history o f  Ireland  to replace Curtis’s volume, said:
I deliberately eschewed social and economic history because I did 
not want  to make the book too long, so I concentrated on the 
political.27
24 I’ekka Kosonen. ‘European Community ami the challenges to the Nordic welfare state m odel’. 
Typescript o f  talk given at the Nordisk Seminar. 2N Sept. 1W0.
25 See John D. Stephens. "Welfare state anil employment regimes', Acta Sociologica. vol. 37 (1904), 
no. 2. pp 20X-200,
26 H istory Ireland, vol. 3 (1W 5). no. 1. p. 13.
27 Ihid.
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Perhaps  L ydon 's  c o m m en t  best  underp ins  the lacuna  of  Irish 
historiography. Far from being a reflection of any shortcomings in his 
own work, it is rather a reflection on the 'the paucity o f  historical 
r e s e a r c h '28 into Irish social policy at a more basic and fundamental 
level. In the absence o f  such groundwork  the survey histories, of  
twentie th  cen tu ry  Ireland in part icular,  will rem ain  polit ical  in 
emphasis. Mary Daly's Social and economic history o f  Ire land  since  
1800  (Dublin, 1981), the first attempt at a more inclusive history of 
Ireland, best exemplifies this lack of research into the social history of  
twentieth century Ireland. Daly’s work concentrates on the nineteenth 
century, social and economic change in independent Ireland being dealt 
with in jus t  two of the eight chapters. Even J. J. Lee's Ireland: politics  
and  society, 1912-85  (Cambridge, 1989), which has a much narrower 
focus and which isn't constrained in terms of size in the way Daly's 
work is, contains at best an uneven emphasis on social history.29
This absence of historical research into Irish social policy and in 
part icular  into the development  of  the Irish welfare state, remains 
unusual  by European standards. European academics speak of  the 
welfare state as ‘an entire historical era in western socie ty’.30 The rise 
o f  the welfare state has been well documented and analysed and the 
subsequent  expansion of  the welfare state has been described as ‘one of 
the most  im por tan t  historical  t ransform ations  in the developing 
countries of the West since the end of World War II’.31
28 Anthony McCnshin, ‘Social policy: 1957-82', A dm inistration: unequal achievem ent - the Irish  
experience l l) 5 7 - I ()S2. vol. 30 (1082). no. 2 mid 3. p. 205.
29 Lee’s work does locus on specific social issues, such as the introduction of children's allowances in 
1944, hut one feels that such treatment is almost incidental to the overall political and administrative 
thrust o f the work.
30 Tapani Paavonen. Welfare state and  political fo rc es  in F inland in the tw entieth century, p. 3.
31 Kari Salminen. Pension schem es in the making: a com parative study o f  the Scandinavian countries 
(Helsinki. 1993). p. 13.
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Perhaps it is the ‘national question’ in Ireland, responsible as we 
shall see in the com ing  chapters for the near absence  o f  social 
democrat ic  politics in Ireland, and which consum ed the energies of 
politicians and civil servants for decades after independence,  which is 
responsible for the dearth of social history in Ireland: combing through 
the political history of  the Irish nation from a revis ionist  or  non­
revisionist stance would appear a more pleasurable intellectual pursuit 
than the investigation of  social history which, by its nature, includes 
political, administrative and economic history as well.
O f  actual secondary source material available, historical works 
can be dealt with briefly. The poor laws have been researched and 
analysed in detail by Helen Burke in her book The people  and the poor  
law in nineteenth century Ireland  (Dublin, 1987), a major contribution 
if  not  the defin i t ive  history of  the Irish poor laws. Her work  is 
complemented by that of Séamus Ô Cinnéide, who has been a consistent 
contributor to our historical understanding of  the Irish welfare state, in 
pa r t icu la r  o f  hom e  assistance, which had its foundat ions  in the 
nineteenth century poor laws.32
Welfare legislation in independent Ireland has been left almost 
exclusively  to social scientists (excluding historians) who tend to 
in troduce  their  subject  by giving perhaps a paragraph or two of 
h is to r ica l  b a c k g r o u n d  before  lau n ch ing  into a d iscu ss io n  of 
contemporary policy. Breaking this mould somewhat is the most recent 
volume by a lecturer in social studies, Mel Cousins, whose book The  
Irish social welfare system: law and social policy  (Dublin. 1995) does 
contain a more detailed historical survey in the initial chapters.
32 See Scninus ( ) Cinnéide. A law  fo r  iluj poor: a sim ly o f  home assistance in Ireland  (Dublin, 1070).
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An earlier work with a strong element of historical analysis is 
that edited by another social scientist, Peter Flora. In volume two of his 
three volume work, welfare legislation in Germany, Britain, Italy and 
Ireland is discussed in a clear and well-presented fashion.33 The 
drawback is that its point of departure is post-World W ar II, thus 
ignoring the rise as distinct from the expansion and consolidation of the 
Irish welfare state. Two similar studies were published by P. R. Kaim- 
Caudle, with the emphasis again being on the contemporary rather than 
the historical.34 Now somewhat dated, however, having been published 
in 1964 and 1973 respectively, they are interesting for what they have 
to say on contemporary development.
In 1964 another social scientist, Desmond Farley, published what 
amounted to a catalogue of social security benefits in Ireland.35 Useful 
as such, it was a missed opportunity at analysing and evaluating Irish 
legislation. F arley’s decision to include neither references nor 
bibliography detract from the value of the work.
The most interesting and promising publications of late on Irish 
social policy, if not on the welfare state, have been Frederick Powell’s 
The politics o f  Irish social policy 1600-1990 (Lewiston, 1992) and Lars 
M jpset’s The Irish economy in a comparative institutional perspective 
(Dublin, 1992). Powell, Professor of Social Studies in U.C.C., can be 
credited with producing the first survey history of Irish social policy. 
It is obvious, however, that he vastly overstretched himself and his 
work is disappointing for its generality of discussion and its use of often 
obscure sources to bolster arguments. Nonetheless, it may well be
33 Peter Flora (ed.), Growth to limits: the western European welfare state since World War II, vol. 2.
34 P. R. Kaim-Caudle, Social security in Ireland and western Europe, (E.S.R.I., Paper no. 20, 
Dublin, 1964) and Comparative social policy and social security: a ten country study (London, 1973).
35 Desmond Farley, Social insurance and social assistance in Ireland (Dublin, 1964).
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considered the starting point for a historiography o f  Irish social policy, 
if not of  the welfare state.
On the other  hand, Lars M jpse t ’s work, commissioned by the 
National Economic and Social Council, is a fascinating contribution. Its 
depth of  analysis and observation is a breath of  fresh air and an eye 
opener for those who think Irish social history means a paragraph on 
Noel B ro w ne’s mother  and child scheme. A Norwegian, Mjpset  is 
always insightful, and it is perhaps his removal from Ireland which has 
allowed him to contribute in such a positive way to our understanding 
of  ourselves. In the following chapters, and in the absence o f  any 
comparable study, Mjpset’s work serves as a point of reference where 
appropriate.
In the absence  of any studies focusing directly on the Irish 
welfare state, recourse has been made to a number  of works which 
mention its development in a tangential way. Labour histories comprise 
one such set of  works, and include Emmet O Connor’s A labour history  
o f  Ire lan d  1H24-1960  (Dublin, 1992) and Ronnie M unck’s Ire land:  
nation, state and  class struggle  (Colorado, 1985). The most  useful 
volume on labour history, however, is Erhard Rum pf’s Nationalism and  
socialism in twentieth century Ireland  (Liverpool, 1977). Translated by 
A. C. Hepburn from Rum pf’s original German doctoral thesis presented 
at Heidelberg, it is interesting that, like M jpse t’s work, it is a scholar 
outside the country who seems to best understand developments within 
it.
Another  corpus of work which has proved useful is that which 
describes the role of  the Catholic church in independent Ireland. The 
chu rch ’s role in the development  of  welfare legislation was in many 
ways central,  and works such as J. H. W h y te ’s Church and  state in 
m odern  Ire la nd  ¡923-1979  (2nd edn., Dublin, 1980) are a valuable
contribution to Irish historiography. One feels in retrospect, however, 
that the role of the church has been over-simplified and perhaps over­
dependent on W hyte’s ground-breaking work, an issue raised in chapter 
two of the present work.
These then are the existing works to which reference may be 
made. The dearth of material presents the present author with both 
opportunities and problems. W hile unencum bered by previous 
approaches to the writing of Irish welfare history, the lack of any 
framework or guidelines in which to write poses its own problems. For 
the theoretical and philosophical undercurrent of the work it has often 
been necessary to marry an original Irish construction to the vast 
quantity of material existing in other European countries. Standard 
works by Douglas Ashford, Maurice Bruce and R. M. Titmus, and 
works with a specifically British approach such as Tony N ovak’s 
Poverty and the state (England, 1988), which provides a balance to 
A shford’s right-wing The emergence o f  the welfare state (Oxford, 
1988), have been used where necessary in the absence of Irish material.
The amount of largely unused primary source material has been 
tremendously rewarding. Government records, now housed in the 
National Archives, Dublin, have been a major primary source of 
information and data, particularly the files of the Departments of Social 
Welfare, An Taoiseach, Industry and Commerce, Local Government 
and Public Health, and Finance. These have been complemented by the 
William Norton Papers held in the Irish Labour History Museum and by 
the Sean MacEntee Papers deposited in the Archives Department of 
University College, Dublin. These two latter collections contain a 
number of files from the government departments in which Norton and 
MacEntee worked, together with additional private correspondence and 
papers as laid out in the bibliography.
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Apart from such manuscript sources, a vast quantity of printed 
primary sources has been used. The largest part of this is official 
governm ent publications, including D ail D ebates  and, where 
appropriate, Seanad Debates. Works by Catholic clergy have been 
especially important in the context of printed primary sources. Other 
such materials used have included election leaflets, pamphlets and a 
broad range of national and local press. It is through the variety and 
extent of primary sources consulted that we can construct in the 
following chapters a synthesis of the rise and subsequent development 
and consolidation of the Irish welfare state, thus going some way 
towards addressing the lacuna left by the absence of social analysis in 
twentieth century Irish history.
The parameters of the work are 1922 and 1952. The earlier date 
merely marks the coming of independence, from which time an Irish 
government was in a position to influence the course of Irish welfare 
legislation for the first time. However, the Irish revolution, despite 
signs to the contrary, firmly remained a political rather than a social 
revolution and, in the absence of any great legislative advances in the 
early years, the present work begins with a discussion of pre­
independence welfare legislation. Chapter one is devoted to the poor 
laws, the Old Age Pensions Act, 1908 and the National Health Insurance 
Act, 1911, all of which provided a British basis for Irish welfare policy.
Chapter two examines the impetus behind the development of the 
welfare state, firstly in trans-European terms and then in the Irish 
context. It is a scene-setting chapter which emphasises the role of the 
Catholic church and the virtual absence of a strong or unified social 
democratic political movement in Ireland. It is in the light of this 
chapter that the timing, pace and extent of Irish welfare legislation up to 
1952 can be best understood.
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Chapters three and four outline the legislative developments 
which took place in Ireland in the first two decades of independence. 
The Cumann na nGaedheal years up to 1932 were characterised by 
conservatism and retrenchm ent in social welfare policy, while the 
coming to power of Fianna Fail heralded the first years of social 
innovation, only to be replaced by a traditional conservatism by the time 
of the outbreak of World War II.
At this stage external developments provided the impetus for Irish 
social policy, and chapter five is devoted to the ramifications in Ireland 
of the publication in December 1942 of Sir William Beveridge’s report, 
Social insurance and allied services. Its influence in Ireland, so far 
ignored by historians of the period, was extraordinary, commanding the 
popular attention for a sustained period over the following months and 
years. Two years after the publication of the Beveridge report, Dr John 
Dignan, Bishop of Clonfert, published what was described as an Irish 
version of the Beveridge plan. The chapter discusses Dignan and his 
report and its importance as a stimulant to debate in Ireland. The 
chapter also focuses on two major post-Beveridge reforms in Ireland, 
namely the introduction of children’s allowances in 1944, the only 
example of an income supplement being introduced in Ireland before 
being introduced in Britain, and the establishm ent of separate 
Departments of Social W elfare and Health in 1947. Prior to the 
establishment of the Department of Social Welfare the Department of 
Local Governm ent and Public Health had responsibility for the 
administration of old age and blind pensions, widows’ and orphans’ 
pensions and national health insurance while the Department of Industry 
and Commerce administered unemployment insurance, unemployment 
assistance and children’s allowances.
14
While Sean Lemass cautioned that the introduction of children’s 
allowances would rule out further innovation in welfare policy for the 
foreseeable future, in fact it was but the first in a series of legislative 
innovations and changes which finally forged social welfare policy in 
Ireland into a unified, co-ordinated whole. This was achieved through 
the Social Welfare Act, 1952 and had its origins in the white paper on 
social security of 1949.36 The 1949 white paper was the first major 
review of welfare legislation in independent Ireland, it being another 
thirty-six years before a similar review was undertaken.37 With the 
passing of the 1952 act Ireland had a unified and co-ordinated set of 
welfare legislation and the analysis of how this came about is the subject 
of chapter six.
A constant thread running through the entire work is the 
development of Irish legislation in a comparative framework. In 
particular reference is made where appropriate to developments in 
other European countries. Chapter seven is devoted exclusively to 
comparative perspectives, the timing, rate and extent of developments in 
Finland, Denmark and Norway being examined so as to provide a useful 
yardstick against which developments in Ireland can be assessed. The 
reasons for choosing these Scandinavian countries is explained in more 
detail in chapter seven. In the words of W. R. Mead, ‘few countries in 
twentieth-century Europe have displayed a stronger attachment to 
welfare criteria than those of Scandinavia’.38
The study focuses on social welfare but it is equally intended as a 
history of the rise of the welfare state in Ireland, bearing in mind the
36 Department of Social Welfare, White paper containing government proposals for social security 
(Dublin, 1949).
37 Commission on Social Welfare, Report (Dublin, 1986).
38 W. R. Mead, An historical geography o f Scandinavia (London, 1981), p. 289.
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definition provided in the earlier part of this introduction that the 
historical core of the welfare state is the system of income maintenance.
CHAPTER ONE 
FR O M  PO O R LAW  TO SOCIAL SECURITY: BRITISH 
FOUNDATIONS OF TH E IRISH  W ELFARE STATE
The foundation of the Irish welfare state was laid by legislation 
passed by the British parliament at the turn of the twentieth century, the 
Old Age Pensions Act, 1908 and the National Health Insurance Act, 1911 
representing the first statutory attempts to provide income security for 
economically vulnerable sections of the population. Important in 
themselves, these acts tied the development of the Irish welfare state to 
that of Britain in the post-independence period, successive governments 
of independent Ireland looking to developments in Britain as an exemplar 
in the area of social welfare legislation. Both of these acts, together with 
the earlier Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897 are discussed below.
It was the nineteenth century poor law, however, that formed the 
basis of Ireland’s first statutory social service, and which provided the 
practical and philosophical backdrop against which the welfare state in 
Ireland developed in the last decade of the nineteenth century and in the 
early decades of the twentieth century. The poor law identified for the 
first time the various categories of people who required relief from the 
state. It was these categories which became central in the construction of 
the welfare state with the poor law distinction between the deserving poor 
and the able-bodied poor forming an important philosophical background 
to the development of welfare legislation in independent Ireland. Indeed 
part of the machinery of the poor law was kept in operation as a means of 
assisting certain classes of poor in independent Ireland up to 1977, 
despite the démonisation of the poor laws by nationalists in the pre and 
post independence eras. It is in this context that a discussion of the poor
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laws from their introduction in 1838 up to independence forms the first 
section of the present chapter.
The introduction and functioning of the poor laws in Ireland
As early as 1772 the Irish parliament had introduced an act which 
provided for the erection of ‘workhouses or houses of industry’ in an 
attempt to relieve the growing poverty in Ireland.1 However the act 
remained inoperative, private charity remaining the only practical channel 
for the relief of poverty. It was not until the introduction of the poor law 
in 1838 that the efforts of charitable organisations were complemented by 
a state scheme, the poor laws remaining the main instrument for the 
provision of social services and for the relief of the poor in nineteenth 
century Ireland.
The poor law was the first serious, statutory, attempt to get to grips 
with the increasing poverty of Ireland following the depression in 
agricultural prices with the ending of the Napoleonic wars. With the Act 
of Union in 1800 bringing Ireland’s ‘social and economic problems 
directly to England’s door’,2 the poor law was a direct response to 
growing disquiet in England over the increasing poverty in Ireland. In 
Ireland itself the potentially disastrous consequences of this growing 
poverty were seen in the localised famine of 1817 and the more 
widespread famine of 1822. In Sligo, for example, the committee 
established to relieve the worst effects of the food shortage of 1822 
reported in July of that year that:
Notwithstanding our exertions, want and wretchedness condnue to 
increase around us. Members of the committee as they pass along 
the streets, are followed by crowds of hungry creatures, whose 
appearance attests to the urgency of their distress, but to whom we
1 R. B. McDowell, The Irish administration 1801-1914 (London, 1964), p. 165.
2 Desmond Roche, Local government in Ireland (Dublin, 1982), p. 37.
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are unable to give assistance. Today a young women fainted 
through hunger. The District Visitors feared deception and as is 
always done, they entered into a strict investigation of the 
circumstances. It appeared that she was the oldest of ten children, 
all dependent on the exertions of their once comfortable, but now 
destitute parents.3
In the absence of poor law structures the machinery employed to deal 
with distress on occasions such as this was described by the Sligo relief 
committee as follows:
The High Sheriff convened a meeting of the county gentry at the 
end of May in order to take steps to alleviate the sufferings of the 
poor. As a result of the meeting, parochial committees were 
appointed to manage the affairs of their own parish, to report to a 
central committee on the state of the poor, and to apply for 
subscriptions and contributions. The parochial committees would 
report to the central committee for relief every fortnight. The 
central com mittee would then apply for a grant from  the 
government to provide employment for die poor by the making and 
maintaining of public roads.4
It was the experiences of such distress that formed the basis of Irish calls
for the introduction of a poor law into Ireland. However it was support
within England itself which would prove more effective and important in
convincing the British government to introduce a poor law into Ireland,
the English basis for such calls going beyond humanitarian concerns. As
Virginia Crossman puts it, ‘poverty was seen as a crucial factor in the
disorder which plagued the country and many of those urging the need
for reforms put great stress on the effect these would have on the
dispositions of the people’.5 However 'probably the most important
single factor'6 behind English support for an Irish poor law was the hope
3 Letter from Owen Wynne, Esq., M.P. and the Committee for the Town of Sligo, 1 July 1822, Report 
of the Committee for the relief o f  the distressed districts in Ireland (London, 1823).
4 Relief of distressed districts in Ireland 1822-23: letters of Rev/s. John Garrett, James Neligan, Wm. 
Urwick and John Yeats; Messrs. Wynne, Dowdall, O Hara, Perceval, etc., Report o f commissioners for  
the relief o f the distressed districts o f Ireland (London, 1823).
5 Virginia Crossman, Local government in nineteenth century Ireland (Antrim, 1994), p. 44.
6 R. D. Collison Black, Economic thought and the Irish question 1817-1870 (Cambridge, 1960), p. 
103.
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that it would put an end to the immigration of Irish labourers to Britain 
due to poverty. As one contemporary writer noted:
We must always keep in mind that the great and undisguised 
motive on the part of the English journals and British members of 
parliament is that a poor rate should be established in Ireland, not 
so much for the purpose of alleviating the miseries of the poor 
Irish, as to protect them, the English, from the visitation of the Irish 
labourer.7
It was a motive recognised though contradicted by Dr Whatley, the 
Protestant Archbishop of Dublin who was appointed chairperson of the 
first major investigation undertaken on the condition of the poor in 
Ireland.8
Established in 1833 in response to public opinion in England rather 
than in Ireland, as reflected in parliament, the commission of inquiry's 
terms of reference were ‘to inquire into the condition of the poorer 
classes of Your M ajesty’s subjects in Ireland, and into the various 
institutions at present established by law for their relief; and also, whether 
any, and what, further remedial measures appear to be requisite to 
ameliorate the conditions of the Irish poor, or any portion of them’.9 It 
was by any standards a huge undertaking, the members of the 
commission saying that no inquiry at the time 'could possibly be 
entrusted with a wider or more complicated subject for its investigation'.10
The commissioners took evidence from all across the country, its 
examination proving ‘to painful certainty that there is in all parts of 
Ireland much and deep-seated distress’.11 This ‘distress’ was common
7 G. H. Evans, Remarks on the policy of introducing a system o f poor rates in Ireland (1829), quoted 
in Séamus Ó Cinnéide, ‘The development of the home assistance service’, Administration vol. 17 
(1969), no. 3, p. 286.
8 Third report o f the Commissioners for inquiry into the condition o f the poorer classes in Ireland 
(1836, Cmd. 43, xxx), p. 23.
9 First report from His Majesty’s Commissioners for inquiry into the condition o f the poorer classes in 
Ireland (1835, Cmd. 369, xxxii), p. v.
10 Ibid., p.xiii.
11 Third report o f the Commissioners for inquiry into the condition of the poorer classes in Ireland, p. 
3.
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not only among those unable in ordinary circumstances to provide for 
themselves, such as the blind, the old and the infirm, but was found to be 
the norm among the able-bodied poor as well. The evidence taken to this 
effect was copious, the following report taken by the commissioner in the 
Parish of Kilmacshalgan in County Sligo being typical:
The period of the year at which almost the entire of the labourers 
are out of work are June and July and part of August, and 
December, January and February: ‘and in fact’, the people said, 
‘there is not a single month in the year of constant work, as every 
man does his own work himself, in order to avoid employing 
anyone.’12
The report of the commissioners concluded that the agricultural 
nature of Ireland, where two-thirds of the population depended on the 
land for subsistence, meant that the causes of poverty there were different 
from those experienced in England, where less than one quarter of the 
population depended on agriculture for a livelihood.13 In the light of such 
differences the commissioners recommended in their report of 1836 the 
adoption of measures dissimilar to those of the British Poor Law system 
despite promptings to the contrary:
It has been suggested to us to recommend a poor law for Ireland 
similar to that of England, but we are of opinion that the provision 
to be made for the poor in Ireland must vary essentially from that 
made in England. The circumstances of the two countries differ 
widely... We cannot therefore recommend the present workhouse 
system of England as at all suited to Ireland.14
In place of the English poor law the report firstly recommended the
official promotion of emigration, something 'the suffering labourers in
Ireland' were 'decidedly in favour o f .15 The report emphasised the
12 First report from His Majesty’s Commissioners for inquiry into the condition o f the poorer classes 
in Ireland, p. 392.
13 Third report o f  the Commissioners for inquiry into the condition o f the poorer classes in Ireland, p.
3.
14 Ibid., pp 4, 5.
15 Ibid., p. 9.
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im portance of stimulating economic growth and of improving the 
efficiency of agriculture 'the only pursuit for which the body of the 
people of Ireland are qualified by habit'.16 For those unable to take care 
of themselves the report recommended the provision of institutions:
We think that a legal provision should be made and rates levied 
hereinafter mentioned, for the relief and support of incurable as 
well as curable lunatics, of idiots, epileptic persons, cripples, deaf 
and dumb, and blind poor, and all who labour under permanent 
bodily infirmities - such relief and support to be afforded within 
the walls of public institutions; also for the relief of the sick poor in 
hospitals, infirmaries, and convalescent establishments.17
Whatley's report, however, in part a victim of its own thoroughness
and the length of time spent preparing it, was ignored and Lord John
Russell, then Home Secretary, who invited George Nicholls, an English
Poor Law Commissioner and former ship's captain and banker, to
investigate the problem of poverty in Ireland:
to examine how far it might be judicious or practicable to offer 
relief to whole classes of the poor, whether of the sick, the infirm 
or orphan children... - whether the condition of the great bulk of 
the poorer classes would be improved by such a measure - whether 
a rate limited in its amount rather than its application, might be 
usefully directed to the erection and maintenance of workhouses 
for all those who sought relief as paupers - whether any kind of 
workhouse can be established which should not give its inmates a 
superior degree of comfort to the common lot of the independent 
labourer - whether the restraint of a workhouse would be an 
effectual check to the applicants for admission; and whether, if the 
system were once established, the inmates would not resist, by 
force, the restraints which would be necessary.18
Taking with him the reports of the commissioners of inquiry, Nicholls
spent a mere six weeks in Ireland in the autumn of 1836. It is clear from
Nicholls' History o f the Irish Poor Law that, ignoring Whatley's warning
that 'the utmost caution' was required in the application of any remedy to
16 Ibid., p. 17.
17 Ibid., p. 25.
18 George Nicholls, A history o f the Irish poor law (London, 1856), p. 157.
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the problems of destitution in Ireland,19 he had decided before ever 
visiting Ireland that the English workhouse system, totally rejected by 
Whatley, was the most suitable means of coping with distress in Ireland: 
having visited English workhouses with Irish inmates before travelling to 
Ireland he concluded that ‘the discipline of the workhouse operated with 
the Irish precisely as it did with the English poor’.20
Nicholls made his first report on 15 November 1836. Having got 
‘one bottle of water out of the Liffey and one out of the Shannon’ he 
returned to England to ‘persuade the English people that he can give them 
a better poor law than we who have been three years considering it’, as 
Whatley observed.21 Telling of his conviction that Ireland ‘has on the 
whole, during the last thirty or forty years, been progressively 
improving’, it being ‘impossible to pass through the country without 
being struck with the evidence of increasing wealth almost everywhere 
apparent’,22 Nicholls duly confirmed his opinion as to the suitability of 
the workhouse system to Ireland’s needs. Predictably his report 
recommended the adoption of the English poor law, dating back to 1601 
but reformed in 1834, in Ireland, without substantial change.
It was Nicholls’ report which provided the basis of the Irish poor 
law, and his recommendations were adopted by the government in 
December 1836. The bill providing for the introduction of the poor law 
into Ireland was introduced into parliament in February 1837, receiving 
royal assent in July 1838. It implemented by and large the English Poor 
Law system into Ireland. As such the Irish act of 1838 owed more to the 
1832 Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Working of the poor law in
19 Third report o f the Commissioners for inquiry into the condition of the poorer classes in Ireland, p.
4.
20 George Nicholls, A history o f the Irish Poor Law, p. 158.
21 Oliver McDonagh, ‘The economy and society, 1830-45’ in W. E. Vaughan (ed.), A new history of 
Ireland, v.- Ireland under the union, 1801-70 (Oxford, 1989), p. 227.
22 George Nicholls, A history of the Irish Poor Law, p. 160.
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England, established primarily to make the existing poor law more cost 
effective, the report of which was written by the laissez faire  economist 
Nassau Senior and which was based on the 'less eligibility' idea 'that the 
condition of the paupers shall in no case be so eligible as the conditions 
of persons of the lowest class subsisting on the fruits of their own 
industry',23 than it did to any Irish inquiry.
The Poor Law Commission of England and Wales, composed of 
three poor law commissioners including George Nicholls, and eight 
assistant commissioners, was initially responsible for implementing the 
poor law in Ireland, establishing the machinery of the poor law ‘in a 
rem arkably short space of tim e’.24 In order to facilitate its 
implementation Nicholls arrived in Dublin in September 1838.
Ireland was divided into over one hundred unions each provided 
with its own workhouse, those 'Irish Bastilles'25 which were already in 
existence in some areas. By 1842, 122 workhouses were in operation, 
catering for some 100,000 inm ates.26 Each of the unions was 
administered by a Board of Guardians (the albatross of the British welfare 
state according to Ashford27) which had the right to value property and 
levy a compulsory poor rate for the area. Guardians, half of whom (three 
quarters before 1843) were elected by the rate payers of the union and 
half of whom (one quarter before 1843) were appointed from among the 
union's justices of the peace,28 also had power over deciding who 
received relief and were responsible for the upkeep of the workhouse.
23 Quoted in Séamus Ô Cinnéide, ‘The development of the home assistance service’, Administration, 
vol. 17 (1969), no. 3, p. 286
24 R. B. McDowell, The Irish administration 1801-1914, p. 179.
25 John Patrick Dunne, ’Poverty problems in a patriot parliament', Journal o f the Social and Statistical 
Inquiry Society of Ireland, vol. 14 (1919-30), p. 196.
26 Virginia Crossman, Local government in nineteenth century Ireland, p. 47.
27 Douglas Ashford, The emergence of the welfare state (Oxford, 1988), p. 131.
28 Enda Kelly, The poor law administrators in Navan Union during the Great Famine', B.A. Thesis 
N.U.I. (Maynooth), 1994, p. 18.
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Every person liable to pay poor rates within a union could become a 
guardian or vote for a guardian, the number of votes per person being 
dependent on the amount of rate levied.29 Each Board of Guardians was 
subject to the Poor Law Commissioners (of England and Wales up to 
1847 and of Ireland from then on), by whom all of their actions had to be 
ratified. When it came to relieving the poor the principle was provision 
of relief within the confines of the workhouse, preference being given to 
the young, old and incapacitated.
However, ‘before the machinery of the new poor law could be set 
in motion, or indeed a single workhouse erected, the commissioners were 
confronted with the cry of distress’30 in the form of the localised crop 
failures of 1839. However it was with the coming of the Great Famine, 
described as 'the single most important event in the shaping of social 
policy in the nineteenth century,'31 that the near total inadequacy of the 
poor law system was underlined. Nicholls had never intended the poor 
law to deal with famine:
The occurrence of a famine, however, if  general, seems to be a 
contingency beyond the power of a poor law to provide for. It is 
however, I think, impossible to contemplate the continuance of 
such a state of things in Ireland, as that in which any considerable 
portion of its population would be subject to the occurrence of 
famine.32
Russell himself, who had fully endorsed Nicholls' recommendations, was 
forced to admit in 1849 that 'the poor law, although it might have 
succeeded according to expectations in some parts of Ireland, had in other 
parts been found unequal to contend with the distress'.33
29 Report o f the Poor Law Commissioners, vol. 7 (1839), p. 58.
30 Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and the Relief of Distress, Report on Ireland, (1909, Cmd. 
4630, xxxviii), p. 13.
Helen Burke, The people and the poor law in nineteenth century Ireland (Dublin, 1987), p. 288.
32 Extract from Report o f George Nicholls, Esq., on poor laws, Ireland quoted in George Nicholls, A 
history o f the Irish poor law, p. 177
33 Quoted in R. D. Collison Black, Economic thought and the Irish question: 1817-1870, p. 127.
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Straining under the pressures placed upon it by famine, the poor 
law was amended by the Poor Relief (Ireland) Act of 1847. Commonly 
referred to as ‘the Soup Kitchen A ct’,34 it made allowance for the 
provision of outdoor relief for the first time for a limited number of 
specified classes, namely paupers permanently incapacitated through age 
or infirmity, those temporarily incapacitated through disease and certain 
classes of widows, all for a period of up to two months.35 Guardians were 
required to receive permission from the poor law commissioners before 
they could undertake outdoor relief, however, the latter preferring 
financial support for the purpose of increasing the capacity of the 
workhouses, being loathe to sanction outdoor relief until the workhouse 
was full. This led to a problem where, as in the case of Navan Union in 
County Meath, 'though the workhouse [initially built to accommodate 
500] was somewhat over crowded as the year 1847 drew to a close, it 
always seemed to have the capacity to admit more inmates and during the 
year 1848, when the workhouse had a capacity which never fell below 
780, it was never full'.36
The provision of outdoor relief was further extended in 1848 
allowing paupers evicted from their holdings to benefit from such relief. 
It would appear to have been too limited to enable guardians cope with 
the problems of famine however, excluding as it did the able-bodied poor. 
The problems caused in one union by the limitations attached to outdoor 
relief were expressed in a resolution passed by the Sligo Board of 
Guardians in July 1848:
That this board think it but right to represent to the Poor Law 
Commissioners that they have since the passing of the poor law 
used their best endeavours to carry out its provisions, but that from
34 Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and Relief of Distress, Report on Ireland, p. 17.
35 S6amus 6  Cinndide, The development of the home assistance service', p.292.
36 Enda Kelly, The poor law administrators in Navan Union during the Great Famine', p. 11.
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the almost total absence of employment for the able-bodied 
labourers, the pressure upon the house for relief still continues 
unabated.37
By July 1849 the numbers being relieved in Ireland were at their 
maximum, 221,583 being relieved in the workhouses with a further 
784,367 receiving outdoor relief.38 In October of that year, however, the 
Poor Law Commissioners rescinded all outdoor relief orders.39 It was 
another thirty-two years before outdoor relief became available as 
standard to most classes of destitute. By that time also the Poor Law 
Commissioners had been replaced by the Local Government Board which 
consisted of the chief secretary, a vice-president and three other 
commissioners, as outlined in the act of 1872. Some of the functions of 
the Boards of Guardians were transferred to the Urban and Rural 
Councils established under the Local Government Act of 1898. This 
latter act also made permanent statutory provision for the relief of 
poverty, marking an important departure from the wholly discretionary 
nature of the poor laws up to then.
As the nineteenth century came to a close there was increasing 
modification in the operation of the Irish poor laws, coinciding with a 
philosophical shift in emphasis from ‘who are the poor?’ to ‘why are the 
poor?’40 The Report o f the Vice-Regal Commission on Poor Law Reform 
in Ireland  of 1906, established to ‘ascertain how, if  at all, a reduction 
could, without impairing efficiency, be made in the expenditure for the 
relief of the poor, and at the same time to show, if possible, how an 
improvement in the method or system of affording relief might be
37 Resolution of the Board of Guardians, Sligo, on 11 July 1848 in Famine Relief Commission Papers, 
Sligo, 1846-47.
38 Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and Relief of Distress, Report on Ireland, p. 19.
39 R. D. Collison Black, Economic thought and the Irish question 1817-1870, p. 131.
40 R. M. Titmusgied.), Essays on the welfare state (3rd edn., Great Britain, 1976), p. 17.
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e ffec ted ’,41 concluded that the poor law act of 1838 was wholly 
inadequate in dealing with destitution in Ireland. In its place it 
recommended, as Whatley had done in 1836, that relief could only be 
satisfactorily dealt with ‘by the development of the country’s resources, 
which is, therefore, most strongly urged’.42 Critical in particular of 
Nicholls' report, it recommended the abolition of the workhouse system, 
the separation of the various classes of inmates, and the extension of 
outdoor relief as being ‘better for the poor and more economical for the 
rate payers’.43
In 1909 a second commission was established to inquire into the 
operation of the poor laws in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Ireland, ‘and to consider and report whether any, and if so, what, 
modification of the poor law or changes in their administration or fresh 
legislation for dealing with distress are desirable’.44 The report for 
Ireland was drafted by the only Irish representatives on the commission, 
Sir Henry Robinson, Vice President of the Local Government Board, and 
Denis Kelly, Bishop of Ross. Robinson was to later criticise the way in 
which evidence was taken by the commission on the operation of the 
poor laws in Ireland:
I think they found it hard to understand the mentality of the Irish 
witnesses and their way of expressing themselves. Certainly some 
of the persons locally deputed to attend and give evidence were 
chosen more on account of their willingness to take advantage of 
the opportunity of a free trip to London than of any special study or 
knowledge on their part of the needs and weaknesses of poor law 
administration.45
41 Report o f  the Vice-Regal Commission on Poor Law Reform in Ireland, vol.l (1906, Cmd. 3202, li),
p. 1.
42 Ibid., p. 77.
43 Ibid., p. 63.
44 Royal Commission on the Poor Law and Relief of Distress, Report on Ireland, p. v.
45 Henry Robinson, Memories: wise and otherwise (London, 1923), p. 216.
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Recognising the pitfalls of this situation the commission 'came to the 
conclusion that they would understand the Irish part of the problem better 
by a study of the subject on the spot, so they divided into three sections, 
which made a hurried scamper through the country seeing workhouses'.46 
Leaving the drafting of the report on Ireland to Kelly and Robinson, the 
commission’s recommendations were largely in line with those of the 
1906 vice-regal commission, it concluding that workhouses and Boards 
of Guardians ought to be abolished, that the county or county borough 
ought in future be the area of administration in charge of relief and that 
classes of inmates should be segregated.47
In the event political developments were to overtake social reform 
and with the outbreak of World War 1 attention was diverted from the 
poor laws, the dawning of independence placing the issue of reform 
firmly in the lap of the Irish Free State government. The extent to which 
reform was undertaken is discussed in chapter three of the present work.
From poor law to social security
The changing ideology inherent in the 1906 and 1909 commissions 
of inquiry into the poor laws was evident in the advent of the first income 
supplement policies, with the poor law being seen as an increasingly 
inadequate measure in the fight against poverty. This move from poor 
law to social security was nothing short of a radical redirection in social 
policy. These first social security measures implemented before the 
coming of independence in Ireland were the Workmen’s Compensation 
Act, 1897, the Old Age Pensions Act, 1908 and the National Health 
Insurance Act, 1911. While they ‘made an important contribution 
towards the alleviation of the hardships and sufferings of the poor and
46 Ibid, p. 217.
47 Royal Commission on the Poor Law and Relief of Distress, Report on Ireland, p. 81.
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undoubtedly prevented large numbers from being forced to have recourse 
to the resources of the poor law’,48 they were even more significant for 
the fact that, especially in the case of old age pensions, they established 
'the principle of support from the state'.49 As such they were the first in a 
series of social security measures which heralded the coming of the 
welfare state.
'It is difficult to overrate the boldness and importance of the step 
taken by the legislature'50 in introducing the earliest of the acts, the 
W orkmen’s Compensation Act, 1897. It was the first act in which the 
principle of social insurance applied, the employer being directly 
responsible for compensating injured employees in certain jobs including 
railway, building, engineering and factory work, according to fixed rates. 
It provided for statutory compensation in the case of injuries sustained in 
the workplace, benefit taking the form of a weekly paym ent of 
approximately 50% of a persons usual wages prior to injury. In the event 
of the death of an employee due to injuries received at work, their family 
received a lump sum payment based on previous earnings.51 In 1900 the 
act was amended to include agricultural workers and was further 
amended in 1906 to cover most employees engaged in manual labour and 
those involved in non-manual labour with an income not exceeding £250 
per year.52
More significant than the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897 
both in the numbers encompassed by the legislation and for its 
fundamental and principled break with the poor law was the Old Age 
Pensions Act of 1908, which followed the German and Danish precedents
48 Report o f the Commission on the Relief o f the Sick and Destitute Poor, including the Insane Poor 
(Dublin, 1927), p. 9.
49 Report o f  the Commission on Social Welfare (Dublin, 1986), p. 29,
50 Arnold Wilson and Hermann Levy, Worbnen's compensation (London, 1939), p. 64.
51 Report o f the Commission on Social Welfare, p. 28.
52 Ibid.
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of the early 1890s. The introduction of the legislation was the result of 
lobbying dating back to the early 1870s, the 'mainspring' of which was 
William Lewery Blackley, a graduate of Trinity College, Dublin, who 
was deeply involved in the work of the National Providence League in 
England.53 Described in an editorial in the Irish Times as 'the blindest 
and most reckless experiment to which the legislature of a great country 
has ever committed itself,54 the introduction of old age pensions was a 
radical departure from social policy precedent. Despite strong criticism 
from some quarters, however, the measure had near unanimous support in 
the House of Commons, the bill receiving royal assent on 1 August 1908. 
Initially proposed as a 51- or nothing basis, the legislation as finally 
adopted provided for a minimum pension of 1/5 and a maximum of 51- 
for people over seventy years of age with an annual means not exceeding 
£21 10s per year. Later becoming the object of much criticism, the 
means test was a significant move away from the poor law destitution 
test. Still in vogue however was a moral test, with convicted drunkards, 
prisoners both while in prison and for a period of ten years thereafter, 
those in receipt of indoor or outdoor poor relief, lunatics and those who 
had failed to work prior to qualifying for pension being disqualified from 
receipt of pension. It was the test of age however that proved the biggest 
problem in determining qualification for pension in Ireland. In the 
absence o f statutory registration of births before 1864, it was often 
impossible to verify claimants' age, many ‘old men, assuming the bent, 
decrepit attitude and the high quavering voice peculiar to applicants for 
old age pension’55 in a effort to convince the officials of their age. In the 
place o f birth certificates, other official certification of age was
53 Arnold Wilson and G. S. Mackay, Old age pensions: an historical and critical study (London, 
1941), pp 14-15.
54 IT, 3 Aug. 1908.
55 Henry Robinson, Further memories of Irish life (London, 1924), p. 158.
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acceptable, such as baptismal certificates, the Archbishop of Dublin 
requesting all priests of the diocese to provide such certificates free of 
charge as claimants for old age pensions were often 'so poor that the 
payment even of the smallest fee would be all but impossible'.56
The pension was made payable on a weekly basis through post 
offices, the duty of determining claims being imposed on local pension 
committees elected from and appointed by each borough, district or 
county council, 54 committees and 394 sub-committees being appointed 
throughout Ireland.57 Determination of appeals of the decisions reached 
by the pension com mittees was the responsibility of the Local 
Government Board.
Described by Henry Robinson as removing ‘forever the menace of 
destitution arising from the failure of the staple food of the country’,58 he 
portrayed the reception old age pensions received among the ordinary 
people as follows:
For a long time the people of Connemara attributed the pensions to 
the influence of the King, who since his visit had interested himself 
in them, and they could not bring themselves to believe that the 
pensions would last. ‘You might believe’, they would say, ‘fifty or 
sixty of the old people might get the money maybe for a year, but 
for the whole of the old people to be getting the money for the rest 
of their lives - arrah, what nonsense! Sure where would it come 
from?’59
The first payments were made under the act on 1 January 1909, a 
day of celebration in many communities throughout Ireland:
Perhaps the pleasantest feature of the day - especially in the rural 
districts - was the hearty sympathy and good will with which 
whole localities entered into the happy feelings of the pensioners.60
56 ICD 1909, p. 493.
57 Annual report o f  the Local Government Board for Ireland for the year ended 31 March 1909, 
(1909, Cmd. 4810, xxx), p. xi.
58 Henry Robinson, Memories: wise and otherwise, p. 206.
59 Ibid., p. 207.
60 IT, 2 Jan. 1909.
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The significance of the occasion was underlined by the extensive 
coverage of the first day of payments in the national papers. The Irish 
Times, like Henry Robinson, described the pensions as 'a substantial 
assurance of future safety from the worst evils of extreme poverty'.61 It 
described the scenes in over thirty individual post offices throughout the 
country on the first day of payment:
Inchicore: One old dame caused some am usement by her 
complaint as to the stinginess of the government. She said she had 
to support three children belonging to a useless son, and that if  the 
Lord Lieutenant only knew of her struggles he would, no doubt, 
provide 'for them that was under seven as well as them that was 
over seventy’.
Gal wav: Among the applicants was an old woman who had 
attained the age of eighty, who wished to know why she should not 
be paid her 'back time'... Several old women from the Claddagh 
refused to take the pension unless they were assured that by 
accepting it the government would have no claim to send their sons 
to the wars to fight the 'black Boers'.
L im erick: Everything was done so that the recipients should be 
made to feel that they were not receiving absolute charity, and in 
this respect there was a strongly drawn contrast between the 
procedure and that which marks the granting of out door relief at 
the poor law union boards.62
Amended in 1911 and again in 1919 with the effect of increasing 
both the means threshold and the maximum rate, the 1908 act introduced 
the first scheme of social welfare policy into Ireland dealing with a 
specific group identified as being vulnerable to destitution and which did 
not require proof of destitution for receipt of benefit. In this context it 
was a mile stone in the evolution of the welfare state. Similarly, its 
receipt did not involve deprivation of citizenship's rights, such as the right 
to vote.
61 IT, 1 Jan. 1909.
62 IT, 2 Jan. 1909.
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Administered on similar lines to old age pensions were blind 
pensions first introduced in 1920 following the report in 1889 of a royal 
commission on the conditions of the blind in Ireland and Britain. Blind 
pensions were payable to those who were certified as blind by the 
medical profession, recipients being entitled to receive the same benefits 
as old age pensioners once they satisfied the same means test and had 
reached the age of fifty.
The third m ajor piece of 'epoch-m aking'63 social legislation 
introduced into Ireland by the British Parliament was the National 
Insurance Act, 1911. Again based on the German precedent of 1883, the 
act introduced the first, state-organised, national, compulsory social 
insurance scheme into Ireland, providing insurance for the majority of 
employees over the age of 16 against both unemployment and sickness. 
Becoming law on 16 December 1911, it came into operation in July 1912.
The introduction of unemployment insurance, considered by social 
scientists as a key element in the formation of the welfare state64 and later 
described by an Irish government as 'one of the most significant schemes 
of social legislation ever framed',65 was the first measure outside of the 
poor law which went some way towards ensuring the income 
maintenance of the ‘able-bodied poor’ while out of employment. It was a 
direct response to the new social problem of wide-scale unemployment 
brought about by the industrial depression in England from the 1880s.
Denounced by many English and Scottish industrialists as 'a grave 
menace to industry',66 the bill received far less official support than the 
Old Age Pensions Act. In Ireland, the Catholic hierarchy, meeting in 
Maynooth in June 1911, asked that the bill not be extended to Ireland:
63 Department of Social Welfare, First report, 1947-49, p. 10.
64 Douglas Ashford, The emergence o f the welfare state, p. 216.
65 Department of Social Welfare, First report, 1947-9, p. 28.
66 IT, 16 Dec. 1911.
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The cost of this insurance scheme would be a heavy burden on 
many of our small struggling industries, and would, in our opinion, 
increase unemployment; whereas a great need of Ireland is more 
employment and better wages, and not a provision designed for the 
wounded member of a wealthy and powerful industrial system.67
However the act was applied to Ireland, being limited as in the case of
Britain to those involved in the trades of building, construction of works,
shipbuilding, mechanical engineering, iron founding, construction of
vehicles and sawmilling.68 A weekly contribution of 5d. per week, shared
equally between employer and employee, was payable while maximum
benefit, deliberately kept low in comparison with wages so as to avoid a
situation where people would decide to draw benefit rather then work,
was 7/- per week. The scheme was adm inistered through labour
exchanges, established under the Labour Exchanges Act, 1909 with the
aim of achieving the redeployment of labour, in order to offer claimants
employment where possible.69
The 1911 act also introduced sickness insurance including
disablement, maternity and sanatorium benefits. The sickness insurance
scheme was administered by ‘approved societies’ selected from among
the numerous friendly societies already in existence and offering private
sickness insurance, overseen by the Irish Insurance Commissioners.
Coming into operation in July 1912, the standard weekly rates of
contribution were 2/5 from employers, 3d. from male workers and 2d.
from female workers. The standard rates of benefit were 10/- per week
for men and 7/6 per week for women for sickness benefit; 5/- per week
for men and women as disablement benefit; and 30/- for maternity
benefit.70
67 ICD 1912, p. 544.
68 Department of Social Welfare, First report, 1947-9, p. 69.
69 Report o f the Commission on social welfare, p. 31.
70 Department of Social Welfare, First report, 1947-9, p. 97.
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The weaknesses of the 1911 act were numerous. In the case of 
sickness insurance, while there were flat rates of contribution and cash 
benefit, additional benefits could be provided by approved societies 
solvent enough to do so, in the context of them being debarred from 
making a profit. This resulted in certain low-risk categories of insured 
workers benefiting to a far greater extent from sickness insurance than 
high-risk categories, insurers of whom were often insolvent and in no 
position to offer additional benefits. Equally, the rates of benefit for 
sickness were lower than those for unemployment despite the fact that 
both eventualities resulted in a similar loss of income. Likewise no 
account was taken of claimants' dependants, benefit payments for a single 
man being the same as those for a married man with several children.
Such practical weaknesses were overshadowed, however, by the 
thinking which gave rise to the act, as it brought together for the first time 
the individual, the employer and the state in a cooperative way to deal 
with the problem  of poverty among the able-bodied poor due to 
unemployment or sickness.
The 1911 act was modified by the National Health Insurance Acts 
of 1913 (which provided for increased state grants for the provision of 
medical benefit), of 1918 (which simplified administration and increased 
benefits to women), and of 1920 (which increased the rates of 
contribution consequent on the general rise in the cost of living to allow 
for corresponding increases in the rates of benefit). Being presented as 
the 'epitome of Liberal social democracy', the 1911 act and the 
subsequent amending acts had 'the twin effect of distinguishing between 
the deserving and the undeserving poor while creating a sense of national 
unity through contributions from both the employer and the employee'.71
71 Tony Novak, Poveny and the state (England, 1988), p. 135.
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It was these three social security acts of the late 1800s and the early 
1900s, combined with the earlier poor laws, which provided the 
background to and basis for welfare legislation in independent Ireland. 
Both the provisions and philosophy of the Irish poor law of 1838 in 
particular 'endured well into the present century',72 while the institution of 
the ‘m odern’ welfare state in Ireland 'represents the end result of an 
evolutionary process which began with the enactment of the first Old Age 
Pensions Act in 1908'.73 This historical backdrop was an important factor 
in the developm ent of Irish social security legislation following 
independence. As the Irish Commission on Social Welfare of 1986 
reported:
The historical link with Britain has undoubtedly had an impact on 
the development of the system in Ireland. Thus, some of the early 
schemes, such as old age pensions and national insurance, are 
directly attributable to that link while the influence of the poor law 
continued up to the mid 1970s. Even after independence, 
developments in Ireland have taken cognisance of developments in 
Britain.74
Recognition of this historical and continuous influence on social security 
legislation in independent Ireland is important. The extent to which the 
philosophy of the poor law permeated Irish discussion is particularly 
striking in the early decades of the Free State.
72 Report ofthe Commission on Social Welfare, p. 27.
73 Ibid., p. 3.
74 Ibid., p. 25.
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C H A PTER  TW O 
TH E CO N TEX T O F SO CIA L W ELFA RE LEG ISLA TIO N
The introduction to the present work defined the concepts 
'welfare state', 'social welfare' and 'social security', while the first 
chapter outlined the main components of welfare legislation in Ireland 
up to independence. What is necessary now, before embarking upon 
detailed analysis of legislation in independent Ireland, is to outline the 
major influences on the course, content and rate of development of 
social welfare policy in Ireland from independence in 1922 to the 
consolidation and institutionalisation of the welfare state in 1952. While 
such an examination is a continuing thread of the entire work, it is 
important to establish here the context of policy development and to 
determine the influences on the initiation and carrying out of legislation.
As is discussed in a later chapter, many of the influences on Irish 
social policy were in line with those of other European countries and 
are generally  accepted by social scientists as the im portant 
considerations in analysing the development of social legislation. In 
Ireland the two major internal influences were the strong voice of the 
Catholic church and the virtual absence of a strong or unified social 
democratic political party. Before discussing these two factors in the 
developm ent of the Irish welfare state however, the other factors 
influencing legislation in Ireland are briefly outlined.
Social scientists have traditionally seen the rise of the welfare 
state from three different but complementary perspectives. These are 
summed up by one writer as follows:
1. Political explanations, emphasising the primacy of political decision­
making and explaining the growth of the welfare state by focusing on 
political processes;
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2. Structural functional explanations which see the welfare state as a 
functional response to some basic structural changes in society, for 
example industrialisation and developing capitalism;
3. Structural political explanations which sees the welfare state as an 
outcome of a more or less peaceful struggle between social classes and 
their organisations in politics and in the labour force.1
W hen we exam ine the developm ent of the w elfare state in an
international context we realise that these perspectives provide us with a
basic introduction to the influences behind it.
While Peter Flora, who has written extensively on the rise of the
European welfare state, has said that the rise of the welfare state is a
'very complex phenomenon' with 'causality' being very difficult to
explain,2 there is general agreement that a process of 'modernisation'
starting in the late nineteenth century is where the genesis of the welfare
state may be found. This process of 'modernisation' took place at
num erous, inter-connected, social, economic and political levels.
Firstly, there was a modernisation of thought, the ideas and ideals of the
French revolution and the Declaration of the Rights of Man (1793) for
exam ple perm eating later philosophies.3 Secondly, there was the
practical modernisation of agricultural techniques and the growth in the
importance of industry, and the concomitant rise in an urban working
class. This resulted in the progressive breakdown of traditional
community methods of coping with the problem of want, the vacuum
left by 'cultural welfare' obliging the government to step into the breach
with national, state-organised, welfare schemes. There was also a
modernisation of the political system, with the late nineteenth century
1 Paraphrased from Risto Alapuro, et al„ Small states in comparative perspective (Norway, 1985), pp 
188-89.
2 Peter Flora (ed.), Growth to limits the western European welfare state since World War II (Berlin, 
1986) vol. 2, p. xxxii.
3 For a discussion of the influence of such events see William A. Robson, Welfare state and welfare 
society: illusion and reality (England, 1976) and Douglas Ashford, The emergency o f the welfare state 
(Oxford, 1988).
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witnessing for the first time the rise of popular, mass democracy, 
facilitated by universal franchise, leading in most European countries to 
the rise of Labour Parties which now had a strong electoral mandate 
from newly enfranchised working classes. The previously mentioned 
structural changes, especially the process of industrialisation, led to a 
number of new social problems, particularly unemployment, which 
became national in character and concern for which was now voiced by 
nationally-organised social democratic parties.4
Before directly applying the process of 'modernisation' to Ireland 
as a factor explaining the development of the welfare state, it should be 
noted that this 'functionalist bird's-eye approach'5 is being increasingly 
questioned for its over-simplification of the emergence of the welfare 
state. However, it does provide for us here a valid introduction to the 
influences behind social policy in general, once the greater complexity 
of the emergence of the welfare state is appreciated.
The limitations of applying the concept of 'modernisation' to 
Ireland in explaining the development of the welfare state is not so 
much that the concept itself is of limited value, but rather that Ireland at 
this time was not independent and therefore was unable to react to or 
influence on its own any of the above factors. However, the 
development of welfare policy in Ireland does fit in with another 
generally accepted prerequisite of the welfare state, the rise of the
4 All of the above factors are treated in more detail in Peter Flora (ed.), Growth to limits vol. 2, p. 
xiii; Guy Vanthemsche, 'Unemployment insurance in interwar Belgium', International Review o f  
Social History, vol. 35 (1990), no. 3; Jose Harris, 'Political thought and the welfare state 1870-1940: 
an intellectual framework for British social policy', Past and Present, May 1992, no. 135; Tony 
Novak, Poverty and the state (England, 1988), p 90 Douglas Ashford, The emergence o f the welfare 
state (Oxford, 1988); Peter Baldwin, The welfare state for historians', Contemporary Studies in Society 
and History, vol. 24 (1992), no. 4; John Saville, 'The origins of the welfare state' in Martin Loney, et 
al., Social policy and social welfare (Philadelphia, 1988).
5 Peter Baldwin, 'The welfare state for historians', Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 
24 (1992), no. 4, p. 701. A critique of this approach is provided by Baldwin in this review article. 
See also Guy Vanthemsche, 'Unemployment insurance in interwar Belgium1, International Review of 
Social History, vol. 3 (1990), no. 3 and Gosta Esping-Anderson, The three worlds of welfare 
capitalism (Oxford, 1990).
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nation state. As Peter Flora points out, 'the welfare state may be seen as 
a completion of the nation state, to the extent that individual social 
rights became an essential element of citizenship as the main basis of 
political legitimacy'.6 The subsequent political division of Ireland, and 
the failure to resolve satisfactorily the 'national question' introduced a 
unique factor into the development of the welfare state in Ireland. 
While the dominance of nationalist politics was largely responsible for 
the weakness of social democratic politics, a point expanded upon later 
in this chapter, the belief among politicians in a united Ireland should 
have afforded a unique impetus behind improving the standards of 
welfare legislation in independent Ireland.
From an early stage of independence the 'social dimension of the 
b o rd e r '7 was apparent to people like John Patrick Dunne of the 
Mothers' Pensions Society who warned that:
Every social service established in the Northern Area, for which 
there is no parallel provision in the Free State but serves as an 
additional barrier to the unity of the nation.8
During the inter-war period the higher standards of benefit in Northern
Ireland as compared to the Free State was more apparent to unionists,
Captain Herbert Dixon, M.P., Chief Government Whip in the Northern
Ireland Parliament, saying in October 1938 in response to de Valera's
demand for a united Ireland:
He asks the working man here to give up all the great benefits of 
our social legislation, such as unemployment benefit, and to 
transfer to conditions which even Mr de Valera would not attempt
6 Peier Flora, G row th to lim its, vol. 2, p. xv. For a brief discussion o f  this in the Irish context see  
Philip J. O Connell and David Rothman, ‘The Irish welfare state in comparative perspective’ in J. H. 
Goldthorpe and C. T. Whelan (eds.), The development o f  industrial society in Ireland  (Oxford, 1992).
7 K. T. Hoppen, Ireland since 1800: conflict and conformity (London, 1989), p. 205.
8 P. J. Dunne, W aiting the verdict: pensions or pauperism : necessitous w idow s and orphans in the 
Free State (Dublin, n.d., [c 1930]).
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to say are anything like so sound or so generous as those of the 
U.K.9
This unionist perception was strengthened as time went on, and as 
legislation in the United Kingdom progressed well ahead of Irish 
provisions.
There is little doubt that by the mid 1940s the Irish government 
and Irish political figures were taking more cognisance of developments 
in comparison with Northern Ireland. William Norton, Ireland's first 
social democratic minister for social welfare and leader of the Labour 
Party from 1932 to 1960, who described in 1946 Ireland’s social 
services as 'lagging seriously behind the six county social legislation',10 
saw his white paper of 1949 as going a long way towards remedying 
this situation:
It represents a credible effort to provide for our people social 
security not less favourable than is being provided for the 
workers of many other lands, including our neighbouring country 
Great Britain and even our own six north eastern counties.11
At this time, for example, the higher rate of old age pension in Ireland
was 12/6 per week for people over 70 years of age while in Northern
Ireland the equivalent rate was £1.6.0., payable at 65 years of age.12
However further developments were taken out of the hands of
Norton as Fianna Fail returned to power in June 1951, Dr James Ryan,
a founder member of Fianna Fail, taking over the social welfare brief.
The subsequent social insurance act of 1952 was again criticised by
Norton in the context of legislation applying in Northern Ireland: 'our
social services are still behind the social services of the six counties',13
9 Belfast Newsletter, 18 Oct. 1938.
10 DD vol. 103, 20 Nov. 1946, col. 1161.
11 Transcript from recording of lecture on social security given by Norton in Newbridge Town Hall on
12 May 1950 (N.A., D/T, S 15069a).
12 Quoted in The Clann, 11 Jan. 1948.
13 DD vol. 143, 2 Dec. 1953, col. 1408.
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while Sean MacBride, leader of Clann na Poblachta, reported to the Dail 
in April 1952 that in 'the six counties during the last elections the main 
leaflet and poster used by the partionists was one setting out in one 
column the social benefits payable in the six counties...and in another 
column the social benefits payable in this part of Ireland'.14 It was part 
of the unfavourable comparison which the Fianna Fail government 
feared might be made 'between the two portions of the island'.15
The extent to which there was genuine concern in political circles 
for ensuring that social welfare standards in independent Ireland did not 
pose a practical impediment to unification was questionable however. 
Beyond the nationalist rhetoric, no specific steps were taken to bring 
Irish standards into line with those in Northern Ireland. Of far greater 
significance in the context of the ‘national question’ was the way in 
which the Labour Party, from the election of 1918, fell victim to it.
However, before discussing the role of social democratic politics 
in the development of the Irish welfare state, I wish firstly to turn to the 
role of the Catholic church in influencing the timing, pace and extent of 
social welfare legislation in independent Ireland.
The Catholic Church
'The overriding importance of the church's attitude to welfare 
i s s u e s ',16 particularly  in Catholic countries, is central to any 
investigation of the welfare state, and the presence of a strong Catholic 
phalanx undoubtedly had a crucial impact on the social welfare debate in 
independent Ireland. The position of the church had been cemented
14 DD vol. 130, 8 Apr. 1952, col. 1604. For analysis of economic and social development in the 
Irish Free State and Northern Ireland in the inter-war period, see David Johnson, The interwar economy 
in Ireland (Dundalk, 1985).
15 Considerations attending the problems of extending social insurance in Ireland', cl945 (U.C.D. 
Archives, MacEntee papers. Social Services, P67/361).
16 Joan Higgins, States o f welfare: comparative analysis in social policy (Oxford, 1981), p. 48.
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through its identification with national and nationalist movements in 
pre-independence Ireland, interestingly a development best documented 
by the Norwegian social scientist Lars M j0set.17
An example of the church's role in the national question in the 
years prior to independence was its involvement in the anti-conscription 
campaign. First mooted in 1916 following heavy allied losses at 
Verdun, a bill was introduced in the British House of Commons on 9 
April 1918 rendering Ireland subject to conscription by special order. 
It was at this stage that the standing committee of the Irish bishops, 
meeting in Dublin in April 1918, passed a resolution protesting against 
any attempt at introducing conscription into Ireland without consent.18 
Two weeks later a meeting of bishops was held at Maynooth College the 
same day as a meeting in the Mansion House, Dublin, of Irish political 
leaders, the latter sending a deputation which included Eamon de Valera 
to the bishops' meeting. Together with supporting the actions of the 
political leaders, and facilitating the signing of an anti-conscription 
pledge and the collection of money to resist conscription, the bishops:
directed that a public mass of intercession be celebrated next 
Sunday in every church, that a national novena be observed in 
honour of Our Lady of Lourdes commencing on 3 May and that 
fam ily rosaries be universally recited for the spiritual and 
temporal welfare of Ireland.19
Such actions by the Catholic Hierarchy ensured their unrivalled 
position following independence. They were, to all intents and 
purposes, a state within a state. An early and clear contemporary 
recognition of this was provided at a meeting held in Dublin in March
17 Lars Mj0set, The Irish economy in a comparative institutional perspective (N.E.S.C. Report No. 
93, Dublin, 1992) pp. 248-249.
18 1CD 1919, p. 509.
19 ICD 1919, p. 511.
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1927 on the serious poverty and level of unemployment in Ireland. The 
meeting resolved that it:
respectfully requests the Irish Hierarchy - in the absence of any 
other helpful medium - to bring together a number of Irish men 
and Irish women who will adequately point the way and provide 
remedies of work and public construction against the continued 
destruction of homes and children.20
The church became particularly involved in the debate on social policy
and the development of the welfare state, a phenomenon to which they
were opposed on the basis of its similarity with the totalitarian state.
The extent to which the pronouncements of the Catholic church
made a practical difference to welfare policy is more difficult to assess.
Their lively contributions to debate did not necessarily result in
influencing in a real or substantial way the actual course of legislation,
and a number of unionist commentators were certainly of the opinion
that the influence of the Catholic church was diminished in Ireland
following independence.21 Certainly, historical analyses which claim
that the Catholic church 'had successfully opposed increased state
involvement in welfare in the 1940s and 1950s'22 are incorrect. In this
period, for exam ple, the Department of Social W elfare and the
Department of Health were established and children's allowances were
introduced. One could argue of course that a good deal more could
have been achieved had the Catholic church come out in favour of
welfare state legislation. However, it is quite clear from government
archives that social conservatism and financial constraints were at least
as im portant as pronouncem ents of the Catholic H ierarchy in
determining the pace and extent of social legislation. Indeed Fianna Fail
governments in particular were not above selectively using statements
20 ICD 1928, p. 573.
21 J. H. Whyte, Church and state in modem Ireland, 1923-79 (2nd edn., Dublin, 1980), p. 35.
22 O Connell and Rottman, 'The Irish welfare state in comparative perspective', p. 237.
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by the hierarchy on social problems as arguments against developing 
welfare legislation as a smoke screen for their own unwillingness to 
innovate and for the conservatism of the Department of Finance.23
However, despite differences of interpretation on the extent of the 
real influence of the Catholic church on welfare legislation, their role in 
the debate and in influencing public opinion cannot be dismissed. The 
esteem of the Catholic church in Ireland in the period covered in the 
present work ensured its leading role in Irish society.
It was only in the 1920s that the Catholic church in Ireland began 
to focus on 'Catholic action1, the delay being attributed to the dominance 
of nationalist issues and pre-independence preoccupations up until then. 
As Edward Cahill, S.J., a leading member of the Irish Catholic social 
movement, explained in his magnum opus published in 1932:
In Ireland, a Catholic social movement in the ordinary sense was 
practically impossible up to the very recent times. The land 
struggle, the fight for educational freedom, the national context, 
the work of church building and religious organisations, engaged 
the energies of the priests and people during the nineteenth 
century and the first quarter of the twentieth century.24
However it was the early 1930s before the Catholic social movement,
the major elem ent of 'Catholic action', spurred on by Pius XI's
encyclical Quadragesimo Anno, began to have a unified and decisive
impact on the course of Irish social policy. Its philosophy was based on
the papal encyclicals, in particular Rerum Novarum, published in 1891,
and Quadragesim o Anno, published in 1931 to commemorate the
fortieth anniversary of the encyclical of 1891.
Catholic action, as interpreted by Pope Pius XI in his encyclical
Ubi Arcano Dei Consilio (1922), involved the laity together with 'their
23 See for example Department of Local Government and Public Health: children's allowances, 
Beveridgeism and the Catholic church, 16 May 1943 (N.A., D/T, 12117b).
24 Edward Cahill, The framework of the Christian state: an introduction to social science (Dublin, 
1932), p. 262.
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pastors and their bishops', carrying out the work of the apostolate of the 
ch u rch .25 In particular the encyclical lauded 'the numberless and 
diverse activities initiated for the education and development, as well as 
for the sanctification of both the clergy and laity'.26 In Ireland as 
elsewhere the movement was based on the assumption that 'it is only the 
Catholic, the Christian teaching, which gives a proper basis for the 
politics of social reform'.27
Before discussing the encyclicals as the foundation of Catholic 
social teaching in Ireland, it is necessary to emphasise that the Catholic 
church's attitude to social policy was an extremely complex one: various 
m em bers o f the Irish  h ierarchy m ade m arkedly  d iffe ren t 
pronouncements on state centralised social legislation which cannot be 
simplified into a uniformity of approach. We shall see examples of this 
diversity of reasoning with the one aim in mind, as we examine in 
particular the church's attitude to the publication of the Beveridge 
report in December 1942 and the Irish White paper on social security 
published in October 1949.
Returning to the basis of the Catholic social movement,28 we can 
now discuss in more detail the content and thrust of the papal encyclicals 
Rerum Novarum, given at St Peter's, Rome, on 15 May 1891 in the 
fourteenth year of Leo XIII's papacy, and Quadragesimo Anno, in 
essence a revised version of Rerum Novarum  given on 15 May 1931 by 
Pope Pius XI.
Rerum Novarum, termed by one contemporary commentator 'the 
immortal encyclical' and earning Leo XIII the title of 'socialist pope' in
25 Ubi Arcano Dei Consilio, Encyclical of Pope Pius XI on the Peace of Christ in the Kingdom of 
Christ, 23 Dec. 1922, para. 58.
26 Ibid., para. 53.
27 Rev. Pat Boylan, Catholicism and citizenship in self-governed Ireland (Dublin, 1922), p. 10.
28 For a brief outline of the development of official Catholic social thought in the run-up to the first 
o f the social encyclicals, Rerum Novarum, see for example Peter Coman, Catholics and the welfare 
state (London, 1977), pp 20-29.
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some circles,29 was the papal response to the process of 'modernisation' 
described earlier. Referred to in English as the encyclical 'on the 
condition of the worker', its stated aim was to provide guidelines within 
which 'the misery and wretchedness pressing so unjustly on the majority 
of the working class'30 could be relieved. Dismissing the inevitability of 
class struggle, the encyclical was anxious in particular to underline the 
faults of socialism, presenting the Christian approach as an ideal easily 
attainable in its place. Above all it forcefully rejected the socialist idea 
of the interventionist state: 'the contention, then, that the civil 
government should at its option intrude into and exercise intimate 
control over the family and household is a great and pernicious error'.31 
Such intervention could only be tolerated in the case of 'extreme 
necessity'.32
Advising the merits of 'frugal living' and of keeping 'out of the 
reach of those vices which devour not small incomes merely, but large 
fortunes',33 the pope stressed the importance of Christian charity which, 
he said, could not and should not be substituted by state-centralised 
relief. The encyclical was unequivocal on what was termed 'the 
heroism of charity':34
At the present day many there are who, like the heathen of old, 
seek to blame and condemn the church for such eminent charity. 
They would substitute in its stead a system of relief organised by 
the state. But no human expedients will ever make up for the 
devotedness and self-sacrifice of Christian charity.35
29 J. B. McLaughlin, The immortal encyclical: Rerum Novarum and the developments o f Pope Pius 
XI (London, 1932), p. v.
30 Rerum Novarum Encyclical of Pope Leo XIII on Capital and Labour, 15 May 1891, para. 3.
31 Ibid., para 14.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid., para 28.
34 Ibid., para 30.
35 Ibid.
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Describing Rerum Novarum  as the 'magna carta of the social 
order'36 Pius XI's encyclical on 'the reconstruction of the social order' 
was, of necessity, a more in-depth analysis and application of Catholic 
social teaching, being over twice as long as Leo's encyclical. Lauding 
Leo's encyclical as the basis for all time of the Catholic church's 
response to 'the social question', Pius recognised that the 'new needs and 
changed conditions of our age have made necessary a more precise 
application of Leo's teaching or even certain additions thereto'.37
Dismissing both liberalism and socialism, and individualism and 
collectivism, it sought to find a middle way based on the teachings of 
Christ. It made a distinction between the idle and deserving poor, 
condemning those unwilling to work and quoting the apostle: 'if any 
man will not work neither let him eat'.38
Like Leo, Pius emphasised the centrality of Christian charity, and 
its desirability above any form of state relief. Indeed, Quadragesimo  
Anno  rejected all forms of state-centralised social policy, advocating in 
its stead syndicalism or corporatism (or, as it was to become known in 
Ireland in the 1930s and 1940s, vocationalism):
Anyone who gives even slight attention to the matter will easily 
see what are the obvious advantages in the system... The various 
classes work together peacefully, socialist organisations and their 
activities are repressed and a special magistry exercises a 
governing authority.39
The major 'addition' to Leo's teaching was in regard to the 
encyclical’s view of socialism which it subdivided into communism on 
the one hand and moderate socialism on the other. Not surprisingly, 
Pope Pius rejected communism in its totality, but saw some merit in
36 Quadragesimo Anno Encyclical of Pope Pius XI on reconstruction of the social order, 15 May 
1931, para 38.
37 Ibid., para 40.
38 Ibid., para 57.
39 Ibid., para 95.
49
moderate socialism, or, as he referred to it simply, 'socialism', going so 
far as to equate it with the principles of the Christian tradition: 'it 
cannot be denied that its demands at times come very near those that 
Christian reformers of society justly insist upon'.40 On this point the 
encyclical concluded, however, that 'no one can be at the same time a 
good Catholic and a true socialist'.41
Returning again to Leo's emphasis on the centrality of Christian 
charity, he said 'the law of charity which is the bond of perfection, must 
always take a leading ro le '.42 The only qualification was that 
'admittedly, no vicarious charity can substitute for justice which is due 
as an obligation and is wrongfully denied'.43
Among its concluding remarks, it advised that 'the church must 
be duly prepared by an intensive study of the social question'.44 The 
Catholic church in Ireland was to follow this last urging to the same 
extent and as strenuously as the rest of the encyclical.
W hile the impact of Rerum  Novarum  in Ireland had been 
minimal, the impact of Quadragesimo Anno among official Catholic 
circles was enormous. It was immediately adopted by the Catholic 
hierarchy in Ireland as the firm foundation for all social action. 
Extracts were to be found in a number of government department files, 
one file dealing specifically with the encyclical.45 The publication date 
of Quadragesimo Anno was commemorated annually by lectures on 
Catholic social teaching throughout the country.46 Its publication came 
at a time when the Catholic church in Ireland was perhaps at its
40 Ibid., para 113.
41 Ibid., para 120.
42 Ibid., para 137.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid., para 142.
45 Extracts from 40 years after Pius XI and the social order (N.A., D/SW, I.A. 154/53(j)).
46 For example the Mayo News reported on 31 May 1952 on one such lecture given by Rev. F. 
Jones, CSSR, in Taibhearc na Gaillimhe.
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strongest and most influential, a fact witnessed by the estimated one 
million people who attended the pontifical high mass in the Phoenix 
Park celebrated by the Papal Legate, Cardinal Lorenzo Lauri, on the 
occasion of the 31st International Eucharistic Congress in June 1932.47
Preparation for the 'intensive study of the social question’ was 
given priority by the Irish clergy. A 'regular course of social study' 
had been 'inserted by the Irish bishops in the programme of religious 
knowledge for the secondary school' by 193 2.48 In July 1937 the 
Catholic Hierarchy established a Chair of Catholic Sociology and 
Catholic Action at Maynooth, endowed by the Knights of Columbanus, a 
Chair of Catholic Action having been established in University College, 
Dublin in 1930. At their October meeting the hierarchy appointed 
Peter McKevitt to the Maynooth post, a position he held until 1953.49
M cKevitt had completed his doctorate in Louvain and had also 
studied in Rome where he examined Catholic action in Italy.50 He went 
on to publish numerous papers on Catholic approaches to 'the social 
question', and in 1944 the Catholic Truth Society published his book 
The Plan o f  Society which formed the basis of McKevitt's course in 
sociology at St. Patrick's College, Maynooth. It is clear that central to 
the course were the papal encyclicals:
The social teaching of the church is then the only foundation of a 
complete study of society. Although the encyclicals in which this 
specific teaching is to be found are not equivalent to solemn 
definitions of doctrine, they give us the official teaching of the 
church and we must receive them with obedient assent and 
reverence.51
47 ICD 1933, p. 633.
48 Edward Cahill, The framework o f a Christian slate: an introduction to social science, p. 262.
49 ICD 1938, pp 605-6, 630.
50 See P. J. Corish, A bicentenary history of Maynooth (Maynooth, 1995), pp 315-316.
51 Peter McKevitt, The plan o f society (Dublin, 1944), p. ix.
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Apart from McKevitt's work there were several other organs 
expounding the virtues and approaches of the papal encyclicals, and 
dedicated to their study. An Rioghacht (The League of the Kingship of 
Christ), specifically dedicated to the study and propagation of Catholic 
social principles, was established in 1926 in response to Leo XIII's 
encyclical. Founded on the feast of Christ the King, it has been 
described as 'an important mainspring in the intellectual drive behind 
Catholic action in Ireland'.52 Some years earlier the Central Catholic 
Library had been opened in Dublin, an important source of information 
on Catholic social reconstruction. Meanwhile the formation of groups 
like the Catholic Social Study Circle, established in 1937 by the O 
Connell Schools Union in Dublin,53 became more common-place, 
especially in Dublin. In 1951 the Social Study Centre for Catholics was 
founded, being officially blessed by Archbishop John Charles McQuaid. 
Located at 14 Gardiner's Place in Dublin and with over 160 members, it 
fulfilled McQuaid's wish to have established in his diocese a school of 
social science for Catholics. The idea of the Social Study Centre was 
that each person would 'follow a planned course in Social Ethics and 
Moral Philosophy under the direction of chaplains. The aim of the 
centre is to equip students with a clear knowledge of the church's 
teaching on the moral problem of social justice.'54
To facilitate the education of clergy in the church's social 
teaching, the Christus Rex Society was established at a meeting of 
newly-ordained priests in Maynooth in September 1941. Its specific 
purpose was 'to promote among Irish diocesan clergy the study of the
52 Maurice Hartigan, 'The Catholic Laity of Dublin 1920-1940’, Ph.D. Thesis, N.U.I. (Maynooth), 
1992, p. 92.
53 ICD 1938, p. 636.
54 ICD 1952, p. 644.
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church's social teaching '.55 This aim was pursued through the 
publication of Christus Rex and the convening of an annual Summer 
School of Social Study for the priests of Ireland.
As already mentioned, a considerable number of public lectures 
on Catholic approaches to social justice were also organised.56 The 
C.Y.M.S., founded in 1849 and increasingly involved in Catholic action 
by the 1930s, organised an annual Catholic Social Week for the 
Archdiocese of Dublin from the 1930s. Outside of Dublin Muintir na 
Tire, established in November 1931 by Canon John Hayes of Tipperary, 
and based on the social principles outlined by Leo XIII, organised 
formal 'fireside chats', then 'rural weekends' and 'rural weeks'. The 
first of these rural weeks was opened by Eamon de Valera in 1937. 
Inspired by the French semaines rurales51 and based on the Belgian 
B oerenbond ,58 Muintir na Tire was described by Canon Hayes as 'an 
honest attempt to bring Catholic sociology from the text books to the 
cross-roads'.59
The practical application of Catholic social principles, the extent 
to which the church succeeded in imposing them on social welfare 
legislation in Ireland, and the extent to which successive governments 
took cognisance of it, is a central issue in the following chapters. The 
church's reaction to each piece of legislation is documented and analysed 
as one of the major contributors to the debate on social legislation.
The church's reaction to two events in particular provides an 
insight into both the strength and forcefulness of its convictions in 
regard to social legislation and the principles and fears which guided
55 C. B. Daly, 'Christus R ex Society', Christus R ex, 1 (1941).
56 For e.g ., Peter M cKevitt, 'The Beveridge Plan reviewed', Gresham Hotel, Dublin, 14 Feb. 1943; 
Cornelius Lucey, 'Ireland and the Beveridge Plan’, Mansion House, Dublin, 18 Mar. 1943.
57 Muintir na Tire, O fficia l handbook 1941, p. 44.
5X Thomas Morris, M uintir na Tire: a sketch o f  its history (Tipperary, 1962), p. 3.
59 ¡CD 1943, p. 606.
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members of the hierarchy and other Catholic writers. It also underlines 
the fact that, while all were guided by a similar set of principles as laid 
down in Quadragesimo Anno in particular, individual Catholic opinions 
were often at odds. Indeed the direct relevance of the encyclicals was 
called into question in December 1941 by Bishop William MacNeely of 
Raphoe in the context of serious poverty and in particular the lack of 
housing:
We may discuss encyclicals as long as we like and the various 
remedies suggested, but until we get suitable housing for our 
people it will be impossible to make any decent progress whatever 
in solving our social problems.60
However, such a statement, calling into question the practical value of
the encyclicals, was very rare and the point of departure in Catholic
interpretation of the papal encyclicals centred on the role of 'charity'
and 'justice'. Exponents of Catholic action were all agreed that Catholic
charity was eminently more desirable than state-centralised relief;
however, it was also agreed that 'justice' was due to everybody within
the state. Pius XI had said in Quadragesimo Anno  that 'no vicarious
charity can substitute for justice which is due as an obligation and is
w rongfully denied '.61 Whether 'justice' included the provision of
income maintenance by the state in the absence of employment or in the
case of ill-health led to a complexity in the attitude of the Irish
hierarchy. This complexity comes through in the debate over Sir
W illiam Beveridge's Report on social insurance and allied services of
1942 and the Irish government's White paper on social security
published in 1949.
Two of the main writers giving form to the Catholic church's
views were Peter McKevitt and Cornelius Lucey. Lucey, a strong
60 ICD 1943, p. 599.
61 Quadragesimo Anno, pula. 137.
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supporter of the establishment of the Christus Rex Society, held the 
chair of Philosophy and Political Theory in Maynooth from 1929-1950, 
after which he was appointed coadjutor bishop of Cork and subsequently 
bishop in 1951. McKevitt and Lucey, the most important individuals in 
terms of written work and interpretation on Catholic social action in 
Ireland, and both professors at Maynooth, were pragmatists. On the 
publication of the Beveridge Report they were far from dismissive, 
despite government attempts at the time to portray the Catholic response 
as essentially negative and therefore supportive of their own non- 
persual of a Beveridge-type social programme.
It was perhaps Lucey who best evaluated the huge appeal of the 
Beveridge report in Britain:
It was radical enough for the socialists; it was moderate enough 
for the conservatives; it was complimentary enough in references 
to the soviet security system for the communists; it promised the 
working man what he had dreamt of but hardly dared to hope 
for; and it estimated an initial cost not so astronomical as to 
antagonise the Chancellor of the Exchequer or unduly alarm the 
industrialists.62
He saw the plan as presenting more of a challenge to the Irish 
government than to Irish Catholicism, the only challenge to the latter 
being that the report was a step towards rather than against 
totalitarianism:
However, one step, or even a few steps towards totalitarianism, 
though dangerous, were not disastrous.63
In Lucey's own words, 'the plan did not bring them halfway on the road
to Moscow1.64
Equally, Peter McKevitt wrote that 'the good points of the scheme 
are obvious', welcoming 'the expression of the principle that the welfare
62 Cornelius Lucey, 'The Beveridge Report and Eire', Studies vol. xxxii (1943), p. 36.
63 Catholic Herald, 12 Feb. 1943.
64 Ibid.
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and security of the worker are put in the first place'.65 However, he 
was obviously more worried by the prospect of the omnicompetent state 
than Lucey, saying that 'totalitarianism may come gradually like the 
flow of the tide, and the series of surrenders mount up until our 
freedom and spiritual independence have vanished'.66 It was a point 
further emphasised by another frequent and well-known contributor to 
the debate, Rev. E. J. Coyne, S.J., who saw the ever-growing 
dependence of people on the state as leaving the way open for the state 
to dictate to its citizens 'their way of life, of worship, of thought, of 
speech and of work'.67 The other danger in such schemes according to 
Coyne was that people were 'liable to become morally flabby.... There 
is a danger that certain types of social services may sap and weaken the 
moral fibre of citizens'.68
The Beveridge Report, however, was designed for post-war 
Britain. It was only when the Irish government set about introducing 
the first comprehensive scheme of social security into Ireland that the 
principles of the papal encyclicals were stuck to more rigidly and that 
dogmatic conservatism replaced the Christian pragmatism expressed 
earlier by Lucey and McKevitt.
In an attempt to bring on board the Catholic Hierarchy the 
Minister for Social Welfare at the time, William Norton, under whose 
direction the white paper of 1949 was drawn up, sent an advance copy 
of the paper to all the bishops of Ireland. Apart from the reply of 
Archbishop John D'Alton of Armagh, the letters acknowledging receipt 
of the white paper were cool and non-committal.69
65 Peter McKevitt, The Beveridge Plan reviewed', Irish Ecclesiastical Record, Mar. 1943, pp 147,149.
66 Ibid., p. 150.
67 E. J. Coyne, 'Irish Social services: a symposium', Journal o f  the Statistical and Social Inquiry 
Society o f Ireland, vol. 17 (1942-3), p. 108.
68 Ibid.
69 Letter from John D'Alton to William Norton, 28 Oct. 1949 (Labour History Museum, Norton 
Papers, Item 114).
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Criticism of the scheme by Lucey and M cKevitt was widely 
reported, M cKevitt, echoing the pronouncem ents of the papal 
encyclicals, arguing that 'the state should not do for people what they 
can do for themselves by private organisations'.70 Just how big the gap 
had become between the views of Lucey in 1942 and his views a decade 
later when speaking on the subsequent Social Welfare (Insurance) Bill 
of 1952 can be seen in a sermon delivered by him commemorating the 
diamond jubilee of Rerum Novarum :
This is the age of the State, the age of the eclipse of the individual 
person and the family by the government departments and civil 
servants.71
Perhaps the 1952 act was a step too far towards Moscow.
In his Lenten pastoral of 1952 Archbishop D'Alton expressed 
views similar to Lucey's. Having privately complimented Norton's 
white paper for its potential for providing 'great help to a big section of 
the workers',72 he now warned of 'the menace' of the welfare state and 
criticised those 'willing to barter their freedom for security'.73
N evertheless, despite the marked conservatism  of the Irish 
hierarchy when the government began to increase the extent of welfare 
legislation, the opinions of the Catholic church, now perhaps more in 
tune, could still not be described as uniform. In contrast to the 
foregoing statements of McKevitt, Lucey and D'Alton, Bishop John 
Dignan of Clonfert, who had produced his own welfare scheme in the 
early 1940s, was critical but for a different reason. While welcoming 
the general thrust of the scheme as outlined in the 1949 white paper, 
Dignan criticised it for not going far enough:
70 Limerick Leader, 1 Apr. 1950.
71 Quoted in ICD 1952, p. 714.
72 Letter from John D'Alton to William Norton, 28 Oct. 1949 (Labour History Museum, Norton 
Papers, Item 114).
73 Quoted in ICD 1953, p. 634.
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Only 700,000 'wage earners' benefit from the scheme; all other 
'workers' are excluded, and they num ber roughly another
700,000. Excluded are small farmers, shopkeepers and business 
people.74
This diversity o f opinion among the Catholic hierarchy may be 
illustrated at its most extreme when we compare Dignan's critique of 
the white paper to that of Bishop Neil Farren's of Derry. Speaking in 
April 1951 in the context of such welfare proposals he said that 'the 
power and the spirit behind practically all social legislation at the 
present time is taken from the worst principles of both Nazi and Russian 
im p eria lism '.75 Awareness of this diversity of opinion within the 
Catholic church is necessary as we examine the course of welfare 
legislation over the next number of chapters.
Emphasising the influence of the church was the interaction 
between the church, the government, and the various political parties. 
The stance adopted by political parties in relation to church teaching 
would have an obvious importance, and all national political parties 
were at pains to stress the orthodoxy of their philosophy. In 1926, for 
example, Sinn Fein claimed that its social policies were 'true to the 
Christian doctrine and democratic principles', accusing Cumann na 
nGaedheal of being 'true to neither'.76 Likewise Fianna Fail claimed in 
the late 1920s to 'speak for the big body of Catholic opinion...we 
represent the big element of Catholicity'.77 J. H. Whyte, who has 
contributed more than any other historian to our understanding of 
church-state relations during this period, said of Fine Gael that it was 
'the first Irish party to respond to the new wave of Catholic social
74 Rev. Dr John Dignan, 'The government proposals for social security’, Christus Rex, 25 Mar. 
1950, p. 107.
75 //, 18 Apr. 1951.
76 Sinn Fdin, How the republic will deal with poverty (election handbill, Nov. 1926).
77 S. T. O Kelly, DD vol. 30, 5 June 1929, col. 821.
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teaching inaugurated by Quadragesimo Anno. It was in need of an 
ideology and the encyclical provided one.'78 Likewise the social 
democratic parties, discussed later in the present chapter, were at pains 
to stress their Catholic orthodoxy. Brendan Corish, a future leader of 
his party, assured the church that 'there was no vestige of Communism 
in the Irish Labour Party'79 while Clann na Poblachta listed among its 
ten founding objectives 'the application of Christian teaching, tolerance 
and reason to public affairs'.80
Successive governments also used the teachings of the church to 
reinforce their position. One feels that this resort to Catholic teaching 
had little to do with a genuine orthodoxy but was rather an expedient to 
which recourse could be had in the absence of other substantial 
arguments in favour or otherwise of developing social legislation. This 
becam e particularly evident in the debate on Beveridgeism  and 
children's allowances.
Before concluding these introductory remarks on the role of the 
Catholic church in the development of the Irish welfare state, one 
further aspect namely, the practical effect of Catholic charity, deserves 
attention. It could be argued that the charitable organisations of the 
Catholic church took the wind from the sails of state-centralised welfare 
policy and were therefore a factor explaining the pace of development 
of social welfare legislation in Ireland. It also goes some way towards 
explaining the reluctance to accept the role of the state in providing for 
the needs of its citizens; the acuteness of those needs were often dulled 
by Catholic philanthropy. Apart from the 'social reconstructive'81 work 
of nationally-organised groups such as St Vincent de Paul, which was
78 J. H. Whyte, Church and state in modem Ireland 1923-79, p. 80.
79 ICD 1938, p. 602.
80 Clann na Poblachta, A portrait o f  Ireland from contemporary sources (n.d., c late 1950s).
81 Edward Cahill, The framework o f a Christian state, p. 262.
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introduced to Ireland in the 1840s having been founded in France in 
183 3,82 individual efforts by priests and bishops provided relief in areas 
in which the government would otherwise have had to become directly 
involved. For example, the Bishop of Cork, Dr Daniel Cohalan, 
established a relief fund for the unemployed in December 1932,83 an 
appeal he renewed in the Spring of 1933, a short time before the Fianna 
Fail government introduced unemployment assistance.
The Catholic Social Welfare Bureau seems to have been set up not 
only to provide assistance organised by the Catholic church but to 
ensure that the government would not step into the breach. Established 
in Dublin in 1942 by Archbishop John Charles M cQuaid, it was 
'intended that the Bureau will deal with many aspects of social 
w elfare '84 with an emphasis on assisting emigrants. This primacy of 
private charity over public welfare was perhaps best expressed by 
Edward Cahill, S.J., founder of An Rioghacht, in his magnum opus, The 
fram ew ork o f  a Christian state: an introduction to social science 
published in 1932. It was Cahill's opinion that as:
the legitimate functions of the state in social life are essentially 
supplementary, they have place only where private effort fails, or 
is manifestly inadequate. Thus, it would be an act of unlawful 
usurpation for the state to attempt to supplant private charity, as 
is being attempted under the existing unchristian  régime in 
France. The normal duties of the State in regard to the poor 
are:...
(b) to protect and encourage private effort on behalf of the poor
(c) to supplement the same as far as is found necessary especially 
by subsid ising  and assisting re lig ious and charitable 
organisations.85
82 For a brief history of the Society of St Vincent de Paul and other charitable organisations see for 
e.g. Eamonn Dunne, 'Action and reaction: Catholic lay organisations in Dublin in the 1920s and 
1930s', Archivium Hibernicum, vol. xlviii (1994). See also Manual o f the Society o f St Vincent de 
Paul (Dublin, 1935) and Charles K. Murphy, The spirit o f the Society o f St Vincent de Paul (Dublin, 
1944).
83 ICD 1934, p. 590.
84 ICD 1943, p. 629.
85 Edward Cahill, The framework o f a Christian state, p. 570.
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Cahill conceded, however, that the direct intervention of the state was 
required where poverty and destitution had reached 'dimensions beyond the 
power of private charity',86 as it had already done, according to Cahill, in 
Ireland.
The extent to which Catholic philanthropy was effective in practice 
outside of the larger cities and towns is questionable; one medical doctor 
spoke of the 'failure to recognise the magnitude of the problem '87 of 
poverty on the part of the church. While individual members of the clergy 
played a part in alleviating local poverty, there was no defined role for the 
clergy in the relief of poverty. Indeed propounding the theory of 
providing Catholic charity as opposed to state welfare seemed at times to 
have been indulged in more passionately and energetically than the practice 
of doing so. The 'hair splitting as to terms and definitions'88 was often 
more rigorously pursued, perhaps explaining Dr McNeely's frustration at 
the level of action as distinct from discussion, as quoted earlier.
The Catholic church's philosophy as distinct from practice 
undermined the efforts of those seeking to establish a centralised welfare 
state but equally facilitated successive governments' unwillingness to 
expand Irish social welfare legislation. Disagreeing with Cahill regarding 
extent, governments claimed that poverty, the worst excesses of which 
were addressed by Catholic philanthropy, was not a major problem in 
Ireland.
The role of social democratic politics
It is widely accepted among writers on the rise of the welfare state 
that the position of the social democratic parties is reflected in the
86 Ibid.
87 Dr James Devane, 'Towards a just social order', Ireland Today, vol. ii (1937), no. 10, p. 33.
88 Ibid.
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strength or weakness of welfare legislation.89 In Ireland, the welfare 
state was achieved in the absence of social politics as the role of social 
democratic parties during the period under discussion in the present 
work was marginal. Their influence, or ability to influence, the course 
of social welfare legislation was virtually non-existent up to the first 
inter-party government formed in 1948. This position of weakness was 
in large measure the result of the way in which Ireland finally gained 
her independence, and the outbreak of the subsequent civil war, an 
'enduring legacy' of which was the division of political parties on 
national lines. As Donal Nevin points out in his article on 'Labour and 
the political revolution', 'so long as this issue dominated politics, the 
influence of the Labour Party was bound to be marginal'.90 The way 
this situation came about, and the failure of the Labour Party to 
appreciate the possibility  o f such a situation occurring after 
independence is important to outline.
There was little doubt in the minds of Irish nationalists including 
social democratic nationalists before independence that independence 
would put an end to an inequitable social system. It was James 
Connolly, described by a contemporary as 'Ireland's first socialist 
m artyr',91 who best expressed the pre-eminence of national politics at 
the expense of social politics in the period up to independence:
Usually the democrats of Ireland have been rebels against political 
tyranny; the necessity of keeping up the fight for the 
establishm ent of the political m achinery through which 
dem ocracy might express itself interfered with, and indeed 
destroyed, the possibility  of developing as a theory or
89 O Connell and Rottman, "Ibe Irish welfare state in comparative perspective’, p. 207.
90 Donal Nevin, Labour and the political revolution’ in Francis MacManus (ed.), The years of the 
great test, 1926-1939 (Dublin, 1967), p. 55.
91 Robert Lynd, 'Introduction' in James Connolly, Labour in Ireland (Dublin, 1917), p. vii.
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philosophical system those democratic principles which inspired 
the rebels personally.92
Writing on how socialist movements in continental Europe had brought
together the intellectual classes and the working classes Connolly noted
that: 'in Ireland the fight for national freedom had absorbed the intellect
of the one and prevented the development of the necessary class-
consciousness on the part of the other'.93 Such a situation was not
unique to Ireland, as an authority on Austrian history has observed:
Independence movements were not generally protests against the 
established social order, but against what were generally 
perceived by the elites of that order as continued unwarranted 
intervention by the metropolitan powers; which denied them the 
full potential benefits of the social order... The metropolitan 
power, rather than the social order it had established and 
protected in its early, vulnerable years, was perceived as the 
source of social evils. National independence rather than social 
reform was seen to rectify the evils.94
The irony was that in Ireland little changed on gaining 
independence. The post-independence party division in Ireland was 
unconventional in the context of Europe where divisions were generally 
between social democratic parties on the one hand and conservative 
parties on the other. Nationalist politics dominated independent Ireland 
leading to party divisions along primarily national political rather than 
social lines. James Connolly's 'reconquest of Ireland' by the Irish 
Labour Movement never happened. As Sean McBride was to comment 
twenty-five years after independence:
Unfortunately, since we obtained control of our own affairs, in 
this part of the country, political and economic questions have
92 James Connolly, Labour in Ireland  (Dublin, 1917), p. 259.
93 Ibid., p. 329.
94 Brigitte Unger, 'Possibilities and constraints for national economic policies in small countries: the 
case of Austria', Germ any: Politics and Society , no. 21 Autumn 1990, p. 68. Quoted in Lars Mjpset 
The Irish econom y in com parative institutional perspective  (Dublin, 1992).
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mostly been clouded by issues that aroused heat and passion, often
leading to virtual civil war conditions.95
The Irish Labour Party lacked, not a progressive social policy, 
but rather the opportunity to implement it. Despite Thomas Johnson's 
substantial involvement in the drafting of the Democratic Programme of 
1919, the party which he led from 1922 and which formed the effective 
parliamentary opposition for the first years of independence due to the 
abstentionist policy of the republicans, was never more than a token 
presence up to 1948. Its only real chance of gaining a grip on 
government came in 1927 when Thomas Johnson put down a motion of 
no confidence in the Cumann na nGaedheal government. The 
government needed the casting vote of the ceann comhairle to scrape by 
on this occasion.96 Likewise, the Labour Party's back bench support for 
Fianna Fail after the general election of April 1932 cannot be said to 
have significantly influenced the course of social welfare policy, as 
Fianna Fail, returning with a majority of Dail seats in 1933 and no 
longer dependent on the support of Labour deputies, was no more or 
less socially innovative than it had been when depending on Labour 
support. The divisions in the Labour party in 1943, resulting in the 
establishment of a break-away National Labour Party, only further 
weakened its position in national politics at a time when social 
democratic parties throughout Europe were to the fore in implementing 
social reform. The role of the Labour Party in Ireland was 'sectional 
or marginal, in no sense crucial or central'.97
95 'Our economic problems', lecture given by S6an MacBride, S.C., T.D., 13 Oct. 1949 (Labour 
History Museum, Norton Papers, Item 90).
96 For a biography of Johnson and his role in the Labour Party see J. Anthony Gaughan, Thotnas 
Johnson, 1872-1963 (Dublin, 1980).
97 Patrick Lynch, 'The social revolution that never was' in T. Desmond Williams (ed.), The Irish 
struggle 1916-1929 (London, 1968), p. 56.
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This position of weakness did not deter the party however from 
speaking out on the necessity of developing Ireland's social legislation. 
In the first years of independence it published a booklet, The Nation 
O rganised, which stressed the importance of not allowing Ireland's 
'am eliorative social schemes to fall behind those of neighbouring 
countries', disagreeing 'emphatically with the policy avowed by the 
present ministry regarding social services'.98 It was one of many such 
publications issued by the Labour Party.99 However, in the absence of 
political clout, they had no practical effect, apart from contributing to 
the debate on social legislation instigated by others.
This weakness of Labour left the field open to both Cumann na 
nGaedheal/Fine Gael and Fianna Fail to claim that they were the true 
Labour Parties, despite lacking any socialist agendas. Realising its 
opportunity, Fine Gael published a pamphlet in 1934 entitled The  
Labour policy o f  Fine Gael, underlining the vacuum left by the Labour 
Party. It was Fianna Fail however who most vehemently campaigned 
for the Labour vote, unashamedly calling itself 'the true labour 
party',100 a point it was intent on hammering home up to the 1950s.
The only serious prospect of filling the breach left by a weak and 
divided Labour Party came with the formation of Clann na Poblachta. 
It was a party in the James Connolly tradition in the extent to which it 
saw socialism  and republicanism as complementary. It combined 
republican nationalism with radical socialism. Founded in the summer 
of 1946 it described itself as:
the first real attempt which has been made since the civil war to 
raise national affairs out of the rut of party politics and
98 Labour Party, The nation organised: Labour's constructive policy and programme (Dublin, n.d. 
[cl920s]), p. 23.
"  See for example Labour's Programme o f a better Ireland (Dublin, 1943) and Labour's Constructive 
programme (Dublin, 1952).
100 Fianna Fdil, Gteas, no. 3, June 1952.
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recriminations. Public life has been largely the monopoly of 
persons whose only qualifications were derived from their 
association with events that occurred twenty or thirty years 
ago.101
Its social programme, outlined in the party's objectives, included 
increased allowances for recipients of old age pensions and widows' and 
orphans' pensions based on the cost of living.102 In its first election of 
1948 it promised to introduce 'a comprehensive scheme of social 
secu rity '103 to give effect to its social objectives. Combining with 
Labour, National Labour, Clann na Talmhan and Fine Gael it became 
part of the first inter-party government in February 1948.
The 1948 inter-party government was the first administration 
with a strong social democratic influence, and while Clann na Poblachta 
in particular failed to live up to its radical pronouncements, the 
government achieved more in the construction of the Irish welfare state 
than any single government up to that time. W illiam Norton, the 
Labour M inister for Social Welfare, produced the first comprehensive 
white paper on social security in Ireland. It was a reflection of what 
could have been achieved at a much earlier date in the construction of 
the welfare state had social democratic parties achieved power before 
this time. This fact is particularly evident when we compare the role of 
social democratic parties in other European countries and the resultant 
pace, timing and extent of development of the welfare state. Belgium 
might be taken as a case in point where social democratic politics 
'succeeded in making a significant impact on policy ',104 while the 
comparative chapter of the present work indicates the importance of
101 Clann na Poblachta, The Clann (Dec. 1947).
102 Gann na Poblachta, A portrait o f Ireland from contemporary sources (n.d. [cl960]).
103 II, 24 Jan. 1948.
104 Patrick T. Pasture, The April 1944 "social pact" in Belgium and its significance for the post-war 
welfare state', Journal o f Contemporary History, vol. 28 (1993), no. 4, p. 695.
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such parties as determinants in the development of the welfare state in 
Finland, Norway and Denmark.
These are themes which are developed throughout the coming 
chapters. W hat is necessary is to bear in mind that one of the main 
ingredients in the development of welfare states, namely, 'the role of 
class and ideology operating through the party system1,105 was absent in 
Ireland. Perhaps the comment of Frank Sherwin, an independent T.D. 
for Dublin from  1957-1965, best sums up this post-independence 
political make-up: 'we had a political revolution but we never had a 
social revolution. That is the weakness of our system.'106
105 Maria Maguire, 'Ireland' in Peter Flora (ed.), Growth to limits, vol.2, p. 332.
CHAPTER THREE 
A DECADE OF STALEMATE: THE CUMANN NA 
nGAEDHEAL YEARS, 1922 TO 1932
Apart from the maintenance of political stability and the avoidance 
of anarchy, the first ten years of the Irish Free State was remarkable only 
for what it did not achieve. By 1922 independence had become an end in 
itself, and there was little in the way of economic, social or cultural 
innovation. The reasons for gaining independence were largely ignored 
or deliberately forgotten. The cultural revolution so fervently 
campaigned for by the Gaelic League was abandoned in 1922, its central 
tenet, the revival of the Irish language, receiving little more then a tepid 
tokenism from the new authorities. Continuity became the key word; 
conservatism the modus operandi.
Continuity and conservatism also marked this first period of Saorstat 
Eireann in the context of the development of social policy. In fact the 
reality is that, if  social policy in the context of income maintenance 
benefits is used as a yardstick, independence was a backward step for 
many sections of society. Had Ireland remained part of the United 
Kingdom, its citizens would have enjoyed a greater level of welfare 
benefits in 1932, such as widows' and orphans' pensions, than it did under 
a native government. This resulted from a combination of the tattered 
economy inherited by the Saorstat and the overwhelming desire of the 
Cumann na nGaedheal leaders to establish the economic security of the 
new state; to prove that an independent Ireland could and would exist as a 
financially viable entity, whatever about existing as a culturally and 
socially viable entity.
There was little doubt about, and no excuses made for, the short 
term  hardship that political freedom would bring to the people.
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Independence was 'not to be had for nothing'.1 However the high price 
was unexpected, independence having been portrayed as the panacea 
which would solve all of Ireland’s problems, and which would bring to 
the Irish people economic stability and equality.
There was no shortage of positive and promising political rhetoric 
however. Members of the Cumann na nGaedheal governing party such 
as Richard Mulcahy, a member of the First Dâil and former Commander- 
in-Chief of the pro-Treaty forces following the death of Michael Collins 
in 1922, assured the people that the objectives of the first Dâil were still 
central to the work of the government. In the summer of 1925 he told the 
Dâil that 'The same spirit that filled our people who entered the Dâil in
1919... is there today. We are only now beginning to get our machinery 
in order to do the work.’2
Still remaining outside the official political process, abstaining from 
taking its seats in the Dâil, Sinn Féin was publishing pamphlets 
containing similar rhetoric. From its extra-parliamentary position it 
promised, upon entering government, the creation of a 'proper department 
for Public Health'3 and the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry into 
the organisation of national insurance. Echoing the proceedings of the 
first Dâil, its pamphlet of Spring 1924, entitled The economic programme 
o f Sinn Féin, promised 'the immediate consideradon of effective solutions 
of the problems connected with public health, factory conditions, child 
welfare, care of the aged and infirm, education and temperance'.4
Despite all the solemn talk however, the existing British welfare 
policies were at best merely sustained, developments in Britain after 1922 
taking a long period of time to find replicas on the Irish statute books.
1 IT, 3 Nov. 1923.
2 DD vol. 12, 30 June 1925, col. 1815-1817.
3 Sinn Féin, Economic Development (n.d.), p. 7.
4 Sinn Féin, The economic programme of Sinn Féin (Dublin, 1924), p. 4.
69
The reasons for this were numerous and complex. The prevailing 
political climate stressed financial orthodoxy rather than social reform. 
The pre-eminence of establishing the newly independent country on a 
financially secure footing in the eyes of the watching world has already 
been mentioned. W. T. Cosgrave, the political leader by default rather 
than by design, who served as President of the Executive Council from 
December 1922 until the final collapse of the Cumann na nGaedheal 
government following the election of mid-February 1932, speaking of the 
heavy financial burden imposed by 'the devastation done by Mr de 
Valera's followers',5 blamed the anti-treaty people.
However, if little was achieved by way of alleviating the problems 
of 'little work, much unemployment and a great mass of destitution',6 a lot 
was written about solving them. The decade 1922-32 was characterised 
by a series of commissions of inquiry into the condition of the poorer 
classes. Three major commissions were established, producing three 
significant reports: the Report o f the Old Age Pensions Committee o f 
Inquiry, published in 1926, the Report o f the Commission on the Relief o f 
the Sick and Destitute Poor, including the Insane Poor, published in 1927 
and the Report o f the National Health Insurance Commission, published 
in 1928. If of little value for what they achieved in practice, the three 
inquiries underlined in particular the need for radical reform of the poor 
law, the area of social legislation most criticised by nationalists in pre- 
and post-independence Ireland. Being the largest single piece of 'social' 
legislation, it is appropriate that the present chapter should begin with an 
analysis of how nationalist vilification of the poor laws was reflected in 
the government's approach to their reform.
5 W. T. Cosgrave, To the people o f  Ireland (election pamphlet, 1924), p. 3.
6 Rev. Pat Boylan, Catholicism and citizenship in self-governed Ireland (Dublin, 1922), p. 17.
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Nationalist ideology, and changes to the poor law
As we have seen in chapter one, the poor law was the main channel 
for the provision of social services in Ireland between 1838 and 1872. It 
was this poor law system of the nineteenth century, continuously refined 
as the century progressed, which the government of independent Ireland 
inherited in 1922 as the chief foundation of the country's social system. 
With the coming of independence there was an expectation that reform of 
the poor laws would be a social priority of a native government, the 
promise of better social conditions and of a better social system being 
inherent in such declarations as the 1916 Proclamation and the 
Democratic Programme of the First Dail.
Revolutionary in many ways, the Proclamation of 1916 spoke about 
guaranteeing ‘religious and civil liberty, equal rights and equal 
opportunities to all its citizens’. These general aspirations were defined 
in specific terms by the Democratic Programme of 1919 which singled 
out those sections of society, with the important exception of the able- 
bodied poor, which most required social and economic security, overtly 
promising them the same:
In return for willing service, we, in the name of the Republic, 
declare the right of every citizen to an adequate share of the 
produce of the nation's labour.
It shall be the first duty of the government of the Republic to 
make provision for the physical, mental and spiritual well-being of 
the children, to secure that no child shall suffer hunger or cold 
from lack of food, clothing, or shelter, but that all shall be provided 
with the means and facilities requisite for their proper education 
and training as citizens of a free and Gaelic Ireland.
The Irish Republic realises the necessity of abolishing the 
present odious, degrading and foreign Poor Law system, 
substituting therefor a sympathetic native scheme for the care of 
the nation’s aged and infirm, who shall not be regarded as a
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burden, but rather entitled  to the Nation's gratitude and 
consideration.7
Using the immediate and valid excuse of the British presence as the 
reason why the ‘social programme’ could not be implemented by the 
provisional government,8 it was soon to become apparent that ‘the 
occupation of the foreigner’9 was not the only circumstance blocking the 
proposals, which took on an increasingly hollow ring after 1922. It 
quickly became apparent just how ingrained the poor law mentality had 
become in the Irish psyche, despite the anti-poor law nationalist rhetoric. 
As Virginia Crossman points out, 'the poor law system continued to 
influence the character and administration of social services in Ireland'.10
However there were some external signals that the much criticised 
poor law was indeed going to be dism antled or at least 'vastly 
improved'.11 Workhouses, 'the sole refuge of the vagrants, and of the 
physical wreckage of the population',12 and Boards of Guardians, through 
a 1923 order of the minister, now relics of a harsh and intolerant 
imperialism, were abolished, with the Minister for Local Government 
taking over the functions of the Local Government Board from April 
1922, thereby assuming responsibility for the poor law administration.
It would appear, however, that these reforms were not so much the 
result of independence as a change in political and philosophical attitudes 
to the problem of poverty as epitomised by the growth of 'new liberalism', 
the British government having already examined the desirability of 
closing the workhouses and of abolishing the virtually redundant Boards 
of Guardians in Ireland. As outlined in chapter one of the present work,
7 Miontuairisc an chiad Dala ¡919-1921: Democratic Programme, 21 Jan. 1919, p. 23.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Virginia Crossman, Local government in nineteenth century Ireland (Antrim, 1994), p. 43.
11 Rev. Pat Boylan, Catholicism and citizenship in self-governed Ireland, p. 18.
12 Department of Local Government and Public Health, First report, p. 52.
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both the Vice-Regal Commission of 1906 and the 1909 Royal 
Commission on the Poor Law recommended the abolition of workhouses 
and of Boards of Guardians.13 As Desmond Roche explains, ’the trend 
was away from the idea of a deterrent poor law with its workhouse test. 
But before anything was done World War I broke out'.14
The Local Government (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1923, 
described as ‘an act to remedy the more serious defects in the existing 
law relating to the relief of the poor and certain other matters of local 
governm ent’,15 reinforced and consolidated the various changes since 
1922 giving legislative ratification to the abolition of the workhouses, the 
availability of indoor and outdoor relief to all classes of poor, the 
centralization of poor law administration under one authority in each 
county and the establishment in each county of central institutions to 
replace the workhouses. This latter provision was given effect through 
the County Scheme Order of 1923 which established a County Board of 
Health in most counties, consisting of a chairperson and nine members, 
all elected by and from among the members of the County Council and 
responsible for the administration of the relief of the poor in its own area. 
As under the poor law, the expenses of the County Board were to be met 
by means of the poor rate. It was claimed that the main purpose of the 
new structures was:
to provide separate accommodation for the classes requiring 
special attention and to avoid as far as possible the chief defect of 
the workhouse - the housing of all classes together in one building. 
The two principal institutions under each scheme were the County 
Home and the County Hospital.16
13 Report o f  the Vice-Regal Commission on Poor Law Reform in Ireland vol. 1 (1906 Cmd. 3202, li), 
p. 77 and Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and Relief of Distress, Report on Ireland (1909, Cmd. 
4630, xxxviii), p. 81.
14 Desmond Roche, Local government in Ireland (Dublin, 1982), p. 48.
15 Local Government (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1923.
16 Department of Local Government and Public Health, First report, p. 56.
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As a main purpose it was a poor reflection on the Department of Local 
Government and Public Health that the main defect of the workhouse 
system should be seen as the fact that all classes of poor were housed 
together. Neither was the plan for separation an original one, it being an 
idea which had its origin in the poor law commissions of the early 
twentieth century:
We concur with the Vice-Regal Commission in recommending that 
there should be classification by institutions; that in each county 
the required number of the existing workhouses should be 
converted into specialised institutions for different classes of 
inmates.17
Chief among the criticisms of the new structures was the use, in many 
cases, of the former workhouse as the county home, the latter being 
referred to up to recent generations as 'the union beyond', i.e., the 
workhouse, or the poorhouse.
The spirit of the Democratic Programme of 1919 was hardly kept 
either in the context of the admission requirements to both institutions, 
which was limited to 'any person who is unable by his own industry or 
other lawful means to provide for him self or his dependants the 
necessaries of life or necessary medical or surgical treatment'.18
The Free State government also moved to abolish the remaining 
hindrances to outdoor relief, now known as home assistance, through 
section 10 of the 1923 act.19 The payment of home assistance, which 
could be in cash or in kind, and which was described as ‘the source from 
which relief is afforded to persons who are not qualified to receive the 
assistance or benefits provided by other branches of the social services or 
to persons for whom such assistance or benefits where provided, are
17 Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and Relief of Distress, Report on Ireland (1909), p. 81.
18 Ibid., p. 58.
19 For a detailed analysis of home assistance see S6amus 6  Cinndide in ‘The development of the home 
assistance service’, Administration, vol. 17 (1969), no. 3 and A law for the poor: a study o f home 
assistance in Ireland (Dublin, 1970).
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found to be inadequate’,20 was the responsibility of the local authorities. 
However local authorities shirked this responsibility when it was found 
that families were in receipt of relief from the society of St Vincent de 
Paul and other charitable associations. When this matter was raised in the 
Dâil Mulcahy simply said that 'I am aware the extent of home assistance 
allowed depends on considerations given to all the circumstances of 
applicants'.21
Initially covering the period up to March 1924, the provisions of the 
Local Government (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1923 were extended in 
1924 and 1925 indefinitely, a tribute to the marked lack of success of the 
new government in tackling the root causes of destitution. In this context 
the self-congratulatory tone of the first report of the Department of Local 
Government and Public Health, which spoke of 'the radical changes'22 in 
the system of poor relief, was hardly justified. Its so-called remodelling 
of the system 'in accordance with Irish ideas'23 was little more than name 
changing, or was perhaps a reflection on the paucity of Irish ideas when it 
came to relieving the poor.
The new structures were investigated by the Commission on the 
Relief of the Sick and Destitute Poor, including the Insane Poor which 
reported in 1927. Its object was to ‘inquire into the laws and 
adm inistration’ relating to the poor with ‘the object of devising 
permanent legislation for the effective and economical relief of the sick 
and destitute poor’.24 The report, which recommended the ending of poor 
law relief and its replacement with income maintenance schemes where 
possible, was particularly scathing in its judgement on the operation of
20 Sean MacEntee, DD vol. 91, 20 Oct. 1943, col. 678.
21 DD vol. 29, 2 May 1929, col. 1291.
22 Department of Local Government and Public Health, Report, 1922-25, p. 44.
23 Ibid., p. 16.
24 Report o f the Commission on the Relief o f the Sick and Destitute Poor, including the Insane Poor 
(Dublin, 1927), p. 1.
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the 1923 local government act, showing how the new county institutions 
differed only in name from workhouses:
In the County Homes we found the following classes: aged and 
infirm of both sexes, lunatics, idiots and imbeciles of both sexes; 
unmarried mothers and their children, in some cases married 
mothers and their children, and orphan and deserted children. In a 
number of homes there were cases of advanced tubercular disease 
and also cases of cancer...
We desire to state emphatically that in our opinion the County 
Homes are not fit and proper places for the reception of the various 
classes which we have found in them... We believe that it was 
originally intended that the homes should be reserved only for the 
reception of the aged and infirm poor and chronic invalids, and that 
separate provision should be made for the other classes. This has 
not been done.25
However, this was a period of inquiry rather than action and the thrust of 
the commission's recommendations was ignored. This lack of practical 
innovation was to become symptomatic of the Cumann na nGaedheal 
period in office. Happy to talk about change, it dared not institute any. 
This was particularly evident in its approach to the Free State's single 
m ost pressing social problem  of the time, the high level of 
unemployment.
Relief of Unemployment
By August 1922, 34,436 people were claiming unemployment 
benefit of which almost 30,000 were in receipt of benefit.26 With only 
250,000 people being employed outside the areas of agriculture and 
domestic services,27 unemployment, described by the Labour Party as ’ a
25 Ibid., p. 17.
26 d d  voi. i .  16 Nov. 1922, col. 135. It should be noted that these figures do not reflect total numbers 
of unemployed, a figure which is far more difficult to calculate for this period. These difficulties are 
highlighted by Cormac 6  Grada, Ireland: a new economic history, 1780-1939 (Oxford, 1994), chapter 
17. This problem was recognised in 1925 by Patrick McGilligan, Minister for Industry and Commerce, 
who informed the D3il that publication of weekly unemployment figures would cease until 'some better 
system of unemployment statistics have been set up' (DD vol. 10, 5 Mar. 1925, col. 580).
27 DD vol. 1, 16 Nov. 1922, col. 135.
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national emergency as serious as the outbreak of a war or a plague',28 was 
clearly a large social problem and a significant drain on the limited 
financial resources of the unemployment insurance scheme.
The Irish government's initial reaction to the problem was to initiate 
a series of public works for which £275,000 was allocated, the money 
being given to county councils for approved schemes. This was 
com bined with the establishment of an emergency relief fund of 
£100,000.29
Apart from this immediate reaction, the legislation in existence 
under British rule was to continue. The Irish M inistry of Labour, 
Aireacht Oibreachas, (later the Department of Industry and Commerce) 
located in Lord Edward Street, Dublin, took over the running of the 1911 
and updated 1920, 1921 and 1922 unemployment insurance acts ‘for the 
time being’.30 From 1 April 1922 claims for unemployment benefit 
previously referred to the chief insurance officer at Kew were to be 
referred to local offices and the Dublin ministry. The only change was 
that the words 'Rialtas Sealadach na hEireann' would now appear on all 
forms, alongside the existing words.31
However the issue of unemployment and the question of its relief by 
providing relief work or unemployment benefit was a constant topic of 
discussion at official parliamentary level, albeit to little practical avail. 
Thomas Johnson was to the fore in many of the debates, raising the issue 
in the Dail as early as September 1922. Looking beyond independence as 
an end in itself, Johnson spoke of unemployment as a 'grievous social and
28 Irish Labour Party, Unemployment 1922-24: the record of the government's failure (Dublin, 1924), 
p. 13.
29 Department of Local Government and Public Health, First report, p. 141.
30 Aireacht Oibreachas, Unemployment Insurance Acts, 1920-1922, Explanatory Memorandum, (May 
1922).
31 Rialtas Sealadach na hfiireann: Ministry of Labour, 7 April 1922 (N.A., D/SW, Government of 
Ireland Act: Transfer to Northern Ireland, E.B. 55867).
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economic loss to the commonwealth' and 'a danger to the state'.32 
Defining the notion of nation as involving not only a cultural integrity but 
also being inextricably linked with the well-being of the individual, he 
urged the Cumann na nGaedheal government to 'make a deliberate and 
direct attempt to save the mass of the people from the contamination that 
results from unemployment, from the deterioration, the demoralisation 
that unemployment entails'.33 It was in essence an appeal, in the absence 
of em ployment being available, for an increase in the levels of 
unemployment benefit.
Table 3.1
Weekly rates of contributions of unemployment insurance
employers workers total value state
M en 10 9 1/7 6.75
W om en 8 7 1/3 5.25
B oys 16-18 yrs 
o f  age
5 4.5 9.5 3.8
Girls 16-18 yrs 
o f  age
4.5 4 8.5 3.6
Table 3.2
Weekly rates of Unemployment Insurance Benefit*
Category Rate o f  Benefit
Men 15/-
W omen 12/-
B oys 16-18 yrs 7/6
Girls 16-18 yrs 6/-
* Persons in receipt o f  unem ploym ent benefit were also entitled  to receive  
dependants' benefit in respect o f  their w ives, dependent husbands and dependent 
children.
Source: Table 3.1 and 3.2 are com piled from Aireacht Oibreachas, U n em p lo ym en t  
In suran ce A c ts  1 9 2 0  to  1922  E xp lan a tory  M em orandum  (May 1922)
32 DD vol. 1, 20 Oct. 1922, col. 1860.
33 Ibid., col. 1862.
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On this occasion the motion was predictably defeated, it being an 
oddity for an opposition motion to be passed on the floor of the Dail. 
However the government did react to the severe unemployment of the 
early 1920s by a plethora of unemployment insurance acts which had the 
effect of extending the period for which benefit was paid and to 
marginally increase the levels of benefit. The Unemployment Insurance 
Act of 1924 also made provision for the men demobilised from the army 
who had been previously employed in insurable occupations. In addition 
the act revived stamps (which indicated the number of contributions to 
the insurance fund) which had been void since December 1920. A 
measure largely welcomed, it was nevertheless a last minute, stop-gap 
measure, the result of several deputations and protest marches in Dublin.
By the time the act was implemented a number of other measures to 
relieve unemployment had come into operation. The majority of these 
concerned the creation of relief employment: the development of the 
roads scheme, the reconstruction of Dublin, the facilitation of individuals 
wishing to carry out work under the Housing Act, the renewal of various 
drainage schemes, and the continuance of the division of estates by the 
land commission. In the early summer of 1924 a bill for the extension of 
unemployment benefit was promised, as was legislation on economic 
matters such as railways, the reorganisation of various branches of 
agriculture, patents, trade marks and designs, all of which would facilitate 
the development of employment opportunities in both agriculture and 
industry.34 Security of the country and of the individual was seen as a 
sine qua non for economic growth however.35 At least it was always used
34 Patrick McGilligan, DD vol. 7 ,6  May 1924, col. 190.
Patrick Hogan, DD vol. 7 ,12  June 1924, col. 2255.
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as an excuse for its absence, the blame being taken from the shoulders of 
the government and firmly placed on those of the and-treatites.
In the summer of 1925 it was claimed that most of the factories in 
Dublin were on half-time,36 while the number of unemployed were being 
viewed increasingly as a possible source of insecurity in the state, a view 
exemplified by Richard Corish of the Labour Party: 'The unemployed are 
a serious menace to the state. They are susceptible to the influence of 
people who would exploit the unemployed in the interests of their own 
particular policy.’37
Despite the statutory extension in 1924 of the maximum number of 
benefit weeks from fifteen to twenty-six within any one year,38 Thomas 
Johnson moved a motion in the Dail in June 1927 calling for legislation 
'to extend the period over which unemployment insurance benefit may be 
paid to men and women who are willing to work but unable to find 
work'.39 The motion immediately proceeded the election of June 1927 
which saw Fianna Fail contention for the first time. The election, which 
returned Cumann na nGaedheal as a m inority government, had 
occasioned a debate on unemployment. Despite this, Johnson's motion 
was defeated by 30 votes for to 54 against. However, with the presence 
of a real and substantial opposition in the Dail from August 1927 in the 
form of the newly constituted Fianna Fail party, debates on social issues 
became more fervent, more frequent and more important.
While unsuccessful again in the election of September 1927, which 
took place a few months after the assassination of Kevin O Higgins, the 
Minister for Justice, and which saw a greater polarization of political 
ideas, Fianna Fail deputies began to constantly raise the issue of
36 Alfred Byrne, DD vol. 12, 30 June 1925, col. 1842.
37 DD vol. 12, 30 June 1925, col. 1829.
38 Unemployment Insurance (Amendment) Act, 1924, (No. 26 of 1924).
39 DD vol. 20, 29 June 1927, col. 88.
80
unemployment. If nothing else, it was a profitable subject which would 
yield votes in future general elections. The plight of women workers was 
raised by Eamon Cooney, a grocer's assistant representing Fianna Fail in 
the Dublin North constituency.40 It was more usual, however, to sketch 
graphically the hard lives endured by the family whose father was 
unemployed:
Picture the plight of an unemployed man, with a wife and family, 
whose benefits are exhausted or who was never entitled to draw 
unem ployment benefits... Is it any wonder that I charge the 
minister and the government party with callous indifference to the 
plight of the unemployed.41
Another aspect of unemployment and unemployment benefit was the 
demoralisation caused by spending long periods of time doing no income 
related work. From the official government point of view, it was often 
thought a bad idea to provide unemployment benefit without requiring 
some work or service in return. It was a belief common in non­
governmental circles too; even Thomas Johnson spoke of the desirability 
of attaching a duty to the receipt of unemployment benefit.42 The old 
poor law distinction between the idle/lazy poor and the genuine, job 
seeking poor came yet again to the fore, albeit in a refined language. 
Also coming to the fore in the context of working for benefit was the 
division, or lack of it, between providing each citizen with the necessities 
for leading an economically and socially secure life as an obligation of 
the state, and the provision of charity, an idea upon which the poor law of 
the nineteenth century had been founded. Patrick McGilligan, the Derry- 
born Minister for Industry and Commerce from March 1924 to March 
1932, was to the fore in blurring the distinction between entitlement and 
charitable provision, a retrograde step by any standards, especially in the
40 DD vol. 23, 9 May 1928, col. 1065.
41 Archie Cassidy, DD vol. 24, 5 July 1928, col. 2203.
42 DD vol. 1, 20 Oct. 1922, col. 1864.
81
context of the expressed wish to progress from the undesirable poor law 
system. With reference to the provisions of the various unemployment 
insurance acts of the 1920s, McGilligan was of the opinion that 'any 
further provision of that nature must be looked upon as dole, becausé 
contributions having been exhausted and having been multiplied five 
times over, any further multiplication, in the state in which the 
unem ploym ent fund is, and having reference to those previous 
multiplications, would be nothing more or less than complete charity'.43
Part of the impetus behind the 'work for benefit' idea came from a 
grass roots level. Illustrative of this is the resolution submitted by the 
Offaly Joint Committee of Farmers and Civic Reformers' Association to 
the government in 1926, which requested the government to devise 
schemes whereby those in receipt of 'the dole', the term popularly applied 
to unemployment benefit, firstly in Britain, in the post World War I 
period, could be em ployed at 'useful work' such as drainage or 
reclamation schemes: 'We consider the present system demoralising and 
only tends to lower the character and morals of the unemployed'.44 A 
similar resolution was adopted in 1925 at a meeting of the unemployed in 
Wexford town, which again emphasised the desirability of employment 
over 'dole payments', but also the necessity of sufficient unemployment 
benefit where securing a job became impossible.45
Exacerbating the lack of provisions for the unemployed was the less 
than ideal system of administration, a cause for concern and complaint 
during the period. In particular it was reported as not uncommon for 
employment officers, those charged with administering the legislation on 
the ground, to suggest to claimants of insurance benefit that, if they had
43 DD vol. 12, 30 June 1925, col. 1770.
44 Provision of employment of any kind in lieu of issue of unemployment benefit: resolution (N.A., 
D/Fin., Offaly Joint Committee of Fanners and Civic Reform Association, F 88/45/26).
45 Resolution adopted at meetings of unemployed at Wexford, (N. A., D/Fin. F 88/53/25).
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difficulty securing work in Ireland, then there was work to be had in 
Britain, or Belfast or other areas in Northern Ireland.46
In 1930 Sean Lemass, then Fianna Fail T.D. for South Dublin City, 
claim ed to have received numerous complaints regarding the way 
claimants were treated by employment officers: 'I was told that workers 
who became unemployed and desired to claim benefit were not treated as 
insured persons receiving benefits for which they had paid premiums but 
as paupers seeking charity'.47 A further cause for concern was the 
administrative delay of up to six weeks between the initial request for 
benefit and the first payment being made.48
We can conclude therefore that, from every point of view provision 
for the unemployed was far from satisfactory under the Cumann na 
nGaedheal government. Benefits were low and applied only to the 
insured classes while those not covered by insurance relied on poor law 
relief in the form of home assistance.
National Health Insurance
Apart from unemployment insurance, a provision increasingly 
inadequate as time went on, the only other social insurance scheme in 
operation in the Free State was sickness insurance. Described by Dr 
Francis Ward, a Fianna Fail T.D. appointed parliamentary secretary to the 
Minister for Local Government and Public Health in 1932, as the 'most 
unsatisfactory public service of all',49 sickness, or as it was more 
commonly referred to, health insurance, proved an administrative and 
financial morass during the period under discussion here. Established
46 Thomas Johnson, DD vol. 4, 17 July 1923, col. 962.
47 DD vol. 34, 30 Apr. 1930, col. 1157.
48 Hugh Colohan, DD vol. 34, 30 Apr. 1930, col. 1166; William Broderick, DD vol. 34, 30 Apr. 1930, 
col. 1168.
49 DD vol. 23, 24 May 1928, col. 2024.
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under British rule in 1911 when benefit payments for a single man were 
the same as those for a married man with several children, it was 
modified in particular by the National Health Insurance Acts of 1913 as 
discussed in chapter one. Separated from the British scheme on 1 April 
1922, administration of the act in Ireland was cumbersome, with total 
expenses in 1926 amounting to £145,000, while the total amount of 
benefit paid out was £197,000.50 This represented an administrative cost 
of over 3/8 for each insured person in the Saorstat, against 1/4 in 
England.51 There was also considerable administrative delay, up to two 
months in some cases, in the payment of benefit from the time the initial 
claim for benefit was submitted. This was in the context of the average 
duration of illness in acute cases being about three weeks.52 When 
payment was finally made, it was sometimes given in a grudging way.
Another persistent problem arose by virtue of the fact of having such 
a large number of approved societies. Societies which catered for 
workers in sheltered employment were in a position to pay, with the 
approval of the commission, increased benefits and to provide treatment 
benefits which had the effect of preventing or shortening illness. Over 
one hundred branches of approved societies were providing additional 
benefits ranging from optical and dental treatment to convalescent or 
hospital treatment.53 On the other hand, societies which catered for 
m em bers exposed to such hazards as all weathers and broken 
employment were near insolvency, frequently finding difficulty in paying 
the minimum statutory benefits,54 in which case they could impose an 
additional levy on members:
50 DD vol. 23,24 May 1928, col. 2035.
51 Report of the Committee o f Inquiry into Health Insurance and Medical Services (Dublin, 1925), p.
7.
52 Francis Ward, DD vol. 38,1 May 1931, col. 680.
53 National Health Insurance Commission Report, (1921/28), pp 18-19.
54 Department of Social Welfare, First report, p. 28.
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The inequality in the benefit rate may not and as a rule does not 
arise from bad management or mismanagement on the part of a 
particular society, but arises most frequently from the fact that 
society 'B' has a selected membership, such for instance as bank 
employees, post office employees, railway employees or such like, 
while society 'A' has to recruit its membership amongst the 
industrial classes where conditions of employment are most 
unhealthy... The scheme...that permits inequality of this kind 
cannot seriously be termed a nadonal system of insurance.55
Faced with these problems in one of the most significant schemes of 
social legislation then in existence, and mindful of the fact that the 1911 
act was based on the needs of an industrial country and therefore not 
altogether suited to Ireland, the cabinet, following much prompting over a 
number of years,56 approved the establishment of a committee of inquiry 
at its meeting on 1 April 1924.57 Or at least the committee of inquiry was 
officially credited with dealing with these issues. In fact the initial 
foundation of the committee rested upon the government’s desire to cut 
public expenditure, by up to £4,000,000 in 1923,58 Ernest Blythe being 
particularly involved in its early constitution. In a letter to Sir Joseph 
Glynn of the National Health Insurance Commission in October 1923, the 
Department of Finance stated that :
The present system of Health Insurance involves a heavy burden 
on the state, and it is a question for serious consideration whether 
the benefit to the community is in present circum stances 
commensurate with the burden imposed.59
The correspondence was a prologue to the establishm ent of the
committee of inquiry, its terms of reference including a directive to report
into the possibilities of effecting greater efficiency and economy. The
55 L. J. Duffy, 'National Health Insurance from the members standpoint', Journal o f the Statistical and 
Social Inquiry Society of Ireland, vol. 14 (1919-30), p. 56.
56 See for example Sinn Féin, Economic Programme (n.d.), p. 18.
57 Meeting of Executive Council, 1 Apr. 1924, (N.A., Government Minutes, G2/3).
58 Letter to Sir Joseph Glynn, National Health Insurance Commission, 19 Oct. 1923 (N.A., D/Fin, 
National Health Insurance: suggested inquiry, 1934, F 46/1/24).
59 Ibid.
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committee appointed to investigate the matter was chaired by William 
M agennis, former Professor of Metaphysics at University College, 
Dublin and then Cumann na nGaedheal T.D., and included Sir Joseph 
Glynn of the National Health Insurance Commission and representatives 
from the ministries of local government and finance, together with an 
actuary from the Department of the British Government Actuary, a 
representative of the medical profession and Canon M.J. McHugh of 
Ballyhaunis, 'in view of his knowledge and experience of the practical 
working of approved societies especially in rural areas'.60
After twenty-nine meetings and having exam ined forty-nine 
w itnesses, including represen tatives o f the Irish  Insurance 
Commissioners, the Department of Local Government and Public Health, 
Dublin Chamber of Commerce, the Approved Societies' Association of 
Ireland, the County Council General Council, the Irish Labour Party, the 
Irish Farmers’ Union and a number of the County Boards of Health,61 the 
committee presented its interim report in February 1925. The report was 
critical of the cumbersome administration of the insurance scheme. More 
importantly, it made a strong case for the inclusion of agricultural 
labourers and domestic servants in the scheme,62 a recurring theme in a 
policy which was to continue to exclude these classes. The final report of 
the commission was presented in February 1927 and published in 1928. 
Presenting a number of recommendations, its most significant was 
recommendation number nine:
That unification [of the approved societies] - if feasible - offers the
best method of simplifying national health insurance in the Saorstat
60 Memo, National Health Insurance: suggested inquiry, 1934 (N.A., D/Fin F 46/1/24).
61 Interim Report o f  the Committee of Inquiry into Health Insurance and Medical Services, p. 1.
62 Ibid., p. 6.
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and of effecting very considerable economies in the cost of its 
central administration.63
While the committee had been in session, one modification had
already been effected: each insurance society and branch not having its
headquarters in the Free State was forced to cease business,64 an issue
raised by Sinn Fein at a very early stage.65 Another modification came in
the form of the National Health Insurance Act of 1924 which decreased
the financial burden of the state regarding insurance by placing part of the
burden of costs of medical certification on the insurance fund itself.
The approved societies en masse opposed unification, many of them
submitting resolutions to the Department of Finance outlining their
concerns. Long before the final publication of the committees report, the
Slainte Insurance Society of Dublin submitted such a resolution, as did
St. Mel's Catholic Diocesan Insurance Society of Longford, the Clare
Insurance Benefit Society, the Dublin Protestant Insurance Society, the
Limerick Workers' Approved Society, the Cork Railway Employers'
Friendly Society and numerous others.66 Following the publication of the
Interim Report of the Committee on Health Insurance, the Approved
Societies' Association of Ireland submitted its own 'protest' against
unification to the government on the grounds that the proposed system
would not affect economy, but would rather 'create friction of a
dangerous nature between the various sectional and sectarian groups of
insured persons'.67
The objections, largely representing sectional and vested interests
themselves, were taken cognisance of, as a bill was prepared to give
63 Department of Local Government and Public Health, Report on the administration o f national 
health insurance (1928), p. 10.
64 National Health Insurance Act, 1923 (No. 20 of 1923).
65 Sinn F6in, Economic programme (n.d.), p. 18.




legislative effect to the thrust of the committee's proposals. The second 
stage of the national health insurance bill was debated in October 1929, 
again stressing the twin aims of simplification and economy. Based for 
the most part on the Reports of the Committee of Inquiry into National 
Health Insurance, it did not include proposals for the formation of a 
single unified insurance society, but rather would encourage the 
voluntary amalgamation of the existing sixty-five approved societies to 
produce a more economic and efficient administration.68 The reason 
given for not implementing the recommendations of the committee of 
inquiry in this instance was to afford approved societies a further 
opportunity for such voluntary amalgamation.69 N either was the 
recommended system of medical benefits legislated for in the bill, despite 
Richard Mulcahy, the Minister for Local Government and Public Health, 
admitting that this would be 'very desirable'.70 The reasons given for this 
omission were, firstly, that it would involve larger contributions from 
employers and employees and, secondly, that a longer period was 
necessary to judge the effectiveness of the recent centralisation of health 
services under Boards of Health, in order to avoid the duplication of 
services.71 Another important provision of the 1929 act was the fact that 
it terminated women's insurance upon marriage, a new marriage benefit 
being introduced in place of the limited benefits which were provided for 
under the previous schemes.
By 1930 the number of approved societies was still 65, one of these 
having 19 branches, while the total numbers insured was 399,967.72
68 National Health Insurance Act 1929: Notes for Minister (N.A., D/SW, I.A. 84/53(c)).
69 Ibid.
70 DD vol. 32,23 Oct. 1929, col. 77.
71 National Health Insurance Act 1929: Notes for Minister (N.A., D/SW, I.A. 84/53(c)).
72 DD vol. 33,19 Feb. 1930, col. 404-5.
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In conclusion it may be said that the 1929 act was a stop-gap 
measure with the short term aim of reducing the government's financial 
commitments; the act sprung from an economic rather than a social 
impetus. This economy was partly affected by a reduction of the 
numbers of staff working for the National Health Insurance Commission, 
a much more desirable means of effecting savings than that chosen by the 
government when it came to old age pensions.
Old Age Pensions
As in the case of national health insurance, the question of reform 
of old age pensions was approached from an economic rather than a 
social perspective, and perhaps best illustrated Cumann na nGaedheal's 
'campaign for retrenchm ent'.73 Introduced into Ireland in 1908 at a 
maximum rate of 5/- for people over seventy years of age, following the 
German precedent of 1891, old age pensions were the first scheme of 
British social policy which did not require proof of destitution for receipt 
of benefit, and in that context was a mile-stone in the development of the 
welfare state. In this sense also old age pensions were a move forward 
from the poor law idea. Under the Saorstat government, however, they 
were shunted back into the poor law mould, the reduction of one shilling 
in benefit effected in 1924 being seen as important enough for mention in 
the general surveys of twentieth-century Irish history. Even without 
accepting this as a yardstick of importance, the reduction was significant 
as it underlined the government's general attitude and approach to the 
maintenance and development of social security policies. They were 
viewed at best as a necessary evil, an economic burden largely necessary 
due to poor financial management by the recipients. Although termed
73 Ronan Fanning, The Irish Department o f Finance, 1922-58 (Dublin, 1978), p. 105. Fanning 
discusses the conservative economic and fiscal policy of Cumann na nGaedheal under this heading.
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differently, it was essentially seen in official circles as the provision of 
charity, often to the 'undeserving poor'.
Administered by the Department of Local Government and Public 
Health, the reduction from 10/- to 9/- per week was hinted at as early as 
November 1922, when the estimate set aside for old age pensions was 
over £3,300,000. On that occasion the chairman of the government, W. 
T. Cosgrave, reminded the Dail that each pension granted came out of the 
revenue of the country 'which is sorely needed for... constructive work'.74
It was in this context that complaints regarding the failure to pay 
pensions to people who would ordinarily qualify for them were treated 
with no great interest. Such cases were not difficult to find. The main 
difficulty was proving one's age in the absence of census papers or 
marriage certificates, 'and the sins of the young people are very often 
coming against the same people when they are old, by virtue of the fact 
that they put themselves down as much younger than they actually were 
when they were being married'.75 Sean MacBride reported one such case 
in County Mayo where there were two sisters, the younger of whom had 
been receiving the old age pension for a number of years while it was 
refused to the older one.76 Ernest Blythe, in effect the final court of 
appeal in cases where pensions were not paid, was unsympathetic:
There might be cases where the pension was refused to people who 
were entitled to get it, but I am equally sure that there are as many 
cases, or perhaps more cases, of people getting it who should not
get it, and I think that if one grievance is remedied the other should
also be remedied.77
To illustrate his point, Blythe quoted statistics regarding the number of
recipients of blind pensions, available to medically certified blind people
over fifty years of age and adm inistered under old age pension
74 DD vol. 1,16 Nov. 1922, col. 2128.
75 Thomas Johnson, DD vol. 1, 16 Nov. 1922, col. 2129.
76 DD vol. 1,16 Nov. 1922, col. 2133.
77 DD vol. 1, 16 Nov. 1922, col. 2130.
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legislation. He claimed that the number of people in Ireland receiving 
blind pensions was 3,282, costing £82,000 annually while the 
corresponding numbers in Scotland, with a total population in excess of 
1.5 million of Ireland's, were 1,436 and £35,000. T he results show...the 
need for stringency and care'78 concluded Blythe.
The topic was returned to by the president, W. T. Cosgrave, in the 
summer of 1923 during the debate on the pension estimates. He made 
known his belief that 'quite a number of people are getting pensions from 
the state at the present moment who are living in fairly comfortable 
houses, supported by their relatives'.79 It was obvious that government 
thinking regarding pensions was underpinned by a philosophy more 
appropriate to poor law thinking. In the same debate the pensions 
committees, appointed for every borough or urban district with a 
population of 10,000 by the borough or urban district council and for 
every county by the county council with the primary duty of considering 
and deciding on claims, came in for criticism for their lack of stringency 
in applying the official mles to the full:
Perhaps some of the committees thought they were doing a good 
thing for the country by getting as much out of the British treasury 
as they could, and they think they can do the same now: the 
department does not intend to allow them.80
On the same occasion Blythe again reiterated his point of 1922.
Discussing once more the appeals by some deputies that there were
people fully qualified to receive the pension but were not doing so, he
replied that 'I am satisfied there are thousands of people getting pensions
who are not entitled to get them'. Referring to the lack of
conscientiousness of the pension committees he went on to state that their
loose application of the qualification rules (more a supposition than a
78 Ibid.
79 DD vol. 3, 18 May 1923, col. 1112.
80 Cathal O Shannon, DD vol. 3, 18 May 1923, col. 1114.
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reality) 'has led to persons taking outdoor relief who would have been 
reluctant, and perhaps ashamed, in the past, because of their 
circumstances. They could have got along, and would have got along 
without it.'81 Again it betrayed the worst principles of poor law thinking: 
making relief so undesirable that only the destitute would seek it. It also 
associated old age pensions with poor relief, something specifically 
avoided by the British authorities from its introduction in 1909. This 
situation was not unique to old age pensions: we have already alluded to 
Patrick M cGilligan’s association of increases in unemployment benefit 
with the provision of ‘complete charity’.82 The distinctions between 
income maintenance policies, poor relief and charity were becoming 
increasingly blurred in the minds of the Free State government and their 
administrative officials, the terms often being used interchangeably in 
political circles in this period.
It came as little surprise therefore when the cabinet approved a 
reduction in old age pensions from 10/- to 9/- at its meeting on 27 
October 1923.83 It came in the context of the appeal by the Saorstat for 
borrowings on the international market. It was seen as necessary to get 
domestic finances in order, so as to enhance the credibility of Ireland and 
to increase the chances of receiving international loans. At a time when 
expenditure exceeded revenue, B lythe's philosophy was that 
'retrenchment, then, is the only course'.84 Pensions became a focus for 
attention as it was claimed that almost one half of total normal 
expenditure, £10 million, was devoted to education and pensions. The 
opposition would argue of course that the weakness of the Saorstat 
economy had driven the productive population to more prosperous
81 DD vol. 3, 18 May 1923, col. 1119.
82 DD vol. 12, 30 June 1925, col. 1770.
83 Meeting of Executive Council, 27 Oct. 1923, (N.A., Government Minutes G2/3).
84 DD vol. 5, 14 Nov. 1923, col. 666.
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shores:
What would naturally be the producing part of the population - the 
young people and the able-bodied people - are being driven out by 
emigration, and we have to carry on the service of education to 
deal with the young people and the service of old age pensions for 
the older population.85
The reduction was announced in the Dail in November 1923 alongside an
announcem ent to reduce teachers' salaries by 10%, while the
demobilisation of the army, already in progress, was expected to reduce
government spending dramatically. In the case of old age pensions a
suitable scapegoat was proffered: 'the pensioners may attribute a high
degree of responsibility to those who have wasted and impoverished the
country during the past two years'.86 The necessary legislation was
introduced in February 1924, the bill also providing for a review of the
method of calculating the annual value of capital or property held by
applicants. The only group excepted from the decrease were those over
80 years of age who had been in receipt of pension before the amending
legislation was passed.
Predictably the bill met with strenuous objections, most vocally
from Thomas Johnson who described the reduction as unsustainable and
the adm inistrative changes as 'Gradgrind' in character.87 Johnson's
colleague in the Labour Party, Padraig Hogan, a writer and composer
from Clare who had been deported and tried in England following the
1916 Rising, was also harshly critical of the new legislation:
Deirtear go bhfuil rialtas na nGall inthighthe agus gur Rialtas 
Gaoldhalach ata againn anois. B'fheidir ach...ta aon rud amhain 
cinnte - ta rud ceapaithe ag an rialtas seo nar cheap rialtas na 
nGall riamh; 'se sin daoine bochta na tire seo do chur chun bhas.88
85 Eamon de Valera, DD vol. 25,12 July 1928, col. 475.
86 Ernest Blythe, DD vol. 5 ,14 Nov. 1923, col. 673.
87 DD vol. 6, 12 Feb. 1924, col. 808.
88 DD vol. 6, 21 Feb. 1924, col. 1292.
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Placing the new maximum pension at 91- in context we can note that lib. 
of butter at the time cost 2s. Id., a 21b loaf of bread 5d., lib  of cheapest 
tea 3s. 6d. and lib of sugar 7d.89
Table 3.3
Retail prices in Irish towns of 500 inhabitants and upwards, as averaged from















Beef/lb 8d 13.5d 13d - - - -
Butter/lb 14d 24d 23d 2/2 2/3 2/2 2/2
Cheese/lb lOd 18d 17d 1/5 1/6 1/6 1/6
Fresh
milk/quart
2.5d 7d 5d 6.5d 6d 6.5d 6d
Bread/ 
21b loaf
3d 6d 6d 5.5d 5d 6d 5.5d
Sugar/lb 2d 6d 6d 6d 7d 6d 3.5d
Tea
(cheapest)/lb
18d 31d 27d 2/5 2/7 2/7 2/2
Source: Ministry for Econom ic Affairs, R ep o r t on the c o s t o f  living, 1922-25 .
Blythe partially excused the reduction by claiming a greater 
purchasing power in money, a dubious point when we compare the price 
of basic foodstuffs in the period 1922-1925 (see table). The Minister for 
Local Government and Public Health, James Bourke, a graduate of St 
John's College, Fordham, New York, who had responsibility for 
administering pensions, offered no such practical reasoning, stating 
uncompromisingly that the state:
cannot afford to distribute charity on that extremely liberal scale... 
One of the most serious defects of the Irish character is this 
tendency to dependence of one kind or another, and it is a very 
serious thing in the state at the present time. The number of people 
who lead a parasitic existence, more or less, is increasing in 
proportion to the number of people who are striving to make an 
honest living.90
89 Ministry of Economic Affairs, Reports on the cost of living, 1922-25.
90 DD vol. 7, 25 June 1924, col. 3054.
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Again the distinction between the deserving and undeserving poor was 
being stressed. Indeed Bourke went so far as to claim that the famine 
'was mainly as a result of charity continually distributed at the expense of 
the provident and thrifty',91 a remark hardly worthy of George Nicholls.
The 1924 legislation did achieve its primary goal of reducing 
expenditure, the estimate for old age pensions being reduced by £357,800 
to £2,919,200 on the previous year.92 The numbers in receipt of pensions 
also decreased by 7,000 between 1924 and 1925, the majority receiving 
pensions of 9/-.93 The reduction also contributed to the halving of the rate 
of tax in the Free State from 6/- in the £ in 1922 to 3/- by 1927.94 While 
saying in the spring of 1926 that he saw 'no prospect of being able to 
effect the restoration in the near future',95 by the winter of 1927, Blythe 
was expressing the hope that an improvement in economic conditions 
would allow for the restoration to old age pensioners of the reductions 
made in 1924.96
Table 3.4
Number of recipients of old age and blind pensions, 1914*1926














♦Note: The blind pensions act was passed in 1920
Source: D D  vol. 18, 23 Feb. 1927, col. 965
91 Ibid., col. 3055.
92 President, DD vol. 8, 25 July 1924, col. 2296.
93 Department of Industry and Commerce, Statistical abstract, 1931.
94 W. T. Cosgrave, Policy o f the Cumann na nGaedheal Party (Dublin, 1927), p. 8.
95 DD vol. 13,25 Feb. 1926, col. 1053.
96 DD vol. 21 ,2  Nov. 1927, col. 586.
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The provision in the 1924 act for a general investigation into old 
age pensions quickly became reality in the form of another committee of 
inquiry, 'to consider and report what alterations, if any, should be made in 
the provisions of the acts relating to old age pensions and pensions for the 
blind respecting the machinery for the determination of claims, questions 
and appeals, regard being had especially to the desirability of the just and 
expeditious treatment of all applications'.97 Appointed on 1 January 
1925, the committee, which included representatives of the Labour Party, 
the Catholic clergy, Dublin County Council and the Ministry of Local 
Government and Public Health, held nineteen meetings in all. Having 
placed a number of advertisements in Dublin daily papers to encourage 
submissions from individuals, the committee also received evidence from 
the National Executive of the Irish Labour Party, the General Council of 
County Councils, the Irish Farmers' Union, the Association of Municipal 
Authorities and the Societh of St Vincent de Paul. Many criticisms of the 
existing machinery were voiced. The committee of inquiry again placed 
a large amount of blame for the inadequacy of the administration on the 
shoulders of the pension committees, saying their 'general apathy' was 
resulting in 'careless investigation of claims'.98 The administration of 
blind pensions was no less problematic, the committee finding that 
'practically all blind pensions are appealed'.99
The committee also criticised the appeals procedure as 'defective in 
its design and unsatisfactory in its working',100 a fact in large measure 
attributable to a marked lack of co-operation between the pension officers 
who investigated claims and who were usually custom and excise officers
97 Report o f old age pensions committee o f inquiry, (Dublin, 1926), p. 3.
98 Ibid., p. 6.
99 Ibid., p. 11.
100 Ibid., p. 8.
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who performed pension work in addition to normal duties, and the 
pensions committees who had primary duty in considering and deciding 
all pension claims and who were appointed by each local authority:
Such a state of things naturally leads to a position in which each 
party  considers the other unreasonable in every case of 
disagreement, and in which a sort of antagonism develops, 
resulting in the committee allowing claims which should never 
have been appealed, the ultimate result being an abnormal number 
of appeals and the delay, irritation and dissatisfaction consequent 
thereupon.101
To remedy this seriously defective system, the report of the committee 
recommended that pension officers attend pension committee meetings 
regularly and that an intermediate committee between the pension 
committees and the Departm ent of Local Government should be 
appointed. At this time some appeal cases were taking up to six months 
to sort out.102 One of the main reasons for the large number of appeals, 
apart from the cumbersome method of administration, was the question of 
establishing means, the committee reporting that the existing system of 
evaluating stock, crops and the general condition of holdings, though not 
'ideally perfect' was 'for general purposes the most satisfactory and fair 
method that can be adopted'.103
It was the administration of the legislation on the ground that had 
the greatest impact on the ordinary people. While the parliamentary acts 
were binding on everybody, there was an element of the arbitrary at local 
level, where the pension officers and pension committees decided who 
should and who shouldn't receive a pension, and what level of pension 
was justified. In this context it is little wonder that most of the 
parliamentary questions relating to pensions concerned individual cases 
brought to the attention of local T.D.s. The cases raised at question time
101 Ibid., p. 7.
102 Ibid.. p. 13.
103 Ibid., p. 16.
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in the Dail can be taken as representative of the hundreds if not thousands 
of cases which never went beyond the pension officer.
Often the pension officers were perceived as unhelpful in 
processing pension claims, as grudging in their allowance or rejection of 
individual applications. As in the case of home assistance, pension 
officers were accused of writing to the Societh of St Vincent de Paul and 
other charitable societies requesting to be informed if applicants were in 
receipt of support from these societies. When this particular issue was 
raised in the Dail, Blythe did not fault the pension officers for taking such 
a course of action, saying it was their duty 'to ascertain and report to the 
pension authorities the means from all sources of every claimant to a 
pension'.104
Another complaint regarding the way in which pension officers 
decided on applications harkened back to the worst excesses of the 
landlord and poor law eras, when the neat and thrifty were penalised:
If  the local pension officer goes into a house which is kept clean 
and tidy and has any appearance of comfort he appears to make up 
his mind that these people are sufficiently comfortable without the 
pension. But if he goes into a place that is dirty and untidy, then 
his decision is reversed and the pension is granted.105
Owing to the way in which the act is administered, thrifty people 
who keep their houses clean are penalised for their thrift and 
cleanliness when the pension officer comes to investigate their 
claim.106
Stereotypically a problem associated with British imperialism in Ireland, 
its occurrence in the Saorstat was discussed in the Dail on more than one 
occasion. Sean MacEntee, an engineer by profession and at the time a 
Fianna Fail T.D. for Dublin and honorary treasurer of the party, again 
raised the matter in 1929:
104 DD vol. 15, 20 July 1926, col. 2212.
105 DD vol. 18, 25 Feb. 1927, col. 968.
106 Timothy Murphy, DD vol. 20, 5 July 1927, col. 389.
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Small farmers, particularly, are hard hit by these methods. The 
values put upon the land and farm produce, I am informed, are 
often unjustifiable and often quite thrifty people who keep their 
homesteads clean and who by their thrifty methods and their 
cleanliness maintain an appearance of comfort are penalised.107
Blythe's reply that everything was being done to administer the act
'liberally and sympathetically'108 was hardly adequate. It was also untrue.
As he was to claim himself in June 1931, out of the 118,000 pensions
granted or applied for, up to 20,000 were investigated annually: 'It does
mean the penalising of thrift'.109 The case was particularly difficult for
farmers who owned any piece of property or livestock. Again harkening
back to the 'quarter acre' clause of the poor law, Timothy Murphy, a
Labour T.D. for Cork and member of the West Cork Board of Public
Assistance and Old Age Pensions Committee, claimed that 'the difficulty
of obtaining an old age pension for a person with a small patch of land is
so great that it is almost impossible'.110
Determination of the age of applicants was the other major cause
for criticism in the administration of old age pension. This was blamed
by the government on two things. Firstly, Blythe claimed that 'there are
many applications coming forward from people who are near the age and
who think they will have a shot at it', thus resulting in 'a greater
stringency and detailed exam ination of age in the case of all
applications'.111 Secondly, in the absence of official records in many
cases to verify age, special precautions were necessary. Official
registration of births did not begin in Ireland until 1 January 1864, while
the destruction of records in the Four Courts during the civil war meant
census schedules were not always available. In such cases certified
107 DD vol. 31. 3 July 1929, col. 240.
108 DD vol. 30, 3 July 1929, col. 266.
109 DD vol. 39, 29 June 1931, col. 943.
110 DD vol. 20, 5 July 1927, col. 389.
111 DD vol. 33, 19 Feb. 1930, col. 498.
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extracts from school records, certificates of marriage or other family 
records, wills, parish records, and a large list of other documents were 
used to verify age. In the absence of these, statements from witnesses 
regarding a claim ant's age were accepted, albeit with stringent 
regulations:
A mere assertion, even an oath, that a claimant is seventy years 
old, is not of much assistance. A witness should recite in his 
affidavit his name and full postal address, and state his own age 
and how proved, and then declare on oath the facts which in his 
judgement prove the age of the claimant... The affidavit should be 
signed and executed in the usual formal manner before a district 
justice, peace commissioner of commission for oaths.112
There were other difficulties in the administration of pensions at local
level too, such as the fact that people in receipt of pensions before
entering a county home had the pension revoked upon entering, and had
to apply afresh when leaving the county home again.113
In the context of these problems, and the overall air of stringency
which underpinned all of the complaints and inadequacies, it was hardly
likely that the request of Michael Connolly, a Cumann na nGaedheal T.D.
from Kenagh, Co. Longford, to have the qualifying age reduced by five
years to sixty-five would be listened to. His talk about the 'universal
satisfaction through the country' in the administration of old age pension
was also somewhat optimistic.114
Before concluding discussion of old age pensions, it is important to
mention briefly the area of blind pensions which were administered under
the old age pension legislation. First introduced in 1920 blind pensions
were payable to those who were certified as blind by the medical
profession, the definition of blindness being strictly laid down by the
government:
112 Department of Local Government and Public Health, Report 1930-31, p. 37.
113 William Davin, DD vol. 27, 14 Nov. 1938, col. 90-91.
114 DD vol. 27, 14 Nov. 1928, col. 96.
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Persons whose acuity of vision (refracted error being corrected) is 
below 1/20 of the normal (3/20 Snellen) are usually unable to 
perform work requiring eyesight, while persons with vision better 
than 1/10 (6/60 Snellen) are usually able to perform some such 
work.115
The governm ent also provided grants to approved agencies and 
institutions which provided employment, training, education, and care 
and maintenance for blind people, the four principal agencies being St 
Mary's Asylum for female blind in Merrion Dublin, St Joseph's Asylum 
for male blind in O Connell Street, Dublin, the Richmond National 
Institution for the industrious Blind also in O Connell Street, Dublin and 
the Asylum for the Blind in Cork city.116
The pre-1924 rates of old age pensions were restored through the 
Old Age Pensions Act, 1928. Although alluded to by the government 
soon after the reduction had been affected, the impetus came in the form 
of a motion put down in the Dail by Daniel Morrissey, a Labour T.D. 
from Tipperary and member of the Old Age Pension Commission, in 
February 1928, calling for a restoration in the former statutory rates of 
old age and blind pensions. The motion, with the support of Fianna Fail, 
was carried by 78 votes to 71,117 Blythe introducing an amending bill in 
March 1928. Coming into operation on 6 April of the same year, the Old 
Age Pensions Act, 1928, restored the maximum pension to 10/- per 
week.118
Widows' and Orohans' Pensions
Unlike old age pensions, widows' and orphans' pensions was an 
area of social policy not formally legislated for in Britain until 1925,
115 DD vol. 22, 7 Mar. 1928, col. 821.
116 Department of Local Government and Public Health, First report, 1922-25, p. 42.
117 DD vol. 22, 29 Feb. 1928, col. 489.
118 Old Age Pensions Act, 1928 (No. 1 of 1928).
101
following the lead set by Germany in 1911 and Denmark in 1914. It was 
therefore an area which the government of the Saorstat would have to 
legislate for out of its own sense of social justice and economic need.
It was the Irish Mothers' Pensions Society which was to the fore in 
demanding the provision of economic security for widows and orphans. 
At a meeting in 1920 it resolved:
That the present poor law relief methods, as applied to widows and 
orphans are inadequate to the needs of such cases, and unjust in their 
economic incidence to those ratepayers who reside amidst largely 
populated working-class districts; that the system of state pensions 
for necessitous mothers and children prevailing in the United States 
affords a practical and just solution of this grievance; that we appeal 
to all Irish representative bodies to co-operate with this Society in its 
efforts to secure the establishment in Ireland of Mothers' Pensions 
modelled on the lines adopted by the American Republic.119
Such help and co-operation was forthcoming. As early as 1919 the
following resolution had been passed by a number of public bodies in
Ireland:
That the time has arrived when the burden imposed by the poor law 
system  [in the form of rates] should be lightened by the 
establishment of adequate state pensions for widows and orphans 
and calls for immediate action to this effect.120
A copy of the Mothers' Pensions Society resolution was forwarded to the
Department of Finance which received many such resolutions specifically
regarding the provision of pensions for widows and orphans who were
wholly dependent on poor relief in the absence of personal means.
Among those submitting resolutions was the M unicipal Council of
Wexford, which also used the example of the state pensions for mothers
and children prevailing in America, the Benevolent Fund, the Irish
Women Workers' Union (which also demanded that old age pensions be
payable at 65 years of age) and the Irish Co-operative Women's Guild,
119 Letterhead of Irish Mothers’ Pensions Society.
120 Timothy Murphy, DD vol. 26,17 Oct. 1928, col. 481.
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which took 'a very serious view of the poverty and child neglect caused 
by the loss of the bread winner in the Irish Free State', calling on the 
government 'to immediately pass legislation to deal with widows' and 
orphans' pensions'.121 The Labour Party, in their booklet The Nation 
Organised, (c l920) also called for the introduction of such pensions as 'a 
must'.122
In 1927 the Commission on the Relief of the Sick and Destitute 
Poor, including the Insane Poor, came out in favour of widows' and 
orphans' pensions: ‘we received a considerable amount of evidence in 
favour of removing destitute widows and children from the purview of 
the poor law... W e are in favour of a scheme of M others’ Pensions’.123 
However, as we have seen, the decade of Cumann na nGaedheal rule was 
one of inquiry rather than action, the recommendations of the 1927 report 
being simply ignored.
The recommendation of the 1927 report, however, was debated on 
numerous occasions in the Dail. Richard Mulcahy, the Minister for Local 
Government and Public Health, pointed out that 6,973 widows and 
widows' children were in receipt of home assistance, the total amount 
paid out in the year up to March 1928 being £118,600.124 However, 
home assistance was seen very much as a last resort, and was stigmatised 
in the manner of all poor law relief, and the Labour Party, together with 
Fianna Fail, pressed for the introduction of an insurance scheme to 
provide pensions and allowances where the need arose. In October 1928 
Timothy Murphy, a Labour T.D. for Cork, introduced a motion which 
would have had just such an effect, calling for the removal of 'all stigma
121 Irish Mothers' Pensions Society: resolution urging that question of mothers pensions be dealt with 
by immediate legislation, 1925-31 (N.A., D/Fin, F 46/9/25).
122 Irish Labour Party, The nation organised (Dublin, 1922), p. 25.
123 Report o f the Commission on the Relief of the Sick and Destitute Poor, including the Insane Poor 
(Dublin, 1927), p. 57.
124 DD vol. 26, 10 Oct. 1928, col. 22.
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of pauperism in such cases'. Murphy used the example of Denmark, 
where, since 1914, women with four children and with property up to a 
value of £350, were entitled to support from the state pension scheme: 'a 
small country can be very often a pioneer in schemes of great national 
importance'.125 However, Ireland was not about to become a pioneer in 
the area of social legislation, a position it avoided right through the period 
under discussion here.
The motion, which was almost one year on the order papers before 
being discussed was dismissed, predictably, by Blythe who did, however, 
hint at organising an inquiry into the question 'so that a motion or a bill 
dealing with this matter could be more satisfactorily discussed by the 
house'.126 However the proposed inquiry was not completed before the 
election o f M arch 1932 after which Fianna Fail came to power, a 
different excuse being proffered by the government on each occasion that 
questions were asked in the Dail by Labour and Fianna Fail regarding the 
investigation.127
The attitude of Cumann na nGaedheal to widows' and orphans' 
pensions underlined the remarkable neglect of the government in the area 
of providing economic security for those not in a position to support 
themselves by private income means. The lead provided by the British 
government before independence was not followed. The sheer paucity of 
the social legislation was in sharp contrast to the radical rhetoric of the 
Easter Proclam ation, and of the Democratic Programme of 1919, 
notwithstanding the fact that the events of 1916 were bitterly criticised 
by, among others, the 'separation women', whose sole income was the 
allowance the British government paid them while their husbands fought
125 DD vol. 26 ,17 Oct. 1928, col. 480.
126 DD vol. 26 ,17 Oct. 1928, col. 493.
127 President, DD vol. 29,25 Apr. 1929, col. 905; Archie Cassidy, DD vol. 33,19 Feb. 1930, col. 393; 
Archie Cassidy, DD vol. 36,19 Nov. 1930, col. 1; Frank Fahy, DD vol. 38, 22 Apr. 1931, col. 2.
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on the battlefields of the First World W ar.128 Stripped of its cultural, 
social and economic idealism, the Democratic Programme was ignored, 
any positive changes in legislation being cancelled by a negative attitude 
to the whole idea of securing, not just politically but culturally and 
economically, the life of the Saorstat citizens.
There were a number of reasons for this marked conservatism 
among former revolutionaries, explaining the paradoxical replacement of 
radicalism by what Hoppen describes as 'instinctive caution',129 not least 
of which was the loss of the leadership abilities and energy of people like 
Michael Collins, whose political dominance is evidenced by the cabinet 
minutes of 1922, and the economic vision of Arthur Griffith. The Civil 
W ar was also very much the cause of a low political and public morale, 
and its dominance as a political issue over the ensuing generations left 
little room for co-operation on social issues in these early years. It was a 
situation by no means unique to Ireland. Finland, for example, endured a 
much shorter but equally divisive civil war following independence 
which was to have a significant impact on the development, or lack of 
development, of social legislation in the early years of independence. In 
many ways an ideological struggle between the communists and the 
capitalists, one of the causes of the Finnish civil war was the reluctance 
of the ruling classes to grant any social reforms. The defeat of the Reds 
(the working classes) ushered in a period of conservatism in the area of 
social policy. By contrast Norway, which became independent of its 
powerful Swedish neighbour in 1905, entered a period of rapid growth 
and expansion in welfare services, providing a solid base for continued 
development. In Ireland, however, the political rather than the social 
became the official yard stick for success. Indeed in many ways social
128 See T. P. Coogan, Michael Collins (London, 1990), p. 1.
129 K.T. Hoppen, Ireland since 1800: conflict and conformity, p. 209.
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legislation was sacrificed in the cause of political stability and 
respectability. The main reason for reducing old age pensions was to 
secure the Saorstat as an economically sound political entity in the eyes 
of the world.
Even in the history books, up to present times, it is in these 
contexts that this first decade of the Free State is discussed. Success in 
the political is seen as success; the provision and development of social 
policy is not an issue. And yet it is this area rather than the political that 
most fundamentally affected the lives of the individual citizens.
Free State attitudes to economic policy and economic growth were 
also crucial in deciding social policy. The reduction in old age pensions 
was paralleled with significant reductions in income tax, the standard rate 
of which fell from 5s in 1924 to 3s 6d by 1932.130 The reduction was 
specifically calculated to bring Irish rates into line with those in Britain 
and to thereby appeal to the economic sensibilities of the influential and 
affluent in the Free State.131 In relation to the poor law and the work of 
the poor law commissioners in the nineteenth century, Helen Burke 
comments that 'keeping it going as inexpensively as possible was a top 
priority, one which often appears from the annual reports to be more 
important then meeting human needs'.132 The attitude and approach of 
the Free State government up to 1932 was identical.
130 See James Meenan, The Irish economy since 1922 (Liverpool, 1970), p. 247 for changes in the 
standard rates of income tax from 1924-67.
131 Ibid., p. 246.
132 Helen Burke, The people and the poor law in nineteenth century Ireland (England, 1987), p. 302.
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CHAPTER 4
'THE POOR MAN'S GOVERNMENT': THE FIRST DECADE 
OF FIANNA FAIL IN POWER, 1932-42
Ideologically, politically and practically the early years of the 
1930s was an important time in the development of the Irish welfare 
state. The importance of the publication of Quadragesimo Anno  by 
Pope Pius XI in 1931 has already been described in chapter two. It 
fanned the flames of the nascent Catholic social movement in Ireland, J. 
H. W hyte, in his pioneering work on Irish church-state relations, 
unerlining its effect as follows:
The growing interest in Catholic social teaching can be seen in the 
statem ents of the Irish bishops. In 1937 Bishop Kinane of 
Waterford pointed to the recent strikes in his city as illustrating the 
need for corporate organisation. Bishop Casey of Ross lamented 
that so little had been done in Ireland to implement the pope's 
social teaching. Cardinal MacRory made it clear his opposition to 
communism didn't mean he was satisfied with existing social 
conditions.1
The encyclical revitalised existing Catholic social movements and gave 
rise to many more, such as the Dublin-based League against Poverty, 
the stated aim of which was raising the standards of economic life in the 
Saorstat: 'The demands of social justice have been stated with a noble 
finality in the two encyclicals'.2
This rise in the Catholic social movement was paralleled by 
political developments of equal importance, namely the coming to 
power of Fianna Fail following the general election of 1932, heralding 
the first change in government since independence. The co-inciding of
1 J. H. Whyte, Church and state in modem Ireland, 1923-79 (2nd edn., Dublin, 1980), p. 74.
2 Prosperity (published by the League Against Poverty) no.l, Nov. 1935.
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these politicial and religous developments was complimentary if  not 
ironic. The social teaching of the Catholic church would be especially 
relevant in terms of the Fianna Fail administration which, despite a 
stormy relationship between its members and the Catholic church at the 
founding of the Free State, was claiming by the late 1920s to 'speak for 
the big body of Catholic opinion...We represent the big element of 
Catholicity'.3 Even if  one questions the veracity of this statement, there 
is little doubt but that Fianna Fail ministers and their administrative 
back-up teams were very familiar with Catholic social teaching as 
described in chapter two: departmental files contain numerous extracts 
from papal encyclicals, many files being given over entirely to the 
social teachings of the church.4
Genuinely perceiving itself as 'the poor man's government’,5 
Fianna Fail from its inception held out the promise of social reform. 
Addressing supporters at La Scala theatre in Dublin at the party's 
foundation in May 1926, Eamon de Valera explained his decision to 
break from Sinn Fein in the context of the sterility of republican politics 
as represented by Sinn Fein, a republicanism which people has come to 
see as 'an empty formulism '.6 Rather than accepting Cumann na 
nGaedheal satisfaction with viewing independence as an end in itself, de 
Valera expressed his opinion that it was merely a means to a far greater 
end:
Independence, political freedom, is regarded by most of you, as it 
is regarded by me, simply as a means to a greater end beyond it. 
The thing beyond it is the right use of our freedom and that use 
must surely be to make provision so that every man and women
3 S. T. O Kelly, DD vol. 30, 5 June 1929, col. 821.
4 E.g. Extracts from 'Forty years after Pius XI and the social order' (N.A., D/SW, I.A. 154/53(j))-
5 Letter from Erskine Childers to Sean MacEntee, Feb. 1948 (U.C.D. Archives, MacEntee Papers, P 
67/299).
6 Eamon de Valera's address at La Scala theatre, Dublin, 16 May 1926, (U.C.D. Archives, MacEntee 
Papers, P 67/443).
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in this country shall have the opportunity of living the fullest lives 
that God intended them to live. It is only since I found how 
neglectful of this side of our purpose many are inclined to 
become that I have been able to sympathise fully with James 
Connolly's passionate protest.7
This founding speech of Fianna Fail seemed to echo de Valera's 
appreciation of the social doctrine of republicanism which had become 
overwhelmed by political concerns: in an earlier election de Valera, as 
president of Sinn Fein, had said 'We intend to devote ourselves to social 
refo rm '.8
The speech in La Scala was followed in November 1926 by an 
outline of the provisional constitution of the new political party. 
Placing the establishment of the 'unity and independence of Ireland as a 
republic' as its first priority, it described its third aim, after the 
restoration of the Irish language, as follows:
To make the resources and wealth of Ireland subservient to the 
needs and welfare of all the people of Ireland.9
A variation on the theme of the 1916 Proclamation, this was to remain
one of the primary aims of Fianna Fail.10 The extent to which it was a
genuine aspiration may be judged from the outspokenness of Fianna Fail
deputies while in opposition about the lack of social policies and social
concern under the Cumann na nGaedheal government.
Neither did the Fianna Fail party waver in its commitment to
social reform on taking over the reigns of power in 1932. As the first
governments had the Democratic Programme upon which to base their
policies, Fianna Fail, whose individual members had been very much
7 Ibid.
8 Sinn Féin, The fruitful principle' (Election handbill, 1923).
9 Memorandum regarding constitution of Fianna Fâil, 9 Nov. 1926 (U.C.D. Archives, MacEntee 
Papers, P 67/443).
10 See for example Fianna Fâil, Côni 1934-35.
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involved in the deliberations of the Democratic Programme albeit under 
a different guise, produced their own political, social and cultural 
yardstick, Bunreacht na hÉireann, the Irish Constitution of 1937. 
Drafted entirely by de Valera himself, it laid a significant amount of 
emphasis on the general area of social policy. In a debate in Dâil 
Éireann on the Bunreacht, de Valera claimed that 'the social system at 
present...is not anything like what it ought to be... It ought to be our 
constant endeavour to try to remedy it.'11
Speaking in the Dâil in July 1939, two years after the introduction 
of the constitution, on the subject of the Banking Commission and 
economic policy, de Valera reiterated these statements, saying 'we still 
believe that these social services, notwithstanding the fact that they are, 
to the extent to which contributions have to be made by the individual in 
the way of taxes and so on, a burden - and they are a certain burden - 
constitute a burden which we ought to carry, which I believe we can 
carry, and which I believe it is our duty to carry.'12 Defining the 
government's social aims as 'our effort to find for every member of the 
community as high a standard of material comfort as it is possible for 
the resources of our country to give', de Valera claimed that, in the area 
of social policy, 'we are at one with the Labour Party'.13
W hat is remarkable about such sentiments, if  we ignore for a 
moment their application in practice, is the extent to which they differed 
totally from the poor law rhetoric and grudging attitudes of Cumann na 
nGaedheal from 1922 to 1932. The Fianna Fail attitude was refreshing; 
it displayed a genuine interest in and enthusiasm for progressive social 
legislation. It perceived the provision of social policy in the spirit of
11 Maurice Moynihan (ed.), Speeches and statements by Eamon de Valera 1917-73 (Dublin and New 
York, 1980), p. 326.
12 Ibid., p. 394.
13 Ibid., p. 405.
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the welfare state, i.e. the ensuring of economic stability for all the 
citizens of the state as a basic right, rather than their provision being 
seen in terms of charity, the poor law approach adopted in practice by 
Cumann na nGaedheal.
The attitude of Fianna Fail towards social policy has been 
traditionally explained in terms of the party's initial dependence on the 
Labour Party for support, Fianna Fail falling short of an overall 
majority by five seats in the election of 1932. Reinforcing the argument 
is the fact that the Fianna Fail government implemented a number of 
policies which appeared in Labour's election manifesto, including the 
introduction of w idow s' and orphans' pensions, unem ploym ent 
assistance and an improved workmen’s compensation. However it seems 
likely that Fianna Fail would have pursued a very similar course of 
social security legislation had it obtained an overall majority in 1932. 
Receiving a majority in the general election of 1933 and therefore no 
longer dependent on Labour support in the Dail, Fianna Fail continued 
to pursue a social programme similar in many respects to that of the 
Labour Party, leading to 'immense progress' in many areas of welfare 
legislation according to Oscar Traynor T.D., who served at different 
times as both M inister for Defence and M inister for Posts and 
Telegraphs: 'Fianna Fail has established finally and definitely the right 
of the workers to work or sustenance' he claimed in the election of June 
1938.14 While the claim of 'immense progress' was an over-statement, 
the social welfare legislation passed in the first decade of Fianna Fail 
rule was far in advance of anything undertaken by Cumann na 
nGaedheal. Perhaps the most important innovation came with the 
introduction of unemployment assistance in 1933 and widows' and
14 Fianna Fdil election handbill of Oscar Traynor and Thomas A. O Reilly, Dublin north-east (n.d., c 
June 1938).
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orphans' pensions in 1935. The national health insurance acts were also 
substantially amended while the old age pensions acts were also changed.
A nother factor to be considered during this period was the 
establishment of Fine Gael (also called United Ireland) in 1933, the 
result of the coming together of Cumann an nGaedheal, the National 
Guard and the National Centre Party. Indicating the new party's social 
philosophy its first leader, General Eoin O Duffy, then head of the 
Blueshirts, wrote in 1934 that 'in pursuance of the principle that the 
state as the organ of society has an obligation to secure within the limits 
of its abilities a decent subsistence for its citizens, United Ireland will 
make the maintenance of the disabled and the destitute and the tackling 
of unemployment its special care'.15 However the ensuing decade in 
opposition gave little reason to believe that the social policies of Fine 
Gael would be substantially different from those of Cumann na 
nGaedheal.
Before embarking on a more detailed discussion of developments 
in this period, it is necessary to outline the rise in the cost of living 
from  the early 1930s to the outbreak of the Second W orld War. 
Attributable in part to the worldwide depression and to the protectionist 
policy of the government, the rise in the cost of living was to form the 
central core in many arguments on social policy during the period. 
Table 4.1 gives the predominant retail prices of everyday goods during 
this period, highlighting both the across-the-board rise in the cost of 
every-day commodities and the higher price of these commodities in 
Dublin relative to the rest of Ireland.
15 Eoin O Duffy, An outline o f the political, social and economic policy o f  Fine Gael (United Ireland) 
(Dublin, 1934), p. 18.
112





Coal Tea Sugar Milk Potatoes Bacon
Streaky




Feb. 1931 24 4 29 32 2.5 6 12 16
Feb. 1932 24 4 28 32 3 6 18 16
F eb .1933 22 4.25 30 36 2.5 6 8 14
F eb .1934 22 4.25 32 36 2.5 6 8 17
Feb. 1935 24 4.25 32 32 3.5 6 10 16
Feb. 1936 28 5 32 36 3.5 6 12 19
Feb. 1937 36 5.5 34 36 3.5 6 12 19
Feb. 1939 34 5.5 36 32 3 7 14 22
Feb. 1940 36 5.5 40 32 4.5 7 14 24
Galway
Feb. 1931 20 4 28 34 2.5-3 5.5 10 16
Feb. 1932 19.5 4 28 36 3-3.5 6 14 14
F eb .1933 19 4.5 30 38 2.5 5.5 5 10
F eb .1934 20 4.5 30 34 2.5 5.5 7 12
Feb. 1935 21 4.5 30 30 3.5 5.5 7 13
F e b .1936 25 5 28 34 3.75 5 9 14
F eb .1937 31 5 28 34 3.5 5 8 16
F eb .1939 29 5 32.5 30 3 5 14 17
Feb. 1940 33 5.25 39 30 4.5 5 9 20
TRALEE
F eb .1931
18 4.5 36 32 2.75 5 10 18
Feb. 1932 20 4.5 36 32 3.25 5 12 16
F eb .1933 18 5 36 34 2.5 5 8 13
F eb .1934 18 4.5 33 32 2.5 4 6 14
Feb. 1935 20 4.5 35 28 3.5 4 8 17
Feb. 1936 25 6 34 32 3.5 4 9 17
F eb .1937 31 6 33 32 3.25 4 10 16
F eb .1939 27 6 34 26 3 5 12 16
Feb. 1940 31 6.25 38 26 4.25 5 10 18
Source: DD vol. 69, 27 Oct. 1937, col. 585-595 and DD vol. 78, 22 Feb. 1940, col. 
1949-50
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Cost of living index in February of each year 1931-40
Base July 1914 = 100
Table 4.1(a)
Year 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940
All
items
164 162 151 152 153 159 167 173 174 197
Food 151 151 130 133 136 145 153 159 160 177
Source: Statistical Abstract, 1937-45
Old Age Pensions
One of the first actions of the Fianna Fail government was to pass 
the Old Age Pensions Act, 1932 which greatly modified the means test 
and the definitions of what could be considered as means, as well as 
reducing the age at which blind pensions were payable from 50 years to 
30 years.16 Coming into operation in September 1932, less than six 
months after Fianna Fail came to power, the act also abolished the 
previous disqualification of recipients of old age pensions from public 
assistance. The act was a deciding factor in the election of January 
1933. In an election leaflet entitled 'What Fianna Fail has done for the 
old age pensioners', the party listed the reforms of 1932, warning that 
'there are hundreds of old persons who got pensions under the Old Age 
Pensions Act, 1932, who will lose them if  Cumann na nGaedheal get 
power again'. The election returned Fianna Fail with 49.7% of the first 
preference votes,17 enabling them to form a single-party government. 
This positive attitude of Fianna Fail towards the necessity of providing 
for the economic welfare of all the citizens of Ireland as a duty of 
government, was well demonstrated by de V alera’s speech on the
16 Old Age Pension Act 1932 (No. 18 of 1932).
17 Vincent Browne (ed.), The Magill book of Irish politics (Dublin, 1981), p. 23.
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banking commission and economic policy to Dail Eireann in the 
summer of 1939:
We are paying for old age pensions because we are taking from a 
section of the community who have wealth and handing it over to 
people who have not got it, because we regard it as a social 
obligation on us to maintain those people.18
The object and intent amounted to a very adequate definition of the
‘welfare state’ ethos. The old age pensions bill of 1938 was also in this
mould. Dealing exclusively with blind pensions, it proposed to exclude
from the calculation of means moneys paid by the local authorities to
the child dependants of blind pension recipients.19 Taken together with
the 1932 act, it allowed Fianna Fail to claim that it had removed:
the dread of the aged who, seeing their ability to work diminish 
year by year have no certain prospect of a livelihood. The "cut" 
m ade by Fine Gael has been restored and the vicious 
"maintenance" clause which pauperised so many in former years 
is removed.20
Such understanding went only so far, however, the ICTU request 
that a pension scheme based on a trade union standard of living and 
available to employed workers at 60 years of age being turned down,21 
as was a request to appoint a committee to ‘report at an early date on the 
conditions of old age pension recipients and the value of the pension 
allowances compared with the purchasing power of allowances ten years 
ago’.22 Likewise, the increase in the cost of living due to the outbreak 
of the second world war was not reflected in any increase in pensions, O 
Ceallaigh saying: ‘I am aware of the increase in the cost of living but I
18 Maurice Moynihan, Speeches and statements, p. 407.
19 Old Age Pensions Act 1938 (No. 26 of 1938).
20 Fianna Friil election handbill, Dublin North-East, June 1938.
21 ICTU, Annual report 1935-36 (Dublin, 1936), p. 50.
22 Dr Joseph Hannigan, DD vol. 81, 11 Dec. 1940, col. 936.
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regret that I cannot see my way to introducing the legislation which 
would be necessary’.23 A further problem relating specifically to blind 
pensions was the delay in the processing of applicants, up to twelve 
months in some instances according to Richard Corish in 1941.24
Unemployment Assistance Act. 1933
The plight of the unemployed was uppermost in de Valera's mind 
when he spoke of social policy. In his address to supporters in La Scala 
theatre in May 1926 he had said that it was 'a fundamental duty of any 
government in any civilised country to see that men and women will not 
starve and little children will not starve because opportunity for useful 
work is denied to the breadwinner'.25 It was a point reiterated by de 
Valera in a publication of 1926 explaining the aims of the new Fianna 
Fail party:
Unemployment and emigration if allowed to continue will so 
cripple this nation that there can be little hope for it in the 
immediate future at any rate. Work must be found. I have 
repeatedly stated that I hold it is the primary duty of the modem 
state to ensure that every man, who is able and willing to work, 
will have work, so that he may earn his daily bread.26
Apart from the obvious social impact of unemployment, the cause of 
most concern was the lack of economic provision for the unemployed, 
the Unemployment Insurance Act, which as we have seen remained 
largely unchanged since its pre-war implementation, proving an 
increasingly inadequate measure.
23 DD vol. 81, 11 Dec. 1940, col. 936.
24 DD vol. 81, 6 Feb. 1941, col. 1998.
25 Eamon de Valera's address to La Scala theatre, 16 May 1926, (U.C.D. Archives, MacEntee Papers, 
P 67/443).
26 Eamon de Valera, What Fianna Fail stands for  (Dublin, 1926).
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Numbers registered as unemployed at employment exchanges and branch
employment offices27
Table 4.2








Source: Department of Industry and Commerce, Memorandum on the trend of 
employment and unemployment in the Saorstdt (1935).
From very early in the Fianna Fail administration there was an 
obvious sense of urgency with regards to the unemployment problem, 
springing both from a genuine social concern for the plight of the 
unemployed and their families, and from a real political concern that 
the crisis could precipitate wide-scale social unrest in the country. The 
problem was 'frequently discussed'28 by the new administration. By 
November 1932 the Minister for Industry and Commerce, Sean Lemass, 
had prepared a detailed analysis of the social and political consequences 
of unemployment, offering his own solution within the parameters of 
the 'w ork or m aintenance principle' already accepted by the 
government. His memorandum to Eamon de Valera, President of the 
Executive Council and Minister for External Affairs, underlined the 
inadequacies of existing provisions for the unemployed, namely 
u n e m p lo y m e n t in su ra n c e  and p u b lic  w ork  schem es:
27 See footnote 26 in previous chapter for notes on interpreting unemployment figures.
28 Memorandum from Minister for Industry and Commerce to President, 14 Nov. 1932 (N.A., 
D/Fin., Economic and Financial position of Saorstdt Eireann, F200/25/25).
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With existing machinery it is not possible to deal with the great 
numbers of unemployed even if the finances and schemes of work 
were available which, as you know, is not the case... In the 
meantime the unemployed are there, dependent on what they can 
get from home assistance funds and private charities which is 
altogether inadequate. In these circumstances something more 
than relief schemes on the scale on which they can now be 
undertaken is required.29
Lemass suggested that that 'som ething m ore' ought to be the
introduction of unemployment assistance, thus placing the issue firmly
on the cabinet agenda.
W hile the secretary of the D epartm ent of Finance, J. J.
McElligott, predictably reacted negatively to Lemass's suggested course
of action, the government was, by early 1933, preparing legislation for
the provision o f unemployment assistance, which would have the effect
of supplementing the major weaknesses of the unemployment insurance
provisions. The first of those weaknesses was of course that the
unemployment insurance acts did not apply to persons employed in
agriculture or private domestic service, with an estimate 148,000 being
employed in non-insurable occupations in 1933.30 The census of 1926
had indicated that 670,076 (53% of the active population) were occupied
in the agricultural sector alone, 138,658 of whom were neither farmers
nor assisting relatives.31 The second weakness was that for those in
insurable employment, payments were restricted to one weeks benefit
for every six contributions paid, with the maximum period of benefit
being 26 weeks in any one year no matter how long a person had been
employed, or how many contributions had been made. These two
weaknesses resulted in the relief of those not insured or whose benefit
had been exhausted being dependant on home assistance, which could be
29 Ibid.
30 Department of Industry and Commerce, Trend in employment (1933).
31 Census 1936, vol. ii, pp 2-3.
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highly arbitrary, the assistance given by local authorities varying from 
one area to another. There was the further problem of the 'taint of 
pauperism which has deterred many persons entitled to that [home] 
assistance from applying for it', as Lemass pointed out in the Dail in 
1933.32
To address these problems an unemployment assistance bill, 
drafted in June 1933, was introduced in the Dail in August 1933 by Sean 
Lemass providing that:
all able-bodied persons who are involuntarily unemployed and have 
either no means at all or insufficient means to maintain themselves 
and their dependants, should be given a statutory right to 
assistance.33
The act provided for the payment of unemployment assistance to 
all nationals between the ages of 18 and 70 years whose means were 
within certain prescribed limits: £52 per year in the county boroughs 
and the borough of Dun Laoighre, and £39 per year elsewhere. Once 
the necessary conditions were met, qualification certificates were issued 
by unemployment assistance officers with an unemployment appeals 
committee, appointed directly by the minister, deciding appeals made on 
decisions of the former. No benefit was payable for the first six days of 
unemployment while rates of benefit after that time varied depending 
on place of residence, sex, marital status and number of dependants. 
Residence was seen as an important factor in determining rate, with 
three separate rates for those resident in county boroughs and the 
borough of Dun Laoighre, those resident in other urban areas and those 
resident elsewhere. Benefit was also on a sliding scale depending on 
weekly means. The rate of benefit for a single man resident in a county
32 DD vol. 49, 27 Sept. 1933, col. 1652.
33 DD vol. 49, 27 Sept. 1933, col. 1651.
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borough was 9/- per week while that for a married man was 13/- and 
for a married man with a wife and three children 16/-.
The new legislation was passed by the Oireachtas in October 
1933. Subsequently attributed to the effects of the worldwide economic 
depression of 1929,34 it would stand alongside the insurance acts and the 
provision of home assistance and would include at a future time, it was 
hoped, a type of social employment and training scheme: 'a person 
receiving assistance under this bill must, if  required to do it by the 
minister, attend at a course of instruction appointed or approved by 
regulations under the bill'.35 Described as 'a pious hope'36 at the time 
by the minister, its mention at this time is significant, as it was to 
become a feature of unemployment assistance legislation much later on.
The financing of the scheme, the area which had caused Cumann 
na nGaedheal to shy away from such initiatives, was to be as follows: 
£250,000 was to come from the unemployment insurance fund, a rate of 
Is. 6d. in the £ on the poor law valuation was to be levied on the county 
boroughs and 9d on the other local government districts, a sum equal to 
a rate of 9d. in the £ on the rateable value of other urban areas while 
the balance would be provided for by the exchequer.37 It was estimated 
that the scheme would cost over £1,000,000 per year.38
Speaking for one and a half hours on the second stage of the bill 
in Septem ber 1933, Lemass concluded tha t the provision of 
unem ploym ent assistance was a 'necessary and desirable social 
leg is la tio n '.39 According to Patrick M cGilligan, the Cumann na 
nGaedheal Minister for Industry and Commerce from 1923 to 1932 (a
34 Department of Social Welfare, First report, 1947-9, p. 16.
35 DD vol. 49, 27 Sept. 1933, col. 1658.
36 Ibid.
37 Department of Social Welfare, First Report, 1947-9, p. 81.
38 DD vol. 49, 27 Sept. 1933, col. 1661.
39 Ibid., col. 1666.
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post he combined with the Ministry for External Affairs from 1927) it 
was a wasted ninety minutes of expostulating on what he derogatively 
called 'the dole policy'40: 'we are moving towards getting out of every 
decent attempt that was made to provide work and we are depending 
almost entirely upon this [bill]'.41 Such criticism had a hollow ring 
about it however, coming as it did from McGilligan. It also served to 
illustrate how little Fine Gael thinking differed from that of Cumann na 
nGaedheal, the idea of income redistribution still being seen as 
unwelcome meddling:
The person who is in employment at this moment is going to have 
the deductions made from his wages increased, while the man who 
is paying him is going to have the exactions imposed upon him for 
that employed person increased, and the difference is going to be 
put into the fund not for the benefit of the people who have paid 
but for other people who are not in insurable occupations at all.42
Not all sections of the Fine Gael party criticised the bill however, 
James Dillon, one of the most interesting of political figures for many 
decades in Irish politics very much welcoming it. A spirited 
campaigner for many causes who never allowed his instincts to be 
subjected to party ideology, Dillon had an inherent sense of justice and 
fair play for the ordinary people. His contributions to parliamentary 
debates are among the most colourful and sincere: during a debate on 
health  insurance estim ates in 1939 he declared 'I believe in 
controversy',43 a fitting elegy. Never did he play the game of politics 
as a mere vote catching exercise, a criticism justifiably laid at the door 
of many of his contemporaries. Agreeing that the unemployment
40 Ibid., col. 1670.
41 Ibid., col. 1682.
42 DD vol. 49, 27 Sept. 1933, col. 1676-77.
43 DD vol. 75, 21 Apr. 1939, col. 954.
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assistance bill was 'very necessary',44 his contribution to the debate was 
insightful: 'it is madness to look forward for ever more to having a 
large part of our population mendicants, crawling to the government 
for the wherewithal to keep body and soul together... The people are 
now becoming dependants of the government'.45 This was a crucial 
point which was to be raised in ensuing arguments, most notably by 
adherents of Catholic social teaching, as a reason why the state should 
not take on the responsibility of providing the economic necessities of 
its citizens.
The Labour Party also welcomed the bill, the party leader 
W illiam Norton expressing his preparedness 'to defend the principle of 
this bill in any constituency in this country'46 on the grounds that 'it is 
absolutely imperative for the state to step in and endeavour to relieve 
those destitute persons from the misery, poverty and suffering which 
they are enduring'.47
The implementation of the act caused some initial administrative 
problems, most notably complaints that local poor law authorities were 
not providing relief for those entitled to unemployment assistance but 
who, because of delays, were not in receipt of it.48 There were also 
complaints from local authorities about their level of contribution to the 
schem e.49 Nevertheless the worst excesses of the administration of 
unemployment insurance at local level were avoided in the case of 
unemployment assistance, the Department of Industry and Commerce
44 DD vol. 49, 27 Sept. 1933, col. 1711.
45 Ibid.. col. 1712.
46 Ibid., col. 1690.
47 Ibid., col. 1692.
48 Department of Local Government and Public Health, Report, 1934-35, p. 171.
49 For e.g. letter from Dublin Corporation to Secretary, Department of Industry and Commerce, 24 
Oct. 1933 (N.A., D/SW, Unemployment Assistance Bill 1933, E.B. 144057).
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laying down specific guidelines on how applicants for assistance were to 
be treated:
In considering the question of whether the applicant is 'genuinely 
seeking and unable to obtain em ploym ent' unem ploym ent 
assistance officers should approach die matter by taking it for 
granted that with the exception of certain well-known classes 
unemployed persons generally are only too anxious to obtain 
work and they are genuinely seeking it.50
This official circular outlining the spirit in which the act was to be
implemented was certainly worthy of the ethos of the welfare state and
marked a clear departure from a poor law mentality.
In the first year of operation over 75,000 people received
unemployment assistance, as compared to just under 12,000 receiving
unemployment insurance (see table).
T able 4.3














com m ission/ 
improvement 
o f  estates
Totals
1933-4 NIL 15,022 12,136 2 ,720 29,878
1934-5 75,591 11,921 8,599 2 ,993 99 ,104
1935-6 96 ,279 13,937 10,625 4 ,9 4 2 125,783
1936-7 67,283 15,051 51,377 5 ,130 138,841
Source: Department o f  Finance, Notes on the econom ic situation for the Executive 
Council, N ov. 1937 (N .A ., D /Fin., Econom ic and financial position in Saorstdt 
Eireann, F 200/25/37).
An important measure in itself, it being the first assistance-based 
social welfare policy introduced by an Irish government, unemployment 
assistance did not affect in any way the underlying problems which 
caused the unemployment crisis in the early 1930s. These problems 
were many and complex, McElligott attributing a large portion of the
50 Department of Industry and Commerce, Assistance Circular 2/5: Unemployment Assistance Act,
1933..
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blame to the economic war with Britain which started in 1932.51 A 
further insight into the reasons for such high numbers of unemployed 
was given in a series of confidential reports of the employment branch 
of the Department of Industry and Commerce which went through each 
town in Ireland with a local employment office, listing the numbers 
unem ployed and the reasons for fluctuation in the unemployment 
figures. The following extract from one such report considers the 
situation as reported from the employment exchanges in Ennis, where 
619 people were on the unemployment register, in Waterford, where 
2,167 were on the register and in Clonmel, where 999 were on the 
register:
Ennis
Building work was dull. Conditions at the whiting factory 
improved. Sawmilling made good progress. Thomond woollen 
mills maintained a steady output.
In the Ennistymon area, the kelp industry was very slack. A 
sewage and drainage scheme and work on the erection of the 
creamery continued to provide employment in this area. The live 
register decreased by 53 due, it is stated, to the change of 
procedure in the recruitment of workers. At Kilrush, dockside 
work was dull. Building work was brisk. Good progress was 
maintained at the local flour, meal and saw mills. Considerable 
relief was still afforded on an Irish land commission drainage 
scheme.
W aterford
Quayside work continued brisk. Building work declined slightly. 
C onditions at the boot and shoe factory show ed further 
improvement and 21 men were recalled. The position in the bacon 
factories and in the breweries was normal. Employment at the 
brick and tile factory continued good. Conditions in the sweet, 
pipe and electrical appliances factories were steady. Hotel work 
show ed seasonal activity, county council work improved 
somewhat.
A t Dungarvan, quayside work rem ained good. Building 
operations at Carrick-on-Suir, made good progress. In the Fermoy 




Trade at the local mineral water factories was steady. County 
council work in the area was slack. An increase of 81 in the live 
reg iste r was in consequence o f fresh applications for 
unemployment assistance.
M essrs. M ulcahy, Redm ond and Com pany, woollen 
manufacturers, Ardfinnan, recalled 51 employees who had been 
temporarily suspended. This accounted for the reduction in the 
live register at Cahir. The local flour mills continued to afford 
steady employment. Road work in the Cahir and Tipperary areas 
was dull. At Tipperary, building work was plentiful. Increased 
employment was available at the Thurles Beet Sugar Factory and 
with the Great Southern Railways. Seasonal activity on farmwork 
caused a decrease of 45 in the live register in this area.52
The act of 1933 was amended by the Unemployment Assistance Act, 
1935 which modified certain sections of the 1933 act leading to, among 
other things, an acceleration of the appeals process through the 
appointment of an appeals officer who acted as an intermediary between 
the unemployment assistance officer and the unemployment appeals 
com mittee.53 However the Labour Party, became increasingly uneasy 
with the provisions of the legislation, introducing a Dail motion in 
November 1936 calling for an increase in the amount provided for 
under unemployment assistance.54 Its argument was based on the rise in 
the cost of living index by 12.5% in the three year period up to August 
1936.55 This increase had resulted, for example, from a rise in the price 
of a sack of household flour from 28/- in 1933 to 40/- in 1936; a rise in 
the price of a 41b loaf from 7.5d. to 9.5d.; and a rise in the price of coal 
from 35/- to 45/- per ton (see table 4.1). An earlier petition to the 
government from the Cork branch of the Irish Labour Party had been
52 Department o f  Industry and Commerce, employment branch, Report for week ended 16 July 1934 
(N .A ., D/Fin, F 88/6/33).
53 Unem ploym ent Assistance (Amendment) Act, 1935 (No. 38 o f  1935).
54 D D  vol. 64, 25 N ov. 1936, col. 931.
55 Ibid., col. 933.
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more stinging in its criticism of the act's shortcomings. Claiming that 
the benefits were 'not even sufficient to keep their [the recipients] 
bodies and souls together', it foresaw a situation where:
large num bers of the unem ployed, even those who are 
comparatively young, will be so unfitted for hard work, if and 
when they are re-absorbed in industry, that they will not be able 
to hold their places under the present system... The children who 
have to live under conditions which provide them with a shilling 
per week for their sustenance, must deteriorate into a class of 
weakly adults in later years, products of a system which 
condemned their fathers to a life of unemployment, and passed on 
to them a heritage of misery, through the low conceptions of 
human values possessed by a government which professed such 
deep interest in their welfare.56
Presenting the harsh realities of unemployment, Labour's position was 
not accepted by the government, a private memorandum of the 
Department of Industry and Commerce recommending in the Autumn 
of 1937 that no link should be made in the legislation between the cost 
of living index and the assistance rates. Describing the 1933 and 1935 
acts as being 'in the nature of an experiment',57 McElligott warned, in
56 Letter from Cork branch o f  Irish Labour Party to Eamon de Valera, 25 Oct. 1934, (N.A., D/SW , 
E.B. 154613).
57 Unem ploym ent Assistance Acts 1933 and 1935: rates o f  unemployment assistance. Memorandum  
for the execu tive council prepared by the Department o f  Industry and Com m erce, Oct. 1937; 
Memorandum o f  the Parliamentary Secretary, 20 Sept. 1937 (N.A., D/SW , Proposed increase in rates 
o f unemploym ent assistance, E.B. 215667).
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the context of an increasingly worrying economic and financial situation 
in the Free State, that 'it is essential to disabuse people of the notion that 
this is a land flowing with milk and honey'.58
However, in late 1937 a bill was introduced effecting an increase 
in the rates of unemployment assistance with the amount paid by the 
unemployment fund increasing to £300,000. During the second stage of 
the bill Lemass claimed that 'some time ago the government came to the 
decision that it was possible to effect an increase in these rates',59 a 
seeming contradiction in the context of earlier government memoranda. 
The bill passed its final stages in mid January 1938,60 five months 
before the general election of that year, following the ending of the 
economic war with Britain. The increases were applicable to all 
recipients except in the case of single men in rural areas and small 
towns.
The emergency also resulted in a considerable increase in the cost 
of living, leaving the lot of the unemployed in a more precarious 
position and leading to continuing demands for increases in both 
unem ploym ent assistance and unem ploym ent insurance. The 
unemployment insurance acts remained unchanged during this period, 
except for a 1940 legislative change assuring members of the defence 
forces that their rights under the legislation before they joined the 
forces would be preserved.
58 Notes on the econom ic situation for the executive council, N ov. 1937 (N .A ., D/Fin., F200/25/37).
59 DD vol. 69, 12 Jan. 1938, col. 2954.
60 Unem ploym ent Assistance (Amendment) Act, 1938 (No. 2 o f  1938).
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The series of demands for increases in unemployment assistance 
following the 1938 act and unemployment insurance rates were put 
before Sean MacEntee receiving a distinctly less positive response than 
from Lemass. MacEntee, the M inister for Industry and Commerce 
from September 1939 to August 1941 and subsequently Minister for 
Local Government and Public Health, both ministries being directly 
concerned with social legislation, was obstinate in adhering to his own 
views, rarely taking on board the ideas and suggestions of others, 
especially if those others were not members of the Fianna Fail party. 
Those who publicly disagreed with MacEntee paid the price, the most 
glaring example of which was the case of Bishop John Dignan as 
discussed in the following chapter. Initially a radical in the context of 
welfare legislation, beginning his political career as a member of the 
Socialist Party of Ireland when James Connolly was its driving force in 
Belfast, M acEntee's attitude was to change dramatically. The first 
inklings of this change may be seen in the Spring of 1941 when, 
following requests for increases in unemployment assistance he said: 
'The rates of unemployment assistance are not intended to provide for 
unem ployed persons a substitute for wages or maintenance over a 
lengthy period'.61
The extent to which many of the unem ployed found both 
unemployment assistance and unemployment insurance inadequate for 
subsistence may be judged from the numbers of men and women who 
emigrated to Britain to work on the home front in the factories and to 
join the British armed forces. Economic exiles, they very much remain 
the unsung heroes in the fight for democratic freedom.62
61 DD vol. 82, 2 Apr. 1941, col. 1168.
62 While there fare no official numbers available, it is estimated that between 100,000 and 200,000 
went to Britain between 1939-45. See Dermot Keogh, Twentieth century Ireland: nation and state, pp 
122-3 and J. J. Lee, Ireland politics and society, 1912-85, p, 226.
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National Health Insurance: 'a new epoch'
As in the case of unemployment benefit, there were significant 
changes made to the working and administration of national health 
insurance during this period, w ith the adoption of central 
recom m endations made by the committee of inquiry into health 
insurance and medical services established in 1924.63 With the results 
of the valuation of approved societies at the end of 1928 demonstrating 
that some societies were showing increasing deficits while others were 
enjoying surpluses, the urgent necessity of over-hauling the entire 
system of health insurance in order that all insured people could enjoy 
equal benefits was further underlined.
It was in this context that the Fianna Fail government decided to 
amalgamate the societies, with a view to making ‘all the assets of the 
society available for all the members’64 through the National Health 
Insurance Act of 1933. The act replaced the 83 branches of Approved 
Societies, formerly responsible for administering health insurance, with 
a single National Health Insurance Society, Cumann an Arachais 
Naisiunta ar Shlainte, which took over the assets and liabilities of the 
form er societies. A provisional three-m em ber com m ittee of 
management appointed by the minister was charged with overseeing the 
transfer to the unified society of the activities of the Approved Societies, 
after which a fifteen-member committee of management was to be 
appointed. Nine members of the committee were to be elected by the 
societies' m em bers, w hile three o f the m em bers were to be 
representatives of the employers of insured persons to be appointed
63 Department of Local Government and Public Health, Report on the administration o f national 
health insurance, (1928).
64 National Health Insurance Bill 1940: explanatory memorandum, Department of Local Government 
and Public Health, July 1940 (N.A., D/SW, Financial basis amendment: National Health Insurance Act
1942,1.A. 91/53(a)).
129
directly by the minister. The remaining three members were to be 
appointed as trustees of the unified society by the minister.65
Although receiving a comfortable majority, the bill was criticised 
by both Fine Gael for what it did and by Labour for what it did not do, 
William Norton calling for a co-ordination of all social legislation. At 
that time responsibility for social legislation was scattered between two 
principal departments: Industry and Commerce which administered 
unemployment insurance and unemployment assistance, and Local 
Government and Public Health which administered old age and blind 
pensions, resulting in at best a patchwork of legislation, each individual 
item  being im plem ented with a minimum of reference to other 
legislation. It was indeed far from the ideal, William Norton capturing 
the essence of the problem in an article in 1935:
It is, unfortunately, only too true that in the Saorstat we have 
sadly neglected to plan and co-ordinate our existing services on 
comprehensive lines, with the result that we tolerate inefficiency, 
overlapping, complexity and, by our lack of co-ordination, create 
a veritable maze of technicalities to bar the path of the ordinary 
person whom our social services were intended to benefit.66
Norton's suggestion that the 1933 bill should be broadened to facilitate
the co-ordination of existing services was predictably ignored, not only
on this occasion but on many subsequent occasions.67
Predictable too were the complaints made about the centralisation
of the administration of health insurance in the hands of the Department
for Local Government and Public Health in Dublin. The approved
societies in Cork wrote to the minister saying that ‘such action would
certainly be detrimental to the interests of the insured population of
Cork and the south of Ireland’.68 Numerous such letters were received
65 National Health Insurance Act, 1933 (No. 13 of 1933).
66 Sldinte, vol. 1 (1935), p. 42.
67 E.g. DD vol. 55, 27 Feb. 1935, col. 74; DD vol. 65, 11 Mar. 1937, col. 1615-16.
68 Approved societies (N.A., D/SW I.A. 85/53(1)).
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from existing societies, the Approved Societies Association of Limerick 
and Clare demanding that, on implementation of the 1933 act, branches 
of the unified society should be established at local level.69 This 
resistance to unification and centralisation was shared by John A. 
Costello, subsequently taoiseach from 1948 to 1951, who in 1933 
expressed Fine G ael’s ‘objection to the principle of unification’,70 
although the grounds for such a principled objection were not entirely 
clear. N either were the objections in line with a report of the 
Department of Local Government and Public Health published under the 
Cum ann na nGaedheal government in 1928 which specifically 
recom m ended un ification  as the best m eans o f sim plifying 
administration and reducing administrative cost.71
Centralisation did lead to difficulties both in the long and short 
term. There were increased delays in receipt of benefit, attributed to 
the administration moving from a local to a central basis:72 ‘we have 
claims awaiting six or seven weeks and, in the meantime, these people 
have to receive home assistance’.73 Partly attributing this delay to the 
lack of fam iliarity with national health insurance procedures, the 
committee of management of the new unified society decided to provide 
each member with a special membership card outlining the ‘simple 
ru les’ that were to be observed when transacting business with the 
society. The cards, distributed in June 1937, were designed to ‘secure 
an immense saving of work and time to the outdoor and indoor staffs of 
the society’.74 Administration costs of the new society did prove
69 Ibid.
70 DD vol. 47, 26 Apr. 1933, col. 110.
71 Department of Local Government and Public Health, Report on the administration o f national 
health insurance (1935), p. 42.
72 General Seân McEoin, DD vol. 55, 27 Feb. 1935, col. 73.
73 James Everett, DD vol. 55, 27 Feb. 1935, col. 75.
74 D/SW Agency Circular 102, 3 June 1937.
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substantially less than those incurred under the old system however,75 
while the major thrust of the act, to secure equal benefits for all, was 
also realised.
The headquarters of the new society were officially opened by O 
Kelly in July 1934 at Arus Brugha in Upper O Connell Street, Dublin, 
the ceremony being followed by lunch in the Gresham Hotel where 
toasts were made to 'Eire1, 'The Guests' and 'The Society'. Meanwhile, 
in preparation for the task of administering the new scheme the 
chairm an of the provisional committee of management, D. J. O 
Donovan, together with the secretary, visited the Yugo Slavian unified 
and centralised health insurance society which 'had a unified society 
almost identical in membership to our ultimate organisation' and 
because Yugo Slavia 'is a small largely agricultural nation like our 
own'.76 This openness to developments on the international stage from 
the outset was to remain an important characteristic of the society, the 
society 's annual publication, S ld in te , carrying many articles on 
insurance schemes throughout Europe:
It has been the constant endeavour of the unified society to keep 
abreast of modem development's in the field of social insurance 
in other countries and to discover how our own system may be 
most fittingly harmonised with home needs and conditions.77
This international context was further facilitated through the society's
membership from 1934 of the International Social Security Association
which had a membership of 144 institutions and 58 countries.78 This
involvem ent in international debate in many ways underlined the
75 Setin T. 0  Kelly, DD vol. 55, 11 Apr. 1935, col. 2401.
76 Sldinte, vol. 1 (1935), p. 16.
77 Sldinte, vol. 2 (1936), p. 8.
78 See chapter 7 of the present work for a discussion of this and other aspects of the Irish welfare state 
in comparative European perspective.
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vibrancy of the new society, it proving to be far more than a mere 
administrative agency.
By early 1935 the last of the Approved Societies had been 
transferred to Cumann an Arachais Naisiunta ar Shlainte, beginning 'a 
new epoch in national health insurance in Saorstat Eireann' according to 
O Kelly.79 In July 1936 the three person provisional committee of the 
new unified society, appointed for a maximum period of three years, 
was replaced by a committee of management of fifteen. Dr John 
Dignan, Bishop of Clonfert, who was appointed by Sean T. O Kelly as 
chairman of the committee, was a person who featured in very large 
measure in the development of the Irish welfare state, especially in the 
mid to late 1940s. Dr Helena Concannon, a Fianna Fail T.D. and Gaelic 
League activist, and Dr Robert Rowlette, a Sligo-born Fianna Fail T.D., 
were among the trustees, while the employers' representatives included 
W illiam O Meara of Smithwick’s Brewery in Kilkenny, John O Neill, 
President of the Dublin Chamber of Commerce, and Sean Noone, 
manager of Freemount Dairy Society in Charleville.
The major drawback of the new scheme, as with all previous 
health insurance legislation, was the absence of medical benefit for the 
insured, a result of the ‘slothful indifference’ of the Department of 
Local Government and Public Health, according to Norton.80 A topic 
returned to again and again in insurance debates O Kelly, echoing the 
words of his Cumann na nGaedheal predecessor Richard Mulcahy,81 
told the Dail in April 1938 while speaking on the insurance estimates 
that he was 'interested in seeing medical benefits...introduced’,82 albeit 
at a later date. In July of the same year Dr Dignan, chairperson of the
79 Sl&inte, vol. 1 (1935), p. 5.
80 DD vol. 82, 23 Apr. 1941, col. 1655.
81 See previous chapter.
82 DD vol. 70, 7 Apr. 1938, col. 1659.
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committee of management, claimed that 'the society is doing nothing 
directly and has done nothing for the prevention and cure of sickness... 
In this it is a failure'.83 By this time the total membership of the society 
was 580,000.84
It was another three years before the government decided to 
introduce medical benefits through increasing the state contribution to 
the insurance funds. It was an issue which Bishop Dignan campaigned 
relentlessly for, having discussed the matter with the taoiseach, Eamon 
de Valera, on at least one occasion.85 Medical benefits were finally 
legislated for in the National Health Insurance Act of 194286 which 
provided for dental, optical and hospital benefit, the heads of the draft 
bill having been sent to the British government’s actuary department for 
consideration and suggestions.87
The legislation ended a ten year period in terms of health 
insurance, the most significant changes being the introduction of 
medical benefit and the administrative co-ordination of the insurance 
legislation. More importantly the necessity and desirability of having 
co-ordination in this area of welfare legislation provided an example for 
what could be done in the area of welfare legislation in general, 
something O Kelly, him self was obviously conscious of.88 To the 
forefront of 'public' as distinct from 'political' calls for co-ordination 
of social services under one ministry was the committee of management 
of the National Health Insurance Society, a 'suggestion, often made...in
83 Address to the Committee of Management, 20 July 1938, Sldinte, vol. 3 (1937-8), p. 6.
84 DD vol. 70, 7 Apr. 1938, col. 1653.
85 Letter from Eamon de Valera to John Dignan 3 June 1941; letter from Sefti T. O Kelly to John 
Dignan 16 June 1941 (N.A., D/SW, Financial basis amendment: National Health Insurance Act 1942, 
I.A. 91/53(a)).
86 National Health Insurance Act, 1942 (No. 5 of 1942).
87 National Health Insurance Act, 1942: financial basis amendment, (N.A, D/SW, I.A. 91/53).
88 Sldinte, vol. 1 (1935), p. 24..
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the hope that the government may deem the subject worthy of 
consideration'.89
Widows' and Orphans' Pensions
In the same way that Fianna Fail could claim old age pensions as 
their own, so too could they claim the area of widows' and orphans' 
pensions following Cumann na nGaedheal's reluctance to legislate for 
them. At the founding of the Free State it was the Irish M others’ 
Pensions Society which was to the fore in campaigning for the 
introduction of widows' and orphans' pensions in the light of the 
‘pauperisation and life desolation' which followed the death of the main 
bread-winner:
Mothers' pensions has proved its worth whenever in operation, by 
preserving under the fostering care of the mother and midst the 
sanctities of home the children of the nation and thus enabling 
them to receive such training and care as will mould them into 
self-respecting citizens.90
It was an issue taken up by Fianna Fail at the party's first ard fheis in 
N ovem ber 1926, resolution 39 prom ising ‘to provide generous 
measures ...regarding widows and orphans’.91 In the Dublin North by- 
election of 1928 Fianna Fail renewed its commitment to widows’ and 
orphans’ pensions,92 with an estimated 9,499 widows being in receipt of 
home assistance when the party came to power in 1932.93 Following the 
election of January 1933, in which Fianna Fail promised ‘to ensure that 
needy widows and orphans will be a state charge’,94 the new
89 Sldinte, vol. 3 (1937-8), p. 15.
90 John Patrick Dunne, ‘Poverty problems for a patriot parliament’, Journal o f the Statistical and 
Social Inquiry Society of Ireland, vol. 14 (1919-30), p. 195.
91 Hanna Fiil, Cldr an chiad ard fheis (24-25 Nov. 1926), p. 26.
92 ‘D iil by-election, 1928: to the electors of North Dublin City’ (Fianna F iil election leaflet).
93 Memorandum, 12 Jan. 1937 (N.A., D/SW, Heads of amending bill widows' and orphans' pensions, 
I.A. 89/53(a)).
94 E.g. Fianna Fiil election handbill to the electorate of Tipperary, 11 Jan. 1933.
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government established a fifteen-person committee under the Minister 
for Local Government and Public Health to inquire and report as to:
(i) a scheme of widows' and orphans' pensions suitable for 
Saorstat Eireann
(ii) the probable cost to the state and other interests concerned of 
such scheme, having regard to the consequential savings on 
existing social services.95
Showing evidence of an increasing awareness of developments in other
countries, the committee examined similar legislation in Canada,
Denmark, New Zealand, New South Wales and forty-five of the United
States in order to 'provide a basis on which a similar scheme for this
country might be modelled.'96 The committee also visited the Ministry
of Health in London to examine the workings of widows' and orphans'
pensions there,97 hearing evidence from the principal actuary of the
British governm ent’s actuary departm ent and from  the deputy
controller in the pensions' department of the Ministry of Health.98
H aving evaluated such evidence from  abroad, the com m ittee
recom m ended, in line with the 1927 report and the poor law
commission, a non-contributory scheme.99
The committee presented its proposals to the government in early
1935, after which the government introduced a widows' and orphans'
pensions bill in June of the same year. Adhering only in part to the
com mittee's report, the bill provided for four major categories of
benefit: contributory benefit which was divided into agricultural and
non-agricultural employment, and non-contributory benefits the rate of
which depended on area of residence as in the case of health insurance.
95 Committee of Inquiry into Widows' and Orphans' Pensions, Reports (Dublin, 1935), p. 4.
96 Ibid.
97 Memorandum 28 Nov. 1934, regarding visit to Ministry of Health on 20 Nov. 1934 (N.A., D/SW 
Widows' and orphans' pensions: preliminary visit of controller and Mr Keady to Ministry of Health, 
Nov. 1934.1.A., 87/53d).
98 Committee of Inquiry into Widows' and Orphans' Pensions, Reports, p. 146.
"  Committee of Inquiry into Widows' and Orphans' Pensions, Report, p. 37.
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Widows of insured persons whose husbands had made the necessary 
number of contributions were to receive 10/- per week up to the age of 
70 when they became entitled to old age pensions without a means test, 
while additional child benefit would be paid for children under 14 years 
or 16 years if  attending full-time education at rates between 5/- and 3/- 
per week. These benefits extended to both illegitim ate and step 
children, though not to adopted children. Orphans' pensions were to be 
paid at a rate of 61- (agricultural) or 7/6 (non-agricultural) per week 
under the contributory scheme. The concomitant rates of contribution 
payable were 4d. for men in agricultural employment and 8d. per week 
for other men (50% of which was paid by the employer and 50% by the 
employee) while the corresponding rates for women were 2d. for those 
in agricultural employment and 4d. per week for other woman payable 
in both cases by the employer.100
Non-contributory pensions, payable only to those widows and 
orphans of insured persons or smallholders whose contributions did not 
fulfil the necessary number to warrant contributory pensions, were 
subject to a means test and were not payable to widows under 60 years 
of age who had no dependent children. The rates of pensions varied 
according to locality and means, the highest rate being 7/6 per week for 
those resident in a county borough while a person resident in a rural 
area was entitled to 5/- per week.101 Such a variation was based on the 
low er cost of living in rural areas, the governm ent ignoring a 
submission from the Irish M others’ Pensions Society which, among 
other things, called for uniform rates of pension.
100 Department o f Local Government and Public Health, Widows’ and orphans’ pensions acts 1935- 
1937, Leaflet W.P.l (1939).
101 Ibid.
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Introduced by Sean T. O Kelly, the M inister for Local 
Government and Public Health, with a preface that:
the general purpose to which all social legislation is directed is the 
alleviation of the hardships accruing from risks to which all 
persons are exposed, and to meet that which certain classes of the 
population are of themselves unable to make adequate provision 
fo r102
the bill was broadly welcomed, Norton seeing it as ‘the first step and a 
very important step’103 towards relieving ‘the appalling poverty and 
destitution which frequently follows in the train of the death of a bread 
w in n e r’.104 Interestingly, there was minimal Fine Gael input in 
discussion of the bill, which was passed into law in August 1935.
T able 4.5
Number of beneficiaries under widows' and orphans' pensions acts at
31 Dec. each year


















1936 596 983 18 106 172 1 13.660 12,466 550 28.552
1937 1,556 2.392 121 291 360 19 25,691 16,838 1,002 48,270
1938 2.519 3.618 218 483 545 33 27.989 16.671 1.200 53,276
1939 3,575 4,775 326 635 693 36 28,493 15.926 1,254 55,713
1940 4,621 5,943 424 790 810 46 28,131 15.022 1.277 57.064
1941 5,618 6.999 526 969 946 62 27.672 14,032 1,274 58,098
1942 6,618 7,961 632 1.112 1.033 57 26.698 12,995 1.179 58.285
1943 7.597 8,703 719 1.263 1,129 72 25.695 12,009 1.125 58.312
Source: Local Government and Public Health, Reports (1936-43).
Payable from 6 January 1939, a total of 28,552 people received 
benefit in the first year (see table). A residual problem associated with
102 DD vol. 56, 4  June 1935, col. 2234.
103 Ibid., col. 2250.
104 Ibid., col. 2254.
existing welfare schemes raised its head in the administration of the new 
legislation, namely the often prolonged delay (up to eight weeks in case 
of widows’ and orphans’ pensions) before investigation of claims was 
completed.105
Agreeing with Norton that the 1935 act was only a first step,106 O 
Kelly introduced amending legislation in late 1936, an act being passed 
in 1937. The object of the amending act was to enlarge the scope of the 
non-contributory scheme of widows' and orphans' pensions by 
removing the restrictions of payment of non-contributory pensions to 
widows of insured employees and smallholders. The act also reduced to 
55 years the age at which widows' pension could be paid to widows 
without dependent children.107 The means test was also modified ‘in 
favour of claim ants’,108 such income as bonuses or grants made to 
persons residing in the Gaeltachtai no longer being taken into account.
The amending legislation was universally welcomed. On behalf 
of Fine Gael Michael Brennan, T.D. for Roscommon and a veteran of 
1916, welcomed the bill as ‘certainly a very generous measure’,109 while 
James Dillon said that the extension of ‘this most excellent social 
service...from every point of view, social and economic, is good’.110 
While such praise might have been overly effusive, there is little doubt 
that,, although the initial introduction of ‘this great social reform ’111 
was quite late in view of the fact that the need for widows' and orphans' 
pensions was being publicised from the early 1920s, the course of the 
legislation approximated closely to the ideal approach to social welfare
105 William Norton, DD vol. 89, 3 Feb. 1948, col. 353.
106 DD vol. 61, 28 Apr., col. 1657.
107 Widows' and Orphans' Pensions Act, 1937 (No. 11 of 1937).
108 DD vol. 65, 3 Mar. 1937, col. 1144.
109 Ibid., col. 1148.
110 DD vol. 65, 11 Mar. 1937, col. 1614.
111 Fianna Fdil election handbill, Dublin north-east (June, 1938).
139
planning. The initial 1935 act was allowed to stand for one year. The 
weaknesses observed in the administration and adequacy of the act were 
then reviewed and amending legislation was promptly introduced. The 
philosophy behind the act, the provision of welfare in a dignified 
fashion, replacing the charitable provision of the poor law was also of 
great importance. The entire debate was couched in the caring 
terminology which ideally underpins welfare legislation, and not in the 
grudging approach displayed in the first decade of the Free State. It 
was an approach underpinned by de V alera’s constitution of 1937, 
during the debate on which he pledged state assistance for the widow to 
‘aid and contribute to such an extent as will not necessitate for her 
leaving her duties as a mother and engaging in outside labour... I am 
going, as long as I live, to try and work for that’.112
The act was further amended in 1940 to provide for the continued 
favourable status of agricultural workers who would continue to enjoy a 
lower rate of contribution but a higher rate of benefit. The amendment 
was carried out under the direction of Dr Francis W ard, the 
Parliamentary Secretary at the Department of Local Government and 
Public Health from 1932-1946.
By the time of this amending legislation the cost of living 
argument was also being used as a reason to increase the rates of 
benefit. However, rather than increasing the statutory rates of benefit, 
supplementary benefits in the forms of cash and food were introduced. 
It was a course common to all social welfare legislation during the 
emergency period and discussion of these emergency powers orders 
forms the final section of the present chapter.
112 Maurice Moynihan, Speeches and statements, p. 325.
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1937 4 8 ,2 7 0
1938 53 ,276
1939 55 ,713




Source: Department o f  Local Government and Public Health, R ep o rts  (1936-43).
Food vouchers and cash allowances
The decision by the government to offset the rise in the cost of 
living by providing both cash supplements and commodity (usually 
food) vouchers was by no means a new approach to relieving poverty in 
independent Ireland: in the winter of 1934-35 beef vouchers were 
distributed by the Department of Agriculture through home assistance 
officers to people in receipt of home assistance, over 27,000 receiving 
beef in the first week of the scheme in December 1934. However on 
this occasion vouchers were a mere secondary effect of the Slaugher of 
Cattle and Sheep Act, 1934,113 the primary aim of which was to arrest 
the drop in cattle prices and to provide a market for the surplus cattle 
which resulted from the economic war with Britain (1932-8). The 
latter, sparked by de Valera’s refusal to pay land annuities to the British 
exchequer, resulted in what Dr James Ryan described as a ‘penal 
tarriff’114 of 20% being imposed on Irish cattle and other agricultural 
exports to the United Kingdom, the number of cattle being exported
113 Slaughter of Cattle and Sheep Act, 1934 (No. 42 of 1934).
114 DD vol. 53, 2 Aug. 1934, col. 2061.
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falling by 275,000. The incidental nature of this beef voucher scheme is 
of itself interesting: while it was recognised by Dr James Ryan that 
many families on home assistance and unemployment assistance ‘find it 
impossible to buy meat sufficient for their families in the ordinary 
w ay’,115 there is little doubt that no action would have been taken to 
rectify the situation were it not for the greater needs of the agricultural 
community. The extent to which the welfare provision of the scheme 
was incidental was underlined by the Report of the Department of Local 
Government and Public Health of 1934-5:
In order to increase the consumption of beef at a time when there 
was a surplus of cattle, a scheme for the distribution of beef to 
certain classes of necessitous persons was put into operation.116
During the emergency, however, food vouchers were introduced not as 
a secondary result of other measures but for their own merit. They 
became familiar to recipients of all income supplement benefits at some 
stage, initially applying to persons in receipt of home assistance and 
unem ploym ent assistance, national health insurance, widows' and 
orphans' pensions and old age and blind pension recipients residing in 
urban areas. In 1941, the first year of war time food vouchers, 
£400,000 was allocated to cover their cost, £168,000 being allocated to 
recipients of unemployment assistance, while a further £200,000 was 
allocated to meet the cost of special food allowances which boards of 
assistance could grant, at their discretion, to recipients of home 
assistance.117 Claimed by Lemass to be proportionally greater than the 
rise in the cost of living,118 they were made possible by the Emergency 
Powers (Food Allowances) Order of 1941.
115 Ibid., col. 2067.
116 Department of Local Government and Public Health, Report, 1934-5, p. 171.
117 DD vol. 86, 7 May 1942, col. 1769.
118 Ibid. See also DD vol. 88, 15 Oct. 1942, col. 1282.
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The order of 1941 provided for, amongst other things, the issue 
of food vouchers to recipients of unemployment assistance. Vouchers 
were exchangeable free of charge for certain specified amounts of 
bread, butter and milk: 21bs of bread, 0.251b of creamery butter and 3.5 
pints of milk per week in respect of each dependent of a recipient of 
unemployment assistance up to a maximum of six dependants.119 The 
scheme came into operation in September 1941, the initial allowances 
being increased as the war progressed. Of the £400,000 set aside in the 
first year to meet the costs, £168,000 was provided for food vouchers 
issued to recipients of unemployment assistance while an extra £200,000 
was provided to meet the cost of special food allowances to be 
distributed by boards of assistance.120 Recipients of unemployment 
insurance also benefited from emergency supplements, the Emergency 
Powers (No. 93) Order, 1941, increasing from 5/- and 1/- to 7/6 and 
2/6 respectively the weekly benefits payable to recipients of 
unem ploym ent insurance in respect of an adult and each child 
dependent.
The Em ergency Powers (Food A llow ances) Order, 1941 
provided sim ilar benefits for recipients of widows' and orphans' 
pensions. From 5 September 1941 food vouchers, exchangeable on a 
weekly basis for 3.5 pints of milk, 0.251bs of butter and 21bs of bread, 
were provided for recipients of widows' and orphans' pensions resident 
in county boroughs, boroughs, urban districts and incorporated towns. 
In April 1944 supplementary cash benefits became available for 
recipients resident outside of these 'scheduled areas'. Both the 1941 and 
1944 orders were replaced by the Social Welfare (Cash Supplements)
119 Emergency Powers (Food Allowances) Order, 1941.
120 Sean Lemass, DD vol. 86, 7 May 1942, col. 1769.
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Order, 1947 which replaced previous supplem ents w ith cash 
supplements from April 1947.
Old age pensioners received similar benefits to widows and 
orphans under the food allowances scheme of 1941 while in 1944 an 
emergency supplement to public assistance of up to 2/6 per week was 
granted for necessitous recipients of old age and blind pensions in those 
areas where food allowances did not apply. An additional 1/6 could be 
paid to blind pensioners in respect of each dependent child. From April 
1947 all old age pensioners became entitled to a cash supplement of 2/6 
per week in addition to their existing pension.
By 1942 total expenditure on food vouchers increased to 
£435,000. The volume of expenditure was used by ministers as the 
main justification  for not increasing the basic rates of income 
supplem ent benefits, an explanation which was unacceptable to 
opposition parties. However, this method of dealing with cost of living 
increases was to remain in force until 1948 and in some cases until early 
1949, their initial restriction to residents of urban areas being widened 
to include residents of rural areas by 1944. They were further 
complimented by supplementary cash allowances in some instances (see 
table), and by the introduction in 1942 of a cheap fuel scheme designed 
to ensure that 'the poorer sections of the community'121 could afford 
fuel.
By the late 1940s the Fianna Fail government had decided that the 
time had come to replace the temporary food and cash allowances by 
more concrete measures, namely the increasing of basic benefits so as to 
remove the necessity for supplementary benefits.
121 Department of Social Welfare, First report, p. 50.
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Table 4.7
Dates of commencement and cessation of various supplementary
income services
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W idows' and 
Orphans' Pensions
1947 1948-49
Source: Social W elfare Act, 1955 (N .A ., D /SW , Plan 4/55).
It was an idea furthered by the first inter-party government which took 
over the reins of government in Spring 1948. W hile certainly 
alleviating the plight of those on social welfare, the system of cash and 
commodity supplements was a backwards step in the context of welfare 
state development, having more in common with a poor law approach to 
relief than with a state implementing progressive and comprehensive 
social legislation. They smacked of charity, and their means tested base 
was very much out of tune with the development of a welfare state.
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They were also, according to most sources, inadequate as relief 
measures. One feels that they contributed to the growing apathy and 
conservatism of Fianna Fail towards social legislation from the late 
1930s and into the 1940s. Cash and commodity supplements were 
perceived as justifying a reluctance to further change social legislation, 
a topic discussed in more detail in the following chapter.
C onversely, the move away from  cash and com m odity 
supplements underlined the inadequacy of basic benefits, contributing to 
a move towards positive legislative change. This shift towards 
increasing existing basic benefits and introducing new ones undoubtedly 
had its origin in the publication of the Beveridge Report in Britain just 
before Christmas 1942. Discussion of social policy took on a new 
vibrancy and a new urgency in Ireland, debates and expectations 
reaching fever pitch in the mid 1940s. It took this external impetus to 
highlight the inadequacies of Irish social policy and to provide the 
driving force behind a new era of welfare legislation. Arising directly 
from the second world war experience of the allies, the debate in 
Ireland was bitter and full of recriminations.
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CHAPTER 5
BEVERIDGEISM IN IRELAND: NEW BEGINNINGS IN SOCIAL
POLICY
December 1942 was to mark the beginning of a new era in the 
approach to social welfare policy in Ireland. Despite indications that 
Fianna Fail was becoming increasingly conservative in its approach to 
social legislation - an election advertisement published in the daily 
newspapers in June 1937 held Fine Gael up to ridicule for its promise to 
introduce children's allowances1 - the internal political dynamic was very 
much upset by external events, leading to a prolonged and fruitful debate 
on the whole area of social policy.
Not surprisingly, given the early foundations of Irish social policy 
and the continuous reference to British legislation, the impetus was to 
come from Britain in the form of Sir William Beveridge's report, Social 
insurance and allied services, published in December 1942. Written 
against the backdrop of war, its influence in Ireland was immediate, and 
anticipated by many. Its presentation in the popular press as a solution to 
Ireland's problems made it appeal very much to the ordinary Irish people, 
most of whom were experiencing the social and economic consequences 
of Europe at war, the decrease in industrial production due to shortage of 
raw materials combined with the general shortage of food stuffs and the 
sheer want of those forced to live on social welfare payments being 
especially acute. Such circumstances drove tens of thousands of Irish 
people to England where they contributed to the wartime effort of the 
allies, a phenomenon to which Dermot Keogh ascribes a conspiratorial 
character:
1 IT, 30 June 1937.
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It was of mutual benefit to both the allies and the Irish to facilitate 
the migration of tens of thousands to England for war work. 
Although the British were not permitted to advertise the Irish 
authorities did not impede the steady supply of workers to 
England.2
Many Irish men took active part in the war, Irish citizens being among 
those involved in Operation Overlord, landing on the Normandy beaches 
in June 1944. The fact that most war-time emigrants did not return 
following the war but were rather joined by many more was testimony to 
Irish economic and social conditions. As the Department of Local 
Government and Public Health itself observed in 1945: ‘pauperism exists 
in this country to a considerable degree’,3 the government recognising 
that ‘the inducement offered by the British government social insurance 
scheme’ was a significant factor in the continuing emigration from 
Ireland.4 As Donall MacAmhlaigh, who emigrated to England in 1951 
after being demobilised from the Irish army, was to write in his Dialann 
Deorai, diary of an Irish exile in Britain:
Is e an fea ll go bhfuil an tir seo chomh haindiagach is ata, mar ta 
buanna go leor ag roinnt lei ar gaire don Chriostaiocht iad na go 
leor da bhfuil thiar in Eireann. Tog an w elfare state mar 
shampla.5
It was in the hope of improving social standards that the Beveridge report 
was greeted with popular enthusiasm in Ireland: it held out the promise of 
positive social reform.
The Beveridge report might well have had little practical effect in 
Ireland had it not been for the publication of a somewhat similar, though
2 Dermot Keogh, Twentieth century Ireland: nation and state (Dublin, 1994), p. 122.
3 Department of Local Government and Public Health, Considerations attending the problems of 
extending social insurance in Ireland with special reference to the rural community, c l 945 (U.C.D. 
Archives, MacEntee papers, Social Services, P67/361).
4  Ibid.
5 Ddnall MacAmhlaigh, Dialann Deorai (Dublin, 1960), p. 61.
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markedly less thorough, Irish plan, Social security: outlines o f a scheme 
o f national health insurance by Dr John Dignan, Bishop of Clonfert. A 
committed Sinn Fein activist prior to independence, Dignan, a graduate 
of St. Patrick's College, Maynooth, was ordained for the diocese of 
Clonfert in 1903. During the war of independence, by which time he was 
parish priest of Abbey, Loughrea, his home was raided and bombed by 
the black and tans. He was a known republican sympathiser6 during the 
civil war and supporter of Fianna Fail, accepting from the Fianna Fail 
government in 1936 the position of chairman of the committee of 
management of the newly established National Health Insurance Society. 
In March 1924 he was appointed Bishop of Clonfert, a position he held 
until his death in 1953.
Hailed as 'Eire's Beveridge Plan',7 the publication of Social security 
in March 1945 put increasing pressure on the government to introduce 
legislative changes in the area of social welfare. The Dignan plan, 
criticised by the government for its lack of detail on methods of financing 
and its overwrought idealism, caused a deepening of the popular and 
political debate on social policy, a debate which proved extremely fruitful 
to the extent that it purged forever the poor law mentality that had for so 
long pervaded philosophical approaches to social policy in Ireland.
The importance of the Dignan and Beveridge plans cannot be over­
emphasised in the context of Irish social welfare legislation. Between 
them they took discussion of social policy in twentieth-century Ireland 
out of its nineteenth century ideological confines. It is particularly 
important to note that the Beveridge report, the unofficial blueprint for 
development in Ireland, was the most advanced analysis of welfare 
legislation then in existence in Europe, Ireland becoming in time what
6 Bernard J. Canning, Bishops o f  Ireland 1870-1987 (Ballyshannon, 1987), p. 335.
7 II, 18 Oct. 1944.
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social scientists describe as a ‘Beveridge type’ welfare state.
The two immediate changes precipitated by the report in Ireland 
were the introduction of children’s allowances in 1944 and the 
establishment of a separate Department of Social Welfare together with a 
Department of Health in 1947.
As a central feature of social welfare legislation children's 
allowances ‘breached an im portant p rinc ip le’,8 establishing the 
responsibility of the state in securing the well-being of children. In 
Ireland they are the only example of an income maintenance policy being 
introduced by an Irish government before being introduced in Britain. It 
was a necessary and crucial addition to the limited policies already in 
existence, and its non-means-tested basis was unique. The introduction 
of children’s allowances also had the effect of temporarily placating the 
increasingly vocal demands for a co-ordinated and unified approach to 
the development and administration of income supplement policies, 
responsibility for which was divided between the Department of Local 
Government and Public Health and the Department of Industry and 
Commerce, with the Department of Finance in effect having the power of 
veto.
The inefficiency of such a cumbersome and often overlapping 
system of administration became increasingly obvious in the post war 
years, and in 1947 separate Departments of Social Welfare and Health 
were established, each administered by one minister for the first number 
of years. This development signified the greater importance of social 
policy in general and allowed for the future standardisation and co­
ordination of the various social security schemes.
Before moving to a detailed discussion of Beveridge, Dignan, the
8 Tony Novak, Poverty and the state (England, 1988), p. 152.
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introduction of children’s allowances and the establishment of the 
Department of Social Welfare, it is necessary to outline briefly two 
developments in social democratic politics in this period. First among 
these was the founding of Clann na Poblachta in July 1946. Lead by 
Sean MacBride the new party was primarily a reaction to the perceived 
repression of republicans by Fianna Fail during the war, offering a 
constitutional, republican alternative. Advocating the declaration of a 
republic, it adopted, more importantly in the present context and equally 
im portant in the eyes of its members, a radical social programme, 
promising major reforms of social security. While winning two of three 
by-elections in October 1947, it only managed to gain 10 of the 157 Dail 
seats in the general election of February 1948, perhaps as a result of over­
stretching its resources by fielding almost 100 candidates. Its political 
impact was to make itself felt more after 1948 when it took part in the 
first inter-party government.
M eanwhile the long standing flag-bearer of social democratic 
politics in Ireland, the Labour Party, divided, resulting in the formation of 
National Labour. The split came at a time when the Labour Party’s 
continental brethren were to the fore in heralding a new post-war era of 
social reform. Orchestrated by William O Brien following the return of 
Jim  Larkin to the Labour Party, National Labour split from the parent 
party in 1943, accusing William Norton's followers of belonging to a 
communist-dominated party. The personality-based rather than policy- 
based division was mirrored in the trade union movement, further 
weakening the position of labour. The split was to last until 1950 
resulting in the decimation of the combined parliamentary strength of 
Labour, leaving it is a very weak position to fight for the development of 
social legislation. A similar situation developed in post-war France 
where the labour movement divided into different political and
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ideological groupings, very much diluting its influence in the crucial first 
decade of the Fifth Republic which saw rapid economic change.9
These, then, are the contexts in which the developments from 
December 1942 until the downfall of the Fianna Fail administration 
following the general election of February 1948 took place. The 
following pages discuss, respectively, the publication and influence of the 
Beveridge report, the Dignan plan, the introduction of children’s 
allowances and the establishment of the Departments of Social Welfare 
and of Health.
The Beveridge plan and its influence in Ireland
It is generally accepted by social scientists that one of the major 
driving forces behind the development of social policy is war: one 
observer has described war as a 'great engine of social advance'.10 
H istory illustrates this clearly, the Boer W ar and W orld W ar I 
occasioning discussion and implementation of social legislation in a 
number of countries. In Belgium for example the national governments 
which brought together the socialist, liberal and Catholic blocks, 
introduced several important social and political changes following 
World War I including the legalisation of all trade unions and an eight- 
hour working day.11
The result of World War II was even more marked in this respect, 
the allied nations and Germany both claiming to have the most innovative 
social legislation. Apart from this high-political competition, on a 
popular level there was a great need for development. World War II
9 See Martin Kolinskey, 'The trade unions in a divided Labour movement' in Michalina Vaughan, et 
al.f Social change in France (Oxford, 1980).
10 Kathleen Jones, The making o f social policy in Britain, 1830-1990 (London, 1991), p. 121.
11 See Guy Vanthensche, 'Unemployment insurance in inter-war Belgium', International Review of 
Social History, vol. 35 (1990), no. 3, p. 358.
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occasioned huge sacrifices by the populace which would have to be 
acknowledged through a better social system following the war. It also 
underlined the inadequacy of existing legislation and provisions. 
Widows, orphans and the demobilised would also have to be taken care 
of during and after the war, while the soldiers had to be provided with a 
raison d'être, apart from national pride, for fighting to win the war. War 
also facilitated the introduction of more far reaching social legislation 
through a greater acceptance of state intervention in the lives of the 
people, a requisite of war-time government.
Titmus points to two further factors influencing social policy as a 
direct result of war: as participation in war requires the total effort by the 
nation, the care of dependants becomes a more recognised and accepted 
social responsibility, while the waging of war ‘presupposes and imposes a 
great increase in social discipline’, a discipline ‘only tolerable if  social 
inequalities are not intolerable’:12
The aims and context of social policy, both in peace and in war, are 
thus determined by how far the co-operation of the masses is 
essential to the successful prosecution of war.13
Sir William Beveridge was very much aware of this 'social unification' in
time of war, and the benefits which could accrue from it:
The prevention of want, the diminution and relief of disease - the 
special aim of the social services - are in fact a common interest of 
all citizens. It may be possible to secure a keener realisation of that 
fact in war than it is in peace, because war breeds national unity It 
may be possible, through a sense of national unity and readiness to 
sacrifice personal interests to the common cause, to bring about 
changes which, when they are made, will be accepted on all hands 
as advances, but which it might be difficult to make at other 
times.14
12 R. M. Titmus, Essays on the welfare state (Great Britain, 1976), pp 84-85.
13 Ibid., p. 85.
14 Sir William Beveridge, Social insurance and allied services, (American edn., New York, 1942), p. 
172.
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It was the combination of all of these factors which resulted in the post- 
World War II period seeing the institutionalisation of the welfare state 
across northern and western Europe. To a greater or lesser extent, they 
were factors which influenced neutral Ireland, continental and British 
thinking permeating the Irish approach to social legislation.
The wartime experience of Europe also had the effect of forging a 
sense of national solidarity, and a shared determination that post-war 
society would be far removed from the economic and social depression of 
the 1930s, and the pronounced social stratification of society. In 
particular 'social security...realised the new sense of national community 
in terms o f social policy; it modernised Liberalism , m oderated 
Socialism'.15 The Nordic countries of Denmark and Norway are excellent 
examples of this. In the latter, following liberation in 1945, an all party 
government was sworn into office led by Einar Gerhardsen, a prominent 
figure in the Norwegian Labour Party. Influenced by Beveridge, the 
Norwegian Central Federation of Trade Unions published a report in 
1944 on the development and co-ordination of social security schemes, 
subsequently agreed upon by the national government in its declaration 
on the future political, social and economic aims of Norway, published in 
1945.16 National governments were also formed in Sweden and Finland;
The habit of co-operation across party lines...made for mutual 
understanding and also for recognition of the need for equitable 
distribution of the social product among all classes of society.
Thus by the end of World War II - and even more definitely in 
the decade immediately following it - there was no longer any 
group of importance in Scandinavia which did not accept the basic 
principles of a welfare state.17
15 Peter Baldwin, 'Bourgeois parties, social democracy and the origins of post-war reforms in 
Sweden', International Review o f Social History, vol. 33, no. 2 (1988), p. 122.
16 See for example Stein Kuhnle, 'National equality and local decision making: values in conflict in 
the development of the Norwegian welfare state', Acta Sociologia, vol. 23 (1980), no. 2-3, p. 101.
17 Gunnar Heckscher, The welfare state and beyond: success and problems in Scandinavia 
(Minneapolis, 1984), p. 52.
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A similar chain of events unfolded in Belgium. Influenced by the 
publication of the Beveridge report in Britain and while still under 
German occupation the Belgian labour movement drew up a social 
contract, officially called the ‘draft accord for social unity’, in April 
1944. Over half the text of the contract was taken up with discussion of 
social security and was developed by the Minister for Employment and 
Social Welfare in the decree law of December 1944.18
The labour movement was also to the fore in promoting post war 
social legislation in France (up to its internal divisions in 1947), France 
achieving a national social security plan in 1945 following negotiations 
between the Free French Forces under de Gaulle and French resistance 
groups:19
By 1950 the modern welfare state had not only become a social 
and economic reality, but a political reality.20
These developments were, of course, greatly facilitated by the launch of
the European Recovery Programme in 1947 by the United States,
commonly referred to as ‘Marshall A id’. France alone received a
combined total of over $15,000,000.21
As already noted, many of the wartime and post-war social security
programmes took their influence from the Beveridge report, published in
December 1942, ‘the symbol of the arrival of the welfare state in
Britain’.22 Officially entitled the Report on social insurance and allied
services it was published at a time when ‘the deep and vivid interest of
18 See Patrick J. Pasture, The April 1944 “social pact” in Belgium and its significance for the post 
war welfare state’, Journal o f Contemporary History, vol. 28, no. 4 (1993).
19 See Douglas Ashford, The emergence o f the welfare slate, (3rd edn., Oxford, 1988), p. 284; Robert 
Leaper, ’The Beveridge report in its contemporary setting', International Social Security Review vol. 45 
(1992), no. 1-2.
20 James McMillan, Dreyfus to de Gaulle: politics and society in France, 1898-1969 (3rd edn., Great 
Britain, 1990), p. 294.
21 James McMillan, Dreyfus to de Gaulle: politics and society in France, 1898-1969, p. 164.
22 Tony Novak, Poverty and the state (England, 1988), p. 149.
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the people of Britain in the kind of Britain which is to emerge when the 
floods of war subside’ was realised.23 Described as having an 'enduring, 
alm ost sc rip tu ra l p re s tig e ',24 the report was the result of an 
interdepartmental committee appointed by Arthur Greenwood, Minister 
without Portfolio but with general responsibility for the supervision of 
reconstruction planning, in June 1941. In January 1942 it was decided 
that the report should be made and signed solely by Sir W illiam 
Beveridge.
Its publication came at a crucial time in the war for Britain, just 
weeks after the battle of El Alamein, the turning point in the desert war in 
North Africa. For the first time the church bells were ordered rung by 
Churchill - not to herald an invasion but rather to mark a new mood that 
victory was possible; that the war could be won and that planning for 
peace could begin in earnest.
The timing of the publication of Beveridge's report was therefore 
significant, and the impact the report had in Britain may be judged from 
the huge sales in the first three months of publication, when 250,000 
copies of the full report, 350,000 of the official abridged version and 
42,000 of the American edition were sold, making it the best selling 
British official report up to that time.25 After liberation, Beveridge was 
invited to speak in many continental European countries including 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland, while 
his 1944 publication, Full employment in a free society was translated 
into eight languages.26 In post-war Germany the socialists ‘emblazoned 
Beveridgean ideals of welfare reform on their banners’.27
23 William Beveridge, The pillars o f security (London, 1943), p. 107.
24 Robert Leaper, The Beveridge report in its contemporary setting', International Social Security 
Review, vol. 45 (1992), no. 1-2, p. 17.
25 Ibid., p. 203.
26 Ibid.
27 Peter Baldwin, ‘Class interests and the post-war welfare state in Europe: a historical perspective’,
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The impressively detailed report began by boldly proclaiming that 
‘a revolutionary moment in the world’s history is a time for revolutions, 
not for patching’.28 With its ultimate aim when implemented being the 
abolition of want through the provision of income security, its method of 
achieving this was based mainly on compulsory social insurance, i.e. the 
'giving in return for contributions benefits up to subsistence level, as of 
right and without means test',29 with national assistance ( ‘national 
assistance is an essential subsidiary method in the whole plan for social 
security’30) and voluntary social insurance as subsidiary methods. The 
provision of insurance-based benefits rather than 'free allowances from 
the state' was, according to Beveridge, what people in Britain desired.31 
Priority should be given, according to the report, to the welfare of 
children and the ‘safeguarding of m aternity’,32 one of the prime 
arguments used in favour of the introduction of children’s allowances 
being the restoration of the birth rate:
W ith its present rate of reproduction, the British race cannot 
survive; means of reversing the recent course of the birth rate must 
be found... Children’s allowances should be regarded both as a 
help to parents in meeting their responsibilities and as an 
acceptance of new responsibilities by the community.33
The report recom m ended that such allowances should be non­
contributory, provided out of taxation returns, at a rate of 8/- per week for 
the second and each subsequent child. Recommending payment for 
children up to 16 years of age, Beveridge also advised that they be paid to 
every family, irrespective of means.34
International Social Security Review, no. 3 (1990), p. 256.
28 William Beveridge, Social insurance and allied services, p. 6.
29 Ibid., p. 7.
30 Ibid., p. 12.
31 Ibid., p. 11.
32 Ibid., p. 8.
33 Ibid., p. 154.
34 Ibid., pp 156-7.
157
One of the other major areas dealt with by the report was that of 
unemployment and unemployment benefit. Underlining any insurance- 
based plan is the principle of relatively secure employment being 
available to the majority of those willing to work:
A satisfactory scheme of social insurance assumes the maintenance 
o f em ploym ent and the prevention of mass unemployment... 
Income security which is all that can be given by social insurance 
is so inadequate a provision for human happiness that to put it 
forward by itself as a sole or principal measure of reconstruction 
hardly seems worth doing. It should be accompanied by an 
announced determination to use the powers of the State to 
whatever extent may prove necessary to ensure for all, not indeed 
absolute continuity of work, but a reasonable chance of productive 
employment.35
However, in the event of prolonged unem ploym ent, receipt of 
unemployment benefit was to be made conditional upon attendance at a 
work or training centre.
Among the other proposed administrative changes and social 
security provisions in the plan were the unification of social insurance 
contributions, allowing each insured individual to obtain all benefits 
through a single weekly contribution; an ending of the approved societies 
system which gave unequal benefit for equal contributions; provision of 
skills training and retraining for those who lost their jobs; and the 
centralisation of the administration of public assistance, at the time the 
responsibility  of local authorities.36 The plan also proposed the 
recognition of housewives as a distinct insurance class with benefits 
adjusted to their special needs. This latter recommendation underpinned 
Beveridge’s belief that reform of social security would greatly improve 
the condition of women in society. A product of his time, however, the 
general thrust of the report, which referred to the employee as ‘he’,
35 Ibid., p. 163.
36 Ibid., pp 15-16.
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reinforced conventional stereotypes of the period.37
The fact that the report was a direct response to the wartime 
situation may be seen from its concluding remarks: ‘each individual 
citizen is more likely to concentrate upon his war effort if he feels that his 
government will be ready in time with plans for that better world’.38 It 
was a point alluded to earlier by Beveridge in a talk to the Engineering 
Industries Association, when he said that ‘thinking about reconstruction 
is one of the ways of ensuring victory’.39 The report also formed part of 
the British contribution to the Atlantic Charter signed by the allies with 
the intention of bringing about 'the fullest collaboration between all 
nations in the economic field, with the object of securing for all improved 
labour standards, economic advancem ent and social security '.40 
Stretching a point Beveridge added that the sentiments expressed in the 
Atlantic Charter out of which his own report sprang were ‘a sign of the 
belief that the object of government in peace and in war is not the glory 
of rulers or of race, but the happiness of the common man’.41
From an ideological view point, Beveridge described the report as 
leaning ‘neither towards socialism nor towards capitalism’, but rather a 
blueprint for dealing with the ‘five giant ev ils’ of want, disease, 
ignorance, squalor and idleness.42 In order to further placate any 
conservative, or indeed liberal, reaction to the report, Beveridge 
confirmed that neither the experience nor achievements of the past were 
being forgotten, the credentials of the report being firmly established in 
an historical context:
37 Elizabeth Wilson, ‘Feminism in social policy’ in Martin Loney, et al. (eds.), Social policy and 
social welfare (Philadelphia, 1988).
38 Ibid., p. 171.
39 William Beveridge, The pillars o f security (London, 1943), p. 42.
40 William Beveridge, Social insurance and allied services, p. 171.
41 Ibid.
42 William Beveridge, The pillars of security, pp 42, 77.
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The plan, as I have set it out briefly, is a completion of what was 
begun a little more than 30 years ago when Lloyd George 
introduced national health insurance and Winston Churchill, the 
President of the Board of Trade, introduced unemployment 
insurance.43
While more frequently employing the rhetoric of revolution in describing 
the report, this appeal to history and tradition was both tactful and 
beneficial and, as we shall see later, a characteristic of social reform in a 
period when such reform was not universally accepted as desirable.
Over the period following the publication of the report the social 
evils identified  by Beveridge were ‘system atically tackled by 
legislation’,44 the recommendations being implemented by both Churchill 
and Atlee as part of their four-year and five-year plans respectively. 
Indeed some of the legislation introduced, such as the National Insurance 
Act of 1946 went beyond the provision of the Beveridge report, while 
unemployment was kept at a minimum by the Labour government, rarely 
rising above 2%. In 1946 Aneurin Bevan, the Minister for Health, began 
to reform significantly the national health service entitling everybody to 
com prehensive m edical care free of charge from 1948. It was 
accompanied by other reforms including the National Insurance Industrial 
Injuries Act, 1946 and the National Assistance Act, 1948 which heralded 
the formal abolition of the poor law. It was only in 1951 with the return 
of the Tories to government that the focus of social reform moved from 
Britain to the Nordic countries.
While the report had several weaknesses which social scientists 
have since identified with the benefit of hindsight, it was to prove the 
single most important impetus behind the development of social security 
policy in Ireland in the 1940s and 1950s. Described at the time as ‘the
43 Ibid,, p. 57.
44 Kathleen Jones, The making o f social policy in Britain, 1830-1990, p. 134.
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Maginot Line of those who are tempted not to try to overcome their 
weakness’,45 the immediate influence of the report in the Free State may 
be judged from the numerous articles which appeared in newspapers and 
periodicals together with discussion of the report at government and 
parliamentary level. As Dr John Dignan declared in November 1944:
The publication in England of the Beveridge Report, of the 
government's white papers on social insurance and on the 
comprehensive medical services have undoubtedly awakened 
interest and expectation of similar development's in this country'.46
The report generated a popular interest, all daily newspapers 
carrying reviews of the report itself. Such popular interest was crucial, as 
the Beveridge report and the subsequent legislation in Britain was 'clearly 
a case where popular expectations determined government reaction' 
according to Douglas Ashford.47 It is interesting here to note that the 
immediate and constant thread running through the newspaper articles 
was the feasibility of adopting the essence of the Beveridge report in 
Ireland.
In anticipation the Irish Times, in its regular feature ‘An Irishman’s 
Diary’, told of the imminent publication of the Report on social security 
and allied services, commenting that it should be worth ‘careful study by 
people interested in the social development of our own country’.48 
Coverage in the Irish Times of various aspects of the report continued 
right through December 1942. While the ‘London Letter’ kept the 
readers abreast of developments in Britain49 special feature articles on the
45 Arnold Marsh, Ireland’s new foundation (Dundalk, 1944), p. 101.
46 Observations on a paper entitled 'Outlines of a scheme of national health insurance' read to the 
committee of management of Cumann an Arachais Ndisiunta ar ShlAinte by chairperson, Dr Dignan 
(N.A., D/SW, Dr. Dignan plan, LA. 122/53).
47 Douglas Ashford, The emergency o f the welfare state, p. 269.
48 IT, 27 Nov. 1942.
49 IT, 2 Dec. 1942; 7 Dec. 1942; 11 Dec. 1942; 18 Dec. 1942; 24 Dec. 1942.
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Beveridge report, written by ‘special correspondents’ and ‘political 
correspondents’ appeared - on three occasions on the front page of the 
newspaper.
The thrust of these articles was the relevance of the report to
Ireland. On 14 December the front page article, under the headline ‘The
*
Beveridge scheme: interest in Eire’ said:
Highly desirable...would be a similar document to the Beveridge 
report, setting out the possibility of its adoption here... There is 
strong reason why the Eire governm ent should take early 
cognisance of it.
‘A student of economics’ in a front page article some days later said it 
was ‘inevitable’ that ‘the government of Eire is to adopt some plans of 
“social security” on the general principles of the Beveridge report’.
On New Y ear’s Eve 1942 the Irish Times, w ith obvious 
disappointment, declared in a front page headline, ‘No Eire Beveridge 
plan yet’. Commenting on and quoting from an article that appeared in 
The Econom ist50 earlier in the month, the paper hinted at what could be 
the first practical effect of the report in Ireland, saying ‘it would not be 
surprising if the promise of [family allowances] were not to form part of 
the government’s programme at the coming general election’, which was 
subsequently held in July 1943.
The coverage which the plan received in the Irish Independent, a 
paper with a much greater circulation and wider readership base than the 
Irish Times, was equally expansive and also concentrated on the 
implications of the report for Ireland. The first major article appeared on 
2 December 1942 under the headline ‘British plan to abolish want: 
sweeping changes proposed’. Two weeks later the paper began a series 
of well-reasoned, knowledgeable and balanced articles on the report in
50 The Beveridge plan', The Economist, 5 Dec. 1942.
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response to what it termed the ‘considerable interest [that] has been 
aroused in Ireland, as elsewhere in the world, in the Beveridge Report on 
social insurance and in view of its possible influence on the course of 
social planning [here]’. While the first article, ‘Beveridge’s “No Want 
Plan”: an analysis’, was largely descriptive, the series continued by 
examining the ‘cash benefits and pensions’, the cost of the scheme to the 
state and to the contributor and the question of family and children’s 
allowances. The articles clearly supported the qualified implementation 
of the Beveridge plan in Ireland, the concluding remarks summing up the 
measured tenor of the series:
Every nation has to solve its problems in accordance with its own 
needs and resources. W hat may be feasible in one may be 
practicable in another only in a modified and more moderate 
pattern. Here, with every disposition to be liberal, it is necessary, 
in the words of Sir William Beveridge’s reminder to the relatively 
wealthier nations, to bear in mind that money cannot come from a 
bottomless pit.51
Coverage of the report in the Irish Press was less comprehensive, 
reflecting its political bias and the editorial control over the paper 
exercised by de Valera, and an early indication of what the Fianna Fail 
government’s response to the report would be. An article on 2 December 
1942 gave a descriptive and largely favourable account of the essence of 
the report, calling it a plan which ‘sets out to abolish below-the-breadline 
poverty’. In an unusual front-page article two days later however, under 
the headline ‘Beveridge plan “poor reward" Australian minister says’, the 
reporter cited criticisms of the report by the Australian Minister for 
Labour. Further down, a spokesperson for the German authorities was 
quoted as saying that the basis of the plan was taken from existing 
German policy, highlighting the political significance of the report in the
51 //, 19 Dec. 1942.
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context of the war.
The only other immediate reaction to the Beveridge Report in the 
Irish Press appeared on 18 December under the headline ‘work harder 
and produce better: minister’s views on Beveridge plan’. The article 
reported a speech by Sean MacEntee, M inister for Finance until 
September 1939 and from then on Minister for Local Government and 
Public Health. MacEntee, again providing an indication of what the 
government's response to the Beveridge report would be, was reported as 
saying that:
for us the wiser course is to face the future realistically and to steel 
ourselves with the thought that, if we wish to continue the social 
progress which has characterised our history since we won our 
freedom, we can only hope to do so by working harder and 
producing more efficiently.
Coming so soon after the publication of the report the statement, apart
from  the dubious reference to social progress, underlined the
government’s anxiety regarding the influence the report would have in
Ireland and how public finances could cope with increased social
expenditure.
However the report became almost immediately a burning political 
issue, Fine Gael placing a notice of motion on the order paper on 10 
December 1942 for discussion in the Dail:
That this house is of opinion that the proposals outlined in the 
Beveridge report for the attaining of social security in Britain merit 
the earnest consideration of the government, and requests that a 
white paper be prepared showing the estimated cost of the 
application of such proposals to this country.52
While the motion was never discussed on the floor of the lower house due
to the Christmas adjournment, the essence of the motion was to appear as
52 A copy of the notice of motion is available in Social insurance and allied services: report by Sir 
William Beveridge. 1942, (N.A., D/T, S 13053 A).
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a topic for discussion right through 1943 and long afterwards.
The negative campaign against Beveridgeism, which may not have 
been officially orchestrated by the government but which had its full 
support, continued apace in 1943. In what appears to have been an 
unprecedented incident, P. S. O Hegarty, secretary of the Department of 
Posts and Telegraphs (P. J. Little being the minister) wrote in the Sunday 
Independent of 21 March 1943 under the banner headline ‘Plan means 
workers maintain idlers’ that:
The man who is unable to set his own powers at work, who has 
neither the intelligence to do so nor the energy to do so, and whose 
powers are put to work by the energy and intelligence of someone 
else, is told that he is being ‘exploited’ until he believes it. But the 
boot is on the other foot. It is the employer who is being exploited 
- his brains and energy and his resourcefulness... Between his 
rights and his exploitation it is an easy step to the notion that he is 
entitled to a living, that the...state is bound to provide for him from 
the cradle... Out of this come the Beveridge and similar schemes.
Privately chastised by Little for ‘this grave breach of civil service rules’,53
O Hegarty later claimed that the article was an attempt ‘to draw attention
to the moral and philosophical implications of the Beveridge scheme'.54
Despite the ‘graveness’ of the transgression the cabinet decided to take no
disciplinary action, O Hegarty, a pro-treaty supporter who was later
described in an editorial of the Irish Press as being ‘venemously
disposed’ towards Fianna Fail,55 holding his position as secretary of the
Department of Posts and Telegraphs until he reached retiring age.
Although a serious transgression of the rule that civil servants were
forbidden to contribute to newspapers or other publications any letters or
articles conveying information, comment or criticism on any matter of
53 Letter from P. J. Little to P. S. O Hegarty, 29 Mar. 1943 (N.A., D/T, P. S. O Hegarty: press article 
on social security, S 13186).
54 Letter from P. S. O Hegarty to P. J. Little, 30 Mar. 1943 (N.A,. D/T, P. S. O Hegarty: press article 
on social security, S 13186).
55 IP, 4 Dec. 1945.
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current political interest, the article, very much opposed to Beveridgeism, 
was in tune with government thinking.
In the same month as the article appeared, the Department of Local 
Government and Public Health wrote to the Taoiseach confidently 
reassuring him and taking solace from the fact that ‘opinion in Great 
Britain is not as strongly in favour of the Beveridge report as the 
newspapers would have outsiders believe'.56
The negative campaign of the government very much reflected the 
British government's attempts to frustrate the publicity surrounding the 
publication of the report.57 The Irish government very quickly dropped 
all reference to Beveridge in its official memoranda and reports, again 
emulating the British government's move to exclude mention of the report 
in its official propaganda. It was a stance reinforced to some degree by 
the Catholic church, Dr Farren, Bishop of Derry, best exemplifying this 
church opposition to social policy at its most trenchant. Speaking almost 
ten years after the publication of the report, at a meeting of the Derry 
Catholic Social Services Centre, he said:
We hear of all the expenditure of money and human life that the 
defeat of Nazi materialism entailed, and we see at the present time 
a burden almost intolerable being placed on people to defeat the 
atheistic materialism of Russia, but the fact remains that the power 
and the spirit behind practically all social legislation at the present 
time is taken from the worst principles of both Nazi and Russian 
materialism. I am amazed at the fact.58
However, as outlined in chapter two of the present work, most Catholic 
writers who took up the issue of Beveridgeism, did not reject the report 
out of hand, but rather gave a balanced assessm ent of its
56 Family allowances - Cabinet Committee, Nov. 1939 (N.A, DfT, S 12117A).
57 See Douglas Ashford, The emergence o f the welfare state, p. 270 and Kathleen Jones, The making 
o f social policy in Britain, p. 131
58 II, 18 Apr. 1951.
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recommendations and of their relevance to Ireland. Peter McKevitt, the 
first person to hold the chair of Catholic Sociology and Catholic Action 
established at Maynooth College in 1937, while claiming that ‘the 
Beveridge plan for social security is not for export’ acknowledged that 
'the good points of the scheme are obvious'.59 Similarly, Cornelius 
Lucey, a colleague of M cKevitt’s in Maynooth, while describing the 
report as 'a British report to meet British conditions'60 nonetheless said 
that Ireland:
Cannot afford to ignore the report. If the social security system 
it proposes is adopted in Great Britain and Northern Ireland...and 
if it proves successful there, then we must perforce adopt it too or 
provide something ju st as good, if  not better or else we are 
perpetuating the border on the one hand and encouraging 
emigration on the other.61
It was a theme further pursued by Lucey in a lecture arranged by the
CYMS in the Mansion House in Dublin in February 1943 when he said
that ‘the most can be said against it [the Beveridge report] is that it plans
a step towards totalitarianism rather than against it. However one step,
or even a few steps towards totalitarianism, though dangerous, were not
disastrous’.62 The plan did not lead halfway down the road to Moscow
but rather ‘a step nearer to M oscow’.63
Despite the balanced views of most Catholic writers, however, the
Fianna Fail government often reverted to Catholic-based arguments as
reasons for non-adoption of the principles of Beveridgeism. The extent
to which this ‘Catholic argument’ was a mere cover for more deep-
seated financial and ideological worries over extending social welfare
legislation on the principles of Beveridgeism became apparent with the
59 Irish Ecclesiastical Record, Mar. 1943, pp 147,150.
60 Cornelius Lucey, "The Beveridge Report and £ire', Studies, vol. 32 (1943), p. 36.
61 Ibid., p. 37.
62 Catholic Herald, 12 Feb. 1943.
63 Ibid.
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publication in 1945 by Dr John Dignan, Bishop of Clonfert, of Social 
security: outlines o f a scheme o f national health insurance.
The Dignan plan: ‘something b ig and memorable’
The publication of the Dignan plan in M arch 1945 greatly 
enhanced the momentum for change in welfare policy in Ireland 
initiated by the publication of the Beveridge report. In essence it was an 
Irish blueprint for the restructuring and reorganisation of not only the 
health insurance services in Ireland, but of the entire spectrum of social 
security services from which, combined with the Beveridge report, was 
forged the theory and practise of the modem Irish welfare state.
Drawing newspaper headlines such as 'Eire's Beveridge Plan',64 
‘Beveridge - with d ifferences’,65 and ‘Comments on a bishop’s 
Beveridge P lan’,66 Dignan’s plan was undoubtedly spurred on, if not 
inspired by, Beveridge's report (as the People's Press observed in 
reviewing the plan 'we are an imitative people. W hat Britain does 
today, we m ust do tom orrow '67) D ignan's schem e caught the 
imagination of politicians and ordinary people alike. Influenced by 
developments in Denmark and New Zealand, in many ways it put 
forward some radical suggestions and was undoubtedly the first major 
Irish contribution to the debate regarding the future of the social 
services in Ireland.68
The three underlying principles of his plan - the establishment of 
a Department for Health and Social Services, the decentralization of all
64 II, 8 Oct. 1944.
65 Catholic Herald, 27 Oct. 1944.
66 Daily Telegraph and Morning Post, 1 Nov. 1944.
67 People's Press, 28 Oct. 1944.
68 In 1933 Sean Brophy published Irish social security which set forth ‘a plan for national co­
operation and Christian social security’. However Brophy’s pamphlet was more an argument in favour 
of social security than a comprehensive plan and therefore cannot be considered in the same mould as 
the Beveridge report or Dignan plan.
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social services and the co-ordination of all social services had formed 
the basis of an earlier submission by Dignan to Dr Francis Ward, 
parliamentary secretary to the Department of Local Government and 
Public Health, in July 1944, on behalf of the National Health Insurance 
Society. Stressing the importance of involving the government, labour 
and employers in the management and work of any new national health 
insurance society, this earlier submission called for ’full autonomous 
powers' for a newly constituted central insurance board to take the place 
of the existing insurance society.69
Initially read as a paper to the committee of management of the 
National Health Insurance Society in October 1944, Dignan himself 
described Social security: outlines o f a scheme o f national health 
insurance as 'a comprehensive scheme, consonant with Catholic social 
principles, feasible and practicable and adapted to the circumstances of 
our country'.70 It was, in effect, an outline for the future of the social 
services in Ireland. It described the system in existence as reeking with 
'destitution, pauperism and degradation', in effect no better than the 
poor law of the nineteenth century. Dignan's attitude was 'Erasez  
I'infam e'.11 It provided for the total abolition of the remaining poor 
law services such as public assistance and invisaged that the new scheme 
would ultim ately incorporate 90% of the population, or 2,600,000 
people, as opposed to the 610,000 catered for by the existing insurance 
society (a mere 1 in 5 of the population).72
As part of the reorganisation of the health and welfare services, 
the plan stressed the importance of establishing a separate Department
69 Memorandum submitted by Dignan to Ward, 22 July 1944 (N.A., D/SW, Synopsis of a 
submission by National Health Insurance Society, I.A./296).
70 II, 18 Oct. 1944.
71 John Dignan, Social security: outlines o f a scheme of national health insurance (Sligo, 1945), p. 
3.
72 Ibid., p. 12.
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of Social Services which, in turn, would oversee the work of a new and 
vastly expanded national health insurance society with greatly increased 
powers which would carry out the administration of both health and 
welfare services with a very large degree of independence from the new 
m inistry.73
Referring to the existing sickness and disability benefits as 
inadequate, the scheme proposed that, subsequent to the transfer of all 
health services to the reconstituted society, it would undertake a nation­
wide health campaign through public lectures, advertisements, leaflets, 
etc.; would promote a campaign to modernise the sanitation services in 
every town and village; would encourage the installation of electricity; 
and would facilitate research into illness and occasionally survey the 
health of the members of the society:74
Beneficiaries will have the fullest range of care which medical 
science can supply and this will include, in addition to hospital, 
sanatorial or convalescent home treatment, such other remedial 
agencies of cure as dental, optical and ophthalmic services, 
specialist and consultative advice or treatment, midwifery, medical 
and surgical appliances, econom ic prescribing, nursing and 
ambulance services, and so forth.75
The plan further provided for improvements in the rates of widows'
and orphans' pensions, blind pensions, old age pensions, unemployment
insurance, fam ilies’ allowances and workmen's compensation, the
administration of all of which would be carried out by a new national
health insurance society.
Published just two years after the Commission on Vocational 
Organisation, established to examine the practicability and best means of 
establishing vocational organisation in Ireland, and chaired by Bishop
73 Ibid., p. 27.
74 Ibid., p. 10.
75 Ibid., pp 18-19.
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M ichael Browne, issued its report,76 the plan was framed along 
vocational lines, and therefore in accordance, as one might expect, with 
Catholic social teaching at the time. Describing the existing society as 
'the nearest approach to vocational organisation in this country',77 the 
new society would have, in addition, a number of regional committees, 
conceivably based on the county divisions. Furtherm ore Dignan 
thought 'it would be to the greatest advantage of the society if the 
church were represented on the central and regional committees. It is 
indeed hard to see how these committees could function satisfactorily 
except this is done’.78 The plan also provided for the establishment of 
the principal offices of a number of services outside the Dublin area. 
On the other issue that concerned the church at this time, the question of 
the state becoming increasingly involved in the life of the citizens, 
Dignan was pragmatic: 'I suppose the state must step in and assist but the 
less it interferes with the rights of the family the better'.79
It is little wonder that Dignan foresaw that the plan would be 
greeted as revolutionary by some people.80
He concluded his Social security: outlines o f a scheme o f national 
health insurance, by saying that it 'clamours for criticism'. That it most 
certainly did. Its publication was marked by a flurry of newspaper 
articles, official government reaction, and a bitter war of words 
between the author and Sean MacEntee. The whole thrust of the 
government’s reaction, as in the case of the Beveridge report, was one 
of suspicion. The publication of the report obviously took the 
government by surprise (a headline in the Irish Independent on 19
76 Commission on Vocational Organisation, Report (1943).
77 John Dignan, Social security, p. 31.
78 Ibid., p. 33.
79 Ibid., p. 8.
80 John Dignan, Social security, p. 11.
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October 1944 read ‘Plan a “surprise” for minister’), despite the fact that 
Dignan claims to have spent ten years in its preparation. The report of 
the departm ental committee on health services called the plan 
'fundamentally defective',81 while the government, still somewhat in 
shock, strongly criticised the obvious weaknesses of the plan - the fact 
that the entire scheme was not costed (a weakness acknowledged by 
Dignan in the report, and criticised by Alderman E. E. Benson, 
President of the Dublin Chamber of Commerce, as 'a most dangerous 
thing'82), the lack of provision made for those who would fall behind in 
their insurance payments, and the lack of provision for those who did 
not fall within an insurance scheme:
No examination is made as to what risks the voluntary class may 
insure against or whether in a unified scheme, a farmer, or a 
professional man, having selected his wage-group and paid his 
'single inclusive stamp', may be entitled to receive one of the 
unified benefits, for instance unemployment benefit.83
Criticism  of the plan on the basis of these weaknesses was
justified. It was rather unusual, if not naïve, to produce a detailed
scheme for what amounted to a radical overhauling of the social
services in Ireland and to leave the entire plan uncosted. Providing for
improvements in the rates of all social welfare payments without
attempting to cost the measure was inadequate. It was hardly sufficient
for Dignan to say on the second last page of the plan that 'I could not be
expected at this stage to give any indication of the total cost or of the
contribution to be borne by the contributing parties'.84 Beyond
suggesting that the profits of the Sweepstakes should be put at the
81 Departmental Committee on Health Services, Report (Dec. 1945).
82 Evening Mail, 25 Oct. 1944.
83 Observations on a paper entitled 'Outlines of a scheme of national health insurance' read to the 
Committee of Management of Cumann an Archaise Ndisiunta ar Shldinte by chairman, Dr Dignan 
(N.A., D/SW, Dr Dignan Plan, I.A. 122/53).
84 John Dignan, Social security, p. 36.
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disposal of the society and that the war-time levels of taxation should be 
continued for a few years with the money being transferred to the 
society, the scheme was very short on financing ideas. Dignan did not 
include his suggestion of July 1944 as submitted to Dr Francis Ward 
regarding financing, which made provision for benefits from 'legacies, 
charities, voluntary donations, local efforts', together with 'advances 
from the central bank of interest-free m oney',85 two rem arkably 
amateur suggestions in the light of the overall thrust of Dignan's 
thinking. Returning to his published report, Dignan suggested that the 
first step should be 'to find out how much money can be afforded and 
then draw up the best possible scheme within our means'86: Fianna Fail 
would have argued that this was precisely what it had been doing. Such 
an important omission left the report wide open for criticism by an 
unresponsive government.
Internal government memoranda also criticised the proposal that 
the scheme ought to be run by a reconstituted national health insurance 
society with a large degree of independence from the government and 
implied that the publication and contents of the report had been 
influenced by the publication of the Beveridge report in Britain.87 The 
inaccuracies in the Dignan report were put down to misunderstandings 
as to how the existing system worked, an unusual accusation to level 
against the chairman of the National Health Insurance Society, appointed 
successively to that position from its inception in 1936 by Fianna Fail 
governments. Specific measures such as a mortality benefit and an
85 Memorandum submitted by Dignan to Ward, 22 July 1944. (N.A, D/SW, Synopsis of a 
submission by National Health Insurance Society, I.A./296).
86 John Dignan, Social security, p. 33.
87 Observations on a paper entitled 'Outlines of a scheme of national health insurance' read to the 
Committee of Management of Cumann an Archaise Ndisiunta ar Shldinte by chairman, Dr Dignan 
(N.A., D/SW, Dr Dignan Plan, I.A. 122/53).
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interest-free loan on marriage were also questioned.88 In 1945 a 
departm ental com m ittee on the health services exam ined the 
recom m endations regarding the health proposals contained in the 
report. Reporting in December 1945 it concluded that 'the plan is 
impracticable and can neither be financed nor administered on insurance 
grounds'.89
Despite the negative reaction of the government, the popular 
attitude, reflected through the provincial papers, was one of welcome 
towards the plan. The Carlow Nationalist particularly welcomed the 
fact that it was 'based upon really Christian foundations and upon 
existing Irish conditions',90 a sentiment echoed by the Tuam Herald: 'His 
scheme as published seems to be an admirable plan, based on a Christian 
conception of things and is intended to make the social services the right 
of every citizen, not merely a State charity’.91 The Connaught 
Telegraph described the plan as 'refreshingly bold and far-reaching'.92 
Interestingly, despite its portrayal as an inherently Christian document, 
none of Dignan's colleagues in the hierarchy publically supported the 
plan. Neither did Irish Ecclesiastical Record or Studies carry the same 
analysis of the plan which had earlier greeted the Beveridge report.
Apart from Fianna Fail, political opinion was supportive of the 
plan, William Norton, now leader of a divided Labour Party, issuing a 
press release on 18 October 1944 welcoming the proposals:
88 Ibid.
89 National health insurance: proposals of Most Rev. Dr Dignan (N.A., D/T, S 13570).
90 Carlow Nationalist, 4 Oct. 1944.
91 Tuam Herald, 21 Oct. 1944.
92 Connaught Telegraph, 21 Oct. 1944. A number of other provincial papers carried favourable 
reviews of the report, demonstrating the popular interest generated by it and the interest of ordinary 
people in the issues raised. See for example, Clare Champion, 21 Oct. 1944, Limerick Leader, 21 Oct. 
1944, Wexford People, 28 Oct. 1944, Dundalk Democrat, 21 Oct. 1944, Westmeath Independent, 28 
O ct 1944, Leinster Leader, 22 Sept. 1945.
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as a comprehensive attempt to raise the present wretchedly low 
standard of social services in Eire which were based on pauper 
standards and provided no real economic or social security for 
those who, through economic or physical adversity, were 
compelled to rely on social services to succour them in such 
circumstances.93
The Labour Party’s sub-committee on social services later reinforced 
Norton’s views, saying the importance of Dignan’s plan ‘cannot be too 
strongly emphasised’.94
In January 1945 the national executive of the Irish Trade Union 
Congress adopted a motion welcoming D ignan’s proposals ‘as an 
important and valuable contribution to the solution of the very grave 
p ro b le m ’95 of poverty. Circulating the motion to each affiliated 
organisation, it prompted many such expressions of support, the Irish 
W omen’s W orkers’ Union passing an ‘emergency resolution’ to the 
same effect.96 Both resolutions were forwarded to the Department of 
Local Government and Public Health, as were numerous other petitions 
calling on the minister to seriously consider Dignan’s proposals.97
The national newspapers also warmly welcomed the report, the 
Irish Independent saying that:
we are glad to find this reform advocated by Dr Dignan in his 
suggestive and thought-provoking paper... The scheme is the 
Beveridge Plan with modifications in accord with Christian and 
Catholic principles.98
93 M ost Rev. Dr D ignan’s social services proposals, (Labour History Museum, Norton Papers, Item 
104).
94 Labour Party, Interim report of sub committee on social services (n.d.), (Labour History Museum, 
Norton Papers, Item 104).
95 Letter from ITUC to each affiliated organisation, 9 Jan. 1945, (Labour History Museum, Norton 
Papers, Item 104).
96 Letter from Miss Louie Bennett to Minister for Local Government and Public Health, 7 Feb. 1945, 
(U.C.D. Archives, MacEntee Papers, National health insurance society - Dr Dignan’s proposals, 
P67/257).
97 For example. Resolution from Kilrush U.D.C., 20 Mar. 1945, (U.C.D. Archives, MacEntee 
Papers, National health insurance society - Dr Dignan’s proposals, P67/257).
98 II, 18 Oct. 1944.
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If the popular press was supportive of the scheme, it was in the 
pages of the newspapers that the increasingly bitter row between Sean 
M acEntee, M inister for Local Government and Public Health, and 
Bishop Dignan was played out. In large measure this situation was 
precipitated by Dignan himself, who released his plan to the newspapers 
before providing the Department of Local Government and Public 
Health or the minister with a copy, a move most lightly calculated to 
stave off the possibility of any ministerial attempts to have the report 
blocked before publication. In a letter to the National Health Insurance 
Society on 21 October 1944 the secretary of the Department of Local 
Government and Public Health spoke of the ‘grave issues raised by the 
manner of publication’ of the report, and on 19 October 1944, T. J. 
Barrington, private secretary to the minister, wrote a letter to the 
national papers in response to the claims that Dignan's scheme 'for the 
extension of the social services' had been submitted to the minister. The 
letter, a copy of which was sent to the committee of management before 
publication, was printed in full in the Irish Press:
Dear Sir,
I am desired by the Minister for Local Government and 
Public Health to say that he has read with surprise the statement in 
this morning's papers that a scheme for the extension of the social 
services in the state had been submitted by the National Health 
Insurance Society to the Minister...
If by a scheme for an extension of social insurance is meant 
a proposal substantially worked out in detail, supported by factual 
argument and embodying estimates of the expenditure involved 
and concrete proposals for defraying the cost, the minister can 
categorically state that no such scheme has been submitted to him. 
Inquiry at other government departments has revealed that no 
proposals of the kind have been submitted to them.
In the ensuing public argument, MacEntee had his departmental officials
investigate Dignan's running of the society in search of an instance
'where difficulty was experienced in getting the Society to carry out the
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m inister's  in s tru c tio n s '."  Following investigation, one minor 
adm inistrative difficulty was unearthed, but nothing more and the 
investigation was terminated. MacEntee's hope of unearthing material 
which he could use in his case against both Dignan and his plan, a classic 
instance of argumentum ad hominem, an art to which MacEntee had 
recourse to on more than one occasion, spoke volumes of both the 
minister's attitude to the plan and Dignan's record as chairman of the 
national health insurance society.
In the public controversy however, Dignan, far from letting 
MacEntee make all the running, issued a statement to the newspapers in 
March 1945:
I venture to ask (i) does a minister become, by his ministerial 
appointment, an autocrat with absolute power "whose will and 
pleasure" counts for everything in the affairs of his department;
(ii) is it an offence and crime to offer a minister suggestion, for 
e.g. to submit to him a scheme of National Health Insurance: (iii) 
is it a "derogation of his office" to request him to give reasons for 
b randing  p roposals based  on C hristian  p rincip les as 
"impracticable under almost every heading"?100
The statement was in response to a lecture delivered by MacEntee on the 
topic of ‘Some recent proposals for the co-ordination of our social 
services’, organised by the Tomas O Laoighre cumann of Fianna Fail in 
Dublin, as reported in the Irish Press on 14 March 1945.
MacEntee confirmed his disapproval of both Dignan and his 
scheme by failing to reappoint him as chairman of the committee of 
management of the National Health Insurance Society when the position 
came up for renewal in 1945. Dignan was the only member of the 
outgoing committee not to receive a letter from the minister asking
99 Memorandum, 3 Nov. 1944 (N.A, D/SW, Dr Dignan Plan, 122/53).
100 II, 27 Mar. 1945.
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whether he would be prepared to act on the new committee which 
would come into office on 1 August 1945.101 It was in effect a dismissal 
as Dignan had been reappointed to the position of chairman from the 
inception of the society. The failure to reappoint him on this occasion 
was greeted with both shock and anger in popular and political circles. 
Laois County Council passed a resolution proposed by Oliver J. 
Flanagan saying that the members of the council ‘protest against the 
action of the government in failing to reappoint His Lordship, Most 
Rev. Dr Dignan...and we place on record the great work of his 
Lordship in preparing a plan for improved social services'.102 A 
similar resolution was passed by Dublin City Council, while the Irish 
National Union of W oodcutters sent the government a copy of the 
resolution they passed regarding the non-appointment of Dignan: 'We 
maintain that the minister's attitude in this matter has been in the true 
Fascist tradition and in conflict with the principles embodied in the 
constitution'.103
Many public representatives urged MacEntee to reconsider his 
decision, among them Norton, who chided the m inister for the 
‘humiliation’ to which he had subjected Dignan:
I think that every reasonable person will regret the manner in 
which these proposals by His Lordship were received by the 
M inister for Local Government and Public Health. One could 
scarcely imagine a more intemperate display of pettiness and 
petulance than was exhibited by the Minister in his tirades in 
connection with these proposals... The mere fact that the Minister 
for Local Government and Public Health has seen fit to engage in 
what can only be regarded as a disorderly harangue, so far as he 
was concerned, with His Lordship the Bishop of Clonfert, is no
101 Dr Dignan’s proposals, (U.C.D. Archives, MacEntee Papers, P67/257).
102 Leinster Leader, 22 Sept. 1945.
103 IT, 28 Aug. 1945.
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reason why His Lordship's proposals in respect to social services 
ought not to hold the stage.104
In March 1946 James Pattison of the Labour Party raised the issue on an 
adjournment debate ‘to point out that this [Dignan’s non-appointment] is 
a further definite indication of a tendency on the part of the minister to 
adopt a dictatorial attitude in all matters within the responsibility of his 
department’. It was not an unreasonable comment. However MacEntee 
held firm  in his resolve, responding to Pattison in the following 
manner:
I had to make certain that those whom I proposed to appoint 
would accept what I regarded as the fundamental condition of 
their appointment, that is to say, that they would strive to ensure 
that a close and cordial liaison was maintained between the 
committee of management and the minister.105
Dignan was not reappointed. As far as MacEntee was concerned the 
case was closed.
Despite the negative governmental reaction to the Dignan report, 
and MacEntee's preparedness almost to the point of vindictiveness to 
discredit both Dignan and the report, many of the ideas contained in it 
were implemented over the following decade. In April 1944 Dignan 
had w ritten to Dr W ard urging him to 'do something big and 
memorable in the field of social services'.106 Now Dignan himself, who 
continued to write about social security in Ireland, had done just that. 
While one commentator has described the report as 'more cogent when 
criticising existing Irish institutions than when offering alternatives',107 
the importance of the report lay not so much in its contents as in the
104 DD vol. 99, 30 Jan. 1946, col. 144.
105 DD vol. 99, 13 Mar. 1946, col. 2246, 2440.
106 Letter from John Dignan to Dr Ward, 23 Apr. 1944 (N.A., D/SW, Dr Dignan plan, I.A. 122/53).
107 J. H. W hyte, Church and state in modern Ireland, 1923-79 (2nd edn., Dublin, 1980), p. 103.
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discussion it precipitated and the awareness it created of the need for a 
vastly expanded and co-ordinated network of social policies in Ireland.
In the immediate post-Beveridge period, and before the coming to 
power of the first inter-party government, the first practical steps were 
taken giving effect to this new awareness of the centrality of progressive 
social legislation to the lives of the citizens. The first of these reforms, 
which predated the publication of the Dignan plan, was the introduction 
of children’s allowances.
‘The new half crown’: the introduction of children's allowances
Children’s allowances was the most topical social security issue in 
Ireland at the time of the publication of the Beveridge report, and it can 
reasonably be argued that, while discussion of children's allowances was 
a live issue in the cabinet before December 1942, the publication of the 
Beveridge report hastened the process which lead to their introduction 
in Ireland. Certainly it was the piece of social legislation which many 
commentators predicted would be the first dividend of post-Beveridge 
reform in Ireland.108
Beveridge described children’s allowances as one of the three 
assumptions (comprehensive health and rehabilitation services being the 
other two) upon which a satisfactory social insurance scheme had to be 
based.109 However, he advised that allowances could not be based on an 
insurance principle:
Without such allowances as part of benefit or added to it, to make 
provision for large fam ilies, no social insurance against 
interruption of earnings can be adequate. But it children’s 
allowances are given only when earnings are interrupted and are 
not given during earnings also, two evils are unavoidable. First a
108 See for example IT, 31 Dec. 1942.
109 Sir William Beveridge, The p illa rs  o f  society, p. 98.
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substantial measure of acute want will remain among the lower 
paid workers... Second, in all such cases, income will be greater 
during unemployment or other interruptions of work than during 
w ork .110
The latter was also stressed by the British Chancellor of the Exchequer 
in a memorandum on family allowances which commented that ‘any 
scheme which involves compulsory contributions...offers an incentive to 
enter or leave the fold according to individual circumstances and 
therefore leads to the exercise of ingenuity on the part of individuals in 
a manner detrimental to the finances of the scheme'.111 Significantly, a 
copy of this memorandum is to be found in Irish governmental and 
departmental archives.112
Before the introduction of children’s allowances in Ireland, 
parents did receive some allowances for children under a number of 
social insurance and social assistance schemes, notably under the 
provision of widows' and orphans' pensions, unemployment assistance, 
and unem ploym ent insurance. However, the rates were far from 
adequate, the unemployment insurance rates allowance for each child 
being 1/- per week. Equally inadequate were the limited powers of the 
local authorities, namely 'to make such arrangements for attending to 
the health of expectant and nursing mothers and children under five 
years o f age, as may be approved by the m inister'113 under the 
N otification of Birth (Extension) Act of 1915. W hile national 
government defrayed 50% of the net cost of such child welfare services 
organised by local authorities or by one of the over seventy voluntary 
m aternity and child welfare agencies, the total paid out in the year
110 Sir William Beveridge, Report on social security and allied services, p. 8.
111 Family allowances: memorandum by the chancellor of the exchequer Presented to parliament by 
Command of His Majesty, May 1942, (London, 1942).
112 Family allowances: interdepartmental committee (N.A., D/SW, I.A. 129/53).
113 Department of Local Government and Public Health, Report, 928-29, p. 47.
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1928-29 was a mere £18,204, over half of which went to the voluntary 
sector.114 Local authorities were also empowered to provide benefit in 
kind directly to children in the form of school meals under the 
Education (Provision of Meals) Act, 1914, subsequently amended on 
numerous occasions.
It was this lack of provision for children that prompted discussion 
of the idea of child welfare or mothers' pensions as early as April 1922 
by the Irish Mothers' Pension Society, when John Patrick Dunne, the 
honorary secretary of the association, said:
I would make the state the custodian of necessitous women and 
children, and in order to make the wealthy elem ent of the 
community take a real interest in the welfare of the workers I 
would provide such dependent allowances from a capital levy on 
all funds accumulated in Irish banks... M others’ pensions has 
proved its worth wherever in operation, by preserving under the 
fostering care of the mother, and midst the sanctities of home the 
children of the nation, and thus enabling them to receive such 
training and care as w ill m ould them into self-respecting 
citizens.115
However, it was the late 1930s before the Irish government started 
seriously investigating the whole area of family allowances, a debate 
which was taking place across Europe earlier in the same decade. In the 
Netherlands for example, the debate resulted in a bill being introduced 
in 1939 to provide children's allowances on insurance lines for children 
under 15 years of age after the third child, while in the same year the 
French government introduced a family code which included family 
allowances.116 In Ireland it was James Dillon who first raised the issue 
in the Dail, asking Sean Lemass, then M inister for Industry and
114 Ibid., p. 48.
115 John Patrick Dunne, ‘Poverty problems for a patriot parliament’, Journal o f the Statistical and 
Social Inquiry Society o f Ireland, vol. 14 (1919-30), pp 193, 195.
116 James McMillan, Dreyfus to de Gaulle: politics and society in France 1898-1969 (London, 1985), 
p. 115.
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Commerce, in November 1938 if  statistics were available 'showing the 
number of children under 16 years of age in families, the heads of 
which enjoy an annual income of £250 or less'.117 Lemass replied that 
statistics of this nature were not available. Dillon's purpose in asking 
became clearer in March 1939 when, during a debate on the local 
government and public health estimates, he made an impassioned plea on 
behalf of those children and parents living on and below the poverty 
line. Referring to his own experiences in his home town in Roscommon 
he said:
I could not help remembering having seen people coming in and 
buying margarine because they could not afford butter. I could not 
help remembering children that I saw going to school with a slice 
of bread and mixed fruit jam  on it because it was cheaper than 
butter... The person who has really got his back to the wall is the 
person whose income is only 30/- or 35/- a week and who has ten 
children... Let us go now to the relief of the person whose position 
is intolerable, the person with more than four children, whose 
income is below £2 a week.118
It is clear that the Fianna Fail government had at least begun to collect 
information regarding children's allowances in other countries at this 
time, on the impetus of the Department of Agriculture, which circulated 
a memorandum in September 1939 stressing the need for allowances for 
agricultural families in particular:
In view of the great urgency for forcing every person in the 
community to engage in productive activity and at the same time of 
securing that mothers will be able to support their children, it is of 
the greatest importance that we should introduce a system of family 
allowances for agricultural workers and small farmers... The 
proposal...is taken on the basis of 21- for a wife and 16d. per child
117 DD vol. 73, 23 Nov. 1938, col. 851.
118 DD vol. 75, 30 Mar. 1939, col. 405-407.
183
for the agricultural workers and farmers under £1 valuation and 
applying it only to farmers under £16 valuation.119
In mid November 1939 a cabinet sub-committee on family allowances
was appointed, a strong and positive indication of the importance the
government attached to the issue. By December 1939 it was clear that
the committee was very much in favour of the introduction of children's
allowances in Ireland, saying that:
There is one general argument in favour of family allowances 
which appears to be of application [in Éire]... The life history of 
many working class families could be represented by a graph in 
which the wage is approximately a straight line and the living needs 
of the household a curve which rises above it, as children are bom, 
and drops again as they cease to be dependent. The gap between 
income and needs is a measure of poverty. There is little doubt but 
that this is a true picture of the lives of many urban wage earners 
and possibly also of many agricultural labourers in this country 
and this would justify the payment of family allowances with the 
object of raising the standard of living and alleviating poverty.120
Reporting in A pril 1940, the cabinet sub-com m ittee forw arded
proposals for the payment of allowances in respect of all children under
14 years of age living in families, with the exception of children already
provided for under the widows' and orphans’ pension act and children
whose means exceeded limits to be agreed to. It based the desirability
of children’s allowances on the necessity of alleviating poverty within
families and the encouragement of early marriage.121 It was estimated
that 700,000 children would benefit under the proposals, at a cost of
£3,000,000. £2,000,000 would be raised by contributions from
employees and the balance would be provided by the exchequer.122
119 Memorandum on Family allowances for agricultural workers and small farmers, 29 Sept. 1939 
(N.A, D/SW, E.B. 237766).
120 Family allowances, (N.A., D/SW, I.A. 129/53A).
121 Cabinet Committee: outline of proposals for the payment of family allowances, April 1940 
(N.A., D/SW, Family allowances, I.A. 129/53A).
122 Ibid.
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Not surprisingly the strongest opposition to the sub committee's 
proposals came from the Department of Finance. Rejecting the 
introduction of children's allowances on a purely 'to each according to 
his need', social justice philosophy, the Department of Finance, in a 
circular of July 1940, also questioned whether the introduction of 
allowances would increase the population in the face of a decline in the 
marriage rate and in fertility,123 a consideration which was to become 
more acute as time went on. Such questioning ran counter to historical 
prededent which seemed to favour the introduction of children’s 
allowances as a means of increasing the birth rate: the French 
government had introduced an allocation de maternité for the first child 
of mothers under twenty-five years in 1918 following the first world 
war to boost the population124 and had again introduced allowances 
following World War II with the aim of arresting population decline, an 
idea taken over and developed by Vichy to the point of ‘obsession’,125 
while Beveridge concluded that ‘children’s allowances can help to 
restore the birth ra te’.126 In Ireland the 1936 census had showed a 
significant decline in population revealing the lowest marriage rate in 
the world, the age at marriage being the latest. A significant number of 
females, up to one quarter, remained single while 66% of males and 
44% of females were still single at the ages of 30-44.127 Similarly the 
num ber o f births showed a decrease, perpetuating a continuos 
downward trend since 1881128 (see table). Rather than focusing on 
children’s allowances however, as a means of arresting population
123 Observations of the Minister for Finance on a scheme of family allowances proposed by the 
cabinet sub-committee, July 1940 (N.A., D/SW, Family allowances, I.A. 129/53A).
124 Douglas Ashford, The emergence o f the welfare state, p. 251.
125 James McMillan, Dreyfus to de Gaulle, pp 115, 133.
126 William Beveridge, Social insurance and allied services, p. 154.
127 Inter-departmental committee report, Oct. 1942 (N.A., D/SW, Family allowances, I.A. 129/53E).
128 Census 1936 vol. iv.
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decline, the Department of Finance later concluded that the only 
effective means of increasing the population was to bring about an end 
to em igration.129 However in the absence of any effort to bring this 
about such a statement rang more than a little hollow, emigration being 
perceived as the ‘bealach ealoidh’130 not only by those who left but also 
by the government. As an article in C om hair, a monthly journal 
founded in 1942 with the aim of promoting debate on issues of national 
importance within universities, commented:
Bhi la agus bhiomar ag caintfaoi n-ar gcuid deoraithe a thabhairt 
‘na bhaile as an Oilean Ur agus anois ta ‘n dubh-eagla orainn go 
dtiocfaidh cuid acu sin arais ata thall i Sasana.131
Shifting the emphasis to emigration was expedient. Infact, the number
of births had begun to rise from 1942, the increase being swallowed up
T able 5.1
Births and Birth Rates, 1941L-1952









1948 65,930 22 .00
1949 64,153 21 .46
1950 63,565 21.41
1951 62,878 21 .24
1952 64,226 21 .80
Source: C om m ission on emigration and other population problems, 1948 - 1954, 
R e p o r ts  (1954), p. 89.
129 Family allowances: inter-departmental committee (N.A., D/SW, I.AA. 129/53).
130 Com hair, iml.II (1943), uimh. 8.
131 Com hair, iml. II (1943), uimh. 4.
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by growing levels of emigration, a trend which was ‘likely to continue’ 
according to a post-war memorandum of the government.132
The Department of Finance was also anxious that, should a 
scheme of children's allowances be introduced, it would be based firmly 
on an insurance principle. However, the department concluded that the 
sub-committee’s proposals were inadequate, containing some 'striking 
anomalies and peculiarities'. Describing its proposals for the alleviation 
of poverty as defective and, significantly, suggesting that a scheme of 
children’s allowances based on benefits in kind rather than in cash could 
be administered by vocational organisation,133 it decided that a 'more 
complete investigation of objectives' was necessary.134 It was as a result 
of these observations that an inter-departmental committee on family 
allowances rather than, as Dillon had suggested, a review body 
composed of social workers and econom ists,135 was established in 
November 1940. If nothing else it bought the government more time 
while giving the appearance of action. Its terms of reference were to:
i) Examine and report on the question whether, having regard to 
social, econom ic and financial considerations, it would be 
practicable to establish a system of family or children's allowances 
having for its object the making of due provision for family needs 
and
132 Considerations attending the problems o f extending social insurance in Ireland, c l945  (U.C.D. 
Archives, MacEntee Papers, Social services, P67/361).
133 Department o f Local Government and Public Health memorandum, 5 Sept. 1940 (N.A., D/SW, 
Family allowances: interdepartmental committee, I.A. 129/53).
134 Observations o f the Minister for Finance on scheme for family allowances proposed by the 
cabinet sub-committee, July 1940 (N.A., D/SW, Family allowances, I.A. 129/53C).
135 DD vol. 81, 28 Nov. 1940, col. 936.
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ii) I f  such a system  was to be in troduced , to make
recommendations as to a scheme of family allowances, with
particular reference to the following matters:
(a) classes and circumstances of persons
(b) scale of allowances
(c) minimum number of dependent children which should be held 
to entitle a family to allowances
(d) administration
(e) cost
(f) method of financing
Lastly the committee was to report on the probable social, economic, 
and industrial consequences of the scheme.136 In order to quell any 
unfounded hopes, Sean T. O Kelly, the Minister for Finance, added the 
proviso that the establishment of the committee was 'without committing 
m yself in  any way to the adoption o f any schem e for such 
allowances'.137
Composed of representatives from the Department of Finance, the 
Department of Education (whose representative, Padraic O Dubhthaigh, 
was absent from many of the meetings due to illness), the employment 
division of the Department of Industry and Commerce, and P. J. Keady, 
the superintendent of widows' and orphans' pensions from the 
Department of Local Government and Public Health who went on to 
become vice-chairman of the International Social Security Association 
in the late 1940s, with T. K. W hitaker acting as secretary, the 
com m ittee acquired a number of publications regarding children's 
allowances, including Eleanor Rathbone’s three works Ethics and  
economics o f fam ily endowment (1940), Care fo r  fam ily endowment 
(later 1930s) and The disinherited fam ily  (late 1930s); the Family 
Endowment Society’s Family allowances (1938) and Alexander Gray’s 
Fam ily endowment. Apart from these publications, the committee
136 Report of inter-departmental committee on family allowances, Oct. 1942 (N.A., D/T, Family 
allowances; (a) inter-departmental committee, 1940; (b) legislation proposals, S 12117B).
137 DD vol. 81, 11 Dec. 1940, col. 985.
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collected a number of books and articles on the operation of family 
allow ances in, for exam ple, the N etherlands, for purposes of 
comparison.
The committee held its first meeting at the Department of Finance 
on 13 December 1940, the chairperson ruling out the taking of evidence 
from ‘persons or bodies outside the civil service’, a decision taken in 
view of Lemass’s response to Dillon when he called for a review body 
of social workers and economists to be established.138 The absence of 
professional input was an immediate and significant weakness in any 
proposals the committee might make. At a subsequent meeting in 
January 1941 it was decided to agree that family allowances were 
desirable ‘on general grounds...in many cases’.139 However it was not 
until the following October that it was agreed by the committee that 
‘family allowances should, as a general principle, be given only where 
the number of children exceeded three’140 and that ‘an allowance of 2/6d 
a week might be tentatively considered as giving a fairly substantial 
help’,141 with a higher allowance for residents of county boroughs and 
larger centres of population than rural areas.
The question of financing the scheme was also discussed at some 
length at a number of meetings, the first suggestion that individual 
em ployers should be responsible for paying com pulsory family 
allowances (a suggestion not dissimilar to the practice in France) being 
dismissed due to the possibility that such a course of action would lead 
to discrimination against married employees. A further, though hardly 
equitable suggestion, that unemployment assistance would no longer be
138 See DD vol. 81, 28 Nov. 1940, col. 936.
139 Inter-departmental committee, meeting 15 Jan. 1941 (N.A, D/SW, I.A., 129/53H).




paid to single men, allowing the savings to go towards family 
allowances, was similarly dismissed as was a suggestion that the local 
authorities should be made responsible for their provision:
The functions of local authorities were confined to the relief of 
distress of temporary incidence; they came to the rescue, when 
other sources failed, to prevent destitution. It was not 
appropriate that permanent allowances or pensions for the relief 
of hardship should be charged even in part to local authorities.142
The committee finally issued its recommendations towards the 
end of October 1942, having drawn on the example of existing systems 
in France, Belgium, Germany, Italy and New Zealand. Its report was 
im pressively mature and considered. Crucially, it described the 
provision  o f ch ild ren ’s allow ances as ‘socially  desirab le’,143 
underpinning a major philosophical shift in official approaches to the 
provision of social welfare. It implied that not only was social security 
necessary to alleviate poverty on an individual level, but that it had a 
greater significance in the context of society as a whole, and the 
responsibility of society towards each individual. In advocating the 
introduction of children's allowances it recommended they be confined 
to low-income families in need of ‘assistance’, its argument centring 
around the malnutrition resulting from the low wages of the working 
classes which were insufficient to bring up a healthy family: ‘this is the 
only case for family allowances which need receive consideration in the 
circumstances of this country’.144 The health-based argument was one 
investigated in detail by the committee in 1941 using information
142 Interdepartmental committee, meeting 14 Nov. 1941 (N.A., D/SW, Family allowances, I.A. 
129/53G).




gleaned mostly from experience in Britain.145 (The use of British 
material and statistics was later used by the government as an argument 
against the adequacy of the report.) A submission by the statistical 
branch of the Department of Industry and Commerce to the committee 
stated that a ‘normal’ family of husband, wife and two children required 
21/1 per week for food, and a total income of 37/6 when other expenses 
were considered .146 In the same year, 1941, the Fabian Society 
published The Irish question today, which also raised the question of 
'the malnutrition of many of the children and mothers in Ireland':
The food of the people at the lowest income level in the town is 
predominantly white bread and tea. It is claimed that between 
one fifth and one sixth of the population of Dublin is subsisting on 
a deficiency diet... The traditional diet of cabbage and potatoes in 
the rural areas is healthier but still inadequate.147
Dismissing children's allowances as a means of increasing the 
birth rate, the report made fleeting reference to the support given by 
Catholic social teaching to the introduction of children’s allowances. 
Underpinning the weight attached to Catholic teaching, the inter­
departmental committee drew on the papal encyclicals Casti Connubii 
and Quadragesimo Anno  and on statements by the Catholic hierarchy in 
Britain, all supporting children's allowances. All three sources were 
later used by both the Department of Local Government and Public 
Health and by the Department of Finance to support arguments against 
the ir in tro d u c tio n .148 To avoid the stigma of poor relief, the
145 Memorandum by Dr. E. J. T. McWeeney, Medical Inspector, Department of Local Government 
and Public Health, on the constitution of a minimum basic diet for an Irish family, 29 June 1941 
(N.A, D/SW, Family allowances: inter-departmental commit, I.A. 129/53).
146 Memorandum of Nov. 1941 in Family allowances: inter-departmental committee (N.A, D/SW, 
I.A. 129/53).
147 John Hawkins, The Irish question today (Fabian Society, 1941), pp 25, 26.
148 See memorandum from the Department of Finance for the government re family allowances, 11 
Mar. 1943 and Memorandum of Department of Local Government and Public Health on ‘Children’s 
allowances, Beveridgeism and the Catholic Church’, 16 Mar. 1943 (N.A, D/T, S 12117B).
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committee recommended the payment of allowances in cash rather then 
in kind. However, although admitting that a means test was seen as a 
relic of the poor law by many people, the committee recommended that 
children's allowances be means tested.
Despite deciding that the recipient should be the mother at a 
meeting of the committee in October 1941, in line with the practice in 
Australia and New Zealand, the interdepartmental committee decided at 
a subsequent meeting in November 1941 that the father should be the
recipient, the father being allowed to nominate the mother as payee if he
so w ished.149 So it was in the final report, which recommended that
allowances be paid along the following lines:
i) Allowances in cash to be paid to each child above the number of
three in families whose weekly income was:
(a) in county boroughs and Dun Laoighre, 50/- or less
(b) in towns of 7,000 people or over, 40/- or less
(c) elsewhere, 33/- or less
ii) Allowances were to be paid at a rate of
(a) 2/6 per week in the case of (i.a)
(b) 2/- per week in the case of (i.b)
(c) 1/6 per week in the case of (i.c)150
The committee recommended that the scheme should be administered by 
the Department of Industry and Commerce and that the cost involved in 
financing the scheme should be raised by the tipping of the income tax 
scales more against the unmarried tax payer.151 However the report 
concluded by commenting that the most satisfactory solution to poverty 
in families would be the insurance that 'every able person would be
149 Inter-departmental committee, meeting 24 Oct. 1941 (N.A, D/SW , Family allowances, I.A. 
129153H).
150 Report of inter-departmental committee on family allowances (N.A., D/SW, Family allowances: 
inter-departmental committee, I.A. 129/53).
151 Report o f  inter-departmental committee on family allowances (N.A., D/SW, Family allowances: 
inter-departmental committee, I.A. 129/53).
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productively employed at a wage sufficient at least for the minimum 
needs of himself and his family'.152
The confidential report of the committee was discussed by the 
cabinet on 4 December 1942, two days after the publication of the 
Beveridge report, when it was decided that, based on the inter­
departm ental com m ittee's report the M inister for Industry and 
Commerce should submit to the government an outline of a scheme for 
the provision of children's allowances 'by the method of compulsory 
contributory insurance'.153 It was an unusual and contradictory request 
as all of the evidence had pointed towards the shortcomings of an 
insurance-based children’s allowances scheme, a point highlighted in the 
Beveridge report. Meanwhile the Department of Local Government 
and Public Health, which had earlier claimed that an insurance-based 
scheme ‘would evoke strong opposition’,154 produced its own alternative 
proposals for a scheme of children’s allowances in February 1943 based 
on a tw o-tier system of compulsory and voluntary contributory 
insurance, the compulsory branch of which, it was suggested, could be 
administered through the national health insurance society.155
However, despite the government requesting the M inister for 
Industry and Commerce to submit an outline scheme for the provision 
of children's allowances, and the popular156 and political support for the 
expansion of social welfare services, especially children's allowances, 
the government choose to use the arguments of the Irish Catholic church 
to justify its reluctance to introduce such allowances. Drawing attention
152 Ibid.
153 Cabinet Minutes, 4 Dec. 1942 (N.A., D/T, Family allowances (a) inter-departmental committee, 
1940, (b) legislation proposals, 12117B).
154 Department o f Local Government and Public Health, Family allowances: summarised statement, 
5 Sept. 1940 (N.A., D/SW, Interdepartmental Committee, I.A. 129/53).
155 Family allowances (N.A., D/SW, I.A. 129/53 F).
156 See for example Joseph Anelius, National action: a plan for the national recovery o f Ireland 
(Dublin, 1942), p. 116.
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to Quadragesimo Anno, which had been earlier used by the cabinet sub­
com m ittee to justify  such allowances, the D epartm ent of Local 
Government and Public Health now declared somewhat ironically that:
It can be shown that the moral objection to a scheme of family 
allowances are greatest (a) if the scheme is non-contributory in 
character, (b) is universal in application and (c) if  the distribution 
of allowances is not related as strictly as possible to the actual need 
of the recipients. If therefore, a scheme of family allowances is to 
be adopted...it should be contributory in character.157
Offering an equally coloured, though expedient, interpretation of the
encyclicals Rerum Novarum  and Quadragesimo Anno, the Department
of Finance stated that, in the area of children's allowances, according to
Beveridge an area which required immediate attention, the church:
advocates family allowances only as a palliative in instances where 
a father or a breadwinner of a family is not in receipt of a just 
wage, which, it may be presumed, means a wage sufficient to 
maintain him self and his family free from want. That allowances 
are not advocated on account of any intrinsic merit is clear.158
As though agreeing with the church’s argum ents against state
encroachment on the private lives of the citizens, the memorandum went
on to say:
Other Catholic writers have stressed again and again their dislike 
of the present increase of state interferences in the private lives of 
families and have stated their fears that family allowances may 
tend further in this direction and towards ‘the socialisation of 
children’.159
This approach underlined a recurrence of poor-law  thinking in 
government circles, something Fianna Fail could not be accused of in 
the past. It was a highly selective use of Catholic pronouncements both
157 Department of Local Government and Public Health, Memorandum entitled Children's allowances, 
Beveridgeism and the Catholic church, 16 Mar. 1943 (N.A, D/T, S 12117B).
158 Department of Finance, Memorandum for the government on family allowances, 11 Mar. 1943 
(N.A., D/T, S 12117B).
159 Ibid.
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national and international, on the question of children’s allowances, with 
high profile Catholic figures such as Cornelius Lucey calling for the 
introduction of family allowances as early as November 1942. At a 
meeting in St Patrick’s College, Maynooth, on the subject of ‘Family 
Allowances’, chaired by the Bishop Michael Browne of Galway, Lucey 
described children’s allowances as being most desirable.160 It was this 
insistence on the importance of children’s allowances which led to 
Lucey being described as a ‘well-known champion of the family 
allowance system ’.161 In March 1943 Lucey's favourable disposition 
towards children’s allowances was reported upon in the Irish Press, for 
all intents and purposes the government paper. Speaking at a meeting 
organised by An Rioghacht in the Mansion House, Dublin, Lucey was 
quoted as saying that, 'above all family allowances we must have and at 
once’.162
Meanwhile, despite the government's frequently negative attitude, 
by January 1943 the Department of Industry and Commerce had drawn 
up the heads of bills for the provision of children's allowances on a 
contributory and non-contributory basis without means test at rates of 
2/6 per week for children other than the first child under the age of 16 
years. Lemass made known that such legislation was in preparation in 
February 1943 in the Dail163 but this did not prevent James Dillon and 
Alfie Byrne from moving a motion on the floor of the house saying that 
'Dail Eireann is of opinion that a scheme of family allowances on a 
national scale should be instituted forthwith'.164 The motion discussed 
the position in New Zealand, Australia and Britain. Byrne, who had
160 I CD 1943, p. 648.
161 Catholic Herald, 12 Feb. 1943.
162 IP, 19 Mar. 1943.
163 DD vol. 89, 4  Feb. 1943, col. 493.
164 DD vol. 89, 24 Mar. 1943, col. 1461.
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received the Grand Cross of the Order of Sylvester from Pope Pius XI 
in 1930, said that the government was being asked merely to 'introduce 
a long-overdue act of Christian social justice'.165
In the course of the debate Dillon, commenting on the feasibility 
of a means-tested allowance, said that:
I regard any scheme which involves the application of a means test 
as obnoxious... I would put the subsistence allowance for all 
children on the same basis and I would entitle every parent-citizen 
of the state to draw it without question, without investigation and 
w ithout any stigm a of charity or pauperism  attaching to its 
receipt.166
Spurred on by this continuing debate and the approaching general 
election, the government, having agreed to the principle of children's 
allowances as evidenced by the decision in January 1943 to draw up the 
necessary heads of bills, continued discussing the manner of payment of 
allow ances. Contrary to the departm ental report of 1942, a 
mem orandum  by Professor T. A. Smiddy, de V alera’s unofficial 
economic advisor, dated April 1943 suggested that:
It would be advisable to consider giving [children's allowances] in 
kind - clothing and milk, cheaper medical and dental services. 
Such a scheme on account of the knowledge now acquired of the 
technique of rationing and coupons would be feasible from the 
point of view of administration. It would ensure that children 
would directly benefit... Such a scheme could also be made to serve 
industrial development and increased milk production.167
It is likely that this suggestion was based on the Beveridge report which
equally recommended that 'children's allowances should clearly be made
to some extent in kind'.168
165 Ibid., col. 1460-1477.
166 Ibid., col. 1469.
167 Observations of T. A. Smiddy, Apr. 1943 (N.A, D/T, National health insurance: proposals of 
Most Rev. DrDignan, S 13570).
168 William Beveridge, Social insurance and allied services, p. 155.
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In September 1943, two months after the general election in 
which social security provisions formed part of the debate, being 
described by the Labour Party which promised the introduction of a 
children's allowances scheme, as 'the main issue before the people',169 
and in which Fianna Fail were returned as a minority government 
having suffered a 7% drop in support,170 the cabinet discussed a 
submission regarding allowances by the Departm ent of Industry, 
Commerce and Supplies, now headed by Sean Lemass. The submission 
suggested that:
i) allowances be payable irrespective of means
ii) allowances be supplementary to those for children under 
existing social services and that
iii) the cost of the scheme would be borne entirely out of state 
funds.171
Following discussion the cabinet decided that
i) the number o f children in a family after which children's 
allowances were to be payable would be two and that
ii) allowances should be at the rate of 2/6 per week.172
It was further decided that the scheme would be non-contributory and, 
in line with Dillon's argument of February 1943, not means tested.
The children's allowances bill was finally introduced in the Dail 
in November 1943, Lemass defining the bill as providing for 'the 
inauguration of a new social security service in this state'.173 Being 
more realistic, pragmatic, and above all diplomatic then MacEntee, 
Lemass drew on the example of how children's allowances worked in
169 Labour Party, Labour's programme for a better Ireland, (Election handbill, 1943).
170 Vincent Browne (ed.), The Magill book of Irish politics (Dublin, 1981), p. 25.
171 Department of Industry and Commerce, memorandum re children’s allowances, 11 Sept. 1943 
(N.A, D/T, National health insurance: proposals of Most Rev. Dr Dignan, S 13570).
172 Cabinet minutes, 24 Sept. 1943.
173 DD vol. 92, 23 Nov. 1943, col. 23.
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other countries. More significantly, he quoted from the Beveridge 
report:
"Abolition of want requires, second, adjustment of incomes, in 
periods of earning as well as in interruption of earning, to family 
needs, that is to say, in one form or another it requires allowances 
for children."174
The allowance proposed was 2/6 to be paid weekly for each child under 
16 years of age, after the first two. This age limit was in line with that 
in New Zealand and Germany for example, with other countries, 
including France, Spain and Belgium having an age limit of 14 years. 
No means test was planned. If the bill was not accepted on these 
grounds, Lemass threatened the resignation of the minority government, 
an eventuality which did not come about. It would have been political 
suicide to vote against such a measure, even if  it was viewed as not 
going far enough, the bill passing all stages in the Dail without a vote. 
Under the bill 340,000 children from some 150,000 families would 
benefit.
W. T. Cosgrave heavily criticised the bill for not being 
contributory  in ch a rac te r,175 using in a rather dubious fashion 
Beveridge's report to support his position, although Beveridge explicitly 
favoured a non-contributory allowance. Sim ilarly Norton, while 
welcoming the principle of the bill, criticised what he saw as its 
lim itations,176 most notably that it would not make significant inroads 
into the 'endemic poverty '177 in many parts of the country. Dillon, in 
many ways the energy behind the bill, welcomed it, saying:
174 DD vol. 92, 23 Nov. 1943, col. 28; William Beveridge, Social insurance and allied services, p. 
7.
175 DD vol. 92, 23 Nov. 1943, col. 45.
176 Ibid., col. 51.
177 Ibid., col. 54.
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In our rejoicing in what I regard as som ething closely 
approximating to a great revolution which will be brought about 
by this bill when it becomes an act, we should not lose sight of the 
fact that family allowances...are only a second best. The ideal 
would be to ensure that every person who did an honest days work 
would receive for that labour a wage sufficient to enable him to 
rear a Christian family.178
Giving credit where it was due, he commended the government for
being 'courageous' in recognising 'a great principle', although he would
have been happier had the allowance been made payable to the mother
rather than the father.179 Michael Donnellan, leader of Clann na
Talmhan, described the bill as 'a Godsend' but also argued that the
allowance be payable to the mother as 'the chief parent’,180 a position
supported by Bridget Redmond,181 a Fine Gael T.D. for Waterford and
daughter-in-law of John Redmond. Indeed Cosgrave put down an
amendment calling for payment of allowances to the m other,182 a
request which the Department of Industry and Commerce refused to
grant:
By inference, the proposal means that the fathers of families in 
the state who have provided and are providing for their families 
to the best of their ability and according to their opportunities are 
not to be trusted with the allocation of an allowance granted to 
them by the state to augment the family income.183
W ith what appears with the benefit of hindsight as a dated theory, 
Lemass stated in the Dail that:
There may be some social theory behind that suggestion. If there 
is, I disagree with it, and I strongly support the view...that we
178 Ibid., col. 103.
179 Ibid., col. 106-108.
180 DD vol. 92, 23 Nov. 1943, col. 59.
181 DD vol. 92, 24 Nov. 1943, col. 204.
182 Children's allowances bill, N.A., D/SW C2.
183 Children's allowance bill, 1943, N.A., D/SW C 2.
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should regard the father as the head of the family, and responsible 
for the proper utilisation of the family income.184
However regulations were provided for whereby the father could
delegate the mother as payee.
In conclusion it may be said that the government seemed to have 
viewed the legislation as both the alpha and the omega of the state’s new 
social policy. The estimated cost of the plan was £2,250,000 per year, 
an increase of 25% on the amount that was already being provided for 
under existing social security services. Sean Lemass put the matter as 
follows:
The imposition of this new charge upon the tax-payers of the 
country must inevitably mean that any other further and substantial 
change in our social security services must await the advent of 
better times.185
To provide for the amount required, he pointed out, would mean an 
extra 1/- in the £ on income tax; 1/- in the lb. on tobacco; 2d. on tea; a 
half pence on sugar and Id. on the pint of beer.186
Winding up the final stages of the debate on the bill, in December 
1943, Lemass paid tribute to James Dillon, 'for his efforts in bringing 
about the introduction of this b ill'.187 The bill became law in 1944, 
children's allowances being payable from 1 August of that year. It was 
an obvious occasion of joy for many families, a song entitle ‘The New 
H alf Crow n’, commemorating the event becoming popular in North 
Leitrim. Equally the government was anxious that the first day of 
payments should be marked as a significant event, several employees of 
the G.P.O. in Dublin being detailed to form a crowd for official 
photographs of a packed post office on the first day of payment of
184 DD vol. 92, 23 Nov. 1943, col. 224.
185 Ibid., Sean Lemass, col. 30, 31,
186 Ibid., col. 32.
187 DD vol. 92, 10 Dec. 1943, col. 1015-16.
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allow ances.188 The act was amended in Spring 1946189 improving the 
administration of the scheme and removing the citizenship clause upon 
which entitlem ent rested, while the Social W elfare (Children's 
Allowances) Act of 1952190 introduced further important changes in 
administrative procedures. M ost significant among these changes was 
the extension of the code to cover the payment of allowances at the rate 
of 11/- a month in respect of the second qualified child and the increase 
in allowances to 17/6 a month for each subsequent qualified child.191 
The rates were again increased in 1957 following the withdrawal of 
food vouchers (see table 4.7 in previous chapter), paym ent of an 
additional 4/6 per month coming into effect from June 1957, bringing 
total expenditure on children's allowances to almost £7,000,000 per 
year.192
As we shall see later, Lemass's forecast that further changes in 
social policy would have to await better times proved incorrect. The 
introduction of children’s allowances was the first of many post- 
Beveridge changes in social welfare legislation in Ireland, directly 
influenced if  not initiated by, developments in Britain.
The establishment of the Department of Social Welfare
It was in the light of the Beveridge and Dignan reports that it 
became increasingly obvious that the social legislation of the Saorstat 
was lacking most of all in organisation and co-ordination. It was an 
issues which came to the fore many times during the debate on 
children’s allowances. Services and policies had developed in isolation
188 I am indebted to a former employee of the G.P.O. in 1944, for this information.
189 Children’s Allowances (Amendment) Act, 1946 (No. 8 of 1946).
190 Social Welfare (Children’s Allowances) Act, 1952 (No. 12 of 1952).
191 Department of Social Welfare, Report 1950-53, p. 9.
192 D iil £ireann brief on Social Welfare (N.A, D/SW, Children' Allowances Act 1957: second stage, 
Plan 5/57).
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of existing legislation. Such an ad-hoc approach to ensuring the 
economic and social security of the citizens was far from ideal, not to 
mention overly bureaucratic and wasteful of the lim ited finances 
available. As the unification of the health insurance societies had 
dem onstra ted , co -o rd ination  resu lted  in appreciab ly  low er 
administrative costs, a more balanced and equal distribution of welfare, 
and an equalisation of benefits. Such experience in the co-ordination of 
one crucial welfare service led to demands for the co-ordination of 
welfare and social services in general.
From the early 1930s it was clear to the government that such co­
ordination was not only desirable but inevitable. While claiming that 
the pressure of work in organising the day-to-day running of the 
existing services left only lim ited time for thinking about new 
organisational structures and methods, Sean T. O Kelly felt 'that sooner 
or later a step in that direction will have to come, that co-ordination of 
social services must be secured'.193 It was a view very much supported 
by the opposition parties, Norton speaking in the late 1930s about the 
necessity of establishing a 'department for social services'.194
While in February 1944 MacEntee foreshadowed the development 
of such a department in a speech he delivered to the Medical Society of 
University College, Dublin, it was February 1945 before the Fianna Fail 
government decided to establish an interdepartmental committee on 
social services to examine and report on:
(a) the desirability and practicability of the assignment of the 
adm inistration of social services such as old age pensions, 
w idow s’ and orphans’ pensions, unem ploym ent insurance, 
national health insurance, unemployment assistance, children’s 
allowances, etc., to a single minister, and
193 DD vol. 65, 11 Mar. 1937, col. 1623.
194 DD vol. 75, 21 Apr. 1939, col. 944.
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(b) the practical step which would be necessary to give effect to 
such an arrangem ent if  it should be decided upon by the 
government.195
Established by the Minister for Finance, Seân T. O Kelly, on 15 
May 1945, one of his last actions before being installed as President of 
Ireland, the committee was composed of one representative each from 
the Departm ents of Finance, Industry and Commerce and Local 
Government and Public Health. Having received detailed memoranda 
from the concerned departments on the effects of unifying social 
welfare legislation under a new department, the committee produced its 
report in July of the same year following eight meetings. Reporting on 
each individual social service at the time, the overall thrust was that the 
establishment of a new department would result in a more uniform and 
comprehensive approach to social services, leading to greater economic 
and adm inistrative efficiency. Its recommendations regarding the 
following services capture the positive tenor of the report:
Widows' and orphans' pensions: Prima facie  allocation of all this 
work to one central authority should make for more efficient 
administration and should lead to economies.
Unemployment insurance and assistance: Here again it seems to us 
that the centralisation of the work under one authority should 
improve administration and tend towards economy.
Children's allowances: This service falls clearly into the income 
maintenance class and we recommend that it should be included in 
any merger with other social services.
The report concluded that:
If the future developments of social services are to be adequately 
supervised, planned and co-ordinated, the government should have
195 Secretary, Department of Local Government and Public Health from Department of the Taoiseach, 
21 Feb. 1945 (U.C.D. Archives, MacEntee Papers, Social Services, P67/361).
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at its disposal the specialist advice of a minister and a department 
for that purpose.
This recommendation was made in the light of a perceived expanded 
role for social services in post-Emergency Ireland, and therefore the 
necessity for the government to keep abreast of 'modern trends' in 
social legislation.196
W hen no action on the report was immediately forthcoming, 
James Everett of the Labour Party introduced a motion in the Dail in 
November 1945 which described social security measures as 'the first 
and most urgent consideration in our post-war planning',197 and which 
called upon the government to:
Introduce proposals for the establishment of a scheme of social 
security in which all the existing social services shall be unified 
and co-ordinated under a Ministry for Social Services.198
While much of the debate was taken up with the issue of Dignan's report
and his dism issal from the National Health Insurance Society, the
taoiseach claimed that the question of unifying and co-ordinating the
adm inistration of the income maintenance services had been 'for a
considerable time engaging the attention of the government' but that:
As a result of an investigation which had been made in some 
detail the general conclusion would seem to be that the present 
system of administration of the social services is efficient and 
economical...The government had taken no decision adverse to 
the establishment of a Department of Social Services, but were of 
the opinion that there was no urgent need for any closer 
investigation of the matter.199
However, on 7 November 1946 a ministries and secretaries bill 
was introduced in the Dail by the government allowing for the
196 Report of inter-departmental committee on social services, 2 July 1945 (U.C.D. Archives, 
MacEntee Papers, Social Services, P67/361).
197 DD vol. 98, 14 Nov. 1945, col. 1143.
198 DD vol. 98. 14 Nov. 1945, col. 1143.
199 DD vol. 99, 30 Jan. 1946, col. 170.
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establishment of a Department of Health and a Department of Social 
Welfare. To the Department of Social Welfare was to be transferred 
responsibility for children's allowances, food allowances, national health 
insurance, unemployment insurance, unemployment assistance, widows’ 
and orphans' pensions, blind pensions and old age pensions, the term 
'social services’ being defined as 'the income maintenance services'.200 
Described by the government as 'a real advance towards promoting 
social welfare and the public health of the country',201 the bill received 
a less than enthusiastic welcome from W. T. Cosgrave, the leader of the 
opposition. His unusual line of argument, that the inability of the 
Department of Local Government and Public Health to carry out its 
duties was no excuse for the establishment of two new departments,202 
was a mere example of opposition for opposition’s sake, a similar 
approach having being adopted by Cosgrave in the case of children's 
allowances. It also illustrated the lack of any principled approach by 
Fine Gael to social legislation.
Putting the provisions of the M inisterial and Parliamentary 
Offices (Amendment) Act, 1947, into practice took some time as the 
offices of the new M inistry for Social W elfare were scattered 
throughout eight separate buildings in Dublin city, including at the 
Customs House, on Lord Edward Street and Earlsfort Terrace. It was 
September 1953 before Sean Lemass, then Tânaiste and Minister for 
Industry and Commerce, officially opened Âras Mhic Dhiarmada, 
bringing together the staff of the Department of Social Welfare under 
one roof.
200 DD vol. 103, 15 Nov. 1948, col. 1031.
201 P. J. Burke, DD vol. 103, 20 Nov. 1948, col. 1147.
202 Ibid., col. 1149.
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There is little doubt but that the establishment of the new 
department and the continuing unification and co-ordination of the 
social services in Ireland was a Beveridge-inspired reform, a fact made 
clear by J. J. O Sullivan of the employment branch of the Department of 
Industry and Commerce at a lecture he delivered to social science 
students in University College Dublin in 1952:
The main advantage claimed for this change was immensely 
im proved efficiency and the possibility of economies through 
concentration of administrative machinery.203
It was in the same year that the Department of Social Welfare, in a
paper dated October 1952, made clearer reference to the influence of
the Beveridge report:
Sir William Beveridge in his report on social insurance and allied 
services made unification of administrative responsibility one of 
the six fundamental principles in his scheme of social insurance 
against interruption and destruction of earning power which was 
the main feature of his plan for social security...
[In Ireland] a major step in the unification of administrative 
responsibility was the establishment on 22 January 1947 of the 
Department of Social Welfare.204
The establishment of the new department was a crucial step on the co­
ordination of social legislation in Ireland. It was a necessary pre­
requisite upon which the structured unification and expansion of social 
legislation could take place. This unification and expansion came in the 
form of the Social Welfare Act, 1952 which is discussed in detail in the 
following chapter.
203 Lectures in UCD on unemployment insurance, unemployment assistance, etc. 1945-64 (N.A, 
D/SW, E.B. 316481).
204 'The new social welfare scheme', 27 Oct. 1952 (N.A, D/SW , EB 316481). See William  
Beveridge, Social insurance and allied services, p. 15.
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Unemployment - a perennial problem
Before moving on to the next chapter, however, it is necessary to 
outline developments in another important area, that of unemployment, 
which was to become a major issue in post-1945 Ireland, a problem 
equalled only by emigration, the sole solution to unemployment for 
thousands of Irish people. After the war London and many British 
cities needed to be rebuilt and Ireland largely provided the labour to do 
it, Britain actively seeking labour supplies during this period, especially 
for lower-grade jobs. It was an indictment of the social effects of de 
Valera's politics, and a problem that was to become increasingly severe 
in the 1950s. Not only did the emigrants of the mid to late 1940s not 
return after a few years to settle in Ireland as they had hoped, but they 
were joined by thousands more who themselves never returned to settle 
in Ireland, their passage made easier by the dropping of the visa 
requirem ent from Irish people entering Britain from October 1947. 
The Fianna Fail election slogan 'Work and Maintenance' with 'Fianna 
Fail under it, Fianna Fail over it, Sean Lemass to the right of it and 
Sean Lemass to the left of it'205 rang increasingly hollow. W ork was 
difficult to find and the levels of unemployment insurance and assistance 
were less than adequate.
In Spring 1945 Alfred Byrne introduced a motion in the Dail 
regarding poverty amongst the unemployed:
That, having regard to the continuous increase in the cost of food, 
clothing and footwear, especially in relation to children, and the 
consequent hardship on many of our citizens, Dail Eireann requests 
the government to undertake an early survey of poverty prevailing 
amongst the unemployed.206
205 John Hennigan, DD vol. 89, 3 Mar. 1943, col. 920.
206 DD vol. 95, 2 Feb. 1945, col. 2185.
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The motion further called for increases in unemployment benefits. 
However it was not increased benefits that were most important but 
rather the creation of more jobs. Beveridge had stressed the 
maintenance of high levels of employment as a prerequisite of the 
welfare state.
However, following the war, the government's focus of attention 
in the area of unemployment was in respect of demobilised members of 
both the Irish and British defence forces. To this end Lemass 
introduced an unemployment insurance bill in June 1945 which had the 
effect of providing unem ployment insurance for members of the 
defence forces demobilised and unable to find employment. The reports 
of the Department of Industry and Commerce witness to the potential 
social problem caused by the numbers of demobilised men. From 1939 
to 1944 the numbers of unemployed entered a downward trend due to 
the expansion of the defence forces and emigration.207 However, in 
1945 15,733 N.C.O.'s were discharged from the defence forces, 5,577 
going on the live register of unemployed.208 By 1946, 28,179 had been 
discharged and 5,610 were on the live register.209 This latter number 
had dropped to 2,723 by 1949, many demobilised men deciding to 
emigrate to Britain.210
While the plight of Irish emigrants overseas does not fall within 
the remit of the present work, we can note that John Charles McQuaid, 
Archbishop of Dublin from 1940 to 1972, was to the fore in looking 
after their welfare, establishing the Catholic Social Welfare Bureau in 
1942.2! i McQuaid was also chairperson of the Commission on Youth
207 Department of Industry and Commerce, Employment and Unemployment 1943 and 1944, p. 24.
208 Department of Industry and Commerce, Trend o f  em ploym ent 1944 an d  1945, p. 7.
209 Department of Industry and Commerce, Trend o f  em ploym ent 1945 and 1946, p. 6.
210 Department of Industry and Commerce, Trend o f  em ploym ent 1948 and 1949, p. 9.
211 See J. H. Whyte, Church and state in m odem  Ireland 1923-79, p. 77.
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Unemployment, having been appointed to the position in 1943 by the 
government.212
Regarding those dem obilised from the British forces, the 
unemployment insurance bill of 1946 enabled the payment of benefit in 
respect of unemployment insurance contributions acquired in Britain to 
be made to those ordinarily resident in Ireland, an arrangement made 
with the British government at a conference in London in July 1946.
This post-em ergency period of high unem ploym ent, high 
emigration and decreasing population was not inevitable. It was rather, 
the result of negative politics during the war. Ireland defined her 
neutrality as a negative force; like the achievement of independence, it 
was very much seen as an end in itself. In no way was it presented as a 
constructive policy. To this extent it was very much a lost opportunity. 
The only other European country which declared its neutrality and 
survived the war without foreign occupation was Sweden which, in 
contrast with Ireland, emerged from the war as an exemplar in the field 
of social reform. Unlike Ireland, Sweden used its neutrality in a 
profitable and constructive way.
In turn this 'negative neutrality' in Ireland was to have a further 
unhelpful effect. W hile Ireland suffered during the war, albeit spared 
from active participation, there was no sense of relief or popular joy to 
lift the national spirit following the war. The sense of hope and victory 
which permeated Europe was absent as Ireland became increasingly 
isolated from mainstream European politics.
It is in these contexts that the publication of the Beveridge report 
and Dignan plan and their long term influence and effect would be 
crucial. In the short term they had served to revolutionise the Irish
212 Correspondence between His Grace Rev. Dr John Charles McQuaid DD, Archbishop and the 
Minister regarding the staff of the Commission on Youth Unemployment (N.A, D/SW, D 209/45).
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approach to welfare legislation: through the popular support for them 
they had forced the government to change its view of social services, 
from one of dispensing, grudgingly, a form of charity to the citizenry, 
to viewing social services as the right of the people to receive and the 
duty of the government to provide through redistributive economic and 
social policies. The two reports also served to heighten popular 
expectations in the areas of social benefits, and greater demands on 
government to provide them. It was these changes which ushered in the 
modern welfare state in Ireland. They forged the new philosophy 
underpinning the introduction and co-ordination of social services in 
Ireland. The product of the 'Beveridge period' in Ireland was an 
expanded and co-ordinated body of social legislation, allowing Ireland 
to be described, up to the 1970s and beyond, as a Beveridge type, 
distributive welfare state, similar to Britain and the Netherlands in 
particular.
However, it is in the years following the publication of the 
Beveridge report and Dignan plan that this mind-shift could be made 
concrete in terms of further expansion and co-ordination of social 
legislation in comprehensive terms.
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CHAPTER 6 
CONSOLIDATING SOCIAL WELFARE, 1948-52
The period from the late 1940s to mid 1950s, was one of 
reconstruction in Europe, one of the major aims being the organisation 
of social services and welfare legislation. In Ireland, albeit on a 
different scale, the period was of great importance in the construction, 
future emphasis and definition of the Irish welfare state. The coming 
to power of the first inter-party government, representing a broad 
spectrum of political opinion in Ireland (and, therefore, similar to 
Fianna Fail), was an important factor in this, not so much for any 
change in ideology from the previous Fianna Fail governments, but 
rather for the introduction of new blood into the offices of state. By 
the 1940s, Fianna Fail had lost its initial enthusiasm for change: Fianna 
Fail ministers had become less innovative, and were beginning to lose 
touch with the reality of people’s lives in Ireland. As Erskine Childers 
was to conclude following an investigation as to why Fianna Fail lost 
the election of February 1948: '[there is] a feeling, intangible in 
character, that we have ceased to be the poor man's government'.1 
Complacency, conservatism, and a feeling that it knew what was best 
for Ireland without having to look outside its own party, began to 
replace the earlier dynamism. The gulf between de Valera's vision of 
the 'Ireland which we dreamed o f 2 and the reality of social and 
economic deprivation underpinned the extent to which Fianna Fail was 
losing touch with reality.
1 Letter from Erskine Childers to Sean MacEntee, Feb. 1948 (U.C.D. Archives, MacEntee 
Papers, P67/299).
2 Radio broadcast on St Patrick's Day 1943, quoted in Maurice Moynihan (ed.), Speeches 
an d  statem ents ofE am on de Valera (Dublin, 1980), p. 466.
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The general feeling among opposition parties in the late 1940s 
was that an alternative to Fianna Fail rule was necessary and desirable 
after sixteen years, and this shared feeling initially proved to be a 
stronger force than the deep seated ideological differences between 
Fine Gael, Labour, National Labour, Clann na Poblachta, Clann na 
Talmhan and the handful of independents, all constituents of the first 
inter-party government formed in February 1948. The change was 
fruitful, not least in the area of social policy and much was achieved in 
the three-year administration.
Now that an alternative government was in the offing, politics in 
general and social politics in particular, took on a new vitality. While 
historical caricatures of the 1950s, invariably based on a political and 
economic analysis of events, generally involve the words ‘gloomy’, 
‘failure’ and ‘depressing’, they are terms which cannot be applied 
without qualification to the field of social welfare legislation during the 
period. From an economic perspective the 1950s in general was 
certainly a decade of ‘gloom’, profoundly marked by the high levels of 
em igration, the reality  of w hich is docum ented in Donall 
MacAmhlaigh's Dialann Deorai: 'mhothaigh me mar a bheadh meara 
fuara an eadochais i ngreim ar mo phutoga '.3 However the paradox is 
that it was the same period which established Ireland as a welfare state 
in the modem sense founded on the principles of Beveridgeism and 
consequently organised on the principle of distribution of benefits 
rather than on the provision of services.
It was the lack of structural development which postponed the 
impact of these reforms in the short term. As welfare policy is reactive 
rather than proactive to underlying structural factors, the reforms could
3 Dtinail MacAmhlaigh, Dialann Deorai (Dublin, 1960), p. 2.
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have little immediate impact in terms of improving the lot of recipients 
by means of substantially increased rates of benefit. For example, one 
major structural development judged by experts to be important in the 
development of the welfare state is the transformation from an 
agriculturally-based to an industrially-based economy. While such a 
transformation had been slowly taking place in Ireland from the late 
1920s, when 53% of the active working population were still engaged 
in the agricultural sector, by 1952 40% were still engaged in 
agriculture, while 22% were engaged in other areas of production 
including industry.4 In this Ireland was unique in western Europe 
where the rapid shift to industry, a prerequisite of post-war economic 
reconstruction, lead in time to an economic boom on the continent. It 
was the 1960s before Ireland was to share in that boom.
As alluded to in the last chapter, this economic boom greatly 
facilitated the development of the welfare state right across western 
Europe. This international development had a positive, driving 
influence on Ireland, especially in the context of the Beveridge report. 
Once provided with the Beveridge model, a number of developments 
within Ireland itself facilitated the implementation of legislation in this 
country. The first development was the cross-party consensus which 
arose in favour of social welfare legislation. Secondly, the changes in 
government led to issues-based election campaigns which, in the 
absence of core political issues for the first time, brought social issues 
to the forefront. Civil war divisions, still strong, were becoming less 
relevant and acceptable as mainstays of election campaigns. The lack 
of enthusiasm for the declaration of the Republic in 1948 underlined 
the increasing obsolescence of such issues in southern Ireland. Issues
4 Trend in employment 1950-52, p. 10.
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that affected the ordinary lives of the voters, unemployment, 
emigration, poverty and social legislation, came to the fore.
This new political climate allowed Dr James Ryan, the first 
Minister for Health and Social Welfare, to declare in the Dail in June 
1949 from the opposition benches that:
We may take it for granted that any party that comes into power 
in this country is going to progress in the way of increasing and 
not decreasing these [social] services.5
In the same month de Valera said that:
We have advanced, thank goodness, very far from the day in 
which one had to preach that if individuals in our community 
through no fault of their own, are unable to support themselves, 
the community and the state has a duty to come to the aid of 
those individuals.6
Such post-war cross-party consensus was one of the significant
political developments right across western Europe in this period. In
Denmark, for example, 'the largest part of the political spectrum'7 was
supportive of the broad thrust of welfare policy, while in Finland a
similar situation became evident by the 1950s.
This cross-party consensus regarding the desirability and
necessity of social policy - whether motivated by a genuine social
democratic ideal or by the hope of boosting party support - and the
importance of welfare issues in elections is well illustrated by events
surrounding the three by-elections of June 1952 during the period of
Fianna Fail government between the two inter-party administrations,
from June 1951 to June 1954. The opposition deputies accused Fianna
Fail of using the resources of the Department of Social Welfare in its
5 DD vol. 116,23 June 1949, col. 1331.
6 Ibid., col. 1461.
7 Daniel Levine, 'Conservatism and tradition in Danish social welfare legislation, 1890- 
1933: a comparative view'. Comparative Studies in History and Society, vol. 20 (1978), no. 
1, p. 56.
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campaigning in the M ayo-North, W aterford and Lim erick-East 
constituencies. Fianna Fail was accused of using the provincial press 
in each constituency to extensively advertise the benefits that would 
accrue to recipients of unemployment assistance, old age pensions and, 
as Thomas O Higgins of Fine Gael commented, 'to various classes of 
voters who might be affected by the sudden appearance in their local 
papers of advertisements by the Department of Social Welfare telling 
them what a great new deal the Fianna Fail government were giving 
them. That was a scandalous abuse by the government party.’8 The 
relevant advertisem ent outlining the increases appeared in the 
Waterford News on 20 June, six days before polling day, and was 
spread across the top portion of the front page of the paper.9 Presented 
in a very graphic and attractive style, with a reminder that the first 
payment of increased rates was imminent, the advertisement outlined 
the enhanced benefits in health insurance, children's allowances, old 
age pensions, blind pensions, unemployment insurance and assistance 
and widows' and orphans' pensions.
While not abandoning its usual election rhetoric (for example, 
Fianna Fail's candidate in Limerick thought it sufficient to surround a 
picture of him self with the phrases 'his father was a freeman of our 
city', 'Honour the dead by electing the living' and 'Give your No.l vote 
to the son of the fenian'10) Fianna Fail were obviously becoming more 
attuned to political functionalism. While Fine Gael took the Limerick- 
East seat, Fianna Fail held the seat in North Mayo and gained a former 
Fine Gael seat in Waterford where the advertising by the Department 
of Social Welfare had been most intense. While there is no obvious
8 DD vol. 136, 4 Mar. 1953, col. 2142.
9 The Waterford News, 20 June 1952.
10 Limerick Chronicle. 26 June 1952
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precedent for the civil service advertising extensively in the provincial 
press, the prestige of welfare issues in electoral politics is very 
significant, and was to remain significant in subsequent elections.
The one organisation that remained outside this enthusiasm for 
state-organised welfare legislation was the Catholic church which, 
during the 1950s became more entrenched in its opposition to state- 
centralised social policy in what appears to have been a final attempt to 
bolster an ideology patently out of step with developments on 
continental Europe and increasingly called into doubt at home in 
Ireland. Willing to discuss the benefits or otherwise of social reform 
outside of Ireland, the church became obviously more conservative 
when discussion moved to reform within Ireland.
While the role of the Catholic church in the controversy over the 
mother and child scheme has been over-emphasised to the near 
exclusion of discussion of other developments in social policy in 
independent Ireland, what happened, when placed in the context of 
developments over the previous twenty years, was one of the final 
stages in the conflict between church and state over state-centralised 
social policy versus the provision of Catholic charity. Having its 
origins in an earlier bill of James Ryan, the mother and child scheme 
proposed by Noel Browne in June 1950 would provide free and non­
means tested post- and ante- natal care for mothers as well as medical 
care for children up to sixteen years of age.11 The Catholic church 
although recognising the necessity of improving the dispensary system 
available to the 'technically* poor people', it objected to exposing
11 The most inclusive account of the mother and child scheme and the subsequent 
controversy is given in J. H. Whyte, Church and state in modern Ireland (Dublin, 1980), 
chapters 7 and 8. See also Noel Browne, Against the tide, chapters 9 to 11.
* Present author’s emphasis.
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people to 'the danger of a state medical service'.12 While discussion of 
the events are avoided here as the entrails have been picked through by 
so many already, the conclusion of the episode in the form of Dr James 
Ryan’s health bill of 1953 put the first significant dent in the power of 
the Catholic church to influence negatively social welfare legislation.
In the context of developments in Britain, but more particularly 
in Europe, the Catholic church's rhetoric was dated. In an article 
headed ‘Dangers in the evolution of health services’ which appeared in 
Irish Ecclesiastical Record in 1948, D. J. Cannon, a medical doctor 
who contributed numerous articles to the debate on health legislation 
and who fully supported the church's view, wrote that:
It is my opinion that the undue consideration being given to the 
evolution of the Public Health Service in this country tends to 
make us forget the excellent services which have long been 
given to the Irish poor and needy by voluntary organisations...
On the principles of Catholic Sociology the government 
should be able, without any undue interference with the people 
or with the medical profession, not only to build up a happy and 
prosperous Ireland, but Public Health and Social Services 
which...will be the envy of the world.13
In the discussion which follows, the position of the Catholic 
church has to be considered when evaluating the legislative history of 
the period: it was not until the 1960s that the church changed its 
fundamentally negative attitude to state organised social policy.
The discussion that follows begins with an analysis of the Social 
Welfare Act, 1948. Combined with the dissolution of the National 
Health Insurance Society and the transfer of its functions to the 
Department of Social Welfare, the act paved the way for the Social 
Welfare Act 1952 which provided what the Minister for Social Welfare




called 'a fairly comprehensive insurance scheme'14 by establishing a 
general scheme of compulsory insurance, covering employees aged 
between 16-70 years for the following range of eventualities: 
disability, unemployment, marriage, maternity, widowhood and 
orphanhood. The emphasis of the 1952 act was on the co-ordination of 
the existing three schemes of social insurance (i.e. unemployment 
insurance under the Unemployment Insurance Acts; health insurance 
under the National Health Insurance Acts; w idows’ and orphans’ 
contributory pensions under the W idows’ and Orphans’ Acts) which 
had developed in isolation of each other resulting in two cards for 
stamps and different rates of contribution and benefit despite similar 
needs. In the area of assistance legislation, the act increased the 
various rates under old age pensions, unemployment assistance, and 
widows’ and orphans’ non-contributory pensions, while children’s 
allowances was dealt with by a separate act in the same year.
The 1952 act, which had much in common with post-Beveridge 
reforms in Britain, was the culmination of the work of both the first 
inter-party government and of the Fianna Fail administration, Dr 
James Ryan claiming that, with the passing of the act, ‘the structure of 
social services in this country might be regarded as having taken final 
form ’.15 While there can be nothing final about social legislation, as 
the social problems themselves continue to change, it was a significant 
achievement within a decade of the publication of the Beveridge 
report. The initial white paper of October 1949, drawn up under the 
direction of William Norton, Tanaiste and Minister for Social Welfare, 
had the direct aim of achieving a modem welfare state.16 The fact that
14 The new social welfare scheme', Dec. 1952 (N.A., D/SW, EB 316481).
15 DD vol. 143, 2 Dec. 1953, col. 1394.
16 Transcript o f recording of lecture on social security given by William Norton in 
Newbridge Town Hall, 21 May 1950 (N.A., D/T, Progress Reports 1949-1963, S 15069).
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it was initiated by the five-party coalition government and carried into 
law (albeit with some changes) by Fianna Fail further cemented cross- 
parliamentary support, not just for this act, but for future social 
legislation.
The Social W elfare Act. 1948 and the dissolution of the National 
Health Insurance Society
The election of early 1948 saw social issues coming to the 
forefront, alongside the more traditional political issues. While the 
tired election slogans of the two largest political parties persisted - Fine 
Gael's newspaper advertisements for example spoke of the need to 'end 
political jobbery'17 - the emphasis placed by Labour, National Labour 
and Clann na Poblachta on social issues forced the larger parties to pay 
a significant amount of attention in both speeches and advertisement 
campaigns to social issues in general and welfare issues in particular. 
Sean MacBride, leader of Clann na Poblachta, promised to institute 'a 
comprehensive scheme of social insurance'18 if returned to power, 
while Labour's William Norton and National Labour's James Everett 
proposed the introduction of a similar scheme if  elected to office.19 
Likewise, Clann na Talmhan, upon its foundation, was eager to stress 
that it was 'not just a land-minded party', but was also concerned with 
social legislation.20 As things turned out, all four parties, together with 
Fine Gael, formed the new government in February 1948.
Adhering to pre-election promises the government immediately 
set about standardising and simplifying pensions and benefits available 
under the various welfare schemes. By March 1948, one month after
17 II, 24 Jan. 1948.
18 II, 24 Jan. 1948
19 II, 27 Jan. 1948; II, 29 Jan. 1948.
20 The book o f Clann na Talmhan (1944), p. 2.
219
taking office, the government had outlined a ‘proposed new scheme of 
old age pensions’, but later extended its scope to include, by May of 
the same year, a broader spectrum of welfare benefits, reflecting the 
three-fold concerns of the Department of Social Welfare: the cessation 
of cash supplem ents and payments through public assistance 
authorities, the modification of the means test and the increasing of 
maximum rates of benefit.21
Within six months of coming to office, the new inter-party 
government had introduced a comprehensive social welfare bill based 
on these proposals. William Norton, the Tanaiste and Minister for 
Social Welfare, described the purpose of the bill during the second 
reading in July 1948 as being ‘to distribute £2,500,000 a year by way 
of increased social welfare benefits’,22 the greatest share of which, over 
£1,500,000, was to be allocated to old age pensions while widows and 
orphans were to be the second largest class to benefit through increased 
pensions and allowances. Norton's strongest adversary was P. J. 
McGilligan, M inister for Industry and Commerce from September 
1923 until the downfall of the Cumann na nGaedheal government in 
March 1932 and at this time the Minister for Finance, who strongly 
criticised the proposal to grant a pension to a childless widow at the 
age of 45 years, a reduction of 10 years on the former age of 55 years. 
On the instruction of McGilligan the secretary of the Department of 
Finance wrote to Norton claiming that:
The minister sees grave objection to the proposals under this 
head. The grant of a pension to a childless widow at the early 
age of 45 years would be indefensible; it would encourage 
idleness at state expense in the class to which it applied, serve as 
a lever to lower still further the age at which pensions generally
21 Social Welfare (Reciprocal Arrangements) Act 1948 bill file (N.A., D/SW, I.A. 
93/53A).
22 DD vol. 112, 28 July 1948, col. 1626.
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are granted and would in all probability immediately raise the 
question as to whether spinsters should be treated in like 
manner.23
A compromise was eventually agreed upon where the age limit was 
lowered to 48 years. The bill also significantly modified the means test 
in regard to both old age pensions and widows’ and orphans’ pensions, 
Norton expressing the desirability of doing away with the means test 
altogether, something he hoped ‘that, in the not to distant future, it will 
be feasible to do’.24
Norton, who seemed more anxious to devote his energies to the 
Public Services Executive Union of which he was general secretary 
than to take up a ministerial position,25 was Ireland’s first social 
democratic Minister for Social Welfare, a role he combined with that 
of Tanaiste. Being leader of the Labour Party from 1932-1960, it is 
significant that this bill was carried through by a Labour minister: had 
Labour been part of government at an earlier time the development of 
the Irish welfare state might have been significantly different.
While Norton acknowledged that the 1948 bill was not ‘an end 
in itse lf , he described it as carrying ‘our social services and our social 
legislation a very substantial step forward. It provides more security 
for the weak and the helpless and it is calculated to brighten their lot.’26 
If we take the old and blind as part of this ‘weak and helpless’ group 
then it was a step forward. For a number of years while in opposition, 
the parties now in government had been calling on Fianna Fail to 
legislate for more just pensions for the old and the blind, putting 
forward numerous motions in the Dail covering all aspects of pensions,
23 Letter from Department of Finance to Secretary, Department of Social Welfare, 15 July 
1948 (N.A, D/SW, Social Welfare Act 1948: submission to government, Plan 4/48).
24 DD vol. 112, 28 July 1948, col. 1627.
25 Garry Sweeney, In public service: a history of the public services executive union, 1890- 
1990 (Dublin, 1990), p. 110.
26 Ibid., col. 1636.
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from rates of benefit to severity of means tests.27 Now the 1948 bill 
proposed to reduce the minimum age for the receipt of blind pensions 
by nine years to 21 years of age, a measure initially opposed by the 
Department of Finance which feared that the reduction would ‘tend in 
many cases to remove the incentive to blind persons to look for 
suitable em ploym ent or train ing’.28 The act also modified the 
calculation of means by excluding certain personal earnings. In 
common with old age pensions, the maximum means allowable was 
increased from £39 to over £52 per year in urban areas with a new 
minimum pension of 5/- replacing the old minimum of 1/- (or 3/6 when 
supplementary allowances are considered). The two-fold effect was 
that many people previously excluded from receiving pensions could 
now benefit from them, while those already in receipt of pensions 
could hope for increases in that benefit. With the introduction of these 
increases, the various emergency supplements, described in chapter 
four, were withdrawn. These had included, as from 1 April 1944, 
emergency supplementary allowances of up to 2/6 per week payable 
through public assistance authorities to needy pensioners not entitled to 
food allowances outside of urban areas. This measure had been further 
supplemented from April 1947 with benefits of 5/- and 2/6 per week, 
irrespective of rate of pension, payable to urban pensioners at the 
higher rate and rural pensioners at the lower rate.29
While on the one hand the new provisions had been criticised in 
the preparatory stages by the Department of Finance for being too 
generous,30 Fianna Fail deputies criticised the bill for not going far
27 See for example DD vol. 92, 23 Nov. 1943, col. 889; DD vol. 92, Sept. 1944, col. 2005;
DD vol. 99, 6 Mar. 1946, col. 2054; DD vol. 104, 20 Mar. 1947, col. 2569.
28 Observations of Department of Finance to Secretary Department of Social Welfare, 15 
July 1948 (N.A., D/SW, Plan 4/48).
29 Social Welfare Act 1948: bill file (N.A., D/SW, I.A. 94/53).
30 Observations of Department of Finance, 15 July 1948 (N.A., D/SW, Social Welfare Act 
1948: submissions to government, Plan 4/48).
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enough.31 Neither were the Fine Gael members of government allowed 
to forget the 10% reduction in pensions their members had introduced 
in 1924.32
Certainly the reform did not go quite as far as the Labour Party 
had wanted according to its motion placed before the Dail in 
September 1944 by Michael Keyes, Minister for Local Government 
from 1949-1951. In that motion Keyes requested from the Fianna Fail 
government the introduction of ‘proposals for the purpose of providing 
for persons over 65 years of age, who have ceased being gainfully 
employed, old age pensions at the rate of 20/- per week’,33 although the 
upper m eans lim it suggested by Keyes on that occasion was 
implemented in the 1948 act. Perhaps it was this motion of 1944 that 
led to Keyes' circumspection when commenting on the 1948 bill: ‘I do 
not wish to delay the House, except to congratulate the minister on the 
steps which he is taking’.34 Of course Keyes was not the only member 
of the inter-party government who had called for vastly improved 
legislation from the opposition benches but was now happy to support 
something less.35 By March 1949, 4,093 extra persons were in receipt 
of old age and blind pensions, the weekly cost by that time having 
increased by £35,286 (see table 6 .1).36
The changes made to the receipt of w idows’ and orphans’ 
pensions were similar to those made regarding old age and blind 
pensions. The means test was modified for non-contributory pensions, 
allowing the widow to earn up to 10/- per week and to receive 10/- per 
week from other sources, a sum that previously stood at 2s 6d. The
31 E.g. Patrick Beegan, DD vol. 112,28 July 1948, col. 1658-1659.
32 See Dr James Ryan, DD vol. 112, 28 July 1948, col. 1643.
33 DD vol. 94 ,26  Sept. 1944, col. 2005.
34 DD vol. 112, 28 July 1948, col. 1655.
35 See for example the motion of Martin O Sullivan in DD vol. 99, 6 Mar. 1949, col. 2054.
36 Statistical Abstract 1950.
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qualifying age for receipt of non-contributory pensions was reduced 
from 55 years of age to 48 years, the effect of which was to permit 
7,000 widows to qualify for non-contributory benefits.37 These 
changes meant that, for the first time, in certain cases a non- 
contributory pension could be larger than a contributory pension, the 
maximum being increased from 11/6 to 14/- per week in urban areas 
and from 8/- to 10/-per week in rural areas.38
Table 6.1




exceed in g  5s  
but le s s  than 
15s







145,302 4,271 141,031 NIL £3,620,035
19
44
145,387 4,290 141,097 NIL £3,717,139
19
45
146,243 4,472 141,771 NIL £3,695,789
19
46
147,582 4,567 143,015 NIL £3,709,168
19
47
146,777 4,583 142,194 NIL £3,729,678
19
48
149,414 567 120,100 28,747 £4,841,386
19
49
153,507 470 11,187 141,850* £5,426,982
* O f this number, 132,014 were receiving the maximum pension o f  17/6 per week.
Source: S ta tis tica l A b s tra c t 1 9 5 0
The other areas changed under the act related to national health 
insurance and unemployment benefit, the purpose of the changes again 
being the replacement of cash supplements introduced during the 
emergency period through the re-establishment of the principle of
37 DD vol. 112,28 July 1948, col. 1635.
38 See D&l fiireann: brief on Social Welfare Act 1948: committee stage (N.A, D/SW, Plan 
6/48).
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insurance based benefits in the non-assistance based policies. In the 
case of unemployment benefit, the cash supplements were made a 
permanent part of the rates of benefit, an increase off-set by an increase 
in the rates of insurance contributions. The act also allowed for the 
period of disqualification from unemployment assistance ‘in the case 
of persons losing em ploym ent through m isconduct or leaving 
voluntarily without just cause, at present fixed at three months, to be 
varied from one week to three months according to the circumstances 
of the individual case’.39
Regarding national health insurance, enhanced rates of sickness 
and disability benefits were provided for together with an increase in 
the remuneration of doctors who issued certificates to claimants of 
benefit, again making the cash supplements permanent by merging 
them with basic benefits.
The thrust of the act was therefore in the direction of unification 
and simplification of benefits, with somewhat increased rates of 
benefit, most notably in the area of old age and blind pensions, 
w idows’ and orphans’ pensions and unemployment insurance. To 
some extent therefore it was returning to a pre-emergency position, 
before the introduction of cash supplements as a temporary means of 
increasing benefits without effecting contributions. This return to 
benefits based strictly on an insurance principle was a positive step in 
the context of the development of the welfare state: as discussed in 
chapter four, cash supplements were arbitrary and could be viewed as 
charitable handouts rather than entitlements. With their abolition the 
employee, employer and the state again took collective responsibility 
for welfare provision.
39 Dfiil fiireann: brief on Social Welfare Act 1948: second stage (N.A, D/SW, Plan 5/48.)
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Coming into effect in January 1949, the act was seen, not as an 
end in itself, but as a further step paving the way for substantive 
change in welfare legislation:
Much, however, remains to be done before we can regard our 
social services as adequate... With this bill out of the way and in 
operation, the comprehensive scheme will be tackled with 
earnestness and expedition.40
The unity of feeling in the Dail on this matter was both new and strong.
For the first time there was an overwhelming unanimity of intent. Dr.
James Ryan welcomed the bill, although he thought the ‘country could
afford m ore’.41 Describing the act as an ‘interim scheme’, a fact
already acknowledged by Norton, he urged the necessity of a
‘comprehensive scheme’.42
A further but necessary piece of legislation was introduced by
Norton in M arch 1950 for debate in the Dail to com plete the
preparatory work of clearing ‘the ground for the implementation of the
wider social security scheme’.43 The aim of the bill was to include in
the remit of the Department of Social Welfare the activities carried out
until then by the National Health Insurance Society, thereby
eliminating duplication in the work of the department and the society.44
Describing the non-inclusion of the activities of the society in the
duties of the department as a ‘regrettable deficiency’, the act dissolved
Cumann um Arachais Naisiunta ar Shlainte, the 600 strong staff of the
society, who had been on strike over pay in early 1948, being
transferred en masse to the Department of Social Welfare from 1
40 William Norton, DD vol. 112, 28 July 1948, col. 1636.
41 DD vol. 112, 28 July 1948, col. 1647.
42 Ibid., col. 1649.
43 DD vol. 120, 29 Mar. 1950, col. 223.
44 Views of Minister for Finance on memorandum of Minister for Social Welfare on 
national health insurance society, n.d., cl949 (Labour History Museum, Norton Papers, 
Comprehensive social welfare scheme, Item 108).
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August 1950.45 The measure put paid to Dignan’s expressed desire to 
have an even stronger National Health Insurance Society with powers 
largely independent of the department, one of the major planks of his 
proposed scheme for social security. Dr James Ryan was not slow to 
remind the inter-party government that many of its supporters ‘stamped 
up and down the country blaming our government for not adopting that 
[Dr Dignan's] scheme. We knew at the time that these parties did not 
believe in the scheme’.46
Keeping consistency in the Fianna Fail approach Ryan supported 
the dissolution of the National Health Insurance Society. MacEntee, 
still harbouring obvious feelings of enmity for Dignan, also expressed 
support for the bill, but, like Ryan, spoke of:
the unprincipled political somersaults to which the various 
parties in the coalition have made us accustomed... If this bill 
represents anything it represents the complete abandonment of 
the Dignan plan - a slap in the face, if one might so describe it, 
to a member of the hierarchy who had almost been elected as a 
patron saint by the members of the political parties now forming 
the government.47
Indeed it was a ‘political somersault’ when we compare the contents 
and effect of the bill in the context of the support Dignan received for 
his ideas among the coalition parties while in opposition, as outlined in 
a previous chapter. However it is important to note that a strong, 
unified and largely independent national health insurance society was 
only one aspect of Dignan's overall plan: the second major plank of his 
plan, nam ely the introduction of a comprehensive social welfare 
scheme, was now being embraced right accross the political spectrum.
45 Social Welfare Act, 1950 (No. 14 of 1950).
46 DD vol. 120, 29 Mar. 1950, col. 229.
47 Ibid., col. 248.
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With the preparatory work achieved by the 1950 act through the 
incorporation of the work of the National Health Insurance Society into 
the brief of the Department of Social Welfare, and with the provisions 
of the earlier 1948 Social Welfare Act, the path was clear for giving 
legislative effect to the desire for a more comprehensive and co­
ordinated set of welfare legislation. This process had already begun in 
1949.
'Principles of modern thought': the 1949 white paper on social security 
The preparation and legislative history of what became the Social 
Welfare Act, 1952, was anything but straight forward. Having been 
first raised by Fianna Fail, prepared by the first inter-party government 
and subsequently altered slightly and brought to fruition by a new 
Fianna Fail administration, it was the cross-party consensus on the 
necessity o f such a measure which ensured its success
From an early stage after the election of February 1948 the inter- 
party government made it clear that a white paper dealing with a 
comprehensive social insurance scheme was in preparation. The white 
paper48 was presented to the government just prior to the Dail recess of 
Summer 1949, Norton promising that ‘no avoidable delay will be 
permitted to occur in the preparation of the necessary legislation’, but 
cautioning that ‘the task involved will necessarily be a heavy one’.49
Published in October 1949, the White paper containing  
government proposals fo r  social security was comprehensive and wide- 
ranging. Above all, it was a clear, systematic analysis of past 
developments, contemporary structures and recommendations for future
48 Department of Social Welfare, White paper containing government proposals fo r social 
security (Dublin, 1949).
49 DD vol. 116, 7 June 1949, col. 1. See also DD vol. 112, 13 July 1948, col. 1.
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planning in Ireland, placed within the context of ‘general principles and 
modem thought’.50
The paper was consistently reflective of Beveridge and of post- 
Beveridgean reform in Britain, the Department of Social Welfare 
having written to the British M inistry of National Insurance for 'a 
com plete set of the propaganda literature, leaflets, pamphlets, 
advertisements, etc., published by your ministry in connection with the 
social insurance schemes1.51 Echoing what Beveridge described as the 
'five giant evils' to be overcome by welfare legislation, the 66-page 
white paper, which opened with an historical survey of social legislation 
in Ireland, spoke of 'the major evils of destitution',52 first tackled 'to 
some degree '53 by the Poor Relief (Irel.) Act of 1838. The first 
'departures' from the poor law system were then detailed, starting with 
the Old Age Pension Act, 1908 and the first state-organised national 
health insurance of 1911. It is interesting here to note that the various 
stages in the development of the welfare state in Ireland were merely 
catalogued rather than critically appraised: comment upon individual 
schemes was invariably favourable. To this extent the construction of 
the white paper fitted in very much with the genre: right across Europe 
this appeal to history was a crucial factor when introducing new, 
innovative welfare legislation, or simply reforming existing legislation. 
Innovation and reform was down-played. From comparative analysis it 
would appear that nowhere was the welfare state heralded as 
revolutionary, but rather as a development deeply rooted in a long 
history.
50 This was the heading given to Part II of the White paper (1949).
51 Letter from Department of Social Welfare to Ministry of National Insurance, 7 July 
1948 (Labour History Museum, Norton Papers, Item 54).
52 White paper, p A .
53 Ibid.
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In the previous chapter I have already noted Beveridge's appeal to 
history. A similar emphasis is evident in Denmark, to take another 
example, where an important context of welfare state legislation was its 
traditionalism, an 'ideological traditionalism which posed no challenge 
to conceptions of the relationship between society and the individual'.54 
There was much emphasis placed on the fact that the development of 
the Danish welfare state was not the creation of something new, but 
rather the bringing to fruition of an existing inheritance, specifically the 
development of the guild system.
The perceived necessity for history's im p rim a tu r  on new 
developments perhaps best explains the blandly descriptive outline of 
the poor laws in the Irish white paper. The 'odious, degrading and 
foreign poor law system' described in the Democratic Programme of 
1919 was now admonished merely for the 'original restricted power'55 of 
the 1838 act.
The white paper was based on the principle of insurance, in 
keeping both with the recommendations of Beveridge and, more 
importantly, with the recommendations of the 26th session of the 
Conference o f the International Labour O rganisation held in 
Philadelphia in summer 1944 which recommended that social insurance 
was the most effective method of promoting the welfare of people.56
The white paper defined social security as ‘the organisation by 
society of protection for the individual and his dependants against the 
financ ia l efforts resulting  from  such hazards as sickness, 
unemployment, old age or death’, specifically excluding from the
54 Daniel Levine, 'Conservatism and tradition in Danish social welfare legislation, 1890- 
1933: a comparative view', Comparative Studies in History and Society, vol. 20 (1978), no.
1, p. 68.
55 White paper, p. 3.
56 For an outline of the proceedings of the historic 1944 Philadelphia Conference see 'In 
the service of social security: the history of the ISSA 1927-87', International Social Security 
Review, (1987), no. 2.
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meaning of the term the co-ordination of that protection with the 
medical services or involving the wider concepts of the provision of 
housing or the maintenance of employment.57 Excluded too was the 
provision of workmen’s compensation, first introduced in 1897 and 
which placed on employers a liability to provide compensation in 
respect of workers injured or killed in employment and which was 
adm inistered by the D epartm ent of Social W elfare since its 
establishment.
By virtue of definition, the white paper fitted  in with 
contemporary definitions of distributive as distinct from services-based 
welfare states, although including only five of what Beveridge 
identified as the eight primary causes of need to be remedied. Marriage 
requirements of women and the need for vocational training due to loss 
of livelihood were the principal omissions.
Describing the establishing of the Department of Social Welfare 
as an im portant step in the co-ordination and reform of welfare 
legislation, the white paper went on to point out that:
it had been evident for some time that their [i.e. welfare services] 
independent and spasmodic development had given rise to 
various anomalies and inconsistencies, and that they had a 
number of defects and shortcomings.58
Significantly, this assessment was placed in ‘the light of modern
developments in other countries’,59 an oft repeated phrase in the white
paper,60 and an important background against which the report was
framed. This 'modern' context of the white paper was largely made
possible and relevant through Ireland’s membership of the International
Labour Organisation and the fact that the Department of Social Welfare
57 White paper, p. ii.
58 Ibid., p. ii.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid., pp 10,11.
231
and the National Health Insurance Society during its lifetime were 
members of the International Social Security Association: 'development 
has been assisted by the pooling of ideas through the International 
Labour Organisation and by the efforts of bodies such as the 
International Social Security Association'.61 Ireland's involvement in 
both organisations is discussed in the following chapter.
On the central issue of whether welfare benefits should be placed 
on an insurance or assistance basis, the white paper was unequivocal: 
insurance-based welfare benefits were seen as infinitely more desirable:
It is generally recognised that an insurance system safeguards the 
self-respect of the beneficiary providing a firm guarantee of 
benefits, payable as of right in return for contributions which 
form the basis of such right.62
Assistance on the other hand was described as suffering from ‘serious
disadvantages’ including the existence of the means tests which more
often than not penalised the thrifty; assistance could not be provided for
those who had made private provisions for themselves in order to cope
with illness or old age:
There results a tendency to the weakening of individual initiative 
and family responsibility, the foundations on which the social and 
economic welfare of the community must ultimately rest.63
Despite such drawbacks, the paper concluded by pointing out that,
while the emphasis of social security provision had to be on insurance,
the maintenance of assistance schemes was necessary as ‘a device to
catch those who fall through the meshes of the insurance net’.64 This
directly reflected the line of argument used by Beveridge in his Report
on social insurance and allied services. As the title suggests, his report
61 Ibid, p. 10.
62 Ibid., p. 16.
63 Ibid., p. 10.
64 Ibid., p. 12.
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was ‘first and foremost a plan for insurance’. However in the opening 
pages of the document (coincidentally on the same page number as the 
Irish white paper) Beveridge wrote that:
The state cannot be excluded altogether from giving direct 
assistance to individuals in need, after examination of their 
means. However comprehensive an insurance scheme, some, 
through physical infirmity, can never contribute at all and some 
will fa ll through the meshes o f any insurance.65
The latter phrase was used verb a tim  in the Irish white paper,66
symptomatic of a certain amount of paraphrasing of Beveridge right
through the Irish document.
The insurance principle was to apply to all employees as a single
class insured for all benefits, thus bringing agricultural labourers and
domestic servants within the insurance bracket for the first time. It was
recommended that previous differences in the rates of benefit, most
notably the higher rates in urban as against rural areas, ought to be
abolished as ‘it appears to imply discrimination against agricultural
employment and because it tends to increase migration to the urban
area s’.67 W idow s’ and orphans’ pensions was perhaps the ‘best’
example of separate categories of recipient, benefit being divided into
urban/rural, contributory/ non-contributory and agricultural/ non-
agricultural recipients.
On the question of rates of contribution and benefit, the white
paper was very much in favour of ‘a fixed and flat rate of benefit for a
fixed and flat rate of contribution’68 at a level broadly in line with the
cost of living and irrespective of wages. Claiming that this was ‘in
accord with Christian principles’,69 it was certainly in accord with what
65 William Beveridge, Social insurance and allied services, (London, 1942), p. 12.
66 White paper, p. 15.
67 Ibid., p. 17
68 Ibid., p. 19.
69 Ibid., p. 18.
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Beveridge referred to as one of the six fundamental principles of social 
security.70 Both the white paper and the Beveridge report left room for 
voluntary private insurance and saving.
From a statement of principles the white paper went on to list the 
proposed am endments to existing legislation together with the 
suggested innovations: the simplification of w idows’ and orphans’ 
pensions from the position pertaining as outlined above; an increased 
maternity benefit to consist of a lump sum grant together with the 
provision of twelve weeks allowances for employed women to allow 
them time off work before and after ‘confinement’; a ‘modest’ funeral 
benefit; the introduction of a contributory pension at the age of 65 years 
for men and 60 years for women; the unification of employment and 
sickness insurance schemes; together with the maintenance of 
unemployment assistance, non-contributory widows’ and orphans’ 
pensions and non-contributory old age pensions.
The proposed unification of unem ploym ent and sickness 
insurance schemes was a vital component of the white paper, and very 
much an overdue reform. Due to the arbitrary development of welfare 
legislation, and in the absence of either any underlying philosophy or 
co-ordinating plan, a number of anomalous situations had developed. 
Despite ‘an obvious case for a considerable degree of similarity’71 in the 
hardships caused by unemployment and sickness, for example the loss 
of earnings, benefit rates and conditions for receipt of benefit varied in a 
number of ways. The sickness insurance scheme made no provision for 
dependants’ benefit while the unem ployment insurance scheme 
provided an adult and child dependence allowance each week. Those 
aged between 16 years and 18 years were not entitled to sickness
70 William Beveridge, Social insurance and allied services, p. 15.
71 While paper, p. 20.
234
insurance but were entitled to unemployment insurance. There were in 
existence two rates of sickness benefit (leaving aside age differences 
and gender distinctions outlined above), one for the first 26 weeks and a 
lower amount for the subsequent period, but there was only one rate for 
unemployment insurance benefit. Sickness benefits could be reduced or 
suspended due to arrears, whereas no reduction existed in relation to 
unemployment benefit.
There were also a number of dissimilarities regarding the receipt 
of unemployment insurance and sickness insurance. Firstly, the number 
of contributions required for receipt of benefit differed: 26 in the case of 
sickness insurance and 12 in the case of unemployment insurance. The 
duration of benefit was significantly different in both cases. The 
number of ‘waiting days’, i.e. the initial days during which no payment 
of benefit was made, was six in the case of unemployment and three in 
the case of sickness benefit. Finally, regarding sickness insurance, 
insurance was not maintained during unemployment even though the 
requisite number of contributions may have been paid during a prior 
period of employment. This situation did not develop with regards to 
unemployment insurance.72
In order to rationalise such an anomalous system, the white paper 
proposed ‘as a matter of principle’73 that there should be no distinction 
made between unemployment insurance and sickness insurance in terms 
of rates of benefit or conditions to receipt of benefit.
Regarding the administration of the revamped schemes, co­
ordination was to be the key word, both in terms of the central 
administration and in the way contributions were to be collected and 
benefits paid:
72 An outline of these dissimilarities can be found in White paper, p. 20.
73 Ibid., p. 20
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The central feature of the administration of the scheme will be a 
single record for each insured person and there will be a single 
card in each case to which the employer will affix a single 
stamp.74
This recommendation was equally in accord with Beveridge’s ideas, his 
report being based on:
unification of social insurance in respect of contributions, that is 
to say, enabling each insured person to obtain all benefits by a 
single weekly contribution on a single document.75
The scheme was to apply to ‘virtually all employed persons’,76
the estimated cost of benefits in the first year being £8,800,000, broken
down as follows:77
Unemployment benefit - £3,050,000
Disability benefit - £2,100,000
Retirement pensions - £2,100,000
W idows’ and orphans’ benefit - £1,050,000
Maternity benefit - £400,000
Death grants - £100,000
The scheme was to be largely financed through the insurance
principle: by means of the contributions of the employer, employee and
state. It was seen as reasonable that any extra financial requirements
should be paid by the exchequer, as the welfare of individuals was the
duty of the community as a whole. The greater level of insurance cover
envisaged by the plan would lead, it was hoped, to a raising in the
standards of ‘efficiency, contentedness and security of the workers’,
thereby increasing national productivity and employer profits.78 This
74 Ibid., p. 33.
75 William Beveridge, Social insurance and allied services, p. 15.
76 White paper, p. 34.
77 Ibid., p. 35.
78 Ibid., p. 36.
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latter expectation, it was hoped, would cancel out the increased 
contributions of both employer and employee in any new scheme.
In an attempt to bring on board the Catholic hierarchy Norton 
sent an advance copy of the white paper to all members of the 
hierarchy. While letters acknowledging receipt of the white paper were 
largely non-committal, both the archbishop of Tuam, John Walsh and 
Dr John D'Alton of Armagh congratulated the minister for attempting to 
get to grips with what John Walsh described as 'this difficult and 
important question'.79 However, there were no public expressions of 
support forthcoming from the hierarchy, Catholic writers being to the 
fore in criticising the most contentious element of the white paper, the 
method of financing, leading in turn to a questioning of the desirability 
of the fundamental principles upon which the welfare state was based. 
E. J. Coyne, S.J., was particularly vociferous in questioning whether the 
community should be made responsible for the welfare of individuals 
within it. Developing this line of argument, which was remarkable both 
in the light of Roman Catholic teaching and the principles of Catholic 
charity, Coyne reduced insurance based legislation, the ideal method of 
provision in the construction of the welfare state, to poor assistance by 
another name:
When the beneficiaries receive their benefits it should be clearly 
understood that only one-third of the benefit has been paid for in 
any sense by the participants while the other two-thirds of the 
benefit are m erely a masked form of poor relief or public 
assistance.80
The percentages alluded to referred to the portion of contributions paid 
by employer, employee and exchequer.
79 Letter to William Norton from John Walsh, archbishop of Tuam, 27 Oct. 1949 (Labour 
History Museum, Norton Papers, Item 114).
80 Symposium on social security, 2 Dec. 1949', Journal o f the Statistical and Social 
Inquiry Society o f Ireland, vol. 18 (1948-9), p. 251.
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Coyne wished to advise people under what he saw as the illusion 
that payment of insurance contributions entitled one to benefits if the 
need arose, was wrong and an unjust burden on society. He continued 
his argument, best elucidated at the symposium on social security 
organised by the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland in 
December 1949, by saying that at least half of the 700,00081 which the 
new scheme planned to cover, would never benefit from insurance 
benefits anyway and that, therefore, they should not be expected to pay 
contributions ‘for risks which are completely non-existent in order to 
qualify for benefits which they will never need’, and which, if  they did 
need, ‘would be relatively useless to them’ anyway.82 Not satisfied to 
leave his rather confusing direction of argument there, Coyne went on 
to extol the virtues of Christian charity, provision of which he perceived 
as ennobling rather than degrading: ‘that does not mean to say that 
Christian social charity is something which necessarily degrades either 
the giver or the recipient’.83 Seemingly, according to Coyne’s line of 
argument, only insurance-based benefits did that.
The scheme was criticised by Bishop John Dignan, however, for 
not going far enough him saying it ‘greatly disappoints me’.84 While 
welcoming such measures as the equalisation of employment and 
sickness benefits, his strongest criticism was that the scheme would not 
‘give social security to the nation... Excluded are small farmers, 
shopkeepers, business people, etc.’.85 Also alluded to by Coyne,86 this 
was undoubtedly the most serious omission from the scheme, the
81 White paper, p. 34.
82 ‘Symposium on social security, 2 Dec. 1949', Journal o f  the S ta tistica l and Social 
Inquiry Society o f  Ireland, vol. 18 (1948-9), p. 252.
83 Ibid., p. 253.
84 John Dignan, 'The government proposals for social security', Christus Rex, 25 March 
1950, p. 107.
85 Ibid.
86 Symposium on social security, 2 Dec. 1949', Journal o f  the S ta tistica l and S ocial 
Inquiry Society o f  Ireland, vol. 18 (1948-9), p. 252.
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definition of ‘existence’ or citizenship in terms of insurance rights being 
limited to employment status.
This limitation of the insurance scheme to recipients of cash 
income, reduced the number of insurable people to approximately 
700,000. The white paper acknowledged that this excluded in particular 
individuals living on small agricultural holdings from participating in 
insurance schemes, due to the absence of a regular cash income.87 
W hile it is noteworthy that the paper recognised and appreciated the 
difficulties caused to individuals such as small holders, (not to mention 
small employers, shopkeepers and independent trades people such as 
dressmakers, shoemakers and craftsmen88) the reasons given for their 
non-inclusion simply did not stand up to scrutiny. Certainly its 
appraisal of developments in other countries is not entirely accurate:
While, therefore, development of social security along insurance 
lines may be approved, it must not be assumed that such 
developments can readily be carried to all groups in the 
community. In the circumstances of some countries, indeed, the 
problem is one which not only involves enormous administrative 
difficulties and financial risk, but has to be considered from the 
angle of practicability.89
In fact the Beveridge-type insurance system was operating quite
satisfactorily in Northern Ireland as well as in Britain, provision for all
sections of the population including the self-employed being described
as one of his fundamental principles of social security.
Denmark was another excellent example of inclusive insurance
legislation. While Danish welfare legislation blossomed long before
Ireland’s, the background in both countries was agricultural rather than
industrial. In Denmark, welfare legislation was heavily influenced by
87 White paper, p. 11.
88 Symposium on social security, 2 Dec. 1949', Journal o f the Statistical and Social 
Inquiry Society o f Ireland, vol. 18 (1948-9), p. 252.
89 White paper, p. 3.
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this social-agrarian m ilieu90 whereas in Ireland, not only were the 
majority of those involved in agriculture excluded from state-centralised 
welfare rights, but now the white paper of 1949 foresaw a continuation 
of this situation, admitting in the concluding chapter that ‘a ready 
criticism to be anticipated is that the scheme is more suitable to a 
country which is largely industrial than to a country which is largely 
agricultural’.91 This contradicted the assertion on page one of the white 
paper that ‘social security’ was ‘now generally seen as a problem 
relating to the whole population’.92
This income-based insurance scheme also automatically excluded 
women who choose to remain ‘home makers’ from benefiting from 
insurance of any kind in their own right. Furthermore, the rights of 
m arried women in em ploym ent were not augm ented in the 
recommendations of the white paper. In keeping with previous 
legislation, the white paper proposed ‘that a somewhat lower sickness 
benefit rate be granted to married women’.93 The reasoning behind the 
proposal was as follows:
The sickness experience of this class has been exceptionally 
heavy, and if the higher rates became applicable to them, it is to 
be feared that the degree of malingering would be even worse 
than it has been.94
D ignan’s criticism  of the exclusiveness of the scheme was 
certainly more constructive than that of Rev. E. J. Hegarty's who, 
writing in a later issue of the same journal as Dignan, said that:
These state schemes tend to promote improvidence, indolence 
and degeneration - throwing ‘a gold chain around the necks of the
90 See for example, Byron Nordstrom (ed.), Dictionary o f Scandinavian history (London, 
1986), pp 628-9.
91 White paper, p. 43.
92 Ibid., p. 1.
93 Ibid., p. 21.
94 Ibid.
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w orkers’ (as reported by Bismarck), to leave them a mere 
proletariat rabble ‘securely’ under the thumb of a growing 
bureaucracy.95
The inevitable result was, according to Hegarty, the institution of 
polygamy and divorce: ‘in fact, you might ask why ought people to 
bother with any form of marriage at all if the state will care for them 
“from the cradle to the grave’” . The benefits which he had particularly 
in mind here were maternity benefits and children’s allowances among 
others, policies which, he claimed, led to the absorption and suppression 
of people's rights. Further criticising the proposals for making no 
mention of the ‘social encyclicals’ and for paying only ‘lip service to 
Christian principles’,96 Hegarty went on to suggest his own solutions:
True social policy must co-operate with true Religion to re­
establish a natural form of security through widespread private 
ownership and moral use of real wealth.97
Neither was Hegarty alone in this level of negative criticism of
the white paper: similar articles and comment were to be found in The
Standard , Irish Ecclesiastical Record, and Irish Weekly, the latter
established by Bishop Patrick Dorrian of Down and Connor as a forum
for Catholic and nationalist views, and from such groups as An
Rioghacht, the League of the Kingship of Christ, dedicated to ‘the study
and propagation of Catholic social principles’,98 and the Catholic
Societies Vocational Organisation Conference, and from individuals
such as Peter McKevitt who underlined the church's basic opposition to
state interference in the lives of people:
95 E. J. Hegarty, 'The principles against state welfare schemes', Christus Rex, vol. iv 
(1950), p. 327.
96 Ibid., pp 316, 317.
97 Ibid., p. 333.
98 IC D 1952, p. 713.
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The worst feature of the proposed measure is that it takes for 
granted that the state must play the principal part in securing 
social justice."
Members of the Catholic clergy were by no means the sole 
objectors to both the spirit and content of the white paper. A number of 
negative arguments were put forward at the symposium on social 
security organised by the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of 
Ireland, alluded to previously. Vociferous in his objection was P. S. O 
Hegarty, secretary of the Department of Posts and Telegraphs, who also 
objected to the adoption of any part of the Beveridge report in Ireland 
(see previous chapter). Agreeing with Coyne, he reiterated his view as 
revealed in an article in the Sunday Independent on 21 March 1943 in 
response to Beveridgeism:
I object to the principle of the scheme or similar schemes. The 
more is done for some people, the less they will do for 
themselves. The proposed scheme is another step on the road to 
totalitarianism. It will not end where it is, but will be extended to 
other things, on the assumption that everybody is entitled to be 
kept by the State.100
Obviously unim pressed by the evidence and argum ent of the
intervening six years, O Hegarty stuck rigidly to his first principles.
Again his objection was to any scheme which placed responsibility (or
the ‘burden’ to use his own term) of individual welfare on the
community in which that individual lived.
N either was O Hegarty alone in fearing that state-organised
welfare schemes would lead to people looking to and depending on the
government for their every need. At the same symposium, J. C. M.
Eason expressed the view that inherent in the introduction of schemes
such as that outlined in the white paper of 1949 was:
99 Limerick Leader, 1 Apr. 1950.
100 Symposium on social security, 2 Dec. 1949', Journal of the Statistical and Social 
Inquiry Society o f Ireland, vol. 18 (1948-9), p. 266.
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A danger of introducing into the minds of citizens - particularly 
to the younger ones - that they really are not responsible for their 
state of health or for their unemployment, whereas, in fact, we 
know that many of the absences which arise from illness can be 
traced to carelessness or to the pursuit of selfish enjoyment 
without any recognition of the duty to try and maintain one’s 
health in order to do one’s work.101
However, such criticism received little attention from an actively 
enthusiastic government and Dail, Norton quite rightly claiming that the 
government had ‘produced for the first time in Ireland a comprehensive 
and co-ordinated scheme of social security...[It] represents a credible 
effort to provide for our people social security not less favourable than 
is being provided for the workers of many other lands’.102 This lack of 
attention to church criticism is surprising in retrospect in the light of the 
controversy over the mother and child scheme two years later.
The bill, based on the white paper and which would 'make Eire a 
welfare state'103 according to some commentators, was introduced in the 
Dail just before the summer recess in July 1950. Following closely on 
the lines of the white paper it was with the second stage of the bill, in 
early March 1951, that discussion began in the Dail.
Reiterating the defects in the existing code of social legislation, 
namely its lack of co-ordination and its ‘haphazard and disjointed 
pattern’,104 Norton dealt firstly with the criticisms of the white paper 
from people like Dignan and O Hegarty (although no particular critic 
was mentioned by name). On the question of vocationalism, and the 
argument that the scheme should be planned on vocational lines, Norton 
replied that ‘we are not living in the clouds. We are dealing with an
101 Ibid., p. 249.
102 Transcript from recording of lecture on social insurance given by William Norton in 
Newbridge Town Hall, 12 May 1950 (N.A., D/T, Progress Reports 1949-1963, S 15069a).
103 Sunday Graphic, 22 Oct. 1950.
104 DD vol. 124, 2 Mar. 1951, col. 1073.
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urgent practical problem, not with one that can wait until all ancillary 
problems of vocationalism  have been solved.’105 Regarding the 
objections, raised most strongly by O Hegarty, he said:
To suggest that the new scheme is a step on the road towards 
to ta lita rian ism  is com pletely  un justified  and w holly 
misleading.106
Again stressing the need to bring Irish social legislation in line with 
‘modem conditions’107 Norton proceeded to outline the provisions of 
the bill, including the possibility for farmers who were members of co­
operatives to become voluntary members eligible for all benefits with 
the exception of disability and unemployment.
One important departure from the white paper was in the rates of 
contribution. W hile the white paper advocated a flat rate of 
contribution for a flat rate of benefit, irrespective of wages and in line 
with the Beveridge report, Norton announced that the bill would 
provide for two classes of persons with two rates of contribution, 
depending on income.108
Norton concluded his speech advocating the acceptance of the 
bill by advising that ‘the absence of social security is a challenge to our 
social conscience, a challenge to our concepts of social justice’.109 
Placing the bill firmly in the context of the development of the welfare 
state in Ireland, he said:
We may hear it said in a smug, complacent way that this scheme 
aims at the welfare state...[If] doing these things represents a step 
towards the welfare state, then I, for one, proudly plead guilty to 
the charge.110
105 Ibid., col. 1070.
106 Ibid., col. 1074.
107 Ibid., col. 1074.
108 Ibid., col. 1082.
109 Ibid., col. 1088-9
110 Ibid., col. 1092.
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It was indeed an important step in the construction of the welfare state, 
a term which we can see by inference from the earlier statements quoted 
above was not necessarily seen in a positive light or accepted as a 
positive structure at this time in Ireland.
The Fianna Fail response to the bill seemed unnecessarily harsh 
and politically rather than socially motivated. Richard Mulcahy would 
later claim with some accuracy that ‘except there is the imprimatur of 
Fianna Fail on a piece of social legislation the idea is that it has to be 
worked against and struggled against and m aligned’.111 On this 
occasion James Ryan claimed that the positive aspects of the bill had 
been ‘robbed’ from his own ideas: ‘I would like to say that I proposed 
nothing in the way of benefit that is less than what the minister 
proposes’.112 Indeed there is evidence in departmental files that a wide 
range of social security measures was under review by the Fianna Fail 
government prior to the election of February 1948, including a proposal 
from 1946 by the Department of Local Government and Public Health 
to 'draw up outlines of a scheme of social insurance',113 although no co­
ordinated draft document has been located by the present author.114
Described as Fianna Fail’s ‘champion of lost causes’115 by Gerard 
Sweetman, a future Minister for Finance, Ryan put down a motion 
calling on the Dail not to allow the bill pass the second stage as (a) it 
was not a comprehensive or balanced scheme and (b) it imposed greatly 
increased burdens on both employers and employees through increased 
contributions.116 The motion was supported by two similar motions,
111 DD vol. 130, 27 Mar. 1952, col. 686.
112 DD vol. 124, 2 Mar. 1951, col. 1123.
113 Memorandum on Ministry of Social Affairs, Nov. 1946 (U.C.D. Archives, MacEntee 
Papers, Ministry of Social Affairs, P67/280).
114 See for example Social Welfare Act 1948: submissions to government (N.A., D/SW, 
Plan 4/48).
115 DD vol. 125,4 Apr. 1951, col. 51.
116 DD vol. 124, 2 Mar. 1951, col. 1092.
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Lemass expressing concern in particular over the different rates of 
contribution. All three motions were defeated however and despite 
Fianna Fail voting en masse against the second stage the bill passed to 
the next stage by 71 votes to 67 in mid April 1951.117
However by this time other events were beginning to dominate 
the Irish political scene, namely Dr Noel Browne’s ‘mother and child 
scheme’, issued in June 1950 and growing out of a deepening concern 
for the high rate of infant mortality in Ireland: 49 per 1,000 in Ireland as 
a whole in 1949.118 While members of the Catholic hierarchy in Ireland 
published their criticisms of the white paper on social welfare, they 
became significantly more forceful in their opposition to the mother and 
child scheme.119 The arguments in both cases, however, were similar, 
the church strongly objecting to what it perceived as the increasing 
power of the state encroaching on the private lives of the citizens.
On 11 April 1951, by which time he was out of favour with John 
A. Costello, the taoiseach, Sean MacBride, his party leader, and the 
Catholic hierarchy, Dr Browne resigned, precipitating a protracted 
debate on church-state relations. On the following day the Irish Times 
spoke of the event as revealing that the Roman Catholic church would 
‘seem to be the effective government of this country’.120 It was an 
important contemporary observation. For an ostensibly non-political 
organisation, the Catholic church wielded significant political power.
The crisis hastened the approach of a general election, held in 
May 1951, causing the Social Welfare Bill of 1950 to fall. In the 
election Browne, who participated as an independent, almost doubled
117 D D  vol. 125, 5 Apr. 1951, col. 636.
118 Sta tistica l A bstrac t 1950.
119 Perhaps the best elucidation o f  the events leading up to and surrounding the mother and 
child schem e is to be found in J. H. Whyte, Church and  state in m odem  Ireland  1923-79, 
chapters 7 and 8.
120 IT, 12 Apr. 1951.
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his first preference vote to 8,473, a sign of the overwhelming support 
both he and his health bill enjoyed among the people of his Dublin 
South East constituency, while Norton increased his first preference 
vote by 1,500, a measure of support and approval for his white paper 
and subsequent social welfare bill.
W elfare legislation formed a major element of the election 
campaign, more so than in 1948. On numerous occasions the de 
Valera-influenced Irish Press led with headlines, mostly reporting 
speeches of de Valera’s, which invariably included references to social 
legislation. One such headline read ‘Mr de Valera on Fianna Fail’s 
Social Progress’,121 the article reporting a speech by de Valera at an 
election rally in his own constituency of Clare which he had represented 
since 1917.
The prom ise of more com prehensive social legislation 
undoubtedly boosted the position of Fianna Fail and, while individuals 
from the inter-party government performed well, the result of the 
election was the formation of a minority Fianna Fail government with 
the support of a number of independents, including Noel Browne who 
later became a member of the party, having been refused membership of 
Labour. It was under the direction of Dr James Ryan as Minister for 
Health and Social Welfare that reform of welfare legislation, along the 
lines of the inter-party bill, would be carried to fruition.
Ryan, a medical doctor who had taken part in the 1916 Rising for 
which he was interned in Frongoch, was first elected as a Sinn Fein 
M.P. for Wexford in 1918. He was to spend further periods in jail, 
firstly under the British in Spike Island in 1920-21 and then under the 
Free State forces in 1922-23 when he went on hunger strike for thirty-
121 IP, 19 May 1951.
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five days. A founder member of the Fianna Fail party his first 
ministerial position was in the Department of Agriculture between 1932 
and 1947, moving to the Department of Social Welfare and Health on 
the establishment of these new departments in 1947. Following the 
collapse of the second inter-party government in 1957, Ryan became 
Minister for Finance, being very much involved in the commissioning 
and implementation of T. K. Whitaker's programmes for economic 
development.
As they had spoken ‘at length, wept very bitterly and groaned and 
cried severely about old age pensions’122 according to Oliver J. 
Flanagan, during the election campaign of May 1951, it was appropriate 
that Fianna Fail’s first target of reform was old age pensions. It was a 
social policy the party claimed as its own since Cumann na nGaedheal 
reduced the pension in 1924, de Valera taking every opportunity in the 
1951 election of referring to Fine Gael as ‘the people whose great 
economy on one occasion was to reduce old age pensions by one 
shilling’.123 Shortly after coming into office, the government presented 
a social welfare bill 1951 to the Dail which had a threefold effect: it 
increased rates of benefit; it modified the means test; and it excluded 
certain categories of income from being included in means altogether.124 
Becoming law in July 1951 the measure was in essence taken from the 
inter-party government’s social welfare bill: Norton congratulated the 
Fianna Fail administration for ‘following so faithfully the good example 
of the previous government’.125
122 DD vol. 126,28 June 1951, col. 849.
123 IP, 21 May 1951.
124 Social Welfare Act, 1951 (No. 16 of 1951).
125 DD vol. 126,28 June 1951, col. 750.
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Social W elfare Act. 1952
Taking up the substantive issue contained in Norton’s bill, Ryan, 
having sought observations from the various government departments, 
had prepared a new bill by late autumn 1951 which he submitted to 
government on 28 December. He subsequently introduced the new 
social welfare bill to the Dâil, discussion upon which commenced in 
late March 1952, much to the chagrin of the Department of Industry and 
Commerce who had requested ‘much more time’ to consider the bill.126 
Although limited to insurance benefits, the similarities with the earlier 
coalition proposal were obvious, the bill setting out to achieve the same 
end, primarily the integration, simplification and general improvement 
of the existing welfare schemes.127 The bill made provision for a single 
insurance card w ith a single stam p; uniform  benefits for 
sickness/disability, unemployment and widowhood; together with 
provision for maternity and marriage as in the case of the coalition bill.
As provided for in Norton’s bill, male agricultural workers and 
domestic servants were to be included for the first time in the scope of 
unemployment insurance, although female employees in both categories 
were to remain outside the scheme.
Another important issue regarding provision for agricultural 
workers in general was left unaddressed in this and subsequent acts in 
the 1950s. This concerned the non-payment of old age pensions to 
farmers, a policy heavily criticised on numerous occasions by the 
Department of Agriculture. Some months before the publication of the 
white paper on social security in 1949 the department claimed that ‘a 
vast social improvement in Irish agriculture could be effected by
126 Memorandum from Department of Industry and Commerce, 9 June 1952 (N.A, D/Ind. 
and Comm., Social security measures: legislation to implement proposals published in 
white paper 1952-1960, E 107/49/1).
127 Social Welfare Act, 1952 (No. 11 of 1952).
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allowing all farmers to qualify for the old age pension without first 
having to go through the formality of conveying the farm to their 
sons’.128 Despite such a suggestion, the act of 1952 made no such 
provision resulting in ‘the demoralisation of the eldest son who is 
middle-aged or elderly before he gets the farm and can marry’.129
No justification was offered for the exclusion of female 
agricultural workers and domestics.130 The very fact justification was 
seen as otiose is a commentary in itself. Openly discriminatory, it 
underpinned the justification for feminist criticism of many facets of the 
developing welfare state. The institution itself, dependent largely on 
women working in the home rather than outside it, was ‘employee’ and 
therefore ‘male’ oriented. The non-inclusion of female workers in this 
instance may be paralleled with the negative definition of ‘maternity’ 
implied in this and similar cross-European welfare legislation, equating 
it with ‘sickness’, i.e. absence from the workforce.131 Ireland, suffering 
from a singular dearth of imagination when it came to formulating and 
implementing welfare legislation, only re-inforced the discriminatory 
emphasis of such legislation. It should also be noted that, while only 
male employees were liable to pay widows’ and orphans’ insurance, 
female employees who did pay insurance contributions were obliged to 
pay less than male employees: the new rates of contribution following 
the 1952 act were 2s. 6d. for men and Is. 4d. for women. Equally, the 
employer’s rate of contribution for female employees was 4d. less than
128 Department of Agriculture, memorandum for the government, 29 June 1949 (N.A., 
D/T, S 13384B).
129 Ibid.
130 For example, the Minister for Social Welfare merely alluded to this point in a matter- 
of-fact way offering no explanation for the ‘special’ treatment of women, in a lecture to 
social science students in U.CD. in Dec. 1952. (N.A, D/SW, EB 316481).
131 For a discussion of these issues see for example, Wiebke Kolbe, ‘Modrama och 
valfardstaten. Svensk och vastertysk moderskapspolitik under 1950-talet: en jamforelse 
(Mothers and the welfare state. Swedish and West German maternity policies in the 1950s: 
a comparison)', Historisk Tidskrift, no. 4 (1992), with English summary.
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that for male employees. In turn the rates of unemployment and 
sickness/disability benefit were lower for fem ale than for male 
employees up to the passing of the 1952 act. Subsequent to this act the 
rates for unemployment benefit were the same for single women, 
widows and certain classes of married women as those payable to men.
The act did contain a number of changes from Norton’s bill 
however. Ryan questioned the wisdom of contributory old age pensions 
at 65 or 60 years of age and instead provided for a higher rate of non- 
contributory pension at age 70 years. Another change was the provision 
of full ordinary benefits for ‘men in the agricultural industry’, requiring 
moderate contributions from farmers.132 The idea of a death grant was 
done away with.
Rates of benefit in the new bill differed only slightly from those 
proposed in Norton’s bill, the most obvious differences being decreased 
maternity benefits and an almost doubled upper means limit of over 
£104 for recipients of old age pensions, the latter being in line with 
statements made by Ryan during the discussion of the inter-party 
legislation.133
The overall cost of the scheme was £1.3 million less than that of 
N orton’s plan, explained by Ryan by the fact that he envisaged a 
number of complementary reforms in the parallel health bill, the Fianna 
Fail version of the mother and child scheme. Explaining the decrease in 
maternity benefits, the minister said:
I hope to produce a health scheme before long. This scheme will 
deal, amongst other things, with maternity and child welfare.134
Similarly, the issue of children’s allowances was not covered in the bill
but Ryan said that ‘it was always my intention, however, to proceed
132 DD vol. 130,27 Mar. 1952, col. 632.
133 See DD vol. 124,2 Mar. 1951, col. 1124.
134 Ibid., col. 642.
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without delay with the preparation of an assistance bill which would 
deal with children’s allowances’.135
Echoing the politically-biased response of Ryan when in 
opposition to Norton’s bill, it was now Norton’s chance to decry the 
shortcomings of Ryan’s bill while claiming that the overall thrust of the 
bill with which he agreed, was in fact taken from the 1949 white paper:
I do not think anybody will now have any doubt that, whatever 
good is in this bill, has been taken from our bill.136
However, because of what it omitted (retirement pensions without a
means test at 65 years; death benefits; increased maternity benefits;
increased children’s allowances) Norton refused his support for
allowing the bill pass its second stage, moving a motion to that effect in
the Dail in March 1952.137
Richard Mulcahy, leader of Fine Gael, the largest constituent of
the first inter-party government and former Minister for Education was
also harsh in his criticism of the government bill. Attempting to run
with the hare while chasing with the hounds, he claimed that the
legislation was a duplication of the coalition government’s bill but that
‘no one could be satisfied in the case of people who will have to depend
on the amount of benefit in this bill...that the state is doing its duty’.138
J. A. Costello, the former taoiseach, seemed to agree with Mulcahy’s
assessment that the bill ‘failed to introduce a comprehensive plan of
social security’.139
The reaction of the other important element of the inter-party
government, Clann na Poblachta, now reduced to only two T.D.s from a
high of ten, was very much in tune with its radical social and republican
135 Ibid., col. 643.
136 DD vol. 130, 27 Mar. 1952, col. 663.
137 Ibid., col. 646.
138 DD vol. 130, 27 Mar. 1952, col. 685.
139 Ibid., col. 749.
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ideals. In the debate which went on in to the early hours of the 
morning, MacBride, the founder and leader of the party, describing the 
necessity for such a bill in the first place as underlining the structural 
weaknesses of the Irish economy, referred to the bill as ‘a sort of stop­
gap measure’.140 In keeping with his party's philosophy he expressed 
concern over the differences in level of benefits between the Republic 
of Ireland and Northern Ireland:
In the Six Counties during the last election the main leaflet and 
poster used by the Partionists was one setting out in one column 
the social benefits payable in the Six Counties...and in another 
column the social benefits payable in this part of Ireland.141
The criticisms of the bill were largely based on political
expediency, on the necessities of the democratic model of electoral
politics. Everybody agreed with the principle: this was an important
step forward. Disagreement over how to achieve that principle was
fruitful and ensured a lively debate on social security issues impossible
just a few years earlier.
Dr Noel Browne, now a supporter, though not yet a member, of
Fianna Fail described the bill as ‘the fruition of the achievements which
those men on both sides of the House set before themselves 25 or 30
years ago in order to achieve equality of opportunity for all the children
of our nation’,142 a reference to the Democratic Programme of 1919.
Describing himself as a ‘confirmed believer in what has been described
as the welfare state’143 he equally alluded, as MacBride had done, to the
underlying structural and economic problems which made such a bill
necessary:
140 DD vol. 130, 1 Apr. 1952, col. 1602.
141 Ibid., col. 1604.
142 DD vol. 130, 27 Mar. 1952, col. 1000.
143 Ibid., col. 1003
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I believe that this bill is a true measure of the poverty of the state 
thirty years after the declaration of the democratic programme.144
This increasing reference to the lack of achievement in almost every
sphere other than the maintenance of political stability since gaining
independence was a characteristic of this period. The Labour Party, in a
publication from 1952, summed up this legacy of three decades of
independence:
Thirty years ago Irish men and women rightly took pride in 
having defeated the British government....Today the majority of 
Irish people are dismayed at our failure to overcome our 
economic and social problems and to provide the Irish people 
with a reasonable and decent standard of life, a sense of security 
in the knowledge that our country was progressing rather than 
standing still.145
Coming into effect in January 1953 the Social Welfare Act, 1952, 
the formulation of which was the result of the efforts of all the Dail 
parties to a greater or lesser extent, and which contained several positive 
aspects o f the British National Insurance Act of 1946 and of the 
Beveridge Report, was a crucial achievement in the context of the Irish 
welfare state. Dr Ryan claimed that ‘with the passing of that act the 
structure of social services in this country might be regarded as having 
taken final form’.146 While there is no finality in the structure of social 
services legislation, the general tenor of the remark was justified. 
Echoing Norton’s sentiments of March 1951, Ryan did not make any 
excuses for the fact that the act was of crucial importance in the 
achievement of the Irish welfare state: ‘Suppose it does. Suppose it 
does aim at creating a welfare state. Is there anything particularly 
reproachful in that?’147
144 Ibid., col. 1007.
145 Labour Party, L abour’s constructive program m e (Dublin, 1952).
146 DD vol. 143,2 Dec. 1953, col. 1394.
147 Transcript of lecture on social security given by Minister for Social Welfare in 
Newbridge Town Hall, 12 Dec. 1952 (N.A., D/T, Progress reports, 1949-63, S 15069 (A)).
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
COM PARATIVE CONTEXTS AND PERSPECTIVES
Having examined the timing, pace and extent of welfare legislation 
in Ireland over the course o f the preceding chapters, one question remains 
to be dealt with: the extent to which the course of welfare legislation in 
Ireland reflected trends in other European countries. To help place Irish 
legislation in the w ider European context developments in three North 
European  countries are exam ined: Finland, N orw ay and Denmark. 
Before embarking upon these parallel studies, however, it is necessary to 
exam ine another com parative aspect to Irish legislation, namely the 
extent to which Irish policy was influenced by existing legislation in 
other countries. Never an innovator in the field of social policy, Ireland 
turned in particu lar to Britain as an exem plar in the field  o f social 
legislation.
R ight through the present work com parisons have been drawn 
between developments in Ireland and elsewhere: certain periods, such as 
the course and aftermath of the Second W orld W ar had very similar 
results in terms o f  social policy and attitudes towards the necessity of 
expanding the role o f the state in the social lives o f its citizens right 
across Europe. To a greater or lesser extent, these developments were 
reflected within Ireland.
T h ro u g h  m em b ersh ip  o f  the In te rna tiona l Socia l Security  
A ssoc ia tion  and the In ternational L abour O rganisation , the Irish 
g o v e rn m e n t  and ad m in is tra t iv e  o ff ic ia ls  kep t up to date  w ith 
developm ents in social policy right across Europe and beyond. The 
In terna tional Social Security  A ssoc ia tion  (ISSA) alone boasted a 
membership o f 144 institutions and 58 countries. Having its origin in the 
International Conference of National Unions of Mutual Benefit Societies
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and Sickness Insurance Funds founded in Brussels in 19271 the Irish 
National Health Insurance Society was a member of the ISSA from  1934 
until the am algam ation of the society with the D epartm ent of Social 
W elfare in 1950, while the Departm ent o f Social W elfare accepted an 
inv ita tion  to b ecom e a m em ber in N ovem ber 1948.2 Indeed  
underpinning the enthusiasm of the National Health Insurance Society for 
international com parative studies, the chairman and secretary of the 
provisional com m ittee of m anagem ent travelled to Yugo-Slavia in late 
1934 to exam ine how ‘a unified society almost identical in membership 
to our ultimate organisation’ operated in a ‘small and largely agricultural 
nation like our o w n ’.3 It was an enthusiasm taken up and pursued with 
vigour by the committee o f m anagem ent under Dr John Dignan which 
took over from  the provisional committee: the society’s journal o f  1936 
stated that:
It has been the constant endeavour o f the unified society to keep 
abreast o f  modern developments in the field o f social insurance in 
other countries and to discover how our own system may be most 
fittingly harm onised with hom e needs and conditions. For this 
purpose the system of international conferences and the resulting 
exchange o f  information are invaluable. D uring the year the 
chairman and secretary represented the society at the International 
Soc ia l In su rance  C onfe rence  held in B russels , and at the 
In te rna tion a l  Congress of Social Insurance E xperts  held  in 
Budapest the society was represented by the secretary.4
The prim ary aim of the International Social Security Association 
was to p rom ote  the exchange of information on welfare legislation 
betw een the m em ber countries and institutions as Article 1 of its 
constitution made clear:
1 For a history o f  the ISSA see ‘In the service o f  social security: (lie history o f  the International Social 
Security Association 1927-87’, International. Social Security Review, 2 (1987).
2 Department o f  Social Welfare, Second report, p. 12.
3 National Health Insurance Society, Sldinte. vol. 1 (1935), p. 16.
4 National Health Insurance Society, Sldinte, vol. 2 (1936), p. 8.
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The object o f  the ISSA is to co-ordinate internationally and to 
strengthen efforts towards the extension, the protection, technical 
and administrative improvement of social security, particularly by
(a) the organisation o f periodical international m eetings of its 
m embers
(b) the exchange o f information and the comparison of experiences 
in the matter o f  the activities of its mem bers.5
Ire land’s participation in this ‘exchange o f inform ation’ is clear from 
government records which contain a number o f  files on the provision and 
receipt o f  inform ation from other countries, the D epartm ent o f Social 
W elfare establishing a separate file series with the prefix ‘IS S A ’.6
In o rder  to fac ilita te  at an official level the ‘exchange  o f 
in form ation  and the com parison  of e x p erien ces’ the Com m ittee  o f 
Experts o f  the ISSA met regularly in different countries to discuss issues 
o f m utual concern  in the area of welfare legislation. In 1938, for 
exam ple, the IS S A ’s predecessor held its general m eeting in Prague. 
A ttended by delegates from Ireland, it heard papers on ‘Econom ic and 
security functions o f social insurance’ by Frank Spalowsky, Chairman of 
the A ustr ian  Federa tion  o f  W o rk e rs ’ Funds, and  on ‘Present day 
prob lem s o f  invalid ity  and old age in su rance ’ by P rofessor Emile 
Schonbaum , Director of the General Pensions Institution o f Czecho­
slovak ia .7 In January  1949 the ISSA  com m ittee , under the v ice ­
chairm ansh ip  o f  P. J. Keady o f  the D epartm ent o f  Social W elfare, 
ga thered  in D ublin  to discuss the co llec tion  o f  social insurance
5 Internationa] Social Security Association. Constitution. A copy o f  the constitution can be found in a 
number o f  government departmental files, e.g. International Social Security Association (N .A .. D/SW . 
ISSA 1).
6 See for exam ple Request from American Consul for particulars o f social services witli which this 
department is concerned. 1937, D/SW  E.B. 215801; Swiss social welfare laws 1948-57, D /SW  E.B. 
311553; Request from M. McLoughlin o f the American Legation for information regarding social 
services in this country, D/SW  E.B. 312936: Government Information Bureau, Dublin - request for 
particulars o f  socia l services 1946-47. D /SW  E.B. 294657; Enquiry from Netherlands regarding 
unemployment insurance. D /SW  E.B. 306082.
7 A report on die proceedings is given in Sldinte , vol. 3 ( 1937-38).
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contributions and the financing of social security. Representatives from 
B elg ium , S w itz e r lan d ,  C zech o s lo v ak ia , F rance , D en m ark , The 
Netherlands, Italy and Ireland attended the meeting, each being asked to 
supply a national monograph on the issues for discussion.
There is little doubt that Ireland's involvement in the ISSA, and its 
attendance at such meetings, played an important role in the formulation 
o f Irish policy, either as a reference point for what could be achieved, or 
as an argum ent against state-centralised social policy. Certainly the 
Dublin meeting o f the committee in 1949 focused the Irish government's 
attention on the role of the National Health Insurance Society, Norton 
comm enting in the context o f its deliberations that 'it may be necessary 
that the integration o f the National Health Insurance Society into the 
department [of social welfare] should take place at a date earlier than I 
contemplated'.8
As a lready  m entioned, Ireland was also a m em ber o f  the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO), established in 1919 at the 
Versailles Peace Conference.9 Ireland automatically became a member in 
Sep tem ber 1923 on being admitted to m em bership  of the League of 
N ations and, as in the case of the ISSA, supplied and received 
information about a broad range of social policy areas, the Department of 
Social W elfare again opening a file series specific to the IL O .10 The first 
reference to an ILO convention in the drafting of welfare legislation was
8 DD voi. 116. 23 June 1946, col. 1326.
9 For a general background to the International Labour Oraganisation, and a list o f  Irish delegations to 
annual conferences o f  the ILO from 1923 to 1969. see Brian Mickey and Patrick Lynch. Ireland in the 
International L abour O rganisation  (Dublin. 1969).
10 The numerous tiles in die Department of Social Welfare dealing with the ISSA and the ILO testify 
to their importance. Tw o series o f  files within the Department o f Social W elhue dealt respectively  
with the ISSA and the ILO. The files include the follow ing: Department o f  External Affairs: 
International Labour O ffice. Geneva: the world unemployment situation: Objectives and advised  
standards o f  social security: ILO Conference. Geneva, 1952. D/SW  ILO 17; International Labour 
O ffice European R egional Conference. G eneva. 1955: Age o f  retirement, D /SW  ILO 51(c); 
International Social Security Association, D/SW ISSA 1: International Labour O ffice Committee o f  
Social Security experts: request for national monograph on social security, 1949. D /SW  ISSA 23; 
Monograph on social security, 1951. D/SW  ISSA 30.
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in the case of widows' and orphans' pensions. First introduced in 1935 by 
the Fianna Fail governm ent, the initial act was am ended in 1937 in 
accordance with a draft convention adopted at the seventeenth session of 
the International Labour Conference in June 1933 which stated that:
w here econom ic , social and adm inistrative conditions permit, 
national laws or regulations should provide that invalidity, old age 
and widows' and orphans' insurance should also include persons of 
small means working on their own account in industry, commerce 
and agriculture.11
Taking on board  at least part o f the recom m endation, the amending 
legislation abolished the restrictions on paym ent of non-contributory 
pensions to smallholders.
Together with these direct influences on policy, the N ational 
Health Insurance Society together with government departments collated 
data on how various social welfare schemes operated in other countries, 
before attempting to introduce such schemes into Ireland. Such was the 
case with the in troduction  of w ido w s’ and o rphans’ pensions, the 
com m ittee  o f  inquiry exam ining sim ilar legislation in Canada, New 
Zealand, New South Wales, Denmark and forty-five of the United States 
of A m e ric a .12 S ld in te , the annual publication of the National Health 
Insurance Society, contained numerous articles on social insurance 
schemes e lsew here ,13 while the first major collection of comparative data 
collated by a governm ent departm ent in the preparation o f  welfare 
legislation was in relation to the introduction of children's allowances by 
the D epartm ent o f Industry and Commerce. The situation prevailing in 
eighteen countries was investigated and reported upon (Australia, New 
Zealand, Germany, France, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Chile, Hungary, The
11 E xtra c t fr o m  L ea g u e  o f  N a tio n s In terna tiona l L ab o u r C onference: dra ft conven tions and  
recom m endations adopted  at the 17th session, 1931S’, p. 81. A copy of this is to he found in Heads of 
(Unending hill, w idow 's and orphans’ pensions, 1036, D/SW I.A. 89/53(a).
12 Comm ittee o f  Inquiry into W idows’ and Orphans' Pensions. Report (Dublin, 1035). appendix H.
13 See for exam ple ‘Social insurance in (¡recce’, Sldinte, vol. 2 (1936).
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N e th e r lan d s ,  Sw eden , The A rgen tine , C zech o s lo v ak ia ,  G reece, 
Luxembourg, Poland, Rumania and Switzerland). In each case four areas 
in particular were documented: those entitled to receive allowances, the 
number of children from each family included, the source of funding, and 
the rate of allowance.14
Sim ilarly , the 1949 White p a per  on socia l security  included  
c o m p a ra t iv e  m a te r ia l ,  m ak in g  p a r t i c u la r  r e fe re n c e  to the  
recommendations of the twenty-sixth session of the International Labour 
Conference held in Philadelphia in 1944, saying that 'social insurance 
was the most suitable method in modern conditions for securing freedom 
from want'.15 In the drafting of the subsequent social welfare bill in 1951 
it is clear that the Departm ent o f Social W elfare was anxious that it 
would bring Irish social security standards into line with international 
standards as laid down by the IL O .16
In the 1950s reference to legislation in other European countries 
became a standard part of constructing and presenting legislative change 
in Ireland. Undoubtedly attributable to Ireland's increasing interest in 
becom ing  a m em ber of the European Econom ic  C om m unity , the 
Departm ent o f Social Welfare was anxious to bring its legislation into 
line with the Treaty o f Rome, signed in 1957 establishing the E E C .17 
Article 51 of the treaty stated that:
The council shall, acting unanim ously on a proposal from the 
commission, adopt such measures in the field of social security as 
are necessary to provide freedom of movement for workers; to this 
end it shall make arrangements to secure for migrant workers and 
their dependants:
14 Children's allowances hill, 1943. N.A. ,I)/SW  C2.
15 White, paper containing governm ent proposals on social security  (1949), p. 11.
16 Proposals for new legislation com piled with standards in international conventions: social welfare 
(insurance) hill, 1951 (N.A., D/SW, ILO 13). I he ‘international slandtud’ referred to was that outlined 
in ILO. Industry am i Labour, vol. vi. no. 1-2 (Geneva. 1951).
17 See Seamus () C inneide (cd.). Social t'.urope: E uropean C om m unity socia l po licy  in Ireland  
(Dublin, 1993).
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(a) aggregation, for the purpose of acquiring and retaining the right 
to benefit and calculating the am ount of benefit, o f  all periods 
taken into account under the laws of the several countries;
(b) paym ent o f benefits to persons resident in the territories of 
mem ber states.ls
Having finally applied for membership in 1961, in 1962 the Minister for 
Social Welfare, Kevin Boland, requested approval from the government 
to increase  the benefit  rates o f  welfare services, 'having regard to 
m inim um  subsistence requirements, the general level o f wages and the 
levels obtaining in Britain and continental countries '.19 The request came 
in the context o f  the European Social Charter which was opened for 
signing at Turin in O ctober 1961, the draft o f  which, dating from  
N ovem ber 1958, was familiar to the Irish government. The opening page 
o f the draft included the proposal that:
The governments' signatory, hereto, being members of the Council 
o f  Europe [have resolved] to make every effort in com m on to 
improve the standard of living and to promote the social well-being 
o f their peoples.20
Ireland  was also a signatory  o f a num ber o f bila tera l and 
international agreements which focused on social welfare legislation. A 
num ber  o f  rec iprocal agreem ents were concluded with the British  
government, the need for which arose from the establishment of the Free 
State and the consequent divergence of legislation.21 Negotiations on
1S Article 51 is paraphrased in Department o f  Social We If; ire. Report, 1959-62, p. 24.
19 Department o f  Social W elfare. Summary o f  memorandum for the government; the general level o f  
social welfare payments. 9 Feh. 1062 (N.A, 1)/'1\ Social services: expenditure on and unification of  
social welfare insurance hill 1 9 5 1 and social welfare (amendment) act I960, S 133384 K/62).
20 Council o f  Europe. Text o f  the draft European social charter established by the Social Committee  
o f  the C ouncil o f  Europe  (Strasbourg, 1958), p. 1. A copy o f  die text can be found in Social security: 
international agreements. 1952. D /T S  15360B.
21 These arrangements are outlined in detail in Department o f  Social Welfare, First report. See also 
the followin': departmental files: D/SW EB 255730: D/SW I.A. 70/53: D/SW  l.A. 217/53: D /SW  I.A. 
93 /53A: D/S~W l.A . 94/53: D/SW  Plan 7/48: D/SW Plan 8/48B: D/SW  Plan 9/48: D/SW Plan 4/49; 
D/SW  Plan 3/52: D/SW Plan 1/58: D/T S 15069 (A).
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reciprocal a rrangem ents  were also opened on occasion with other
countries, as in the case of the Swiss government in 1929:
by virtue of which Swiss citizens who have become unemployed in 
the Irish Free State will, with the exception o f those employed on 
board an Irish Free State ship or vessel, be placed on the same 
footing as citizens of the Irish Free State for the purposes o f 
unem ploym ent insurance on condition that citizens o f the Irish 
Free State enjoy reciprocal treatment in Switzerland.22
W hile such an agreem ent was a more peripheral abstraction, Ireland 
ratified  a num ber o f  significant European agreem ents. By the late 
sum m er o f  1951 the Department of Social W elfare had created a file on 
the ‘Council of Europe: recommendations relating to the draft European 
convention on reciprocal treatment of na tionals’23 and by 1958 the 
following agreements had been ratified:
I. E uropean Interim  A greem ent on Social Security  Schem es, 
relating to old age, invalidity and survivors, which provided equal 
treatment with nationals for non-nationals under the social security 
laws of contracting countries.
II. European Interim Agreement on Social Security other than 
schemes for old age, invalidity and survivors, which made the 
same provisions as in (I) but applied to (a) sickness, maternity and 
death including medical benefits insofar as they were not subject to 
m eans testing; (b) em ploym ent injury; (c) unem ploym ent; (d) 
family allowances.
III. European Convention on Social and Medical Assistance, 
which provided for contracting countries to ensure that a national 
o f  any other contracting party legally residing in the country but 
w ithout sufficient resources, were entitled to sim ilar social and 
medical assistance as nationals.24
22 E xchanges o f  notes betw een  the governm ent o f  the Irish Free State and  the Sw iss governm ent 
respecting unem ploym ent insurance, h em e , Nov. 3/4, 1930 (Dublin. 1930) in Deptu'tment o f External 
Affairs: unemployment insurance reciprocal agreements with Switzerland, D/SW  E.B. 98851. The 
agreement was based on the ILO’s International Convention on Unemployment Insurance.
23 D/SW  E.B. 327160.
24 Department o f  Social Welfiire, Report, I954-5S, p. 18.
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By the same period, the governm ent had ratified two important ILO 
conventions, namely:
I. Convention concerning workmen's compensation in agriculture 
which required that laws and regulations providing compensation 
for workers for personal injury by accident arising out o f their 
employm ent should include agricultural wage earners
II. Convention ensuring benefit or allowances to the involuntarily 
unemployed.25
It is clear, therefore, that successive governm ents were becom ing 
increasingly aware of European trends in welfare legislation in particular, 
and were anxious to bring Irish legislation into line with that in the rest of 
western Europe.
O f  course, it was not only in political and administrative circles 
that developments in other countries were raised in discussion. Several 
c o n tem p o ra ry  pam phle ts , jou rn a ls ,  and books con ta ined  detailed  
discussion of social welfare legislation elsewhere,26 apart altogether from 
discussion of such legislation in Britain where developments formed a 
more integral part of discussion and debate in Ireland.
Developments in the Nordic countries, welfare legislation in three 
o f  w hich is d iscussed  for com parative  purposes below , appeared 
frequently. Indeed the Labour Party seemed to think that so widespread 
was knowledge of social legislation in these countries among Irish people 
that one o f its election slogans in the 1948 election campaign ran as 
follows: 'Countries like Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Australia and New 
Zealand have prospered under Labour governments. Why not Ireland?'27 
Arnold Marsh summed up the importance of these countries as references 
in the case of Ireland in 1944 when he said:
25 Ibid., p. lb.
26 A number o f these have been alluded to already in this and previous chapters.
27 II. 3 Feb. 1948.
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So far no great state has at the same time secured economic welfare 
for all of its citizens and preserved their personal liberty, whereas 
little  countries like Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, 
Czechoslovakia and Switzerland - places with no colonies and no 
empires have all succeeded to a great extent in doing this. In the 
British Commonwealth the state that has achieved most in the same 
direction is the smallest, New Zealand.28
The implication was that Ireland could equally be to the forefront in
securing the economic welfare of all of its citizens.
Many individual politicians were also aware of developments in
these countries, Jack McQuillan, an independent T.D. for Roscommon,
mentioning in particular developments in Sweden and Norway during a
debate on old age pensions in December 1953.29
It is partly for the reasons outlined by Marsh that three of these
Nordic countries, Finland, Norway and Denmark, have been chosen:
firstly, to assess the level of comparative reference in Ireland to
individual European countries; secondly, as a yardstick against which we
can measure the pace and extent of legislative developments in Ireland;
and thirdly, to highlight the m ajor actors and influences on the
development of the welfare state in a broader European context. While at
first glance the countries have little in common with Ireland, in fact there
is a basic common ground during the period discussed: each had
relatively small populations; each is religiously homogeneous; agriculture
was crucial to their economies, especially up to 1945; and the
development of the welfare state was preceded by vigorous nationalist
movements, leading to independence in the case of Finland and Norway.
On the other hand there are many contrasts with Ireland:
Protestantism is the dominant religion; social democratic parties have
been an integral part of politics and government; and the rate of
28 Arnold Marsh, Ireland's new foundation (Dundalk, n.d., [cl944]), p.10.
29 DD vol. 143, 2 Dec. 1953, col. 1483.
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industrialization, and concom itant move away from agriculture, long 
predated similar trends in Ireland (see table).
Table 7.1
Population and political statistics from Finland, Norway and Denmark in
comparison with Ireland

























Finland 3,147,600 4,029,000 73% 46% 7.7% 2% 45% 1899 1926-7 1945:
50%
Norway 2,649,775 3,278.000 37% 26% 7.4% 18% 80%. 1887 1928 1945:
50%
Den mart 2,921,200 4.281,000 35% 26% 10% 70% 79%. 1871 1924-6 1940s
40%
Ireland 2,971,992=! 2.960.5934 51%* 40%+ 9.3% 23%. 52% 1912 - 1948:
11.3%
** Schem es include old age pensions, sickness insurance, unemployment insurance 
and occupational injuries insurance
* Figure relates to 1926 
+ Figure relates to 1951
Source: Social security in the Nordic countries: expenditure on and scope o f  certa in  
socia l secu r ity  m easures, ¡972  (C openhagen, 1976); Research Group for 
Comparative Sociology, University o f  Helsinki, Structural change, classes and the 
state: F inland in an historical and comparative perspective  (Report No. 33, 1986); 
Risto Alapuro, et al.. Small states in comparative perspective  (Norway, 1985); Fritz 
Hodne, The Norwegian economy, 1920-80 (New York, 1983); Martti Hiiikio, A brie f 
history o f  modern Finland  (Helsinki, 1992); Census o f  population (Ireland), 1936, 
vol. ii; 1961, vol. ii.
It must also be borne in mind that the concept o f 'welfare' is culture 
bound: the definition and priorities of 'welfare' in the predominantly 
Lutheran Nordic countries is not necessarily paralleled by the definition 
and priorities o f 'welfare' in some of the traditionally Catholic western 
European states. As Stein Kuhnle, one of the major contributors to the
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welfare debate in N o rd e n , points out, 'welfare is a many dimensional 
concept. Its content varies with time and space.’30 Most writers on the 
subject agree, however, on the essential elements of the welfare state - the 
distribution by central government of moneys raised through taxation to 
ensure  a certain equality of income distribution, together with other 
support for individuals in areas such as health and education. It is given 
this proviso that the emergence of income supplement policies as a main 
pillar of welfareism is examined in Finland, Norway and Denmark.
Finland
W hile discussion of Finnish social policy in Ireland was limited, 
study of how welfare legislation developed in Finland is illuminating in 
the context o f Arnold M arsh ’s com m ents quoted earlier and o f  the 
num ber o f com parisons which may be drawn between the historical 
developm ent o f Finland and Ireland in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries.
D om inated  by powerful neighbours for centuries - Sw eden and 
R ussia  in the case o f  Finland - both Ireland and F inland achieved 
independence in the early decades of the twentieth century. A bitter civil 
war immediately preceded independence in both countries, although the 
division in Finland was on social rather than constitutional national lines. 
H ow ever national issues, particularly the language question in Finland, 
often dominated post-independence political debate, leaving less time and 
energy for debate on social policy issues, a phenom enon which also 
occurred in Ireland.
Both Ireland and Finland remained predominantly rural economies 
up to the Second World War after which Finland began to change rapidly
30 Stein Kulinle. ‘W elfare and the quality o f  life' in llrik Allardt, et a!., N ord ic  dem ocracy: ideas, 
issues and  institutions in politics, economy, etlncai ion, social and  cultural a ffairs o f  Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland, N orw ay and Sweden  (Copenhagen. 1 OS 1). p. 3W.
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to an industria lly -based  econom y (see table). The rela tively  late 
structural changeover was in large measure responsible in both Finland 
and Ireland for the 'slowness' in the development of the welfare state: the 
com m ent that ‘in Finland the building of the welfare state has been a 
prolonged p ro jec t’31 could equally be applied to Ireland. Given these 
general observations, some of which are later discussed in more detail, 
we can now turn to the developm ent o f social welfare legislation in 
Finland.
Erik Allardt, perhaps the most notable contributor to the discussion 
of welfare legislation in Finland, defines the concept of welfare state as a 
society 'in which certain fundamental values have been realised: social 
security [including social insurance and social assistance], relative 
equality o f  opportunity , the notion that everybody has the right to a 
m od icum  o f  w ell-being , that certa in  forms of inequality  are not 
legitimate'.32 C om plem enting  this definition is Annikki Suviranta 's 
defin ition o f social welfare, saying it implies 'the various services 
provided by the public authorities in an endeavour to help citizens cope 
with ordinary everyday social circumstances'.33
It is against these definitions that the development of the welfare 
state in Finland can be examined, the institutionalisation o f which was 
largely a post W orld W ar II phenom enon when the country embarked 
upon a period o f remarkable structural and economic change, the whole 
basis of the Finnish economy shifting from agriculture to industry.
31 Vappu Taipola, in troduction’ in Juliani Lehlo (oil.). Deprivation, social welfare, and  expertise  
(Finland, 1091). p. 11.
32 Erik Allardt. 'Experiences from the comparative Scandinavian welfare study, with a bibliography 
o f  the project', European Journal o f  Political Research, vol. 9 (1981), p. 170.
33 Annikki Suviranta, 'Social welfare and municipalities', Finnish local governm ent studies: selected  
writings, vol. 9 (1981), no. 5, p. 74.
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Table 7.2
Proportional size of agricultural population as % of economically active 
population in Ireland, Finland, Denmark and Norway








Ireland 53% 49.3% 46.6% 40.3%
Finland 73% 70% 64% 46%
Denmark 35% 35% 30% 26%
Norway 37% 35% 30% 26%
Source: Nordic statistics taken from Maui Alestalo, Structural change, classes and  
the state: Finland in an historical and comparative perspective , Research Group for 
comparative sociology. University of Helsinki, No. 33, 1986, p. 26; Irish statistics 
taken from Trend in em ploym ent 1950-52, p. 10.
In order to highlight the developm ent o f the w elfare  state in 
Finland, and to better illustrate the predominance of those other issues of 
national im portance, the follow ing discussion is d ivided by period: 
developm ents before  independence in 1917 and the im pact o f the 
Bismarckian reforms through independence to the Second W orld War, a 
period characterised by a marked conservatism  in the area o f social 
policy; the im m ediate  post war period when the results o f  the war 
necessitated a radical rethinking of social policy; and the 1950s and 
1960s which saw the institutionalisation of the welfare state.
Finland had perhaps the most restricted form of national autonomy 
in the Nordic countries at the time of the Bismarckian social insurance 
reforms in Germany being a Grand Duchy of the Russian Empire. It is 
only in this context that developments in Finland can be compared with 
developm ents in the o ther Nordic countries. Despite the lack o f 
independence however, there is little doubt that the Bismarckian national
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social insurance schem e o f the 1880s stimulated discussion o f social 
legislation in Finland, a country which had always been very much 
influenced by cultural and political events in Germany. Even before the 
G erm an R eichstag  had approved Bism arck 's proposals, the Finnish 
historian Yrjd Koskinen had introduced the concept of social policy to 
F inland. G reatly  in fluenced  by G erm an thinking, he praised  the 
establishm ent o f  the Vere in fu r  Sozialpolitik, and went on to found the 
Finnish National Economic Society in the 1880s based on the German 
model.
It was in the context of Germ an legislation that the Finnish 
Lantdag petitioned the governm ent to establish a com m ittee to draft 
proposals for w orkers’ insurance. In October 1889 such a committee was 
appo in ted , reporting  in February  1892 that the e s tab lishm ent of 
com pulsory  insurance was not desirable. Likewise, proposals for a 
national pension scheme came to nothing. This lack of innovation can be 
explained both in the context o f 'Russification', the term given to the 
increasingly  direct involvem ent by Russia in the process o f Finnish 
legislation from the mid 1890s, and the fears of the Russian tzar that any 
concessions in the area of social legislation in Finland would result in 
demands for sim ilar legislation in Russia. Despite this, some reforms 
were introduced, namely the 1889 act on the protection o f industrial 
workers against accidents and the 1897 act on unem ploym ent relief 
funds, although neither affected more than a minority of the working 
population.
M ore im portant than any changes in policy in Finland, was the 
change  in a ttitude, especially  am ong political parties, which the 
B ism arckian reform s precipitated. Although affecting no immediate 
result, the political parties began to focus on social legislation, an 
important development in the context of later reforms.
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The Finnish Party, whose primary defining interests were in 
relation to the language question (the hegemony of Finnish over Swedish) 
and Finland's relations with Russia, now began to show a new interest in 
social policy. Danielsson-K alm ari, one o f the leading figures o f the 
Finnish Party who had spent some time studying in Germany, began to 
debate the importance of social as well as linguistic and political reform. 
However, fo llow ing the later split in the party into 'Old' and 'Young' 
factions, the Old Finnish Party (which, following independence, became 
the Conservative Party), despite some allusion to the importance of social 
reform following the electoral reforms of 1905-06, showed little interest 
in social policies in adopting a new 'magna carta' at its national congress 
in 1922.
The Y oung Finnish Party however, and to a greater extent the 
L abour Party (founded in 1899, the last in the N ordic  countries) 
embarked on a m ore sustained discussion o f  social issues. In 1903 the 
Social Dem ocratic  Party, the new name adopted by the Labour Party, 
demanded general social insurance, basic education and free health care 
in its Forssa Program. In the election o f 1907, following the franchise 
reform of the previous year (the change from a four estate diet constituted 
in 1772 to a unicam eral assem bly and the introduction of universal 
suffrage) the Social Democratic Party became the largest party, winning 
80 of the 200 seats. However, even after independence it was never to 
hold a very strong or influential position in parliam ent (with the 
exception of 1916 when it held a majority of seats), unlike the other 
Nordic countries where the social democratic parties have always been 
important, even in opposition. The main opposition came from the 
Agrarian Party (renamed the Centre Party in the 1960s, by which time it 
had moved from a centre right to a centre position) founded in 1906 and 
representing the farming classes.
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Table 7.3
Percentage electoral support of major parties in Finland at every second general
election, 1922-1951
1922 1927 1930 1936 1945 1951
Finnish Party,
Coalition (Conservative)  
Party
17.5 17 21 10 14 14
Swedish People's Party 12.5 12 10 10.5 7 7.5




7.5 5 5.5 3.5 4.5 5
Agrarian Party, Centre  
Party
22.5 26 29.5 26.5 24.5 25.5
Social Democratic Party 26.5 30 33 41.5 25 26.5
Source: Compiled from statistics in Juhani M ylly  and R. Michael Berry (eds.), 
P o litic a l p a r tie s  in F inland: essays in h isto ry  a n d  p o litic s  (Turku, 1987).
With the com ing o f  the revolution in Russia in 1917, and the 
overthrow ing of the tzar, interest in Finland was again to focus on 
political issues. F in land’s response to the revolution was to assert its 
right to self determination, a move supported following negotiation by 
the revolutionary authorities in Petrograd. There followed a short but in 
many ways bitterly divisive civil war" which was to have a big impact on 
the development, or lack of development, o f social legislation in the first 
years o f independence. One o f the causes of the civil war was the 
reluctance o f the élite ruling classes to grant any social reforms. The 
country split into the Whites (the bourgeois and farming classes) and the 
Reds (the working classes). The war ended in defeat for the workers, 
resulting in a pronounced social cleavage developing in Finnish society 
lasting until the Second World War, a period marked by conservatism on
* Revisionist inierpreuilions o f  (lie Finnish 'civil war' ;ue now leaning towards explanations which see 
the conflict as part o f  the 'war o f independence' rather than a civ il war. The revisionist argument is led 
by Prof. Matti Klinge, History Department. University o f Helsinki.
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the part of the victorious Whites in the area of social policy, they shying 
away from any changes based on labour interests. It was also a period of 
conservative governm ents: the Social Dem ocratic Party, which drew 
most o f  its support from the working class, only participated in one short­
lived government between 1917 and 1936.
There  were some positive developm ents in the area of social 
welfare legislation, however, in the period between independence and the 
Second W orld  W ar, despite the prevailing air of conservatism. The 
institu tion  o f  voluntary  unem ploym ent insurance in 1917 and the 
es tab lishm ent of a M inistry for Social Affairs three years later was 
followed by a renewed interest and debate in social issues in the 1930s. 
Initiated by the Social Democratic Party, this renewed debate, although 
lacking  in real en thus iasm ,34 was partly the result of the econom ic 
depression o f 1929-33. However, coinciding with the depression was an 
upsurge in the nationalist debate and renewed arguments regarding the 
language question, reawakening many old antagonisms and absorbing 
political attention. (The language question-33 was to remain an intensely 
important and often divisive issue in Finnish politics until the Winter W ar 
o f 1939 when the Finnish people again felt, in the face of the common 
Soviet enem y, that what united them was stronger than what divided 
them.)
The only substantial pre-war legislation was passed in the late 
1930s, a p roduct of the coalition governm ent betw een the Social 
Democrats and the Agrarian Party. In 1937 the coalition introduced the 
first general pension scheme in Finland. Becoming operative in 1939, it 
extended old age pensions and disability pensions to the entire population
34 Matti Alestalo, Structural changes, classes and  the state: F inland in an historical and com parative  
p ersp ec tive , Research croup lor comparaiivc socioloev, llniversiiv o f Helsinki, Research Reports, no. 
33 (1086). p. 31.
33 For a discussion o f  this issue see lor e.i:.. Malli Klin>:e, The Finnish tradition: essays on structures  
and identities in the North o f  Furape (Helsinki. 100.3)
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(state pensions had been introduced in 1926). Although described as 
'only a reform  on paper, '3f) as it was based on the accum ulation of 
individual insurance premiums, the value o f which was greatly reduced 
following the war, it was more significant in its ending o f a period of 
stagnation in social policy then in what it achieved in practice. It also 
provided an indication of the direction Finnish (and indeed Nordic) social 
policy was to take after the war: the low rates of benefit (on this occasion 
amounting to only 30% of a person's income) were to become a feature of 
Finnish social welfare legislation, comprehensiveness being seen as of 
greater importance than rate of benefit.
In 1939, the year the pensions act came into effect, attention was 
again averted from social policy to the more pressing area of political 
developments, W orld W ar II resulting in many changes in Finnish life. 
Fighting at different stages on both the German and then the Soviet sides, 
Finland was to cede part o f its national territory to the Soviet Union and 
to pay the Soviet Union a very heavy burden in reparations. Structurally, 
there was need for radical rethinking of policies in Finland, not least in 
the area of social policy, to facilitate the veterans, widows, evacuees, etc., 
that were a consequence of war. Even before the war was over there was 
a very evident debate regarding social legislation, the establishment o f 
social policy as an academic discipline in Finland dating from this period. 
Follow ing the W inter W ar with Russia, the Finnish Population and 
Family W elfare Federation, Vciestoliitto, was founded, campaigning for 
the introduction of children's allowances, under the slogan, 'We are too 
few ' and 'A fourth child to the country'. The m ovem ent reflected a 
general concern regarding the declining fertility rate and the population 
trend, the taxation laws having been changed in 1935 in favour o f
36 Peter Flora, Malli Alestalo and Ilannn Uusiialo, 'Structure and politics in the making o f the welfare 
state: Finland in com p.uative perspective' in Risto Alnpuro, el ul.. S m a ll sta tes in com parative  
perspective  (Norway. p. 1 .
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families with young children. It was partly in response to the demands of 
Vaestoliitto , and partly out of necessity, that the government introduced a 
system of state financed home loans in 1944 for couples under 30 years 
of age. The burden of repayment was reduced if the couple had a child, 
and was totally cancelled if the couple had four children. The change 
was p receded  by the in troduction of m aternity  grants (1937) and 
a llow ances for large fam ilies (1943) while in 1945 m eans tested 
allowances for fam ilies with four or more children were introduced. 
Then, on the eve of the parliam entary elections o f  1948, ch ild ren’s 
allowances were introduced providing allowances, Lapsilisd ,  for all 
families with one or more children.
Contributing to the renewed interest in social legislation, combined 
with the practical necessity of introducing changes to provide social and 
health  care services for war victims and housing for veterans and 
evacuees, was the shift to the political left following the war, sometimes 
described as the shift from the First to the Second Republic,37 political 
control m oving from the hands of the right wing parties, to the left. This 
change was precipitated partly by the reluctance o f  the conservative 
parties to change their pre-war positions regarding social policy. (It was 
only in 1957 that the Conservative Party adopted a programme of social 
policy reform, 'dynamic conservatism', a process which the conservative 
party in Sw eden for exam ple embarked upon im m ediately  after the 
war.38)
The Popular Front governm ent of Social Dem ocrats, Agrarian 
Party and Com m unists (who had now been permitted to return to the
37 Matti A lestalo anil Hannu IJusilalo. 'Finland' in Peter Flora (cd .). G row th to lim its: the m odern  
European welfare states since W orld War II: vol. i. (Berlin. New York. IdXfi), p. 255.
38 For an account o f  the 'new social policy' o f  the Swedish Conservatives, see Peter Baldwin, 
'Bourgeois parties, social dem ocracy and the origin o f post-war reform in Sweden', International 
Review  o f  Social H istory, vol. 33 (1 OSS), no.2.
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political fold following their banning in the late 1920s39) formed after the 
general election of 1945, increased social expenditure. It was actively 
encouraged in this by the Confederation of Finnish Trade Unions, SAK, 
which had an important input into social and economic policies at this 
time.
Perhaps the most important development under the Popular Front 
government was the establishment of a committee of experts representing 
civil servants, trade unions, employees and employers to examine and 
report on the reform of the 1937 pension scheme. Reporting in 1952 the 
com m ittee  recom m ended a scheme financed largely by employers and 
employees. A scheme was subsequently introduced, providing a flat rate 
benefit with means tested supplements.
The 1950s and 1960s saw rem arkable structural changes in 
Finland, one result of which was the institutionalisation of the welfare 
state. Described as an 'explosive structural change',40 the agricultural 
population in Finland fell from 50% to 15% in the thirty year period 
following the war, a process which had earlier taken 50 years in Sweden 
and 80 years in Norway. The recovery of the Finnish economy from the 
effects o f the war and the huge indemnities it was obliged to pay the 
Soviet Union, coupled with this structural change resulting in a tripling of 
the gross value o f industrial production, with a total increase of 243,000 
w orkers  in com m erce  and services and 82,000 in m anufacturing  
ind us try ,41 facilitated the introduction and expansion of social welfare 
legislation. The period also saw a relative reduction in the traditional 
areas of governm ent expenditure such as administration, transport and
39 Erik Allardi, Social struktur ocli po litisk  aktivitet: en stiidie a r vflljjetrtiktivitenen vicl riksdagsvalen  
i F inland 1945-54  (H elsinki, 1056). p. 21.
40 Pekka Kosonen. Tapio Lovio and Jikka Pekk;uinen, 'Den tinska modellen: forandringar oeh 
lorviitrine ellcr kontinuiiei oeh ¡illmanuiliiyhcl?', Nordi.sk Tid.skrift fo r  Politiki ocli Ekonomi vol. 15/16 
(1984), pT 20.
41 D.G. Kirby. Finland in die tw entieth century  (London. 1979). p. 201.
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comm unications, and defence, with a concomitant increase in spending 
on education, health and social services.
The first major changes were introduced in 1956 when the national 
basic pensions were increased, with effect from 1957. At the same time, 
fo llow ing  the general strike o f 1956, a com m ittee  o f  em ployers, 
employees and political parties was established to exam ine the issue of 
occupational pensions for private sector employees. As a result o f  the 
c o m m ittee ’s recom m endations, an occupational pensions scheme for 
private sector employees was accepted by parliament, albeit after much 
intense debate. This was followed in 1959 by the introduction of state 
unem ploym ent assistance and in 1960 by an em ploym ent act which 
in troduced , am ong o ther  im provem ents, general ( though  m odest) 
unem ploym ent benefit.
In conclusion it may be said that the developm ent of welfare 
legislation in Finland up to the 1950s provides a pattern of emphasis and 
influences which are largely similar to those present in other European 
countries where the welfare state has becom e institutionalised. The 
developm ent of welfare policy was directly influenced by a number of 
factors: the extent o f political independence, the hegem ony of other, 
m ain ly  po lit ica l,  issues, and econom ic  growth being  o f  central 
importance. The development of social welfare legislation in Finland 
was both excelerated and made necessary by the econom ic changes in 
Finland after the Second World War, expenditure on income maintenance 
increasing twelve times in the three decades after 1950.
Part o f  the explanation offered for the 'success' o f  the Finnish 
w elfare  state, and the Nordic welfare state model in general, is the 
decentralised system of administration, the tradition of local government. 
In Finland, administration of welfare has always been heavily dependent 
on the 461 municipalities which enjoy a strong tradition of self
276
government. The hierarchical structure of administration consists of the 
municipalities, supervised by provincial offices of the Ministry for Social 
Affairs and Health, which in turn are subordinate to the National Board 
o f Social W elfare, a body with administrative, executive and guiding 
authority, supervised by the ministry. This decentralised structure has 
resulted in increased knowledge o f local conditions and an opportunity to 
iron out regional differences.
This ideal o f organising as much as possible outside the state, or at 
least in a decentralised fashion, is shared by Norway, the second of our 
comparative Nordic studies.
Norway
As in other European countries, the beginning o f  the Norwegian 
welfare state can also be traced to the nineteenth century, although in 
N orw ay it predates the Bism arckian reforms in Germany. Indeed the 
term  ‘w elfare’ itself is derived from the Old Norse, velferd ,42 while the 
use o f  the term ‘welfare sta te’ in Norway from 1939 predates its use in 
the English language.
As in the case of Finland, the following discussion is divided into 
the period from the mid nineteenth century to independence in 1905; 
from  1906 to the outbreak o f the Second World War; and the effects of 
the Second W orld  W ar and the subsequent social security measures 
adopted.
In comm on with many other European countries, the first wave of 
industrialisation came to Norway in the 1840s, with a concomitant rise in 
the growth o f towns and urbanisation. W hile the total population of 
Norw ay doubled from one to two millions in the period 1822-1890, an
42 Byron J. Nordstrom (ed.). D ictionary o f  Scandinavian H istory (London. 1986). p. 625.
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increase which would have been far more pronounced had it not been for 
considerable emigration to North America and elsewhere, there was also 
a marked shift from the countryside to the towns: while in 1835 only 11% 
of the population lived in urban areas, the figure had increased to 33% by 
1900.43 This industrialisation, most notably around Oslo and Bergen, 
gave rise to the first labour organisation in Norway, founded by Marcus 
Thrane in 1849. Influenced by Louis Blanc, the French socialist, it was 
Thrane who made the first calls for the introduction of welfare policies to 
protect the growing industrial work force, calling for among other things 
the introduction of old age pensions. However relief of the poor on a 
local level remained the principal means of supporting the needy until the 
Bismarckian programme of national, compulsory, social insurance began 
to have an influence on policy in Norway. A relatively generous poor 
law had been passed by parliament in 1845, restricted in 1863 due to 
financial constraints.
At the time of the Bismarckian reforms, Norway was the only 
Nordic country to have introduced the principle of parliamentarianism (in 
1884) and the only country to get an all Liberal governm ent.44 
Following the developments in Germany the King of Sweden, then also 
the King of Norway, suggested to the Norwegian government in 1885 
that it should carefully study the German developments with a view to 
im plem enting sim ilar legislation in Norway. A parliam entary 
commission consisting of a wide range of groups and interests was duly 
established in August 1885 by the Prime Minister, Johan Sverdrup of the 
Liberal ‘Venstre’ (Left) Party, to draft proposals for social insurance 
legislation. Reporting in February 1890, the commission proposed the
43 Ante Selbyg, Norway today: an introduction to modem Norwegian society (Oslo, 1987), p. 10.
44 See Stein Kuhnle, ‘The beginnings of the Nordic welfare state: similarities and differences’, Acta 
Sociologica, vol. 21 (1978) Supplement, p. 17.
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introduction of accident and sickness insurance, and at a later stage old 
age insurance. Fram ed in accordance with G erm an principles, the 
reco m m en d a tio n s  regard ing  com pulso ry  acc ident in surance  were 
accepted with minor modifications, the Accident Insurance Act o f  1894 
becom ing  the first social security m easure in Norw ay. It was also 
perhaps the m ost pressing insurance need in a rapidly industrialising 
country. H ow ever a governm ent proposal on sickness insurance was 
rejected by the Storting in 1893, and again in 1894, 1895 and 1896. A 
new proposal in 1902 following the appointment o f another commission 
in 1900 was also rejected, and it was 1909 before sickness insurance 
finally  becam e law. Until then the 225 voluntary  sickness funds 
established in Norway, with up to 35,000 m em bers,45 rem ained pre­
eminent. A proposal for the introduction of old age pensions, discussed 
in parliam ent some years earlier, also came to nothing. In 1900 the 
earlier Poor Law was replaced by a Social Assistance Act, providing 
public support for those unable to support themselves and not eligible for 
other social benefits.
A separa te  but im portant developm ent o f  this period was the 
introduction o f  universal male suffrage in 1898, w om en obtaining the 
universal r igh t to vote in 1913. A m ong other things, the reform  
stimulated the development of political parties, the Labour Party being 
established in 1887. Remaining largely in the shadows until the 1930s, 
its founders were Carl Jeppesen. for a number o f years editor of the 
party 's new spaper Soc ia l D e m o k ra ten , and C hris tian  H olterm ann 
Knudsen, the party's chairman at various times between 1899 and 1918. 
Both men were also leading figures in the Federation of Trade Unions 
founded in 1899.
45 Stein Kuhnle. 'Welfare and the quality o f  life ’ in Allardt. el ul.. N ord ic dem ocracy, p. 401.
279
However, from the 1890s to the opening years of the new century, 
foreign policy dominated the political scene, the question o f union with 
Sw eden becom ing  the main issue in parliam ent. In June 1905 the 
parliament unanimously passed a resolution declaring that the union with 
Sw eden  no longer existed, a reso lu tion  w idely  supported  by the 
Norwegian public in a plebiscite. Inviting the Danish Prince Carl to 
becom e their own king, Norway rem ained a monarchy, but was now 
independent o f  its powerful neighbour.
The first decades o f independence  w itnessed rapid industrial 
growth, resulting in the transformation of the Norwegian econom y and 
country from a mainly agricultural to a mainly manufacturing and trading 
society (see table 7.2). It was also a period when welfare services were 
rapidly expanded, providing a solid base for the further expansion of 
social welfare legislation that took place after the Second W orld War.
The years 1906-1919 have been described as ‘the first golden era 
o f social re fo rm ’,46 and not without justification. In 1909 the Liberal 
g o v e rn m e n t un der G u n n a r  K nudsen  in tro d u ced  s ta te -o rg an ise d  
com pu lso ry  s ickness  insurance , fo l low ing  closely  the p rinc ip les  
established in Germ any in 1883. Providing only for temporary illness 
and limited in terms o f  members, benefits and risk coverage, the scheme 
was substantially widened and made more comprehensive when the law 
was amended in 1915. From the outset it covered both wage earners and 
their fam ilies, the inclusion of ‘spouse and ch ild ren ’ rem ain ing  an 
element peculiar to Norwegian sickness insurance law up to the 1930s.
Little further reform in the area o f social welfare were achieved 
until the mid 1930s, when the Labour Party, coming to power in 1935 
and stay ing  in pow er until 1963. em barked  upon a social policy
46 John Midgiiiiril, A b r ie f history o f  Norw ay  (Oslo. 19X6), p. 109.
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‘c rusade’. L ab o u r’s coming to power in 1935 was facilitated by the 
introduction o f  proportional representation in 1919, and by the ending of 
a bitter three-w ay split in the party following the First W orld  War. 
Divided on their attitude towards communism, the radical, revolutionary 
elem ent took over the party in 1918, shortly afterwards adopting the 
principle o f dictatorship as the only form of government. This caused the 
initial breakaw ay by a group forming the Norwegian Social Democratic 
Labour Party. W hen the Labour Party dropped its ties to the Russian 
com m unists another group split forming the Norw egian C om m unist 
Party. How ever at this stage Labour and the Social Democrats merged, 
m aking considerable progress in the election of 1927. Abandoning its 
revolu tionary  program m e in the 1930s, the party began to stress the 
im p o rtan ce  o f  social reform  and in p a rt icu la r  the reduc tion  of 
un em ploym en t.  R eceiv ing  enough seats to form  a s ing le  party 
government in the 1935 election, it was now in a position to carry out its 
social reform programme. Politically, its accession to power has been 
described as ‘the definite social democratic take over’.47
Am ong the first measures successfully introduced was the Labour 
Protection Act o f  1936 which provided for such entitlements as paid 
holidays for workers. Perhaps the most important reforms however were 
the introduction o f  old age pensions and unemployment insurance.
The in troduction  of old age pensions had been d iscussed  in 
parliam ent as early as 1892, although a law had not been agreed upon 
until 1923. Even then, the law was not implemented in practice due to 
financial constraints. However the Labour government had an almost 
identical old age pensions law to that of 1923 formulated and passed with
47 Matti A lesla lo  and Slein Kulinle. T he Scandinavian route: econom ic, social and political 
developm ents in Denmark. Finland and Sweden' (MS. n.d.), p. 50.
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the support o f  all parties in the Storting in 1936. Financed through 
general taxation and means tested, it became effective from 1937.
Just before the Second World W ar an Unem ploym ent Insurance 
Act was passed, perhaps the most necessary social security measure at the 
time. W hile the unemploym ent rate for union members was as high as 
15% in 1929, it had more than doubled by 1933, amounting to 110,000 
unemployed, while the numbers on the dole reached 158,000 by 1935.48 
It was in response to such high unemployment, partially caused by the 
economic slump following the world depression of the early 1930s, that 
the Labour governm ent introduced compulsory unemployment insurance 
for industrial workers financed equally by the employees, employers and 
the state.
So severe was the unemploym ent problem, and so important its 
alleviation, it has been claimed that ‘it was above all out o f the trauma of 
mass unem ploym ent in the 1930s that the welfare state was born’.49 By 
the outbreak o f the Second W orld W ar the alleviation measures adopted 
by the Norwegian government, combined with the other social legislation 
o f  the period, gave Norway a leading position among the welfare state 
countries o f Europe. This had been made possible largely by the coming 
to pow er o f  the L abour Party, rep lacing  the p redom inan tly  non­
interventionist philosophy of the Liberals (although the Liberals had 
introduced direct taxation in 1892), increasing econom ic growth and a 
constructively high level o f cross party consensus on the issue of social 
policies.
Despite declaring its neutrality when the war broke out, N orw ay’s 
position was first violated by Britain and then, more directly and forcibly 
by Germ any, G erm an troops launching an attack on Norway in April
48 Fritz llodnc. The N o n ivg ia n  econom y I9 2 0 -I9 S 0  (New York, l ()S3). pp 72-73.
40 Ibid., p. 73.
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1940. By June o f that year resistance to the Germ an invasion was 
subdued and the king together with his governm ent sought exile in 
Britain for the remainder of the war. A serious set back economically, 
the war was follow ed by a period of growth and generally improved 
living standards. Following liberation in 1945 an all party government 
was sw orn into office pending national elections. Led by E inar 
Gerhardsen, a prominent figure in the Labour Party who had spent most 
of the war in concentration camps, the provisional government issued an 
agreed declaration on the future political, social and economic aims of 
Norway. A lluding to the importance of a ju s t  distribution of national 
income to ensure the welfare of all, the declaration said:
Social legislation will be developed aim ed at making the relief 
system redundant. The social security schemes will be harmonised 
so that one com m on social security  system  covers sickness, 
invalidity, unemployment and old age.50
An aspiration which formed the core of social policy developments in 
Norway after the war, it was greatly influenced by trends in Britain and 
Sweden, the Beveridge Report of 1942 forming the basis for the post-war 
debate on social policy. These ideas had already been incorporated in a 
report published in 1944 by the Norwegian Central Federation o f  Trade 
Unions which sought the co-ordination of the social security schemes. It 
would appear correct to assume that this document formed the backbone 
o f the agreed declaration of 1945.
The job  of implementing the policies o f the agreed declaration fell 
to the Labour Party who received a majority o f  the seats in the Storting 
following the election o f October 1945. Among the first measures taken 
was the introduction of ch ild ren’s allowances in 1946, an aspiration
50 Quoted in Stein Kulinle. ‘National equality and local decision making: values in conflict in the 
development o f  the Norwegian welfare stale’. A d a  Socioloyica. vol. 23 (1‘JSO). no. 2-3. p. 101.
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outlined in the declaration of 1945, a system unanimously agreed to by 
the parliament. Benefits were paid to the second and subsequent 
children, extended to include all children in 1969, although tax 
allowances for children, available from the 1930s, were of greater 
importance financially for a number of years.
Provision of more generous and comprehensive social welfare 
legislation was made possible by a period of stable, and at times rapid, 
economic growth experienced by Norway from the 1950s. The period 
saw further changes in the insurance schemes. Already in 1949 
unemployment insurance was extended to agricultural workers and 
certain other groups not included in the 1938 act. In 1953 sickness 
insurance was extended to cover the whole labour force, and extended to 
all residents four years later. In the same year, 1957, an orphans' 
pensions scheme was introduced. In 1959 the means test for old age 
pensions was abolished and all wage earners were brought within the 
scope of unem ploym ent insurance. The following year a general 
occupational injury insurance became law while in 1961 comprehensive 
disability insurance and rehabilitation aid was introduced. From 1965 
widows' and unmarried mothers' pensions were made available together 
with support for mothers with small children. With the Labour Party as a 
driving force behind these measures, it is important to remember that 
their passage through parliament was facilitated by a very high level of 
cross-party support.
Denmark
The last of our comparative studies is Denmark, which became the 
first Nordic welfare state. Perhaps more than any other Nordic or 
western European country, Denmark’s welfare state legislation was 
examined by the Irish government as providing a possible blue print for
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Ireland. The reason behind this was the agricultural basis o f the Danish 
state, more relevant to Ireland than the industrially-based legislation of 
Britain.
In the mid-1940s, when the Irish government realised the necessity 
of coordinating social welfare legislation and of making it more reflective 
of Ire land’s agriculturally-based economy, it drew very much on the 
experience o f Denmark. Realising that ‘the greatest problem of all is 
having to apply social insurance measures to a population, half o f whom 
are unoccupied  and half o f whom  are in the rural com m unity ’51 the 
Departm ent o f Local Government and Public Health identified Denmark, 
together with Sweden, as being in the same group as that of Ireland in 
terms o f national incom e. Attributing D en m ark ’s ‘high degree of 
civilisation’ to its largely peaceful development, the completion of land 
division by the end of the eighteenth century, and the fact that universal 
education and universal franchise had been introduced in the early 1800s, 
the department went on to say that ‘some comparison can be made with 
Ireland as to the amount of benefit which could be conferred on the 
people by redistribution of a given proportion of the national incom e’.52
W hile Irish welfare legislation remained largely in line with its 
inherited industrial base, it is important to note that the Irish government 
was fam iliarising itself with welfare legislation in Denmark, the social 
security measures of the Danish welfare state being considered generous 
in terms of provisions in comparison with both its Nordic and western 
European neighbours.
W elfare legislation in Denmark has been characterised by four 
main elements: universal coverage irrespective of employment status, the
51 Considerations attending the problems o f  extending social insurance in Ireland with special 
reference to the rural community, c l 045 (IT.C.D. Archives, Macl-ntee Papers. P67/361).
52 Ibid.
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exclusion o f  persons with higher incomes, the financing o f pensions and 
b en e fi ts  p r im ar ily  out o f public  revenues , and  ad m in is tra t iv e  
decentralization.53 As in the case of Finland and Norw ay a remarkable 
consensus in relation to social policies among the major political parties 
characterised the introduction and development of these measures, there 
existing a com m on belief in the necessity and desirability o f  instituting 
and developing social security legislation.
As alluded to in a previous chapter, an important context of this 
legislation, again an idea very much shared by the main political parties, 
was its traditionalism , an ‘ideological traditionalism  which posed no 
challenge to conceptions of the relationship betw een society and the 
individual’.54 There  was much emphasis placed on the fact that the 
deve lopm en t o f  the Danish welfare state was not the creation o f 
som eth ing  new, but rather the bringing to fruition o f  an existing 
inheritance, specifically the development of the guild system.
A further context of the development of the Danish welfare state 
a lready  a lluded  to was the agricultural rather than the industrial 
background  w hich stim ulated social policy well into the twentieth 
century. Legislation was as often as not a direct result o f agrarian 
agitation, rather than of increasing industrialization: ‘the welfare state in 
D enm ark  is based on regulations and attitudes which long preceded 
industrialization’.55
As in the case of Finland and Norway, the following discussion is 
loosely broken into developments in the nineteenth century, the inter-war 
period, and World War II and its aftermath.
53 P.R. Kaim Caudle. C om parative social policy and social security: a ten country study (London. 
1973). p. 148.
54 Daniel Levine, ‘Conservatism and iradilion in Danish social welfare legislation. 1890-1933: a 
com pilative v iew '. C om parative Studies.in H istory and Society, vol. 20 ( 1978). no. I. p. 68.
55 Byron J. Nordstrom (ed.). D ictionary o f  Scandinavian history (London. 1986), p. 628.
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As early as 1798 poor relief reform in Denm ark decreed that 
anyone who needed social aid was entitled to it. By 1803 the task of the 
public poor relief system was defined as four fold: to give assistance to 
those unable to provide for themselves, to provide relief for the old and 
weak, to provide employm ent opportunities for the able bodied, and to 
provide medical care for the sick.56 However the reforms of the early 
1800s were immediately followed by a severe and prolonged economic 
crisis in Denmark from 1804, greatly affecting the economic provisions 
m aintaining the poor law. Coinciding with the spread o f liberal and 
M althus ian  ideas in Denm ark, the econom ic decline resulted  in a 
regressive reform of the poor law, the concept of paternal responsibility 
being replaced by the stigmatizing of relief. A ‘deterrent system ’ was 
introduced in 1824, recipients o f relief being denied the right to marry 
w ithout the prior consent o f the poor relief comm issioners. Further 
regressive legislation was introduced in 1838 when the system of outdoor 
relief was replaced by indoor assistance, relief within the confines of the 
workhouse becoming predominant.
M eanw hile  in the political arena important developments were 
taking place, King Frederick VI announcing in February 1831 that he 
intended to establish consultative provincial assemblies, thus diluting the 
absolute  authority o f the monarchy. Leading to a greater political 
awareness among the general public, who previously had little influence 
and therefore interest in political developments, the change from an 
absolute to a constitutional monarchy was marked by the Constitution of 
1849. Establishing poor relief as a right, paragraph 89 of the constitution 
stated that ‘Anyone who cannot support himself or his dependants and is 
not h im self the dependent of someone else, has a right to public support,
56 Norby Johansen. 'Denmark' ¡11 Deter Flora (eil.). Growth to lim its, vol. I, p. 296.
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though he must com ply with the obligations imposed by law in such 
cases’. Rem aining one o f the few unaltered provisions in the Danish 
constitution, this clause established the right to a modicum of poor relief, 
though the ‘obligations’ entailed the loss o f political rights, such as the 
right to vote.
The next twenty years saw little development in social legislation, 
and it was not until the 1870s that Denmark embarked upon a thirty year 
period of reform, establishing the foundation of a ‘m odern’ welfare state. 
The period from the 1870s to the early 1900s was one which saw the 
com ing together o f two m ajor structural changes in D enm ark  - the 
com preh en s ive  industr ia liza tion  o f  the 1870s and 1880s and the 
concomitant demographic changes which ensued, together with what has 
been described as the ‘rural crisis’ of the same period and the efforts to 
m aintain the rural labour force, while preventing the spread of socialist 
ideas. It was in the early 1870s that the Agrarian Liberal Party, D e t  
Forenede Venstre , was founded, predating the estab lishm ent o f the 
C onservative  and Social Dem ocratic parties, and gaining an absolute 
majority in the Folketing, the lower house of parliament, in the election 
of 1872. The coming together of the problems in industry and agriculture 
was reflected in the dram atic increase in the num ber o f  workhouses 
during the 1860s and 1870s. How ever it was clear that a far more 
com prehensive response was necessary and, in part influenced by the 
German and later European social insurance reforms of the 1880s and 
1890s, Denm ark, at this time enjoying the strongest econom ic growth 
among the Nordic countries, embarked upon a series o f  reforms in the 
areas o f  poor relief, old age relief, sickness insurance, accident insurance 
and unem ploym ent insurance between 1891 and 1907, signifying the
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foundation of the ‘modern welfare s ta te ’.57 Although influenced by 
B ism arckian legislation, it is nevertheless important to note that the 
fram ework o f  the Danish social reforms in the 1890s in particular was 
established by investigating commissions and committees long before the 
social reforms were carried out in Germany. Examples o f this are the 
1862, 1866 and 1875 committees o f investigation on state involvement in 
vo lun tary  s ickness funds and the 1881-83 investiga tions into the 
provision of old age pensions.
The most important legislation of the Bismarckian period was the 
Old Age Relief Act of 1891, Denmark being the first Nordic country to 
introduce such legislation. Stressing the continuation with tradition, 
V iggo Horup of the ruling Conservative Party, when introducing his 
proposals in 1890, said that ‘our proposals in this respect do not, of 
course, go in for anything new. They simply continue principles which 
are widely reco gn ized .’5S The pension schem e had its roots in 
agricultural conditions, and the demands of farmers for a better quality of 
life: ‘the Pension Act of 1891 was tailor made to meet the needs and 
interests of farm ers.’59 Separating relief of the old from the poor relief 
system, the act allowed for assistance without stigma and without the loss 
o f  political citizenship rights. With a very low age limit o f  60 years, a 
non-con tr ibu to ry  system  financed out o f general state and local 
governm ent revenues was instituted, while benefits which carried a 
means test and a moral test and were often paid in kind rather than in 
cash up to the early 1900s, were payable at the same rate as poor relief. 
This rate was determined by local and municipal authorities. Coming
57 Byron Nordsimm. D ictionary o f  Scandinavian history, p. 628.
58 Daniel Levine. 'Conservatism ami tradition in Danish social we It; ire legislation. 1800-1933: a 
comparative view '. Comparative Studies in History and  Society, vol. 20 (1978), no. 1, p. 62.
59 Kari SaJminen, Pension schem es in the making: a com parative studs o f  the Scandinavian countries 
(Helsinki, 1993). p. 125.
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into effect in 1892, Denm ark becam e the first country to pay non­
contributory pensions.
In the same year the sickness funds, established in the 1820s and 
1830s, were reformed. Comprising up to 120,000 members by 1885, the 
1892 reform was based on voluntary membership which was restricted to 
those o f limited means and provided state subsidies for the voluntary 
insurance funds. By the end of the first year of operation the reformed 
and recognized funds had a membership o f almost 1.2 million people. 
An Accident Insurance Act was introduced in 1898, insurance being paid 
by the em ployer, while in 1907 an Unemployment Insurance Act was 
introduced providing public subsidies to voluntary (i.e. trade union) funds 
to which the state contributed one third and the communes one sixth of 
the total contribution, rounding off  the first period of welfare legislation 
in Denmark.
The inter-war period was one o f gradual transition in Denm ark 
from the agricultural to the industrial sector, although agriculture was to 
rem ain a significant econom ic force up to the 1950s. Pensions were 
again the focus o f  social security reforms in the period, being one o f the 
few areas that d idn’t experience retrenchment during the 1920s, a trend 
particularly evident in the area of unemployment insurance. In 1922 old 
age pension reform  introduced statutory fixed benefits replacing the 
ex isting  d iscretionary  benefits. In the 1930s pensions were again 
reformed, this time to allow for their indexing with the cost of living.
However the major piece o f social legislation of the inter-war years 
came in 1933 as a result of co-operation between the Social Democratic 
and Radical Liberal government. It was based on the initiative and ideas 
presented ten years earlier by K. K. Steincke of the Social Democrats. 
Known as the Great Social Reform it rationalized and simplified the 
varying disparate pieces o f social welfare legislation then in existence
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under four basic acts: the Employment and Unemployment Insurance Act 
and the Accident Insurance Act, both o f  which introduced relatively 
m inor alterations to existing legislation, and the Public Assistance Act 
and the National Insurance Act, which were rather more important in 
their consequences. The latter catered for sickness and invalidity 
insurance together with old age pensions, while the Public Assistance Act 
introduced communal assistance and special assistance together with poor 
relief, receipt of which still involved the loss of citizenship rights.
Although collectively described as the Great Social Reform, many 
com m entators have questioned their actual significance, beyond the 
adm inistrative co-ordination and simplification which they achieved. 
A ccording to Johansen, they fell far short o f establishing the social 
democratic welfare state with which they have been credited. He argues 
that the principle of universal compulsory social insurance contained in 
the reforms was merely cosmetic, as individuals could choose between 
active and passive membership of funds. Passive membership entailed 
the paym ent o f  ‘a ridiculously low fee and in no way guaranteed 
protection, the only entitlement being the right to old age benefits which 
were granted and financed as before’,60 while active membership and the 
benefits it bestowed were restricted by a number of qualifying conditions.
The context of the reform was, of course, the world depression of 
the early 1930s which severely affected Denmark, as it did Finland and 
Norway. Indeed the social reform may be seen in the context of the 
combination response of relief program m es for farmers coupled with 
deficit spending on public works, an approach pioneered by Denmark in 
the relief o f distress during the depression.
60 Norby Johansen, ‘Dcnmiirk’ in Pelcr l-'lora (ed.), Growth to lim its, vol. I, p. 300.
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Despite the taint of collaboration with the Nazis during the Second 
W orld War, and a significant communist challenge, the Social Democrats 
still remained an important force in Denmark after the war, forming a 
single party governm ent from 1947 to 1950, a position it held for a 
further fifteen years from 1953. The post war period also witnessed a 
more decisive shift from agriculture to industry, manufacturing exports 
surpassing agricultural exports for the first time in the late 1950s, the 
period from  1957 to 1965 being know n as the ‘second industrial 
revolution’.61 It coincided with a period o f  unprecedented econom ic 
growth, the average annual growth rate for the three decades following 
1952 being 3.5 % .62
In the im m ediate  aftermath o f the Second W orld W ar the Social 
Dem ocrats published their party manifesto, ‘The Future of D enm ark’, 
which contained a significant emphasis on social legislation. Among 
o ther things, it called for a non-contributory incom e-tested old age 
pension scheme, a significant shift from its 1892 position when the party 
had voted against the pension scheme then enacted because of its means 
tested basis. Going one step further, the Radical Liberals called for a 
universal scheme at the same time. In 1948, two years after the previous 
governm ent had substantia lly  increased the levels o f old age and 
invalidity pensions, the Social Democratic governm ent established a 
Com mission on Old Age Pension Insurance, consisting of politicians, 
civil servants and other experts with the purpose of developing a system 
based  on a con tr ibu to ry  social insurance  model. Follow ing the 
com m ission’s denunciation of the idea of a contributory, social insurance 
based old age pension system, the Social Democrats proposed the idea of
61 Kai'i Salm inen, P ension schem es in the m aking: a com para tive study o f  the Scandinavian  
countries, p. 3 1.
6  ^ Norby Johansen. ’Denmark’ in Peter Flora (eil.). Growth to lim its vol. I. p. 345.
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a full national pension, den fulcle folkepension, the subsequent reform of 
1956 providing for a flat rate minimum pension granted to everybody of 
retirem ent age (increased to 67 years o f age in 1956) who satisfied 
residence  and nationality  tests, and including many incom e tested 
supplements, being a first step towards this ideal.
The post-war period also saw the introduction of income tested tax 
credits being introduced for families with children under 16 years of age, 
coupled  with m eans tested cash benefits for groups such as single 
m others  and the unem ployed  in 1952, while in 1955 the Public  
Assistance Act was reformed, extending special assistance to, among 
other groups, widows with children and certain groups of single women.
Summary
W e can see from the foregoing that, in fact, little was learned by 
successive Irish governm ents from the experiences o f countries which 
faced relatively similar problems in the area of welfare legislation and 
which shared relatively sim ilar structural make-up. This was most 
no ticeab le  in the case of D enm ark which, as we have seen, was 
scrutinised by the Irish governm ent for its agriculturally- rather than 
industria lly-based  social insurance scheme. Despite the collation of 
comparative material in the mid 1940s, including detailed notes on the 
Danish sickness insurance scheme, the white paper of 1949 maintained 
the industrial base o f social security in Ireland:
A ready criticism to be anticipated is that the scheme [outlined in 
the white paper] is more suitable to a country which is largely 
industrial than to a country which is largely agricultural. It is true 
that the insurance methods which are suitable for industrial groups 
are not easy to apply to the agricultural community. Having regard 
to this, it is preferable not to apply insurance generally, but to 
con tinue  the assis tance  schem es for classes unsuitab le  for 
insurance. There is no sound argument however, for abandoning 
insurance where it is suitable, even in the interests of uniformity.
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T he p roposed  schem e is su itab le  for the large industria l, 
commercial and agricultural employee groups in the community.63
If o f  m arginal re levance  for their direct influence on Irish 
legislation, however, the three countries we have studied demonstrate the 
underlying factors which influence the pace and extent o f development of 
w elfare legislation. It is clear that most o f the underlying factors 
influencing development in Finland, Norway and Denmark were at work 
in Ireland, and placing these factors in this cross-country analysis is 
crucial in understanding Ireland’s development as a welfare state.
The first crucial factor in the development of welfare policies from 
all four countries was the coming of democratic, parliamentary politics. 
In Finland and N orw ay this stem m ed from  vigorous but peaceful 
nationalist movements, resulting in independence in the early years o f the 
twentieth century, while in Denmark the political change was marked by 
the move from absolute to constitutional monarchy. An important part of 
this change to democratic, parliamentary politics was the institution of 
universal franchise.
The introduction o f  universal franchise was followed by the rise o f 
Labour parties, another crucial element influencing the timing, pace and 
extent of welfare legislation. The fact that the social democrats were 
weaker in Finland than in either Norway or Denmark provides part of the 
explanation for Finland’s relative slowness in becoming a typical Nordic 
welfare state, while in Norway itself the Labour Party only cam e to 
power after the First World War. The parallels with Ireland, which was 
w ithout a Labour m em ber o f governm ent until 1948 are clear, the 
divisions in N orw ay 's  Labour Party being mirrored by those in the Irish 
Labour Party.
63 Department o f Social Welfare. W hite paper containing governm ent proposals fo r  social security  
(Dublin, 1949), p. 43.
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Two further trends are evident from the comparative studies: the 
im portance of individuals as catalysts in the historical development of 
welfareism  (i.e. Bismarck and Beveridge) and the importance o f what 
social sc ientis ts  term  structural functionalism . U nderlin ing  the 
im portance o f  the latter is the clear correlation between the shift from 
agriculture to industry and the concom itant developm ent of welfare 
leg is la tion . A phenom enon  o f  industria l society  is large scale 
unemploym ent, the emphasis on curbing unemployment, particularly in 
the 1930s and again in the 1950s in the countries examined being an 
important stimulant for social welfare legislation.
The comparative studies bring to light a number of other factors 
influencing  the timing, pace o f  developm ent and extent of welfare 
legislation which can be equally applied to Ireland in order to place 
developments in Ireland in an international context. Among these factors 
were the predom inance  o f  o ther issues on the political agenda. In 
Denm ark in the 1890s 'social reform was subordinated to other political 
issues', namely the 'constitution struggle, fo r fa tn in g s -k a m p e n  .64 In 
Finland in the 1930s much energy was expanded on the language debate, 
while a characteristic o f the post World W ar II period was the growing 
cross-party consensus on the benefits and necessity of social policy. The 
following com m ent on Finland of the 1960s may equally be applied to 
Norway, Denmark or Ireland: 'political parties no longer offer clear cut 
alternatives; differences are in appearance only'.65
While the above comparisons offer explanations and insights into 
the deve lopm en t o f  the Irish welfare state, the ex tent to which 
developments in other countries directly or positively influenced Irish
64 Norby Johansen. 'Denmark' in Peter Flora (ed.). Growth to lim its, p.299.
65 Onni Raniala. ‘Changing features in the Finnish ptuiy system  from the 1960s to the present: an 
overview ’ in Juhani M ylly and R. Michael Berry (eels.), P olitical parlies in Finland: essays in liistoiy  
and po litics  (Turku. 19X7), p. 41.
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legislation is difficult to measure accurately. Perhaps this crux was most 
cogently stated in the 1949 white paper:
How can the new scheme be fairly judged? Should this depend on 
its relation to the schemes it is intended to supersede, or should it 
be measured against the schemes in other countries 01* should it, 
perhaps, be required to stand or fall by comparison with some ideal 
schem e which each one may fashion for him self? There is no 
simple answer to these questions because there is no simple way of 
measuring the worth of a complex social experim ent which will, 
directly or indirectly, affect every person in this country.66
66 Department o f Social Welfare. While paper, p. 42.
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CO N CLU SIO N  
FR O M  STATE W ELFA R E TO W ELFARE STATE
From  the foregoing chapters it is clear that social welfare policy 
in  independent Ireland falls into five separate phases o f  development 
that m ay be described as an evolution from ‘state w elfare’ to ‘welfare 
s ta te ’, from  individual and restricted  policies dealing with specific 
social problem s and with a m inim um  of cross-referencing to a set of 
co-ordinated policies, centrally administered, national in application 
and com prehensive in character. The phases o f  developm ent marking 
this evolution may be categorised as follows:
pre-1922: A period which saw the introduction of the first
incom e distribution policies in the form  of the poor law 
and, more importantly, the Old Age Pensions Act, 1908 
and the National Health Insurance Act, 1911;
1922-32: A  period of m arked conservatism  and retrenchm ent in 
social welfare policy;
1932-42: The first period o f expansion in social welfare
legislation followed by the return of conservatism in the 
late 1930s;
1942-8: A period when British developments precipitated new 
and prolonged debate in Ireland on the whole area of 
social security resulting in the final abandonm ent o f poor 
law ideologies for more progressive social thinking; 
1948-52: The period when the changing ideologies subsequent to 
the publication of the Beveridge report were given vent to 
in legislation. This legislation institutionalised the welfare 
state in Ireland by providing a co-ordinated, consolidated 
and expanded set o f  welfare policies.
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W hile it is unnecessary here to draw detailed conclusions about each of 
the periods, as this has already been done on a chapter-by-chapter 
basis, it m ig h t  be usefu l to draw  together the m ain  strands of 
developm ent which resulted in the institutionalisation of the welfare 
state by 1952.
T h e  id eo lo g ica l  and p rac tica l fo und a tion  o f  Irish  w elfare  
legislation was the poor law of the nineteenth century. In retrospect it 
can be seen as setting a  precedent for implementing policies in Ireland 
which were unsuited to solving native social problems, a characteristic 
o f  m uch w elfare  legislation even after independence  in 1922, with 
Brita in , a largely  industria l country, rem ain ing  the w ell spring of 
legislative ideology. Certainly George N icho lls’ report, upon which 
the p o o r  law  o f  1838 was based, was unsu ited  to Ireland, a fac t 
recognised  not only in retrospective analyses but by contemporaries. 
In the nationalist debate towards the end o f the nineteenth century it 
w as to beco m e  a m ajo r  tool in the figh t for se lf-governm ent. 
H ow ever, w hile  certain  that the poor laws w ere alien, nationalist 
politicians, w hen provided with the opportunity of replacing them after
1922, seem ed unsure  as to w hat constituted native, a poin t underlined 
by the D epartm ent o f Local Governm ent and Public Health, the first 
report o f  which criticised the workhouses solely on the grounds that 
they  fa i led  ‘to p ro v id e  separa te  accom m odation  fo r  the classes 
requ iring  special a tten tion ’.1 The philosophical bankruptcy when it 
came to social policy was emphasised by the fact that the county homes, 
established under the Local G overnm ent (Tem porary Provisions) Act,
1923, to rep lace  the workhouses, were described in a governm ent- 
com m issioned  report o f 1927 as housing ‘aged and infirm  of both
1 Department o f  Local Government and Public Health, First report, p. 56.
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sexes, lunatics, idiots and imbeciles o f both sexes; unm arried mothers 
and their children, in som e cases married mothers and their children, 
and orphan and deserted ch ild ren’ together with ‘advanced tubercular 
disease and also cases o f cancer’.2
This disparity  be tw een pre-independence pronouncem ents and 
post-independence actions was striking. In a period w hich stressed 
financial orthodoxy rather than social reform, James C onnolly’s vision 
of ‘a united social dem ocracy’3 seem ed irrelevant. The opportunity to 
in f lu en ce  our ow n affa irs  w as fo rfe ited  in favour o f  em ula ting  
developments in Britain. The gap between the rhetoric and the reality 
was particularly striking in the context o f the Dem ocratic  Program m e 
o f  1919, p ro m ulga ted  by  the first Dail ju s t  three years p rio r  to 
independence . W hile  the  asp irational rhetoric  o f  the D em ocratic  
P rogram m e continued in governm ent circles for a num ber o f  years 
after independence, R ichard M ulcahy claiming in 1925 that 'the same 
spirit that filled our people who entered the Dail in 1919...is still there 
today ,4 its great social and cultural promises were simply ignored. In 
the area o f  social legislation it is clear that what m ade a far greater 
im p ress io n  on Irish approaches  were not the asp ira tions o f  the 
D em ocratic  P rogram m e or o f thinkers like Connolly, ‘the pioneer o f 
social conscience in Ireland’,5 but rather the operation o f the poor laws 
in the nineteenth century.
T here  is little  dou b t bu t that the poor law m enta lity  was 
ing ra ined  in the th ink ing  o f Cum ann na nG aedheal politicians in 
particular. M any of the ministers viewed the provision o f  welfare as
2 R eport o f  the Commission on the R e lie f o f  the Sick and D estitu te Poor, including the Insane 
P o o r  (Dublin, 1927), p. 1.
3 James Connolly, Labour in Irish h istory  (Dublin. 1910), p. 216.
4 D D  vol. 12, 30 June 1925, col. 1815.
5 Robert Lynd, ‘Introduction’ in James Connolly, Labour in Ireland  (Dublin, 1917), p. xix.
299
little m ore than the provision of charity. The ministers with direct 
responsibility for welfare legislation were to the fore in expressing this 
view. Patrick M cGilligan, M inister for Industry and Com m erce from 
1924 until 1932 ruled out the possibility o f legislating for increased 
unem ploym ent insurance benefits as such a m ove would be providing 
‘nothing m ore or less than complete charity’.6 James Bourke, Minister 
for Local Government and Public Health from 1923 to 1927, explained 
the reduction in old age pensions in 1924 in the context o f  the state not 
be ing  in a position  ‘to distribute charity on that ex trem ely  liberal 
sca le ’.7 Similarly Ernest Blythe was clearly of the opinion that, as was 
the case under the poor laws, receipt of any benefits ought to be made 
as unpalatable as possible: the loose application o f qualification rules by 
pension officers led, according to Blythe, ‘to persons taking outdoor 
re l ie f  w ho w ould  have been reluctant, and perhaps asham ed, in the 
past’ to do so.8 Both Bourke and Blythe had been m embers o f the First 
Dail which prom ulgated the Democratic Programme, while McGilligan 
had served as secretary to Kevin O Higgins.
A valid  a rgum ent expla in ing  the lack o f  p rogressive  social 
legislation m ay well have been that in the first decade o f independence 
public finances simply could not afford to provide any extension in the 
welfare services already in existence and in fact justified  the reduction 
o f old age pension in 1924. However, it is clear from the rhetoric that, 
apart altogether from the lack of finances to facilitate the expansion of 
social serv ices, there was a fundam enta l lack o f  apprecia tion  or 
acceptance o f  the basic tenet of welfare legislation, namely that the state 
had  a duty to ensure the economic and social well-being o f  its citizens.
6 D D  vol. 12, 30 June 1925, col. 1770.
7 D D  vol. 7, 25 June 1924, col. 3054.
8 D D  vol. 3, 18 May 1923, col. 1119.
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B ecause  this ph ilosophical hurl was never crossed by C um ann na 
nGaedheal in government, the question o f  whether or not the Free State 
could afford measures o f social legislation was largely irrelevant. The 
argument o f  lack o f financial resources pales further into insignificance 
when it is noted that expenditure alone is not a m easure o f the success 
or o therw ise  o f  welfare policies: a w illingness to innovate  and the 
effectiveness and suitability o f innovation are the key elem ents in the 
success of welfare legislation.
This persistence o f poor law approaches to social policy in the 
firs t  d ecade  o f  independence  was by no m eans u n iq u e  to the 
governm ent party. Even Thom as Johnson, leader o f  the parliamentary 
Labour Party from  1922, was not anxious that further unem ploym ent 
benefit should be provided w ithout attaching a duty to the receipt of 
such benefit.9
T he  period  up to 1932 was, therefore, one o f  stagnant and at 
times regressive social policy, lacking insight or radicalism  and cloaked 
in an a ll -p e rv a d in g  con serva tism . H ad  the g o v e rn m e n t  even  
‘s la v is h ly ’10 fo llow ed British m odels in the areas o f  econom ics and 
finance w hich dealt with social legislation, as H oppen suggests, the 
results would have been far greater.
T he  extent to which F ianna Fail sentim ents d iffered from  the 
poor law rhetoric and grudging attitudes o f  Cum ann na nGaedheal was 
refreshing, if  not radical. From its inception the party had stressed the 
im portance o f  social reform, seeing independence as being more than 
an end  in itself. The rhetoric was followed by definite progress in the 
a rea  o f  w elfa re  legislation in the years fo llow ing  F ianna  F a i l ’s 
accession to pow er in 1932. The reforms, as has already been argued,
9 D D  vol. 1, 20  Oct. 1922, col. 1864.
10 K. T. Hoppen, Ireland since ISOO: conflict and  conform ity  (London. 1987), p. 208.
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owed little to the initial dependence of the Fianna Fail governm ent on 
the support o f  the Labour Party. The most im portant initiatives were 
the introduction o f  unemploym ent assistance in 1933 and w idow s’ and 
o rphans’ pensions in 1935. The spirit in which these reform s were 
introduced was as important as what they achieved in practice. Seeking 
cabinet support for the introduction of unem ploym ent assistance, Sean 
L em ass , M in is te r  fo r  Industry  and  C o m m erce , d e sc r ib ed  the 
dependence o f  m any unemployed people on ‘hom e assistance funds and 
private charities’ as ‘altogether inadequate’.11 On seeing the bill passed 
into law, Lem ass specified that unem ploym ent officers were to ‘take if  
for granted’ that ‘unem ployed persons generally are only too anxious 
to obtain w ork  and they are genuinely seeking i t ’,12 a m arked change in 
emphasis to the grudging m anner in which welfare was distributed up 
until then.
H ow ever the initial enthusiasm of Fianna Fail was replaced in the 
late 1930s by  a return to a more conservative approach to social policy, 
rem iniscent o f the early days o f Cum ann na nGaedheal. This can be 
attributed in  large measure to a change in personnel in the departments 
directly  invo lved  in welfare legislation. From  Septem ber 1939 to 
January 1947 Sean M acEntee had responsibility for either Industry and 
C om m erce  or Local G overnm ent and Public Health. Having been 
M in is te r  fo r  F inance  from  1932-9, M acEntee was an instinctively  
cautious and increasingly conservative politician. He very much lacked 
the social unders tand ing  and sym pathy o f Sean Lem ass w hom  he 
replaced as M inister for Industry and Com m erce in Septem ber 1939. 
The legislative innovations of the early 1930s were neither part o f  nor
11 Memorandum from Minister tor Industry and Commerce to President, 14 N ov. 1932 (N.A., 
D /Fin., Econom ic and Financial position o f  Saorstdt Eireann, t200/25/25).
12 Department o f  Industry and Commerce. Assistance Circular 2/5: Unemployment Assistance 
Act, 1933.
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fo llow ed by a sustained, thought-out plan for the restructuring and 
ra tionalisa tion o f  Irish social welfare legislation. Calls for the co­
ordination o f  social welfare policies, dating from  as early as 1933,13 
were sym pathetically listened to but quietly ignored. This lack o f any 
underlying philosophy or plan was clearly shown by Sean T. O K elly’s 
pronouncem ent in 1937 that pressure of day-to-day business in running 
existing services left only lim ited time for thinking about the larger 
question o f  structuring or co-ordinating social welfare po licy .14 It is 
little  w onder that Clann na Poblach ta , the firs t politica l party  in 
ind ependen t Ire land  that a ttem pted  to bring  together the politica l 
traditions o f nationalism and socialism, claimed, with a large degree of 
accuracy, that:
the old castle m achine, the old poor law m achine, etc., were
taken over after the Treaty  and have been creaking along in
m ore or less their original mould ever since.15
It is un likely  that any substantia l exam ina tion  o f  the whole 
corpus o f  welfare legislation would have been undertaken were it not 
for the publication o f  the Beveridge report in 1942. T he Beveridge 
report was the single most im portant influence in the form ation o f  a 
co -o rd in a ted  and  expanded  set o f  social polic ies lead ing  to the 
institutionalisation o f  the welfare state in independent Ireland. W hile 
the  F ian n a  Fail g overn m en t was veh em en tly  op p o sed  to it, it 
precipitated a prolonged and fruitful discussion in Ireland from which 
was forged the m odern welfare state. Apart from  the discussion it 
p rec ip ita ted , the B everidge  report also p rov ided  Ire land  w ith a 
b luep rin t fo r  change, Ireland becom ing  in time a B everidge-type
13 William Norton, Slain te, vol. 1 (1935), p. 42.
14 DD vol. 65, 11 Mar. 1937, col. 1623.
15 The Clan, 14 Dec. 1949.
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welfare state. The extent to which its influence in the shaping of Irish 
social legislation has been virtually ignored by historians is 
remarkable.
It was largely due to the Beveridge report that the decade from 
1948 saw the institutionalisation of the welfare state in Ireland. This 
was very much facilitated by the establishment of the Department of 
Social Welfare in 1947 in response to a perception that ‘the state is 
entering an era in which there will be an increasing demand for the 
development and expansion of social services’.16 W elfareism ' was 
seen as both acceptable and desirable. No longer was it seen as 
necessary to apologise to any section of Irish society for the 
introduction of new and expanded measures of social policy.
While the Beveridge report and the subsequent discussion in 
Ireland modified and modernized ideologies, the 1952 act was of 
crucial practical importance. The act co-ordinated the three social 
insurance schemes in existence until then while effecting improvements 
in both these schemes and the existing assistance legislation. For the 
first time the same rate of benefit was provided for sickness, 
unemployment, maternity and widowhood. A reduction was no longer 
effected in the rate of sickness/disability insurance by reason of 
prolonged illness, and it could be drawn for an indefinite period of 
time, a significant improvement on the previous maximum period of 
twenty six weeks. This co-ordination also provided for the payment of 
dependants' benefit for those in receipt of disability benefit, hitherto 
confined to recipients of unemployment benefit. In both cases, the 
'waiting days' (six in the case of unemployment and three in the case
16 Report of Inter-departmental Committee on Social Services appointed by the Minister for 
Finance on 15 May 1945 (U.C.D. Archives, MncEmee Papers, P67/361).
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of disability) during which the claimant received no benefit, was 
standardised to three days.
The significance of both this act and the 1948 Social Welfare Act 
and the protracted lead up to it lies in a number of areas. Firstly, the 
attention to detail in the 1952 act was impressive. Under the new 
regulations the fees for birth, m arriage and death certificates, 
necessary for the claiming of benefits, were reduced from 6/- to a 
maximum of 1/6.17
Facilitating the introduction of the Social Welfare Act, 1952, was 
a cross-party consensus on the desirability of welfare legislation. The 
three major and enduring parties were committed to welfare state 
legislation as evidenced by successive general elections. Following the 
coming to power of the first inter-party government, for example, Dr 
James Ryan expressed confidence that ‘any party that comes into power 
in this country is going to progress in the way of increasing and not 
decreasing these [social] services’.18 This was a sea change in 
comparison to the mood from the foundation of the Free State to the 
mid 1940s, when Cumann na nGaedheal/Fine Gael were hostile to any 
state-centralised social policy, very much towing the line of the 
Catholic church (indeed Dr James Ryan accused them and the other 
opposition parties of advocating the Dignan plan simply because it was 
published by a Catholic bishop19), when the Labour Party was in such a 
weak position that its advocacy of such policies had almost no impact, 
leaving Fianna Fail in a position to claim credit and call 'progress' for 
even the most minor of reforms. Now consensus about the need for 
progressive welfare legislation underpinned developments, James Ryan
17 Statutory Instrument 384 o f 1952: Social Welfare (Certificates of Births, Marriage and 
Deaths) Regulation, 1952.
18 DD vol. 116, 23 June 1949, col. 1331.
19 DD vol. 120, 29 March 1950, col. 229.
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assuring William Norton, a few months after Norton took office, of 
'my wholehearted support in his endeavour to bring the social 
standards of our people into alignment with those of progressive 
peoples throughout the world today'.20 It should be noted however that 
Lemass rejected suggestions in Spring 1951 that Norton's social 
welfare bill ought to have been passed in the Dail without a division, as 
such a course of action would have created in the minds of the public 
the idea that 'the bill represented the best that the combined wisdom of 
members of the Dail could produce' and would 'make a better scheme 
subsequently more difficult'.21 The cross-party consensus was to 
become a characteristic of political approaches to social policy in 
subsequent decades, political parties out-bidding each other in 
promising innovation and reform.
O f wider significance was the acceptance in principle of 
developing Ireland as a modern welfare state in the European context. 
It is obvious that some politicians and many more senior civil servants 
were becoming increasingly an fa it with developments in social policy 
in western Europe, a process facilitated by Irish involvement in the 
International Labour Organisation and the International Social Security 
Association, the committee of experts of the latter meeting in Dublin in 
January 1949 and attended by delegates from Belgium, Switzerland, 
Czechoslovakia, France, Denmark, Italy and the Netherlands. One 
concrete example of the real impact of this comparative reference may 
be seen in the white paper of 1949. In content and structure it fitted in 
very much with the genre  of the time. Its orthodox weighting of 
insurance as against assistance schemes, its acceptance of prevailing
20 DD vol. 112, 21 July 1948, col. 1068.
21 DD vol. 125, 11 April 1951, col. 61.
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European principles in welfare policy, and its appeal to history made it 
very much a document of its time.
The only institution which did not share this enthusiasm for 
state-centralised social welfare legislation from the late 1940s was the 
Catholic church. W hile it is unnecessary here to reiterate the 
arguments outlined in chapter two of the present work, there was a 
clear move from the Christian pragm atism  which welcomed the 
Beveridge report in 1942 to a more dogmatic conservatism in response 
to the Irish white paper on social security of 1949. This change was 
illustrated by the changing opinions of Dr Cornelius Lucey, one of the 
most prolific and respected of Catholic writers on social and economic 
issues. In response to the Beveridge report Lucey, applying the 
principles of the report to Ireland, said that ‘we must plan for a still 
more comprehensive and unified system of social security in the near 
future’.22 However, when such a scheme was proposed, in the form of 
the 1949 white paper, Lucey ‘subjected [it] to strong criticism’.23
The evidence related in chapter two would suggest that it is now 
time for a reappraisal of the role of the Catholic church in independent 
Ireland in a consistent and balanced manner. The role of the church in 
independent Ireland has been over-simplified: its presentation as having 
a monolithic influence on politics is inaccurate. SO too is its portrayal 
as singularly conservative when it came to social policy. Underlining 
both the diversity of opinion within the church together with the 
progressive social doctrine of individual members of the hierarchy and 
other Catholic thinkers, was the response of the official church to the 
1949 white paper on social security and the subsequent legislation of 
the early 1950s. John Dignan, Bishop of Clonfert, criticised the white
22 Cornelius Lucey, “The Beveridge report’. Studies, vol. 32 (1043), p. 43.
23 Evening M ail, 17 July 1930.
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paper for what it did not do,24 while Bishop Neil Farren of Derry 
implied that the Fine Gael bill of 1951 which emanated from the white 
paper, was taken from ‘the worst principles of both Nazi and Russian 
imperialism’.25 Neither is it easy to judge the actual practical influence 
of the Catholic church on the course of legislation. While Fianna Fail 
governm ents from the late 1930s quoted at length from  the 
pronouncements of Catholic writers to bolster their lack of desire to 
innovate in the area of social welfare, it would appear that such 
recourse was a front, not for Catholic-induced conservatism, but rather 
for a political, social and financial conservatism, an unwillingness to 
innovate.
The reason why it was the mother and child scheme of 1950-1 
and not the 1949 white paper or the subsequent legislation which 
sparked a major church-state debacle is more difficult to assess. Most 
likely it lies in the fact that the spirit if not the content of the white 
paper enjoyed broad social and political support leaving the church as a 
lone opposing voice and therefore with little power to influence its 
course directly. Perhaps it was the absence of independent support 
which staved off a church-state conflict as developed in the case of the 
mother and child scheme: in the latter instance the opposition of the 
Irish M edical Association greatly bolstered the opposition of the 
Catholic hierarchy.
The evidence collated in writing the present work has raised a 
number of other issues. This use of British developments as a model in 
Ireland has already been emphasised, the white paper going so far as to 
paraphrase the B everidge report on occasion .26 Indeed the
24 Dr John Dignan, ‘The government proposals for social security’, Christus Rex, vol. 4 
(1950), p. 107.
25 II, 18 Apr. 1955.
26 See chapter six of the present work.
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international feminist criticism of welfare legislation may be applied to 
Ire land  w here B everidgean ideologies becam e pre-em inent.. 
Beveridge’s report was based on social security for the worker rather 
than the citizen, the worker always being defined in terms of ‘him ’ 
rather than ‘her’.
As outlined in the previous chapter, reference to countries other 
than Britain in the discussion and preparation of legislative change in 
Ireland became increasingly important as time went on. From the 
1933 Committee of Inquiry into Widows’ and Orphans’ pensions, it 
became a standard part of inquiring into and developing Irish social 
legislation to look to existing structures in other European countries 
and beyond. In this case developments in Denmark, Canada, forty-five 
of the United States, New Zealand and New South Wales were 
examined in depth. In the same year, 1933, the provisional committee 
of management of the National Health Insurance Society visited Yugo 
Slavia to learn from the experiences of the equivalent insurance society 
there .27 The inter-departmental committee on family allowances, 
established in November 1940, collated information regarding similar 
schemes in a number of European countries. Dr John Dignan’s plan of 
1945 was heavily influenced by developments in Denmark and Sweden 
while the white paper on social security of 1949 was framed in ‘the 
light of modern developments in other countries’.28 This level of 
reference to other countries by senior officers in the civil service in 
particular calls into question what has been described by others as the 
insularity of civil servant thinking up to the late 1950s. Civil servants 
were not as ‘intellectually isolated’29 as has been suggested. The
27 Slainte, vol. 1 (1935), p. 16.
28 White paper, p. ii.
29 J. J. Lee, Ireland po litics and society, 1912-85  (Cambridge, 1989), p. 261.
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importance attached to comparative analysis and the depth and extent of 
that analysis uncovered in researching the present work would suggest 
that a reappraisal is necessary.
A unique aspect of the development of the Irish welfare state was 
the absence of a strong and united social democratic party. Across 
Europe the role of social democratic political parties has been stressed 
as an essential ingredient in ensuring the institutionalisation of the 
welfare state: its absence in Ireland would suggest that such an 
ingredient was not so much important in the evolution of the welfare 
state but rather in the pace of evolution. Having fallen victim to the 
over-riding importance attached to nationalist politics, the Irish Labour 
Party never commanded an influential position in political life. Its 
position was further weakened by divisions from 1943-50, the politics 
of personality rather than ideology playing a pre-eminent role.
The centrality of ‘the national question’ to the detriment of social 
issues was best encapsulated by Sean MacBride in 1949 when he 
commented that:
Since we obtained control over our own affairs in this part of the 
country, political and economic questions have mostly been 
coloured by issues that aroused heat and passion, often leading to 
virtual civil war conditions...
One of the results of the turmoil of the last quarter of a 
century has been that we took over, w ithout very much 
examination, the political, economic and legal framework which 
had been imposed upon us by Britain.30
In turn the ‘national question’, specifically the desire to create a unified
Ireland, provided its own impetus for welfare legislation: an early
reaction to the Beveridge report was a fear that ‘the application of the
British governm ent’s proposals to Northern Ireland might cause an
30 Lecture by Sean MacBride, 13 Oct. 1949 (Labour History Museum, Norton Papers, Item 
90).
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unfavourable comparison between the two portions of the island’.31 
This secondary social effect of partition on legislation in independent 
Ireland has been largely ignored by writers on the period.
It is this ignoring of what are essentially central themes in the 
course of twentieth century Ireland that has made the present work not 
only possible but an essential contribution both to understanding 
independent Ireland and to the way we perceive the history of 
independent Ireland. It offers three separate levels of analysis. Firstly, 
it is intended not only to sketch the evolution of the welfare state, a 
process eschewed in other studies of independent Ireland, but to analyse 
the reasons for the rise, pace of developm ent and extent of 
development of Irish welfare legislation. Secondly, this analysis of the 
impetus and influences behind the Irish welfare state has led to a re­
appraisal of the role of certain key players in the political, social and 
cultural life of independent Ireland. As underlined right through the 
present work, the role of the Catholic church, of social democratic 
politics and of administrative officials is far more complex when 
examined in the context of social, and not just political, developments. 
Thirdly, the present work has underlined the vast amount of work still 
to be carried out in order to come to a comprehensive picture of the 
history of independent Ireland. Chief among these in the context of 
social developments is the role of ‘the invisible welfare state’,32 the 
unofficial welfare services provided mostly by women and upon which 
much official welfare legislation is dependent.
If studies focused solely on the political, or the economic, or 
indeed the social, lead to incomplete and at times inaccurate
31 Considerations attending Lite problems of extending social insurance in Ireland will) special 
reference to the rural community, [c 1045] (U.C.D. Archives, MacEniee Papers, P67/361).
32 Meija Manninen and Paivi Setiila (eds.). The Uuly with ilie bow: the story o f  Finnish women 
(Helsinki, 1990), p. 144.
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interpretations as suggested above, then the necessity of inclusive 
history is beyond question. The present work is offered not only as a 
synthesis of social, political, economic and administrative history in its 
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1.1(a) Department of Social Welfare
(The following Department of Social Welfare files were consulted in the National 
Archives, Dublin. They are arranged by date.)
Unemployment insurance act 1920: questions of scope and insurability, 
E.B. 43495
EO Circulars, forms, leaflets, E.B. 502059
Government of Ireland act: transfer to national insurance, E.B. 55867
Unemployment insurance act 1922: summary of principal provisions,
E.B. 58738
National health insurance act 1924: bill file, I.A. 80/53
National health insurance act 1925: bill file, I.A. 81/53
National health insurance act 1928: bill file, I.A. 83/53
National health insurance act 1929: notes for minister, I.A. 84/53(c)
National health insurance bill 1929 as presented, I.A. 84/53(d)
Department of External Affairs: unemployment insurance - reciprocal 
agreements with Switzerland, E.B. 98851
Approved societies, I.A. 85/53(i)
Unification of societies: office committee, I.A. 85/53(e)
Unemployment assistance bill 1933, E.B. 144057
Corporation of Sligo: resolution regarding unemployment assistance act 
1933, E.B. 326047
National health insurance act, 1933: committee stage notes, I.A. 85/53(d)
Memorandum on unification of approved societies 1933, I.A. 85/53(c)
National Health insurance act 1933: third stage, I.A. 85/53(k)
National health insurance act 1934: amendment to 1933 act,
I.A. 86/53(a) - (c)
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Memorandum from Cork branch of the Irish Labour Party suggesting 
amendment to unemployment assistance and unemployment 
insurance acts, E.B. 154613
Widows' and orphans' pensions: preliminary visit of controller Mr Keady 
to Ministry of Health Nov. 1934, LA. 87/53(d)
Widows' and orphans' pensions bill 1935: committee stage, I.A. 87/53(a)
Widows' and orphans' pensions act: first official draft, I.A. 87/53(b)
Widows' and orphans' pensions act 1935: committee explanation,
LA. 87/53(c)
National health insurance bill, 1935: amendment to widows' and orphans' 
act 1935,1.A. 88/53(q) - (t)
Widows' and orphans' pensions bill (fifth stage), I.A. 89/53 (m) - (o)
Head of amending bill, widows' and orphans' pensions, 1936,1.A.
89/53(a)
Widows' and orphans' pensions act 1937: bill file, I. A. 89/53
Agency Circular 102 (1937)
Proposed increase in rates of unemployment assistance 1937,
E.B. 215667
Department of External Affairs: International Labour Office, Geneva - 
the world unemployment situation, E.B. 156101
Status of women in Ireland under the laws administered by Department 
of Industry and Commerce 1938, E.B. 224773
Social services in Eire and Northern Ireland: statement by Captain 
Herbert Dixon, 1938-1953, E.B. 228225
Memorandum on Family allowances for agricultural workers and small 
farmers, E.B. 237766
Widows' and orphans' pensions amending bill 1940, I.A. 90/53(a)
Widows' and orphans' pensions bill 1940, I.A. 90/53(b)
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Widows' and orphans' pensions amending bill 1940: second reading,
I.A. 90/53(c) - (e)
Blind pensioners and food schemes 1941-47, E.B. 253406
Memorandum on reciprocal arrangements under the national health 
insurance and widows' and orphans' acts, E.B. 255730
Correspondence on reciprocal agreements between Ireland and Great 
Britain, I.A. 70/53
Financial basis amendment: national health insurance act 1942, I.A. 
91/53(a)
Food voucher scheme, 1942, Local Office Circular 24/42
Proposal by the minister to increase unemployment assistance allowances 
in rural areas to equate roughly to the issue of food vouchers in 
other areas, E.B. 261778
Legislation for contributory social security scheme: progress, I.A. 131/53
Extracts from '40 years after - Pius XI and the social order', I.A. 154/53(j)
Dr Dignan Plan, I.A. 122/53
Children's allowances in other countries, C l79
Social security of migrant workers who are subjects of member states of 
the Council of Europe, C259
International Labour Office: enquiries regarding children's allowances, 
C266
Family allowances: interdepartmental committee, I.A. 129/53(a) - (k)
Children's allowances bill 1943, C2
Schemes for extension of social services of the national health insurance 
society, E.B. 281862
Appointment of referees under section 4: children's allowances act 1944, 
C32
Appointment of investigation officers under section 5: children's 
allowances act 1944, C33
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National health insurance and widows' and orphans’ pensions emergency 
powers orders 381 and 3 8 2 ,1.A. 92/53
Widows' and orphans' pension bill 1945, E.B. 293956
National health insurance act 1946,1. A. 92/53(a)
Great Britain reciprocal arrangements order 1946, Agency Circular 215
Newspaper cuttings on discountenance of food vouchers to applicants 
while in receipt of relief from the mayor's fund 1946, E.B. 294508
Enquiry from Netherlands regarding unemployment insurance,
E.B. 306082
Government Information Bureau, Dublin: request for particulars of social 
services 1946-47, E.B. 294657
Reciprocity talks, Dublin Nov. 1947, Plan 8/48B
Reciprocal arrangements: departmental conference held on 19-21 Nov. 
1947,1.A. 217/53
Acknowledgement of communication received from public, E.B. 155935
Swiss social welfare laws 1948-75, E.B. 311553
Request from M. McLaughlin of the America Legation for information 
regarding social services in this country, 1937, E.B. 215801
Social welfare act 1948: submissions to government, Plan 4/48
Dâil Éireann: brief on social welfare act 1948 (second stage), Plan 5/48
Dâil Éireann: brief on social welfare act 1948 (committee stage), Plan 
6/48
Reciprocal arrangements on sickness and maternity benefits: reports of 
conferences held at London on 7 May 1948 and at Dublin on 4 and 
5 June 1948 and general correspondence relating thereto, Plan 7/48
Reciprocity talks, Dublin, June 1948, Plan 8/48A
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Reciprocity in National Insurance (i) meeting of Minister for Social 
Welfare and Minister for National Insurance; (ii) Discussions 
between officials of both ministries, London 7 - 1 0  May 1948, Plan 
9/48
Social welfare act 1948: bill file, I.A. 94/53
Reciprocal arrangements on unemployment insurance and seamen, Plan 
4/49
Agency Circular 249 (1949)
International Social Security Association 1949, ISSA 1
ILO Committee of Social Security Experts: request for national 
monograph on social security 1949, ISSA 23
Chart for issue to the public giving salient points of social services 1949, 
E.B. 314841
Lectures in U.C.D. on unemployment insurance, unemployment 
assistance, etc., 1949-64, E.B. 316481
Social welfare (insurance) bill 1950, C250
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Social welfare (dissolution of Cumann um Ararchais Nâisiünta ar 
Shlâinte) order, 1950,1.A. 114/53
Social welfare (reciprocal arrangements) act 1948: bill file, I.A. 93/53(a)
Monograph on social security 1951, ISSA 30
ISSA tenth general meeting, Vienna July 1951, ISSA 36
Council of Europe: recommendations relating to the draft European 
convention on reciprocal treatment of national, August 1951,
E .B .327160
Proposals for new legislation compared with standards in international 
conventions: social welfare (insurance) bill 1951, ILO 13
Social welfare (no. 2) bill, 1951: minister's brief for committee state, 
Seanad, I.A. 85/53(a)
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Issue of new insurance cards, 1952, Local Office Circulars 14/52
Social Welfare Act 1952, Local Office Circulars 1/53
Non contributory widows' and orphans' pensions, Plan 3/52
Social welfare act 1952 and social welfare (children's allowances) act 
1952: overlapping benefits, Plan 9/52
Objectives and advanced standards of social security: ILO conference, 
Geneva, 1952, ILO 17
War back: planning for emergency conditions: miscellaneous social 
welfare services. Preparation of 'war book', A.D. 140/53
Royal Netherlands embassy: request for informatiqn regarding scheme 
providing cheap milk to school children in Éire, A.D. 144/53
National insurance fund Northern Ireland: reciprocal arrangements,
AC/S 438/54
Destruction of files 1943-53, AC/S 205/62
National health insurance fund: state grant on benefit and administration 
expenditure, AC/S 54/54
Statistics furnished to the committee on employment and unemployment, 
1940-53, AC/S 33/54
Department of Health: question of instituting national voluntary health 
insurance scheme. Request for observations on draft terms of 
reference of proposed advisory body, I.A. 36/54
Leaflet Social Welfare 3, Local Office Circulars 11/54
Social welfare act 1955, Plan 4/55
ELO European regional conference, Geneva, 1955: age of retirement, ILO 
51(c)
Reciprocal arrangements: fulfilment of contribution conditions for 
qualification certificates by widows and spinsters, A.A. 176/57
Rev. G. B. McConnell, Donore House: copy of resolution passed by the 
Presbytery of Dublin on 2 July 1957, A. A. 581/57
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Unemployment assistance: increases in weekly rates - social welfare act 
1957, A.A. 392/57
Dail Eireann brief on social welfare (children's allowances) act 1957: 
second stage, Plan 5/57
Reciprocal arrangements with Great Britain: observations on draft 
agreement and financial memorandum, Plan 1/58
Social welfare (amendment) act 1958: brief for second stage, Plan 2/58
Representations by P. J. Hillery, T.D., regarding suggestion that
applicants for unemployment assistance be required to perform 
some work such as road work, A.A. 361/58
Special return of persons resident in cities and urban areas who have been 
in receipt of unemployment assistance for eighteen months or over, 
April 1958, A.A. 25258
Employment problems of women workers 1959, OEEC 14
Social welfare act 1959: increases in weekly rates of unemployment 
assistance. Instructions to local officers, A.A. 642/59
Guide to social services, E.B. 255525
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1.1(b) Department of An Taoiseach
(The following Department of Taoiseach files were consulted in the National 
Archives, Dublin. They are arranged by date and are sub-divided into 'S' files and 
cabinet minutes.)
'S' files
Family allowances, cabinet committee, Nov. 1939, S 12117(a)
Family allowances: (a) inter-departmental committee, 1940; (b) 
legislation proposals, S12117(b)
Conditions of economic progress (Colin Clarke): memorandum by 
Minister for Industry and Commerce 1940, S 12070
Social insurance and allied services: the Beveridge report,
S 13053 (a) - (b)
P. S. O Hegarty: press article on social security, S 13186
National Health Insurance: proposals of Most Rev. Dr Dignan, S 13570
Social welfare: schemes and supplements, S 14032(a)
Post-war planning progress reports: Department of Local Government 
and Public Health, S 13527
Planning for post-war situation: Department of Local Government and 
Public Health, S 12887
Post-war white papers on social and economic policy: action taken to 
implement, S 15359.
Department of Social Welfare progress reports 1949-1963, S 15069(a) 
Department of Social Welfare reports 1950/53, S 14936(b)
Social security: international agreements 1952, S 15360(a) - (b)
Guide to the social services: revision 1954, S 15632(a) - (b)
Social welfare benefits: committee of inquiry 1957, S 16233
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Social services: expenditure on and unification. Social welfare
(insurance) bill 1951 and social welfare (amendment) act 1960, S 
13384(a) - (h)
Cabinet Minutes
G2/3 2nd Executive Council C2/1-130 22 Sept. 1923 - 27 June 1924 
G2/9 6th Executive Council C6/1-85 10 March 1932 - 3 Feb. 1933 
G2/10 7th Executive Council C7/1-136 8 Feb. 1933 - 19 Oct. 1934 
G3/8 2nd Government G2/402-449 24 Nov. 1942 - 29 June 1943 
G3/14 5th Government G5/1-83 19 Feb. 1948 - 20 May 1949
1.1(c) Department of Industry and Commerce
(The following Department Industry and Commerce files were consulted in the
National Archives, Dublin. They are arranged by date.)
Ministers and secretaries (amendment) bill 1946: heads of a bill to
provide for the establishment of a Department of Social Services 
and a Department of Health, E 259/46
Correspondence between His Grace Rev. Dr McQuaid, Archbishop of 
Dublin and the minister regarding the staff of the commission on 
youth unemployment, E 209/45
Social security measures: legislation to implement proposals published in 
w hitepaper 1952-1960, E 107/49/1
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1.1(d) Department of Finance
(The following Department of Finance files were consulted in the National Archives, 
Dublin. They are arranged by date.)
Irish Mothers' Pensions Society: resolution urging that question of
mothers' pensions be dealt with by immediate legislation 1925-31, 
F 46/9/25
Resolutions adopted at meetings of unemployed at Wexford 1925,
F 88/53/25
Economic and financial position of Saorstat Éireann, F 200/25/37
Estimates 1925-26: national health insurance commission, F 152/27/24
National health insurance: unification of approved societies. Views of 
societies 1925-1941, F 46/4/25
Provision of employment of any kind in lieu of issue of unemployment 
benefit: resolution of Offaly Joint Committee of Farmers and Civic 
Reform Association 1926, F 88/45/26
Savings and supplementary estimates 1926-27: old age pensions,
F 36/4/27
Revenue commissioners: old age pension committee of inquiry in to 
administration of, F  66/3/24
National health insurance bill 1928, F 46/13/28
National health insurance bill 1929, F 46/2/29
Agency services: procedure to be followed in regard to payment of 
pension through local post offices 1933, F 2/1/33
Industry and commerce: unemployment - reports on position 1934-39,
F 88/6/33
National health insurance: suggested inquiry 1934, F 46/1/24
Office (national health insurance) valuations of approved societies in the 
Saorstat - appointment of valuers from British government 
Actuary's Department, F 2/1/36
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1.2 Wiliam Norton Papers
(The W illiam  Norton Papers are housed in the Labour History M useum, Dublin)
Dail Eireann: brief on vote 57 - children's allowances, Item 32
Estimates 1948/49, notes and statements: vote 66, office of the Minister 
for Social Welfare, Item 33
Estimates 1948/49, notes and statements: vote 67, miscellaneous social 
welfare services, Item 34
The Beveridge Plan, Item 53
British national insurance scheme: leaflets and pamphlets issued by the 
Ministry of National Insurance, Item 54
Memoranda on the means test, Item 55
No title (letter from St Vincent de Paul, St Conleith Conference, 
Newbridge), Item 84
Lectures by Sean MacBride, Item 90
National Health Insurance: basis of valuation, Item 96
Rates of non-contributory pensions under the widows' and orphans' acts, 
Item 97
M ost Rev. Dr Dignan's social services proposals and British social 
insurance plans, Item 104
National scheme of social security: a statement of Labour policy,
Item 106
Comprehensive social welfare scheme, Item 108
Social security bill: letters from Council of Irish Unions, Item 113
Letters regarding white paper on social security, Item 114
Ministerial amendments: notes for minister's brief on committee stage, 
Item 119
324
Department of Social Welfare: incomplete rough draft of white paper, 
Item 120
Irish Labour Party and Trade Union Congress, Item 121 
Unemployment assistance act 1933, Item 122 
Widows' and orphans' pensions bill 1935, Item 131
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1.3 Sean MacEntee Papers
(The Sean M acEntee Papers are deposited in the Archives' Department, University  
C ollege, Dublin.)
National Health Insurance Society: Dr Dignan's Proposals, P67/257
Social services, P67/361
National Health Insurance, P67/258
National Health Insurance, P67/259
Full employment, P67/264
Ministry of Social Affairs, P67/280
U.K. national insurance bill, 1946, P67/283
Confidential letter from Erskine Childers, P67/298
Confidential letter from Erskine Childers, P67/299
General election, 1932, P67/348
General election, 1937, P67/356
General election, 1943, P67/363
By election, 1947, P67/372
Founding of Fianna Fail, general documents, P67/443 
Founding of Fianna Fail, general documents, P67/463 
Saor Eire, P67/545
Material relating to a paper by MacEntee entitled ‘Should Eire plan for 
full employment’, P67/570
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Brophy, Sean Irish social security (Cork, n.d. [c l933])
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1928)
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Family Endowment Society, Family allowances (1938)
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Irish Co-Operative Women's Guild, Rules (Belfast, 1915)
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Labour’s constructive programme (Dublin, 1952)
Lucey, Rev. Cornelius, 'The Beveridge report in Eire', Studies, vol. 32 
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0  Higgins, Kevin How the republic will deal with poverty (election 
handbill, 1924)
O Higgins, T. Facts fo r  intelligent voters (election handbill, 1929)
Quadragesimo Anno Encyclical of Pope Pius XI on reconstruction of the 
social order, 15 May 1931
Rathbone, Eleanor Case for family endowment (London, 1940)
The case fo r  the immediate introduction o f a system o f family 
allowances (London, 1940)
The disinherited family (n.d.)
Rerum Novarum  Encyclical of Pope Leo XIII on capital and labour, 15 
May 1891
Robinson, Henry Memories: wise and otherwise (London, 1923)
Further memories o f Irish life (London, 1924)
St Vincent de Paul Society, Manual (Dublin, 1935)
Sinn Fein Economic programme (n.d.)
The economic programme o f Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924)
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Traynor, Oscar Election handbill (n.d., [1937])
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1.6(a) Official Publications, British Government
Annual report o f the local government board fo r  Ireland fo r  the year 
ended 31 March 1909 (1909, Cmd. 4630, xxxviii)
Beveridge, Sir William Social insurance and allied services (Great 
Britain, 1942)
Poor Law Reports, First report from  His Majesty's Commissioners fo r  
Inquiry into the Condition o f the Poorer Classes in Ireland (1835, 
Cmd. 369, xxxii)
Third report o f the Commissioners fo r  Inquiry into the Condition 
o f the Poorer Classes in Ireland (1836, Cmd. 43, xxx)
Report o f  the Vice-Regal Commission on Poor Law Reform in 
Ireland vol. 1 (1906, Cmd. 3202, 349)
Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and Relief o f Distress: 
Report on Ireland (1909, Cmd. 4630, xxxviii)
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1.6 (b) Official Publications, Irish Government
Mointuairisc an chedd Dala, 1919-21
Ddil Debates vol. 1, 1922 - vol. 179, 1959
Census o f  population o f  Ireland, 1936, 1946, 1951, 1956, 1961
Committee of Inquiry into Health Insurance and Medical Services, 
Interim report (Dublin, 1925)
Appendices to the interim report (Dublin, 1925)
First report (Dublin, 1927)
Committee of Inquiry into Old Age Pensions, Report (Dublin, 1926)
Commission on the Relief of the Sick and Destitute Poor including the 
Insane Poor, Report (Dublin, 1927)
Committee of Inquiry into Widows' and Orphans' Pensions, Reports 
(Dublin, 1935)
Commission on Vocational Organisation, Report (Dublin, 1943)
Commission on Workmen's Compensation, Report (Dublin, 1962)
Commission on Social Welfare, Report (Dublin, 1986)
Department of Finance, Reports on the cost o f living (1922-1925)
Report on the cost o f living in Ireland (Dublin, 1922)
Department of Industry and Commerce, Memorandum on the trend o f  
employment and unemployment in the Saorstdt (Dublin, 1935)
The trend o f employment and unemployment 1939-1940 (Dublin, 
1941)
Statistical Abstract, 1931-61 
Trend o f employment, 1935 - 1959
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Some statistics on wages and hours o f work (Dublin, 1938)
Some statistics on wages and hours o f work (Dublin, 1948)
Department of Local Government and Public Health, Reports, 1922-48
Report on the administration o f national health insurance (Dublin, 
1928)
Department of Social Welfare, Guide to the social insurance regulations 
(Dublin, 1955)
Reports, 1947-1962
White paper containing government proposals fo r  social security 
(Dublin, 1949)
Guide to social services: a summary designed fo r  the information 
o f individuals and groups (Dublin, 1953)
1.6(c) Other Official Publications
Council of Europe, Text o f the draft European social charter established 
by the social committee o f the Council o f Europe (Strasbourg, 
1958)
International Labour Conference, Objectives and advanced standards o f 
social security (Geneva, 1952)
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